- UNED, Edif. Humanidades, Paseo de Senda del Rey s/n, 28040 Madrid, Spain
- Lines of research: Philosophy of Language, Pragmatics of Language, Argumentationedit
What type of speech act is a norm of action, when the norm is agreed upon as the conclusion of an argumentative dialogue? My hypothesis is that, whenever a norm of action is the conclusion of an argument, it should be analyzed as the... more
What type of speech act is a norm of action, when the norm is agreed upon as the conclusion of an argumentative dialogue? My hypothesis is that, whenever a norm of action is the conclusion of an argument, it should be analyzed as the statement of a norm and thus as a verdictive speech act. If the context is appropriate, and the interlocutors are sincerely (or institutionally) committed to their argumentative exchange and its conclusion, then this verdictive motivates and institutes a new one with the force of an exercitive. The interlocutors’ recognition and acceptance that the new illocution has been performed lends the norm its exercitive force.
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What type of speech act is a norm of action, when the norm is agreed upon as the conclusion of an argumentative dialogue? My hypothesis is that, whenever a norm of action is the conclusion of an argument, it should be analyzed as the... more
What type of speech act is a norm of action, when the norm is agreed upon as the conclusion of an argumentative dialogue? My hypothesis is that, whenever a norm of action is the conclusion of an argument, it should be analyzed as the statement of a norm and thus as a verdictive speech act. If the context is appropriate, and the interlocutors are sincerely (or institutionally) committed to their argumentative exchange and its conclusion, then this verdictive motivates and institutes a new one with the force of an exercitive. The interlocutors’ recognition and acceptance that the new illocution has been performed lends the norm its exercitive force.
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S U M M A R Y : Within the Gricean framework in pragmatics, communication is understood as an inferential activity. Other approaches to the study of linguistic communication have contended that language is argumentative in some essential... more
S U M M A R Y : Within the Gricean framework in pragmatics, communication is understood as an inferential activity. Other approaches to the study of linguistic communication have contended that language is argumentative in some essential sense. My aim is to study the question of whether and how the practices of inferring and arguing can be taken to contribute to meaning in linguistic communication. I shall suggest a two-fold hypothesis. First, what makes of communication an inferential activity is given with its calculability, i.e. with the possibility to rationally recover the assigned meaning by means of an explicit inference. Secondly, the normative positions that we recognize and assign each other with our speech acts comprise obligations and rights of a dialectical character; but this fact does not entail nor presuppose an argumentative nature in language or speech. Both inferring and arguing are needed, however, in the activity of justifying and assessing our speech acts.
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M. Lewinski y D. Mohammed (eds.) (2015) Argumentation in Political Deliberation. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 178 pp. [ISBN: 978-90-272-4264-8 (hb), 978-90-272-6827-3 (e-book)]
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This paper endorses a view of argumentation and arguments that relates both to a special type of speech action, namely, the performance of speech acts of arguing. Its aim is to advance an analysis of those acts that takes into account two... more
This paper endorses a view of argumentation and arguments that relates both to a special type of speech action, namely, the performance of speech acts of arguing. Its aim is to advance an analysis of those acts that takes into account two kinds of norms related to their correct performance, namely, felicity conditions and objective requirements related to the “correspondence with the facts.” It assumes that the requirement that certain objective conditions be satisfied is among the set of felicity conditions of speech acts of arguing. Taking this into account helps clarify the position and role of warrants in the performance and assessment of these acts.
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The aim of this paper is to explore the viability of accounting for presumptions as a subtype of verdictives, within the framework of the Austinian approach to speech acts. The available set of felicity conditions is examined and worked... more
The aim of this paper is to explore the viability of accounting for presumptions as a subtype of verdictives, within the framework of the Austinian approach to speech acts. The available set of felicity conditions is examined and worked out, in order to try and account in particular for a main feature of presumptions, namely, their function in shifting the burden of proof. In order to extend the Austinian framework as required, the notion of pragmatic presupposition accommodation is shown to be a useful device.
