

A CRITICISM OF TWO ARTICLES ON ARISTOTLE'S IMAGINATION¹

José R. Silva de Choudens

I. Introduction

Martha Nussbaum's paper, "The Role of *Phantasia* in Aristotle's Explanation of Action" has a footnote (its last) which refers to Malcolm Schofield; she acknowledges in it her indebtedness to him, while recognizing that his paper on the topic of *phantasia* "addresses itself to different passages and reaches rather different conclusions"². Schofield entitled his paper "Aristotle on the Imagination" like Nussbaum's, it is an attempt to discover the fundamental meaning of *phantasia* in Aristotle. These two articles are my point of departure. Both are valuable interpretations, neither of which, however, seems to me persuasive as the definitive account of *phantasia*. While not expressly addressing each other, the criticism in each of the alternative interpretations targets so appropriately what the other suggests that by comparing them, and using each to point to the insufficiencies of the other, I expect to pave the way for, and enhance, the presentation of my views. Henceforward I will present Schofield's interpretation, then Nussbaum's and a criticism of each with my interpretation.

II. Schofield's article

Three aspects are fundamental to Schofield's interpretation: a) his assessment of the importance of chapter 3, Book III, of "De Anima" (DA) for understanding *phantasia*; b) the interpretations against which his own is presented; c) the passages that substantiate his position. By explaining them I will expound what is most

1 This article was written during a stay at the University of Massachusetts.

2 M.C. Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*, text with translation, commentary, and interpretive essays by M.C. Nussbaum, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 269.

important in his article. A reference to what he says of *phantasia* in action contexts will complete our exposition.

A. The importance of III 3

Schofield professes not to be concerned with all the Aristotelian "uses and pronouncements about *phantasia*"³. He writes:

I shall restrict myself to a set of fundamental problems in the interpretation of his official and principal discussion of it (*phantasia*) in De Anima II 3. In that chapter lurk most of the pleasures and puzzles which the student of Aristotle's views on imagination will want to savour⁴.

For Schofield, III 3 contains an explicit attempt by Aristotle to characterize *phantasia*; hence, he treats it as the obligatory source of its fundamental meaning. He is aware, however, that an objection can be raised against him if his exposition seems one-sided and unable to accommodate the uses of "*phantasia*" in other passages, contexts, or works. Though this will not detract him from making III 3 pre-eminent, it will make him consider how other contexts are compatible with his interpretation. Actions contexts, especially, call for some accommodation. Yet his basic view remains that, though one may refer to other works in order to clarify what is unclear in III 3, a distorted interpretation would arise if peripheral meanings of "*phantasia*" are taken for fundamental: the relevance of other contexts and works should be subordinate to the line of inquiry originating from DA III 3.

B. Other interpretations

Schofield interpretation is presented and built around the rejection of what he considers two popular interpretative trends: to take *phantasia* to be foremost the faculty for conjuring mental images; or to consider it phenomenally as the general faculty for sensory and quasi-sensory presentations. He is especially concerned with the latter view ("The Protagorean Interpretation"), which he attributes to Ross as follows:

Ross states: "*phantasia*" is in its original meaning closely related to "*phainetai*", "to appear", and stands for either the appearance of an object

3 M. Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination", in *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses*, edited by C.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 99.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

or the mental act (or, we might add, disposition) which is to appearing as hearing is to sounding". He goes on to cite a number of passages in Aristotle where *phantasia* seems to him to be used in this way. They and others like them constitute the evidence for holding that Aristotle at least sometimes conceives of *phantasia* as a comprehensive faculty in virtue of which we apprehend sensory and quasi-sensory presentations in general⁵.

Presentations of all kinds -sensory appearances, dream images, memory contents, delusive presentations, after-images, free imaginings- are considered cases of *phantasia* in this interpretation. The faculty is one of presentations in general, a species of which is sensation. Such a broad extension seems unwarranted to Schofield. Rather than the general faculty which encompasses all types of presentations, *phantasia*, for him, is a faculty coordinate with perception having to do with a limited domain of experience. The verb *phainetai*, he believes, is crucial with regard to *phantasia* but not as Ross claims. In general Schofield's argues against the Protagorean Interpretation by suggesting that his own fits most relevant passages better. He also claims that this interpretation renders Aristotle's treatment of sense-perception in Book II of DA inconsequential, for if *phantasia* is present in every case of perception, Aristotle "should have introduced the concept of *phantasia* as an essential tool of his analysis of sense perception, instead of omitting virtually all mention of it throughout Book II of "De Anima"⁶.

