Resumen de La partizione originaria: Riflessioni fenomenologiche sull'esperienza del dolore
This paper discusses the phenomenological approach to the experience of pain, highlighting in the first place its ambiguity and indeed its enigmatic trait. The enigma of pain is well known to Wittgenstein, who shows, in his repeated discussions of the topic, that pain cannot be conceived simply as a private experience. Yet in Wittgenstein there is, in the last analysis, no way to address the peculiar relationship between feeling pain and feeling one’s own feeling pain. This issue is well known to Husserl, who derives his approach from the debate between Brentano and Stumpf. In his attempt to find an intermediate position between the two, Husserl broadens the meaning of experiencing pain. This can be seen in particular when taking into consideration what Husserl calls the Leib. In discussing this notion, the paper shows two possible interpretations of it, offering arguments in favor of the radical embodiment of consciousness
