Resumen de Seneca on the Concept of Will
The concept of will (voluntas) has long been a central topic in Seneca scholarship, particularly following influential studies by Pohlenz, Hadot, Voelke, and Dihle, later critically reassessed by Brad Inwood. Despite the wealth of nuanced contributions since, this article argues that the debate still lacks a coherent conceptual framework. Building on previous work, I propose distinguishing three fundamental concepts of will: 1. an appetitive will, based on desire or striving; 2. a decisionist will, rooted in conscious choice or deliberations; and 3. a dynamic will, understood as psychic energy or willpower. Through a close analysis of Seneca's use of key latin terms -voluntas, velle, nolle, arbitrium, among others- I argue that Seneca predominantly adopts the appetitive concept of will, in continuity with the Platonic tradition. While traces of the decisionist and dynamic models are present, their role is secondary. This tripartite framework offers a more precise understanding of Seneca's philosophical psychology and helps clarify ongoing interpretative debates, including the limitations of Inwood's "summary" vs "traditional" will distinction.