The second theory opposed by Schofield interprets *phantasia* as primarily subjective imagining. Its defenders claim that this meaning is unequivocally present in passage 472b 16-24 of III 3. Schofield will not argue; he writes:

For in a passage from the opening section of his discussion of *phantasia* in De An. III 3 (472b 16-24), Aristotle offers two criteria to distinguish it (*phantasia*) from belief (*doksa*) which fit the concept of imagination so perfectly, and are so fundamental to it, that it would be perverse to take the topic to be anything other than imagination. He tells us that *phantasia*, unlike belief, is *u=* to us when we wish, or, in modern parlance, is subject to the will; and that whereas we are confronted by something alarming, in the case of *phantasia* it is merely as if we saw something alarming in a picture⁷.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 106.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 110.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 102.

Acknowledging this significance for *phantasia* here does not mean for Schofield that this is its fundamental meaning. Its use in a special sense, different from "imagining", passages that he considers more important, will outweigh this evidence and give the true insight about its fundamental significance. However, since the "imagination" connotation seems unavoidable, its relation to the fundamental sense must be explained? That it is complementary to it, without inconsistency on the part of Aristotle, is Schofield's view: a "familiar" relation exists between the different usages of *phantasia* in Aristotle's works, which is grounded on its meaning in III 3. The "imagination" sense complements the basic meaning in most cases and stands in a looser, and yet familiar, relation to it in others.

C. Substantive passages

Five passages from III 3 are the most important for Schofield's interpretation: three which are analyzed mainly in opposition to the Protagorean view -428a 5-16, 428a 24-b9, 428b 18-30- and two which are pertinent to *phantasia* as imagination -427b 16-24, 428a 1-2. In each group the first passage is decisive; hence, I shall examine then first. The rest will be viewed in relation to the Protagorean or the Imagination interpretations.

1) *The Crucial Passages*- For Schofield, passage 428a 5-16 provides the fundamental insight about *phantasia*. In it the clue leading to its significance is the word "*phainetai*". Like the upholders of the Protagorean interpretation, Schofield considers Aristotle's frequent use of this verb along with "*phantasia*" indicative of its meaning. But unlike them, he does not consider its significance relative to "what appears" crucial. Aristotle presents five arguments 428a 5-16 to show that *phantasia* is not sense-perception. The fourth, according to Schofield, makes use of "*phainetai*" as "a specially appropriate and significant vehicle for describing what we experience in virtue of *phantasia*"⁸:

Here is the telling example, in the fourth argument of the set (428a 12-15): 'Further, it is not when we are exercising (our senses) with precision on the object of perception that we say that this appears (*phainetai*) to us (to be) a man, but rather when we do not perceive it distinctly'⁹.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 108.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 108.

The verb, Schofield explains, works as a linguistic indicator of a special type of experience where we feel sceptical before what appears: a "non-paradigmatic sensory experience". This experience is different from ordinary perceptual experiences which prompt no scepticism and do not call for the expression "*phainetai*". It is, Schofield believes, the characteristic experience of *phantasia*. Though in 428a 12-15 we are told of a specific case of indistinct perception, this is just an instance of the fundamental significance of *phantasia* as the faculty of experiences in which our sensory apparatus does not function reliably and we are left with an impression of dubiousness. The passage offers the linguistic criterion by which to recognize when the faculty is being exercised.

For Schofield there is more to *phantasia* than what 428a 12-15 *prima facie* suggests. He claims that the "imagination" connotation of passage 427b 16-24 is complementary to the fundamental sense of *phantasia*, non-paradigmatic sensory experience, in that a dubious presentation places us in a subjective position where an imaginative effort of interpretation of what appears becomes necessary. Accordingly, Aristotle's statement in 428a 12-15 is, "not straightforwardly a report of what we perceive but a more guarded statement of how what we perceive looks to us, how we interpret it"¹⁰. It suggests both the awareness of the subjective position we are placed in, and the interpretative initiative that his position must arouse. Imagination, then, adds to the given in an interpretative effort, and is, for Schofield, part of the typical non-paradigmatic sensory experience.

The discovery of "*phainetai*" as an indicator of special sensory experiences, and of imagination as an interpretative aid to perception in such cases, are insights considered so reliable by Schofield that he makes them the guiding principles of further inquiry. He approaches two other arguments in 428a 5-16 -first and fifth- with the suggestion that in them "...*phainetai* occurs, probably as an index of *phantasia*"¹¹ and therefore, he adds:

I submit that we should be guided by the results of our examination of the fourth argument, and take it that in both these further arguments Aristotle means to point to *phantasia* conceived as a faculty for non- paradigmatic sensory experiences¹².

For the arguments left, where "*phainetai*" is not even used, he has the same suggestion.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 109.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 110.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 111.

