Abstract
n agents located along a river generate residues that then require cleaning to return the river to its natural state, which entails some cost. We propose several rules to distribute the total pollutant-cleaning cost among all the agents. We provide axiomatic characterizations using properties based on water taxes. Moreover, we prove that one of the rules coincides with the weighted Shapley value of a game associated with the problem.
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The author thanks Gustavo Bergantiños for his support and helpful comments during the writing of this paper and acknowledges Miguel Rodríguez for his suggestions. The financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER, grant Ref: ECO2008-03484-C02-01/ECON, Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación, grant Ref: ECO2011-23460, and Xunta de Galicia, grants Ref: PGIDIT06PXIB362390PR and Ref: 10 PXIB 362 299 PR, is gratefully appreciated.
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Gómez-Rúa, M. Sharing a polluted river through environmental taxes. SERIEs 4, 137–153 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0083-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-011-0083-2