Rampant Kantianism? John McDowell and the Problem of Intentionality
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Agnese Di Riccio [1]
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[1] Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa
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- Localización: Giornale di Metafisica: revista bimestrale di filosofia, ISSN 0017-0372, Vol. 44, Nº. 1, 2022 (Ejemplar dedicado a: La metafisica di Pittsburgh e l’eredità kantiana / coord. por Angelo Cicatello, Danilo Manca), págs. 74-93
- Idioma: inglés
- Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
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Resumen
McDowell famously relies on his interpretation of Kant to clarify the intentionality of sensory consciousness. In this article, I argue that the selective use of Kantian notions troubles McDowell account. The first section shows how McDowell’s view on intentionality rests on the transcendental role assigned to (revised) Kantian intuitions (§1). The following sections argue that the introduction of “corrected” Kantian claims activates a dialectical tension that runs through McDowell’s thinking. This contradictory logic is visible in the progression from Mind and World to later essays. On the one hand, the broad Kantian framework of Mind and World illuminates the shortcomings of its presentation of intuitional content as propositional. To offer a coherent account of intuitions, McDowell would need to engage more closely with central claims of Kant’s philosophy (§2). On the other hand, McDowell’s attempt to redefine his view of intuitional content in light of Kantian categories does not solve the problem but generates additional frictions. In particular, McDowell’s presentation of the directedness of thought to objects discloses the necessity of a closer engagement with the substantive claims of Kant’s critical metaphysics (§3).