2) *Passages Relative to the Protagorean Interpretation*- Two other passages of III 3 are important in relation to the Protagorean view. In 428a 24- b 9 Aristotle denies that *phantasia* is opinion or opinion and sensation jointly. Schofield refers to this as follows:

Aristotle first expounds Plato's view of *phantasia*, according to which 'appearing (*phainetai*) will be believing what one perceives (and that not just coincidentally)' (428b 1-2). He then offers a counter-example to this thesis, a case where one experiences a false 'appearance' about what is before one which conflicts with the true belief one holds about it (428 b2-4): 'But things also appear (*phainetai*) falsely, when one has at the same time a true supposition about them (e.g. the sun appears (*phainetai*) a foot across, but is believed to be bigger than the inhabited world)'¹³.

Schofield presents two arguments against the Protagorean Interpretation of this passage. The first, that though in the "Sophist" Plato uses "*phantasia*" in the broad sense, we need not conclude that Aristotle, in rejecting Plato's position, gives "*phantasia*" the same broad meaning. The sense of "*phantasia*" in the counter-example can be his own, as the use of "*phainetai*" suggests, which here again points to a non-paradigmatic experience:

I submit that Aristotle accepts the sun example as case of *phantasia* just because it involves a use of *phainetai* which is naturally read ('appears ...but is believed') as implying scepticism¹⁴.

This interpretation is confirmed, Schofield claims, by 460b 3 Sqq of "De Insomniis": a different context in which the same example is used as a dubious presentation. The second argument consists in claiming that the example offered by Aristotle does not fit the Protagorean Interpretation, for the object in question (the sun) goes beyond what is strictly presented and must be taken to involve imaginative comparison: the sun is assessed as to its length in a way that transcends a simple appearance; the appreciation in question involves an inference, and is not the pure presentation of the Protagorean view.

The last part of III 3 is also analyzed by Schofield in opposition to the Protagorean interpretation. He refers to Ross' account of passage 428b 18-30 as follows:

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

He (Ross) states that at 428 b18-30 Aristotle 'distinguishes between *phantasia* with respect to the special sensibles, the incidentals, and the common sensibles, and points out that while in the first case *phantasia* is infallible so long as the sensation is present, in the other two it is fallible even in the presence of the sensation. This amounts to throwing on to *phantasia* the work of apprehending the incidentals and even the special sensibles as well as the common sensibles; and sensation would accordingly be reduced to the level of a mere passive affection which has to be interpreted by *phantasia* before it can give any information or misinformation about objects'¹⁵.

For Schofield, Ross errs in not recognizing that Aristotle begins this part by restating what he says in Book II of DA where all three aspects of sense-perception -perception of special object of sense, of common sensibles, of incidentals- are explained without referring to *phantasia*. 428b 18-30, for him, restates Aristotle's position about perception, and presents an explanation of *phantasia* which stresses its complementary role in perception of non-paradigmatic cases. And *phantasia* has no interpretative function to play over an initially passively given data. There is no conflict, for Schofield, between DA II 6 and this passage, but the passage presents a problem: it speaks of *phantasia* as derived from all kinds of perception, that of special objects of sense included, and says:

The first kind of derived motion is free from error while the sensation is present; ...¹⁶

The infallibility which Aristotle claims for the special objects of sense extends to its derived motion. We have then a *phantasia* that would not seem liable to a sceptical reaction, hardly a non-paradigmatic experience. As a way out, Schofield explains that Aristotle wants his account of *phantasia* to parallel that of perception and runs into the inconsistency of linking intrinsically fallible *phantasia* to infallible special sensibles.

3) *Passages Relative to the Imagination interpretation-* Though Schofield allows passages where *phantasia* means imagining, his opposition to considering imagination the most important aspect of *phantasia* is evinced by his account of 428a 1-2- DA, a passage usually considered favorable to the Imagination Interpretation. Schofield could have used 428a 1-2 as evidence for the interpretative side of *phantasia*, but he makes it serve more forcefully his

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

¹⁶ Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited and with an introduction by Richard Mckeon, New York: Random House, 1941, p. 589, 428b 26.

position by claiming that "*phantasia*" means here dubious presentation, i.e.,

that when Aristotle specifies *phantasia* as 'that in virtue of which we say that a *phantasma* occurs to us' (428a 1-2), *phantasia* again does duty simply as the noun corresponding to cautious, sceptical, and non-committal *phainetai*¹⁷.

