Aecting Reelection Probability through Tax-price

• Autores: María Socorro Puy Segura
• Localización: XVIII Encuentro de economía pública, 2011
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • The evaluation of voters over candidates that compete for o¢ ce can be distorted by the political decisions of an incumbent government. In this paper we analyze, from a theoretical viewpoint, how the likelihood of reelection can be in.uenced by tax reforms a¤ecting the set of swing voters. We consider a two-party system in a two-period model. We .nd that government persuades voters by modifying the progressive of the tax scheme. We show that when the opponent internalizes this persuasive e¤ects, the party in o¢ ce reduces the electoral use of tax reforms.