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Información del artículo Riesgos y oportunidades para la defensa de los derechos humanos: la experiencia de Amnistía Internacional.
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Discursive theories of justice have been questioned for putting forward high-level principles that should nevertheless play a role in practical discourses in which the justice of a claim is at stake. Here, I will critically examine and... more
Discursive theories of justice have been questioned for putting forward high-level principles that should nevertheless play a role in practical discourses in which the justice of a claim is at stake. Here, I will critically examine and systematize the main tenets in Rawls’s and Habermas’s discursive theories, and will suggest that the principles of justice (Rawls) and universalization (Habermas) can and play the role of mandates of optimalization in real deliberations on justice.
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Goodwin and Innocenti (2016) have contended that giving reasons may be a form of enactment, where a claim is supported by the very activity of making the claim. In my view, the kind of interaction that these authors are considering should... more
Goodwin and Innocenti (2016) have contended that giving reasons may be a form of enactment, where a claim is supported by the very activity of making the claim. In my view, the kind of interaction that these authors are considering should be analysed as a form of advocacy, and therefore as an exercitive speech act. In this paper I will suggest that acts of advocating, qua illocutions, institute a normative framework where the speaker’s obligation to justify cannot be redeemed by a mere “making reasons apparent”. In general, giving reasons is part of the procedure in virtue of which the advocate’s authority to exert influence is recognised by their addressees. This illocutionary effect should be distinguished from other perlocutionary consequences.
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In this paper, some attempts to ground human rights are examined. Toulmin’s schema is applied as an analytical tool in order to make explicit not only the structure but also the function accomplished by the arguments. After a presentation... more
In this paper, some attempts to ground human rights are examined. Toulmin’s schema is applied as an analytical tool in order to make explicit not only the structure but also the function accomplished by the arguments. After a presentation of the two main grounding approaches, namely, the moral view and the political view on human rights, it is contended that the proposals within the framework of the political view are in a better position to yield a response, in terms of an argumentative procedure able to determine the rights framework. A critical assessment of two very influential accounts (those by Rawls and Habermas) identifies some relevant conditions of rebuttal against both. Notwithstanding this, finally, the worth of an argumentative procedure in line with the political view is here vindicated as a means to solve problems relating to human rights.
En las páginas introductorias del compendio de ensayos ¿Debemos querer decir lo que decimos? (primera edición), Stanley Cavell destaca su deuda con Thompson Clarke por haberle enseñado a entender la epistemología tradicional y, en... more
En las páginas introductorias del compendio de ensayos ¿Debemos querer decir lo que decimos? (primera edición), Stanley Cavell destaca su deuda con Thompson Clarke por haberle enseñado a entender la epistemología tradicional y, en particular, el escepticismo. Recuerda también que junto a Clarke impartió, entre 1959 y 1960, un seminario sobre las Investigaciones Filosóficas de Wittgenstein. Su defensa de la filosofía del lenguaje ordinario, la profunda influencia de su estudio del último Wittgenstein, y su aproximación al escepticismo como forma de estar en el mundo, recorren la filosofía y la obra de Cavell y se encuentran muy presentes en el conjunto de escritos que componen el volumen que ahora reseñamos. Puede afirmarse que el conjunto de estos diez trabajos, escritos entre 1958 y 1969, muestran ya con claridad la posición filosófica de Cavell y su personal estilo de escritura, lo que en su caso equivale a decir su personal estilo de pensamiento.
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This paper endorses a view of argumentation and arguments that relates both to a special type of speech action, namely, the performance of speech acts of arguing. Its aim is to advance an analysis of those acts that takes into account two... more
This paper endorses a view of argumentation and arguments that relates both to a special type of speech action, namely, the performance of speech acts of arguing. Its aim is to advance an analysis of those acts that takes into account two kinds of norms related to their correct performance, namely, felicity conditions and objective requirements related to the “correspondence with the facts.” It assumes that the requirement that certain objective conditions be satisfied is among the set of felicity conditions of speech acts of arguing. Taking this into account helps clarify the position and role of warrants in the performance and assessment of these acts.