Schofield substantiates this view: (1) by suggesting that the "root" meaning of the term is not "imagining", as attested by the usage of the word before Aristotle and specially in Plato, who basically uses it for dubious appearances when he relates it to "*phainetai*" in order to contrast what "appears" to what is; and, (2) by claiming that "*phantasmata*" in "De Insomniis", though considered by many commentators to mean mental imagery, from the traditional view of how dreams relate to imagination, should be considered to mean dubious appearances. Aristotle's main concern in this context, Schofield argues, are dream contents as unreliable appearances. He approaches dreams form cases of deceptive perceptions and by doing so shows that the relevant aspect of a *phantasma* is the non-paradigmatic character of that which "appears as" but is not as it appears.

D. *Phantasia* in action contexts

Though the main relation of imagination to *phantasia* for Schofield results from the interpretative side of non-paradigmatic experiences, he concedes the outright use of "*phantasia*" relative to mental images in contexts concerned with imagining, memory, and action. In action contexts, that which as an end moves to action is often presented by *phantasia*, and this means that it is visualized, because Aristotle, Schofield explains,

seems to think that movement and the desire which is its principal cause require either the thought of a desirable object or at least something like thought (*noesin tina*, 'a sort of thinking'), namely *phantasia*. What he says elsewhere about the connection of thought and *phantasia* makes it very likely that it is mainly imagination or visualization that he is thinking of¹⁸.

Imagination, above, does not involve an interpretative effort before what is dubious. Schofield, therefore, acknowledges that here the familiarity of meaning is a bit thin.

17 M. Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination", p. 119.

18 *Ibid*, p. 105.

III. Martha Nussbaums's article

Martha Nussbaum's appreciation of III 3 is opposite to Schofield's. She does not grant it canonical importance. To begin an inquiry into the meaning of *phantasia* by assigning a passage pre-eminent significance seems to her arbitrary, and contrary to what is initially suggested by the diversity of uses of "*phantasia*" throughout Aristotle's works.

Like Schofield, Nussbaum presents her interpretation in opposition to what she considers a prevalent and erroneous view, in her case, the Imagination Interpretation, understood as originating mostly from passages which explain *phantasia* as decaying sensation. She regards this interpretation as one-sided, insofar it relies almost exclusively upon III 3 of DA and certain passages of "Parva Naturalia", while it disregards action contexts. *Phantasmata*, in it, are subjective presentations "that resemble the things they represent and are to be contemplated as internal pictures by the living being"¹⁹. As such, Nussbaum explains, they are said to play a basic role in all the psychological phenomena that Aristotle encompasses under the term "*phantasia*": they are the "raw materials" of thinking, of perception, and of the psychic states which lead to action. A considerable part of her article is dedicated to showing that this view of *phantasmata* is wrong.

Nussbaum's rejection of a canonical passage raises this question: Where should textual analysis start? She begins with passages in "De Motu Animalium" (MA) and DA concerned with the faculties animals use when involved in action. Action contexts place *phantasia* in a central position, and seem important enough to Nussbaum to contribute significantly to its meaning. They may be used as point of departure in the inquiry, if only to obtain some initial questions and insights ultimately conducive to discovery of the fundamental meaning of "*phantasia*". Indeed, she uses "tentative conclusions" and "hypotheses", obtained from the passages she first examines, and questions that arise from them, as the guiding ideas for further analysis. Her paper unfolds in terms of the programme that these conclusions and questions suggest. It can be summarized in three parts I will entitle: First Conclusions and Questions; *Phantasmata*-Not Mental Images; Definitive Conclusions.

A. First conclusions and question (action contexts)

19 M.C. Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*, p. 222.

There is, according to Nussbaum, textual evidence in the MA for a disjunctive interpretation of the role of the discriminating faculties -*aisthesis*, *phantasia*, and thinking- relative to desire, in which *phantasia* seems not to have pre-eminent importance with regard to action, for each of these faculties by itself can complement desire. But she finds textual evidence also for the view that Aristotle does give *phantasia* a role different and more important than that of the other two discriminatory faculties. This evidence, passages 702a 18ff of MA and 433b 26-30 of DA, leads her to conclude that:

Phantasia, then, is involved in every action; it must "prepare" the desire whether or not actual perceiving is going on. It is said to have two sources: sense perception or thinking. It looks as though its job is to present the perceived or thought object to the creature in such a way that it can be moved to act²⁰.

