A Proposal About Intentional Action

• Autores: Carlos J. Moya
• Localización: The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy / coord. por Jaakko Hintikka, Robert Cummings Neville, Ernest Sosa, Alan M. Olson, Stephen Lawson, Vol. 9, 2001 (Philosophy of Mind), ISBN 9781889680132, págs. 55-63
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper, I want to defend the proposal that one has to be a realist about the existence and causal efficacy of reasons if one wants to have rationally justified actions. On this basis, I will propose to understand intentional action in terms of justification alone, not in terms of justification plus causation. I shall argue that an action is intentional, under a certain description, if, and only if, it is justified, under that description, by the agent’s reasons. The proposal recommends itself as being capable of solving the problem of wayward causal chains and is promising as a way of avoiding epiphenomenalism of mental properties.