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The aim of this paper is to study the role that dissent may have in public political deliberation in democratic societies. Out of argumentative settings, dissent would seem to have a disruptive effect. In my view, dissension effectively... more
The aim of this paper is to study the role that dissent may have in public political deliberation in democratic societies. Out of argumentative settings, dissent would seem to have a disruptive effect. In my view, dissension effectively puts into question the political authority's hypothetical legitimacy. To the extent that this is so, acts of dissent have illocutionary force and give rise to certain changes in the dialectical duties and rights of the participants.
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The aim of this paper is to offer an account of deliberative dialogues within the framework of an Austinian speech act theory. My analysis focuses on a characteristic aspect of deliberative dialogues, namely, turn-taking organization,... more
The aim of this paper is to offer an account of deliberative dialogues within the framework of an Austinian speech act theory. My analysis focuses on a characteristic aspect of deliberative dialogues, namely, turn-taking organization, with the aim of throwing some light on their interactional dynamics as a basis for collective action. The exploration tries to approach the issue by suggesting how and to what extent deliberation, as a dialogical argumentative practice, can be accounted for with the tools of speech act theory.
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Goodwin and Innocenti (2016) have contended that giving reasons may be a form of enactment, where a claim is supported by the very activity of making the claim. In my view, the kind of interaction that these authors are considering should... more
Goodwin and Innocenti (2016) have contended that giving reasons may be a form of
enactment, where a claim is supported by the very activity of making the claim. In my view,
the kind of interaction that these authors are considering should be analysed as a form of
advocacy, and therefore as an exercitive speech act. In this paper I will suggest that acts of
advocating, qua illocutions, institute a normative framework where the speaker’s obligation
to justify cannot be redeemed by a mere “making reasons apparent”. In general, giving
reasons is part of the procedure in virtue of which the advocate’s authority to exert influence
is recognised by their addressees. This illocutionary effect should be distinguished from
other perlocutionary consequences.
enactment, where a claim is supported by the very activity of making the claim. In my view,
the kind of interaction that these authors are considering should be analysed as a form of
advocacy, and therefore as an exercitive speech act. In this paper I will suggest that acts of
advocating, qua illocutions, institute a normative framework where the speaker’s obligation
to justify cannot be redeemed by a mere “making reasons apparent”. In general, giving
reasons is part of the procedure in virtue of which the advocate’s authority to exert influence
is recognised by their addressees. This illocutionary effect should be distinguished from
other perlocutionary consequences.
Research Interests:
Discursive theories of justice have been questioned for putting forward high-level principles that should nevertheless play a role in practical discourses in which the justice of a claim is at stake. Here, I will critically examine and... more
Discursive theories of justice have been questioned for putting forward high-level principles that should nevertheless play a role in practical discourses in which the justice of a claim is at stake. Here, I will critically examine and systematize the main tenets in Rawl’s and Habermas’s discursive theories, and will suggest that the principles of justice (Rawls) and universalization (Habermas) can and play the role of mandates of optimalization in real deliberations on justice.
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El objetivo de esta contribución es llevar a cabo un estudio comparativo y analítico de algunos planteamientos centrales en la pragmática del lenguaje contemporánea y, en particular, su tratamiento de la noción de acto de habla, centrando... more
El objetivo de esta contribución es llevar a cabo un estudio comparativo y analítico de algunos planteamientos centrales en la pragmática del lenguaje contemporánea y, en particular, su tratamiento de la noción de acto de habla, centrando la atención en el modo en que resulta así iluminada la interacción comunicativa. Como punto de partida, comenzaremos presentando las posiciones históricas fundamentales de Austin y Grice, para, después de considerar la propuesta especialmente relevante de Searle, caracterizar dos grandes aproximaciones al análisis del acto de habla. Para la aproximación intencionalista, el acto ilocutivo está determinado por las intenciones comunicativas de la persona hablante, y el éxito comunicativo se logra cuando el auditorio es capaz de aprehender esas intenciones. Para la aproximación convencionalista, en la caracterización que aquí se va a presentar, la fuerza ilocutiva de un acto de habla ha de aclararse atendiendo al modo en que ese acto da lugar a un efecto convencional en el mundo social e interpersonal de las personas interlocutoras. Aquí se defiende que es la aproximación convencionalista la que mejor puede explicar el carácter intrínsecamente normativo de la interacción mediante el habla.
