On dynamic games in the europeanelectricity market

• Autores: Katerina Stanková
• Localización: Industrial Engineering: Innovative Networks: 5th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Industrial Management "CIO 2011", Cartagena, Spain, September 2011, Proceedings / Suresh P. Sethi (dir. congr.), Marija Bogataj (dir. congr.), Lorenzo Ros McDonnell (dir. congr.), 2012, ISBN 978-1-4471-2321-7, págs. 191-199
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper we define the European electricity market liberalizationproblem as a game with electricity producers as players, while the consumers’ electricity demand is exogenous. The model is based on real data. The producers maximize their profit by investing and choosing how much electricity they will produce by available means of electricity production. The aim of the research presented in this paper is to analyze different scenarios: a market with one electricityproducer being a Stackelberg leader, a market with two electricity producers being Stackelberg leaders noncooperative among themselves, and a perfectly competitive market.As expected, in our case studies the perfectly competitive market yields the lowest electricity prices for the consumers.