The credibility of performance feedback in tournaments

• Autores: Iván Marinovic
• Localización: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, ISSN-e 1530-9134, Vol. 24, Nº. 1, 2015, págs. 165-188
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper studies the effect of performance feedback on tournament outcomes, when a possibly dishonest principal may manipulate the agents' expectations to stimulate their effort. Under plausible circumstances, an increase in the principal's propensity to tell the truth (i.e., integrity) induces a mean preserving spread in the distribution of effort and leads to a decrease in expected profits and welfare. More generally, I identify conditions under which a lower integrity can improve the effectiveness of financial incentives in inducing the agents' effort, thus leading to higher expected profits for the principal.