Summarium
Instructio de pontificio secreto pro eo defendendo duas rationes accepit, quarum prima, officium morale objectivum spectans et in ambitu interni fori evoluta, statuitur cum moralis onerositas eius observantiae declaratur, nihil vero statuto de peccati reservatione. Altera ratio pro iuridico ordine defendendo, cuius forum efficientiae externum est, duobus coactivis instrumentis utitur, sanctione scilicet disciplinae et poenali sanctione, quae duos modos in normas publici commodi rumpendas spectant. Disciplinae sanctio perfecte definita est ac bene dispositus eius processus in applicatione qua eundem accepit atque in Regolamento generale della Cúria Romana ad quod remittit in omnibus suis argumentis. Sanctio autem poenalis in lege invenitur nec determinata nec definita. Poenam statuere, nihil vera legislantibus de eius re et de processu applicationis, relinquere valet in manus exsecutivae potestatis et institutionem et iudicium et iniunctionem poenae, neglectis flagitationibus veri momenti eis videlicet quae distinctionis munerum propriae sunt, tam necessariae ut Mali usus periculum vitetur. Similiter absque legis munimine manent principia exorta ad humanae personae dignitatem tuendam, principium scilicet convenientiae cum legibus -nunc acceptum secundum canonicae oro dinationis species proprias- vel cautionis principium. Poenalis normae relatio videtur constare in morali magis quam in iuridica acceptione pro lege tuenda. Moralis acceptio, ponens auctoritatem solí Deo responsuram, totam potestatem iudicium ferendi de culpa actus et dirimendi de habitudine erga reum própria convictione nitenti iIIi qui officio fungit sepositam habet. Hoc autem solummodo possibile in ordine morali et in eius foro peculiari, interno videlicet sacramentali: sacerdos confessarius illic in persona Christi agit, vitae rationem moralem iudicat et perspicuam notitiam nanciscitur ex reorum confessione quae sincere debet proferri cum a Deo cordis intima scrutante oriatur venia. Valde dissimilis est iuridici ordinis defensio. De humano et terreno negotio hic agitur, cuius solutionem illustrare debent virtutis iustitiae postulationes qua e iudicem quoque attingunt et cogunt ut secundum ius se gerat, id est, secundum probationis positivas normas. His positis existimat Auctor legem multo profecturam in technico-iuridica perfectione, tam necessária hac de re, si, omnibus quae supra protulit consideratis, paragraphus quae poenalem sanctionem statuit iterum exstrueretur.------------------------------------
Abstract
The Instruction, which regulates the observance of the Papal secret, includes two arguments. The first one is based on the objective moral imperative and is confined to the internal forum; refers to it when speaking about the gravity of the observance of the secret, but in no way does it determine the reserved nature of the sin. The juridical argument, which is confined to the external forum, can avail of two coactive instruments, namely, disciplinary and penal sanctions. These protect the two ways of violating the public interest. The disciplinary sanction is well defined and its method of application well regulated, as it refers in all cases to the Regolamento generale della Curia Romana. The penal sanction, is dealt with in the Instruction in an indefinite and not very precise manner. The establishing of a punishment without legislating far its content and means of application is equivalent to abandoning in the hands of the execuive power the nature, the determination and the imposition of the punishment thus disregarding questions of real importance such as the division of functions, so necessary if one wishes to avoid the dangers of arbitrary decisions. In this way certain principies that are meant to defend the dignity of the human person are left without legal protection, such as for example, the principie of legalit
y, understood in this case according to the characteristics of Canon Law, and the principie of guarantee. The preparation of the penal norms has been influenced more by a moralistic than by a juridical idea of the defense of the law. The moralistic menta lit y starts from the position that the authority is responsible only to God, and thus leaves to the executor all power of decision about the culpability of the act and about the attitude to adopt towards the culprit, basing the judgment on personal conviction. Now this is only possible in the moral order, in the internal sacramental forum, where the priest as confessor acts in per,", ona Christi and judges moral behaviour on the evidence that the culprit himself provides; the confession must be sincere as the forgiveness comes from God who reads the innermost thoughts. The defense of the juridical order is a different question. Here one must resolve a human and earthly conflict whose solution ought to be iIIuminated by the demands of the virtue of justice, demands that affect the judge as well, obliging him to act according to the law, that is, according to positive gUidelines. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the law would gain considerably in the technical juridical sense, something very necessary in this particular point, if the paragraph dealing with the penal sanction were reformulated taking into account the points we have indicated.
