An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit

• Autores: Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños Cid, Alejandro Neme, Jordi Massó
• Localización: Working paper series ( RGEA ), Nº. 5, 2004
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose, with a voting by committees, a subset of new members from a given set of candidates. After knowing the elected candidates, former members may reconsider their membership in the society by either staying or exiting. We analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the elected candidates, but also on the final composition of the society. For a restricted domain (additive and monotonic preference profiles with dichotomous bads) we construct a (voting) strategy profile that is an undominated Nash equilibrium of the induced voting game.