- University of Murcia, Dept. of Philosophy, Graduate Studentadd
- I'm a PhD student in the field of Philosophy of Science. In particular I'm focused on Metaphysics of Biology. I'm cur... moreI'm a PhD student in the field of Philosophy of Science. In particular I'm focused on Metaphysics of Biology. I'm currently working on the notion of emergence trying to apply the concept to some biological properties such as fitness and evolvability. I'm also interested on evolution and persistence of species.edit
Holobionts: Ecological communities, hybrids, or biological individuals? A metaphysical perspective on multispecies systems Highlights-The eco-immunity account of the holobiont asserts that holobionts are hybrids and not biological... more
Holobionts: Ecological communities, hybrids, or biological individuals? A metaphysical perspective on multispecies systems Highlights-The eco-immunity account of the holobiont asserts that holobionts are hybrids and not biological individuals on the basis that the microbiota is not a proper part of the holobiont.-We use the tools of contemporary analytical metaphysics to show that the notion of parthood assumed under the eco-immunity account does not exclude the resident microbiota as being a proper part of the holobiont.-We argue that the eco-immunity account entails that the holobiont is a biological individual.-Overall, we show that contemporary debates about biological individuality should be assisted with the tools of analytical metaphysics to properly investigate the assumptions and implications that follow from different biological theories.
Contemporary biological research has suggested that some host-microbiome multispecies systems (referred to as "holobionts") can in certain circumstances evolve as unique biological individual, thus being a unit of selection in evolution.... more
Contemporary biological research has suggested that some host-microbiome multispecies systems (referred to as "holobionts") can in certain circumstances evolve as unique biological individual, thus being a unit of selection in evolution. If this is so, then it is arguably the case that some biological adaptations have evolved at the level of the multispecies system, what we call hologenomic adaptations. However, no research has yet been devoted to investigating their nature, or how these adaptations can be distinguished from adaptations at the species-level (genomic adaptations). In this paper, we cover this gap by investigating the nature of hologenomic adaptations. By drawing on the case of the evolution of sanguivory diet in vampire bats, we argue that a trait constitutes a hologenomic adaptation when its evolution can only be explained if the holobiont is considered the biological individual that manifests this adaptation, while the bacterial taxa that bear the trait are only opportunistic beneficiaries of it. We then use the philosophical notions of emergence and inter-identity to explain the nature of this form of individuality and argue why it is special of holobionts. Overall, our paper illustrates how the use of philosophical concepts can illuminate scientific discussions, in the trend of what has recently been called metaphysics of biology.
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FORTHCOMING IN REVISTA PORTUGUESA DE FILOSOFÍA (RPF) In this paper we revise a recent debate on the metaphysics of evolution pertaining to both the persistence and change of biological species, and the speciesasindividuals thesis. We... more
FORTHCOMING IN REVISTA PORTUGUESA DE FILOSOFÍA (RPF)
In this paper we revise a recent debate on the metaphysics of evolution pertaining to both the persistence and change of biological species, and the speciesasindividuals thesis. We focus on Thomas Reydon’s proposal that, in biology, the term “species” refers to two different biological entities, which he calls evolverons and phylons, and plays different epistemological roles in at least two different disciplines in which it is used, namely, evolutionary and systematic biology. In particular, we critically revise Reydon’s claim that these two biological entities raise a problem for the thesis of the equivalence between the two theories of persistence developed in contemporary analytic metaphysics: threedimensionalism (3D) and fourdimensionalism (4D). In this paper, we aim to reinstate the thesis of metaphysical equivalence by a threefold strategy: motivation of the idea that evolverons and phylons are two dimensions of the same entity, shifting to a less problematic notion of endurance (3D persistence), and an exploration of doubts about the particular biological examples upon which Reydon bases his arguments.
In this paper we revise a recent debate on the metaphysics of evolution pertaining to both the persistence and change of biological species, and the speciesasindividuals thesis. We focus on Thomas Reydon’s proposal that, in biology, the term “species” refers to two different biological entities, which he calls evolverons and phylons, and plays different epistemological roles in at least two different disciplines in which it is used, namely, evolutionary and systematic biology. In particular, we critically revise Reydon’s claim that these two biological entities raise a problem for the thesis of the equivalence between the two theories of persistence developed in contemporary analytic metaphysics: threedimensionalism (3D) and fourdimensionalism (4D). In this paper, we aim to reinstate the thesis of metaphysical equivalence by a threefold strategy: motivation of the idea that evolverons and phylons are two dimensions of the same entity, shifting to a less problematic notion of endurance (3D persistence), and an exploration of doubts about the particular biological examples upon which Reydon bases his arguments.
Research Interests:
Holobionts are symbiotic assemblages composed by a host plus its microbiome. The status of holobionts as individuals has recently been a subject of continuous controversy, which has given rise to two main positions: on the one hand,... more
Holobionts are symbiotic assemblages composed by a host plus its microbiome. The status of holobionts as individuals has recently been a subject of continuous controversy, which has given rise to two main positions: on the one hand, holobiont advocates argue that holobionts are biological individuals; on the other, holobiont detractors argue that they are just mere chimeras or ecological communities, but not individuals. Both parties in the dispute develop their arguments from the framework of the philosophy of biology, in terms of what it takes for a “conglomerate” to be considered an interesting individual from a biological point of view. However, the debates about holobiont individuality have important ontological implications that have remained vaguely explored from a metaphysical framework. The purpose of this paper is to cover that gap by presenting a metaphysical approach to holobionts individuality. Drawing upon a conception of natural selection that puts the focus on the transgenerational recurrence of the traits and that supports the thesis that holobionts are units of selection, we argue that holobionts bear emergent traits and exert downward powers over the entities that compose them. In this vein, we argue, a reasonable argument can be made for conceiving holobionts as emergent biological individuals.
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The notion of fitness is usually equated to reproductive success. However, this actualist approach presents some difficulties such as the problem of explanatory circularity. In order to overcome such difficulties, philosophers of biology... more
The notion of fitness is usually equated to reproductive success. However, this actualist approach presents some difficulties such as the problem of explanatory circularity. In order to overcome such difficulties, philosophers of biology have offered alternative definitions in which fitness and reproductive success are distinguished. We will argue that none of these alternatives is satisfactory and, inspired by Mumford and Anjum's dispositional theory of causation, we offer a definition of fitness as a causally emergent dispositional property. We claim that a causal dispositional theory of fitness allows to overcome some of the problems of the current definitions of fitness. In particular, our definition of fitness accounts for some distinctive traits of biological phenomena (namely, the complexity of biological entities, the emergent character of many organic phenomena and developmental changes to biological organization) that the physicsoriented debate on dispositions has so far not dealt with.
Research Interests: Dispositions and Fitness
En el IX Congreso de la SLMFCE la filosofía de la biología, y en general aspectos filosóficos de las ciencias de la vida, tuvieron una notable representación. En concreto, tuvieron lugar un total de dieciocho intervenciones centradas en... more
En el IX Congreso de la SLMFCE la filosofía de la biología, y en general aspectos filosóficos de las ciencias de la vida, tuvieron una notable representación. En concreto, tuvieron lugar un total de dieciocho intervenciones centradas en cuestiones biológicas muy diversas, como puede ser la definición del concepto de vida, el estudio de criterios para determinar la identidad biológica, o el reduccionismo en biología molecular. Además de estas intervenciones, la segunda jornada del Congreso, miércoles 14 de noviembre, acogió dos simposios dedicados a la presentación de trabajos y cuestiones actuales de la filosofía de la biología.