Max Scheler's Analysis of Ressentiment in Modern Democracies

• Autores: Patrick Lang
• Localización: On Resentment.: An Interdisciplinary Workshop on The History of Emotions, 26,27, 28 October, 2011 The Louis-Jeantet Auditorium, Geneva / coord. por Dolores Martín Moruno, Javier Moscoso Sarabia, Bernardino Fantini, 2011, pág. 10
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • Scheler's study about Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen ("The Ressentiment in the Construction of Moralities", 1912), translated into English under the simplified title Ressentiment (2 nd ed., Marquette University Press, 1994), defines ressentiment as a violation and distortion of the order of value-feeling. Normally, Scheler holds, values are evident objects of intentional feeling and are orderly related to each other, in a way which can be described in terms of an immutable a priori hierarchy, consisting in four independent levels: the lowest value modality is that of sensible values (agreeable/disagreeable); next comes the modality of vital values (noble/vulgar); the next higher rank are spiritual values (aesthetic: beautiful/ugly; juridic: right/wrong; cognitive:

    true/false); finally and highest we find the values of holiness (holy/unholy). The moral values "good" and "evil" appear in acts of realizing respectively positive and negative values on each of these levels; and in acts of choosing and realizing respectively a value of a higher or lower level. This order, given in the intuitive evidence of preference, is "an absolute ethic reference system, on the background of which all moral judgements, norms, variation of ethos and moralities in history take place" (M. Frings).

    Ressentiment is one of the sources of historical variations of the rules of preference, as Nietzsche already pointed out. According to Scheler, it consists in a comparison between different levels of values, in such a way that the values of higher levels are sought to be pulled down to lower levels (value detraction), or that the nature of lower values is injected into that of higher range values. Scheler's analysis includes some statements about collective aspects of ressentiment in Western democratic societies:

    (1) The causes of the accumulation of ressentiment in individuals and groups have to be sought in a social structure that combines equality of rights with inequality of facts (situations, wealth, etc). The present contribution links this analysis to the more comprehensive reflection developed by Scheler on the relationship between democracy and equality, especially in Der Geist und die ideellen Grundlagen der Demokratien der großen Nationen ("The Spirit and the Ideal Foundations of Democracies in the Great Nations"; 1916; translated neither into English nor into French), in order to understand that ressentiment is not a consequence of social inequalities as such, but merely of a specific combination of inequality and equality, linked to the unawareness of the hierarchy of values. This unawareness results in preferring the value of usefulness to those of life, and in the assumption that moral value only belongs to that which is quantifiable and calculable, i.e. to utility. The main question is that of the value ranges concerned by the claim of equality; Scheler consistently argues in favour of a social order where low ranking (i.e. utility and sensible) values are equally distributed, while distribution should be increasingly unequal as the concerned value modalities are higher. He thus holds a position exactly opposite to the thought of Enlightenment, which claimed for equal personal, civil and political rights, at the cost of the equality of factual power, economic possessions, etc.

    (2) Our modern societies favour the development of ressentiment because of the principle of rivalry and competition on which the market economy rests. The word "capitalism" in Scheler's work is an attitude of consciousness rather than a political-economical concept. The assessment concerning the genesis of capitalism is the following: (a) a peculiar form of value comparison generates the characterological type of the pusher; (b) the social preponderance of pushing leads to the socio-economic system of competition, which induces unlimited needs, and where goods that are likely to satisfy desires are first treated as merchandise (as Marx already pointed out). As a result, consumer society exhausts itself in a paradox: the increasingly massive and fast production of goods intended for the enjoyment comes along with a decrease of the human capacity for enjoyment. It is shown how these analyses find resonance among economists from John Maynard Keynes (Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, 1930) to Patrick Viveret (Reconsidérer la richesse ["Reconsidering Wealth"], 2002) and are likely to shed some light upon the most urgent problems of our time.