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The aim of this contribution is to study the role of argumentation within deliberation. With that aim in view, I will examine the Deliberation Dialogue Model set forth by McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons (2017). Taking as a point of... more
The aim of this contribution is to study the role of argumentation within deliberation. With that aim in view, I will examine the Deliberation Dialogue Model set forth by McBurney, Hitchcock and Parsons (2017). Taking as a point of departure an interactional approach to speech acts, I will contend that the model presents some difficulties in accounting for acts of arguing. I will conclude with some reflections on the role of argumentation in deliberation dialogues.
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The aim of this paper is to explore the viability of accounting for presumptions as a subtype of verdictives, within the framework of the Austinian approach to speech acts. The available set of felicity conditions is examined and worked... more
The aim of this paper is to explore the viability of accounting for presumptions as a subtype of verdictives, within the framework of the Austinian approach to speech acts. The available set of felicity conditions is examined and worked out, in order to try and account in particular for a main feature of presumptions, namely, their function in shifting the burden of proof. In order to extend the Austinian framework as required, the notion of pragmatic presupposition accommodation is shown to be a useful device.
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In deliberation, the participants' goal is to reach a common conclusion on the best available course of action. The aim of this contribution is to study some deontic aspects that characterize deliberative dialogues as a dialogical (and... more
In deliberation, the participants' goal is to reach a common conclusion on the best available course of action. The aim of this contribution is to study some deontic aspects that characterize deliberative dialogues as a dialogical (and dialectical) practice. In particular, my exploration is an attempt to consider the way in which deliberation dialogues are structured by virtue of the obligations (commitments, duties) and rights (entitlements, authorizations) that participants assign and recognize each other, on the basis of their performed speech acts. Taking a point of departure in the Austinian approach to speech acts, I will contend that these normative positions, mutually recognized, contribute to determine the illocutionary effect of the utterances and thus the particular speech acts performed in the dialogue. Before that, I will suggest that the proposed claim put forward in a deliberative dialogue can be seen as a verdictive speech act, in that a proposal issues a practical judgement and commits the proponent to giving reasons in support of it. Moreover, whenever an agreement is reached on a proposed claim for action, a new exercitive speech act can be said to have been instituted in which the participants' joint commitment not only concerns the proposal agreed upon, but also the reasons given and the inferential license that connects both.
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The aim of this paper is to examine some recent accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of pejorative names and suggest that a normative approach in line with interactional pragmatics can help provide a complete account of some phenomena... more
The aim of this paper is to examine some recent accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of pejorative names and suggest that a normative approach in line with interactional pragmatics can help provide a complete account of some phenomena related to their use. One seemingly common idea in the theoretical treatment of pejoratives is that they have, together with a semantic level of descriptive meaning, a pragmatic level of evaluative meaning, where the latter is viewed as dependent on the expression of a (negative) attitude. My contention is that, in order to adequately account for the paradigmatic derogatory effect of pejoratives, the social setting of institutions and practices that give support to such derogation have to be seen as not only instituting, but also partially instituted by such language use.
