The private returns to public office

• Autores: Raymond Fisman, Florian Schulz, Vikrant Vig
• Localización: Journal of Political Economy, ISSN-e 1537-534X, Vol. 122, Nº. 4, 2014, págs. 806-862
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We study the wealth accumulation of Indian state politicians using public disclosures required of all candidates. The annual asset growth of winners is 3�5 percent higher than that of runners-up, a difference that holds also in a set of close elections. The relative asset growth of winners is greater in more corrupt states and for those holding ministerial positions. These results are consistent with a rent-seeking explanation for the relatively high rate of growth in winners� assets.