Una teoría de la validez jurídica

Abstract

El concepto de validez jurídica reviste enorme importancia para la teoría y la práctica del derecho en tanto se asocia a la existencia o inexistencia de la norma jurídica. Más allá de su vinculación originaria y decisiva a Hans Kelsen, no solo es posible la propuesta de un concepto justificativo de validez jurídica (no descriptivo) asociado a la justificación racional de la norma, sino que el mismo resulta plenamente funcional al Estado de derecho constitucional y democrático. De ese modo, la norma obliga en tanto es válida, y lo es en la medida que resulte racional; identicándose hasta once requisitos en orden a dicha justificación racional. La teoría auspiciada que reconcilia prudencial o ponderativamente la razón con el derecho, tiene como sustento doctrinario al realismo jurídico clásico y autores vinculados al llamado neoconstitucionalismo no-positivista (en particular Robert Alexy).

The concept of the validity of law is highly important for the legal theory and practice as it is inherently linked to the existence of law itself. Leaving aside its original and decisive connection with Hans Kelsen’s thought, it is not only possible to propose a justifying concept (i.e., not a merely descriptive one) of the validity of law as closely associated with the rational justification of the law; it should also be noted that such concept is necessary for the existence of the Constitutional and Democratic State. Thus, the law binds as long as it is valid and this validity depends on the law’s rational foundation. It is possible to identify up to eleven requirements for considering a law as rationally justified. The proposed theory reconciles reason with law through a prudential and duly weighed approach, is based on the classical legal realism and finds connections with authors counted among the so-called non-positivist/new-constitutionalists (specially Mr. Robert Alexy).