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Research Interests: Communication, Pragmatics, Linguistics, Rationality, Action, and 3 moreInstrumentalism, Threat, and Theoria
Research Interests: Philosophy and Isegoria
Research Interests: Philosophy and Daimon
El artículo pretende ser una contribución al dialogo crítico que el libro de C. Lafont ha abierto entre dos concepciones del lenguaje y de la racionalidad que habitualmente se consideran muy distintas. Se trata, de una parte, de la... more
El artículo pretende ser una contribución al dialogo crítico que el libro de C. Lafont ha abierto entre dos concepciones del lenguaje y de la racionalidad que habitualmente se consideran muy distintas. Se trata, de una parte, de la tradición analítica anglosajona a la que pertenece la teoría de la referencia directa de H. Putnam, y de otra parte de la pragmática filosófica del lenguaje alemana según el último desarrollo de J. Habermas.
In a recent paper by Kauffeld and Goodwin (2022; see also Kauffeld, 1994, 1998, 2009), the authors argue in favor of a pragmatic view of illocutionary acts, according to which those acts are constituted by paradigmatic practical... more
In a recent paper by Kauffeld and Goodwin (2022; see also Kauffeld, 1994, 1998, 2009), the authors argue in favor of a pragmatic view of illocutionary acts, according to which those acts are constituted by paradigmatic practical calculations that can be modeled in agreement with Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning. This view is contrasted with the rule-constituted view (that they attribute to both Austin and Searle). Moreover, Kauffeld and Goodwin contend that the superiority of the pragmatic approach they favor is highlighted when the task is to understand the origins of some of the responsibilities that are incurred by arguers, together with the practical value of fulfilling those argumentative responsibilities.
Focusing on the speech act of accusing, the paper makes a decided case for the thesis that two conditions are conceptually necessary and sufficient to make an accusation, to wit, (i) an accusation-making statement expressing the accuser’s implied negative evaluation, and (ii) the intention with which the accuser openly speaks. Many of the details in their analysis are insightful and help to clarify the complex responsibilities (and other normative stances) that accuser and accused incur in the interaction. However, the analysis presupposes that the speech act creates not only a certain responsibility that the accuser is willing to endorse but certain corresponding responsibilities and entitlements from the accused. In my light, the latter cannot be seen as merely intended by the accuser, but can only be accounted for if the speech act of accusing is understood as a conventional act.
Focusing on the speech act of accusing, the paper makes a decided case for the thesis that two conditions are conceptually necessary and sufficient to make an accusation, to wit, (i) an accusation-making statement expressing the accuser’s implied negative evaluation, and (ii) the intention with which the accuser openly speaks. Many of the details in their analysis are insightful and help to clarify the complex responsibilities (and other normative stances) that accuser and accused incur in the interaction. However, the analysis presupposes that the speech act creates not only a certain responsibility that the accuser is willing to endorse but certain corresponding responsibilities and entitlements from the accused. In my light, the latter cannot be seen as merely intended by the accuser, but can only be accounted for if the speech act of accusing is understood as a conventional act.
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Can a norm of action be the conclusion of an argumentative dialogue? My hypothesis is that, whenever a norm of action is the conclusion of an argument, it should be analyzed as the statement of a norm and thus as a verdictive speech act.... more
Can a norm of action be the conclusion of an argumentative dialogue? My hypothesis is that, whenever a norm of action is the conclusion of an argument, it should be analyzed as the statement of a norm and thus as a verdictive speech act. If the context is the appropriate, and the interlocutors are sincerely (or institutionally) committed to their argumentative exchange and its conclusion, then this verdictive motivates and institutes a new one with the force of an exercitive. The interlocutors' recognition and acceptance that the new illocution has been performed lends the norm its exercitive force.
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My interest lies on studying the way in which an illocutionary speech act can give way to a different illocution, whether or not it is the same speaker who is performing it. I am particularly interested in what happens within the... more
My interest lies on studying the way in which an illocutionary speech act can give way to a different illocution, whether or not it is the same speaker who is performing it. I am particularly interested in what happens within the framework of deliberation, in deliberative dialogues where a proposal for action is put forward with the status of a verdictive speech act, of a judgement which is subject to critical assessment and further justification. If and when the deliberative dialogue is closed with an agreement, the former verdictive becomes a commissive, at least to the extent that the participants agree on carrying it out. I want to explore how this relation between two speech acts, two illocutions can be established and brought into force.
