Politics of setting an example: The European Banking Union and the case of Slovenia

• Autores: Marko Lovec
• Localización: Europe en formation: les cahiers du fédéralisme, ISSN-e 0154-9928, Nº. 383-384, 2017 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Les perspectives de la zone euro), págs. 84-98
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • The attempt of European Union’s institutions to enforce the new banking rules by using Slovenia as an example had counterproductive effects. While the Post-functionalist theory suggests that the overcoming of domestic constraints might require empowering of supranational institutions and/or identities, the Liberal institutional theory warns from the implications of such an action for the democratic deficit. A counterfactual analysis of the Slovenian case demonstrates that the Slovenian government was – to the extent to which this was necessary – both able and willing to overcome the domestic constraints through a pro-European coalition and a transfer of part of the authorities, as argued by the Liberal institutional theory. Although the Slovenian case is due to their lesser leverage more representative for the smaller members than for the larger ones, it does imply the need for proper checks and balances at all levels