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My contribution focuses on subordinating speech, understood as a type of communicative action that incites and promotes discrimination, hatred and violence. My aim is to critically examine the thesis according to which (an act of)... more
My contribution focuses on subordinating speech, understood as a type of communicative action that incites and promotes discrimination, hatred and violence. My aim is to critically examine the thesis according to which (an act of) subordinating speech can be seen as an illocution in Austin (1962)’s terms.
My intuition is that subordinating speech cannot be generally seen as a correctly performed illocutionary act. Instead, my contention will be that some relevant cases of subordinating speech should be seen as a type of abuse in Austin’s original sense.
My intuition is that subordinating speech cannot be generally seen as a correctly performed illocutionary act. Instead, my contention will be that some relevant cases of subordinating speech should be seen as a type of abuse in Austin’s original sense.
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The aim of this paper is to consider how genuine agreement on normative statements is in principle possible. Normative statements are the conclusion of normative arguments, i.e., arguments that are based on norms or rules. The most... more
The aim of this paper is to consider how genuine agreement on normative statements is in principle possible. Normative statements are the conclusion of normative arguments, i.e., arguments that are based on norms or rules. The most characterizing feature in these arguments is that their warrant (in Toulmin 1958’s sense) is a norm or rule and their conclusion is a recommendation, prescription or practical assessment, what in the literature has been termed a practical ought-statement. The schematic form of these arguments can be reconstructed as follows: (D)The considered case is a case of S, therefore (C)One ought to do a, because (W)In cases such as S, one ought to do a. This type of argument figures prominently in deliberation, where what is at stake is a decision concerning the best course of action. In those situations, one may assume that the relationship among participants is collaborative, and that the goal of any participant is to coordinate goals and actions (cf. Krabbe and Walton 1995, Walton 2006) Yet, in order for the participants to reach a common decision, their agreeing in (C) depends on their common endorsement of (W).
Ought-statements such as (W) are normative claims that embed a deontic modal verb. From a standard semantic point of view (Kratzer 1991, Dowell 2013), modal expressions like ‘ought’ and ‘might’ are analysed as second-order expressions that quantify over possibilities and where the domains of quantification are contextually restricted. Here, the evaluation of the deontic modal and henceforth the semantic correctness of the corresponding statement embedding it depend on a contextually determined standard that can, and usually will vary across speakers and their different ideological frameworks. Moreover, the introduction of such a standard is usually seen as depending on the speaker’s communicative intentions. Other theoretical proposals (e.g. MacFarlane 2014’s relativism, and Stanley 2002’s indexicalism) yield similar results in what concerns the possibility of reaching an agreement on practical ought-statements (e.g., the evaluation depends on a context of assessment, or on the contextual assignment of a value to an index.) This makes difficult to explain how arguing about such normative statements can make sense, unless the participants share in advance the relevant standard from which the ought-statement is to be evaluated.
My suggestion is that, in order to give an account of processes of deliberation in which an agreement about normative statements such as (C) and (W) is at stake, we need a notion of assessment for deontic modals that is not contextually restricted in the ways considered above. For that, I will draw on Gauker 1997’s notion of cooperative domain of discourse (as based on reasonable mutual expectations of both speaker and hearer with respect to the meaning of the statement at issue) and an Austinian view of speech acts.
Ought-statements such as (W) are normative claims that embed a deontic modal verb. From a standard semantic point of view (Kratzer 1991, Dowell 2013), modal expressions like ‘ought’ and ‘might’ are analysed as second-order expressions that quantify over possibilities and where the domains of quantification are contextually restricted. Here, the evaluation of the deontic modal and henceforth the semantic correctness of the corresponding statement embedding it depend on a contextually determined standard that can, and usually will vary across speakers and their different ideological frameworks. Moreover, the introduction of such a standard is usually seen as depending on the speaker’s communicative intentions. Other theoretical proposals (e.g. MacFarlane 2014’s relativism, and Stanley 2002’s indexicalism) yield similar results in what concerns the possibility of reaching an agreement on practical ought-statements (e.g., the evaluation depends on a context of assessment, or on the contextual assignment of a value to an index.) This makes difficult to explain how arguing about such normative statements can make sense, unless the participants share in advance the relevant standard from which the ought-statement is to be evaluated.
My suggestion is that, in order to give an account of processes of deliberation in which an agreement about normative statements such as (C) and (W) is at stake, we need a notion of assessment for deontic modals that is not contextually restricted in the ways considered above. For that, I will draw on Gauker 1997’s notion of cooperative domain of discourse (as based on reasonable mutual expectations of both speaker and hearer with respect to the meaning of the statement at issue) and an Austinian view of speech acts.
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La doctrina internacional sobre la igualdad de género ha avanzado de forma consistente en las dos últimas décadas, siendo la cultura uno de los terrenos más destacados de esa lucha por el desarrollo integral. Sin embargo, en España los... more
La doctrina internacional sobre la igualdad de género ha avanzado de forma consistente en las dos últimas décadas, siendo la cultura uno de los terrenos más destacados de esa lucha por el desarrollo integral. Sin embargo, en España los avances legislativos y políticos fueron tardíos y breves, con estancamientos y retrocesos notables durante la crisis. La igualdad de género en la cultura, en la creación cultural en primer lugar, sin la cual la diversidad es imposible, se revela así como uno de los campos de batalla vitales para el futuro próximo.
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Stanley Cavell, ¿Debemos querer decir lo que decimos? Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2018. Traducción de Diego Ribes Nicolás. En las páginas introductorias del compendio de ensayos ¿Debemos querer decir lo que decimos?... more
Stanley Cavell, ¿Debemos querer decir lo que decimos? Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2018. Traducción de Diego Ribes Nicolás. En las páginas introductorias del compendio de ensayos ¿Debemos querer decir lo que decimos? (primera edición), Stanley Cavell destaca su deuda con Thompson Clarke por haberle enseñado a entender la epistemología tradicional y, en particular , el escepticismo. Recuerda también que junto a Clarke impartió, entre 1959 y 1960, un seminario sobre las Investigaciones Filosóficas de Wittgenstein. Su defensa de la filosofía del lenguaje ordinario, la profunda influencia de su estudio del último Wittgenstein, y su aproximación al escepticismo como forma de estar en el mun-do, recorren la filosofía y la obra de Cavell y se encuentran muy presentes en el conjunto de escritos que componen el volumen que ahora reseñamos. Puede afir-marse que el conjunto de estos diez trabajos, escritos entre 1958 y 1969, muestran ya con claridad la posición filosófica de Cavell y su personal estilo de escritura, lo que en su caso equivale a decir su personal estilo de pensamiento. La riqueza de los temas que trata el volumen, unida a la complejidad de algu-nos de los análisis y discusiones, hacen imposible dar cuenta aquí de todo ello con suficiente claridad y detalle. Esta reseña sólo pretenderá dar una idea del conjunto tratando de identificar algunos aspectos característicos y originales del pensamien-to y el estilo de Cavell, centrando la atención en dos de sus ensayos más repre-sentativos (capítulos I y II). Sólo al final se ofrecerá una reflexión más crítica en diálogo con su planteamiento. Dos de los ensayos pueden considerarse de crítica literaria: su lectura de Fin de partida, la obra de Beckett (en el ensayo Final del juego de la espera, capítulo V), y su estudio sobre El rey Lear de Shakespeare (en La evitación del amor, capítulo X). Cavell se anticipa a una visión prejuiciada que no consideraría este tipo de estudios críticos prima facie filosofía, señalando la cercanía entre ambas formas de actividad. Otros dos ensayos, Música descompuesta (capítulo 8) y Una cuestión de querer decirlo (capítulo 9), entran en el terreno de la crítica musical y los problemas de interpre-Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 5, n.º 2 (2018): 387-397