Desire and *phantasia* are indispensable for action in Aristotle's account, according to Nussbaum; and *phantasia* relates to sense-perception and to thinking. It complements perception in cases where the end object of motion is present, and it fulfils a role in thinking whereby the animal moves even when the object pursued is absent. Nussbaum further qualifies *phantasia's* relation to perception by suggesting that the two are coextensive. Though she acknowledges that there are passages where Aristotle speaks as if they were not coextensive, for he envisages the possibility of animals that do not have *phantasia* and animals all have perception, there are others that she interprets as saying that the two faculties are the "same" although different in *einai*, and seem to imply that:

(1) All creatures that are capable of perceiving are capable of *phantasia*, the same physiological apparatus that is sufficient for one is sufficient also for the other. (2) Many activities of the *aisthetikon* can also be viewed, in some other way, as activities of the *phantastikon*. (3) There is some good reason for using both terms, some new information gained by noticing both aspects of the disposition and its activities²¹.

With regard to thinking, Nussbaum tells us that action contexts which emphasize the physiological dependence of thinking upon the body consistently suggest that there is no *noesis* without *phantasia*. In the absence of the actual object, *phantasia* provides the presen-

20 *Ibid.*, p. 233.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 236.

tational content upon which thinking is built, and there is no possible purely abstract pursuance of an object of desire. Even in the case of *nous*, in spite of vacillation by Aristotle, Nussbaum claims that ultimately he would not accept, for a living being, independence of thinking from *phantasia*. All instances of thinking, and not only thinking for action, require *phantasia* and involve physiological change in the body of the subject.

From action contexts, then, Nussbaum derives the view that for Aristotle *phantasia* does not seem to be a faculty that works by itself but rather, alongside perception or thinking, it is essential to the process whereby animals are moved by an object of desire:

...in these contexts (action) more explicitly than anywhere else he tends to give it (*phantasia*) an "umbrella" role, claiming that it functions even in cases where actual perceiving and/or thinking are going on. It is closely linked to the operations of desire and somehow presents the object of desire to the animal in such a way that it can be moved to action... Although he occasionally (e.g., in the "drink" syllogism in MA) suggests that perception or thought alone could operate with desire to produce action, his considered view seems to be that an extra factor must be mentioned in the account of motion and that there is a single faculty (or a special aspect of the faculty of perception) in virtue of which an animal becomes aware of its object of desire, whether that object is initially presented by the senses or by thought²².

These initial conclusions lead Nussbaum to several questions: Why is *phantasia* needed by perception and thinking? What does it add to each faculty? The popularity of the Imagination Interpretation suggests also this question: Are images involved in this faculty's role relative to thinking and perception? The answers to these questions will provide Nussbaum's definitive views. Before addressing the first two, she inquires into the meanings of the words "*phantasia*" and "*phantasma*" in order to answer the third one.

B. *Phantasmata* - Not mental images

Nussbaum's inquiry into the best interpretation of "*phantasia*" and "*phantasma*" in Aristotle's works consists of four parts, three of which seem to me really important. These are, (1) her analysis of the usage of "*phantasia*" and cognate terms in philosophy, (2) the examination of contexts in Aristotle's works where "*phantasia*" has some epistemological bearing, and (3) her analysis of Aristotelian

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 240-241.

passages which seem to refer to images, because they relate to memory or dreams, or because they speak of decaying sense.

1). *Linguistic Usages*- Nussbaum concedes that pre-Aristotelian usage of *phantasia* and related terms has included reference to apparitions, dream contents and hallucinations, in a way that suggests representative images, but, she writes:

The early evidence shows, however, that *phantasma* often functions simply as the verbal noun of *phainetai* and means, in a most general way, "what appears"²³.

And she will conclude, mostly on the basis of passages from Plato, that:

In much of the pre-Aristotelian evidence, then, *phantasma*, *phantagesthai*, and the new word *phantasia* are used simply as relatives of *phainetai*: their presence does not imply that any theory of imaging, or indeed any other particular theory, is in question²⁴.

Aristotelian usage too, Nussbaum claims, turns around the word "*phainetai*" in its "appear" sense; and in many cases it cannot refer to subjective images for what is said to appear is present itself. Though she grants that Aristotle uses the word for hallucinations, and dreams, she contends that this does not point to the technical meaning "images", for while one may be tempted to import images into those cases, and, on this basis, to posit a specialized sense for "*phantasia*" and "*phantasma*", it is only because what appears is an appropriate expression in such cases that "*phantasia*" and cognate terms are useful.

2) *Epistemological Bearing*- Nussbaum finds many passages with epistemological relevance not to involve images. She says of the passage with the sun counter-example:

To say the sun appears a foot across is not to claim that when we look at the sun we must have before us a mental picture that is a foot wide -or even a picture that we somehow internally measure and find to be a foot wide... The person's *phantasia* has as its object the sun itself, and *phantasia* is his activity of seeing it as an object of a certain size. Judgement also has the real sun for its object, but, unlike *phantasia*, it requires experience and induction. It would be hard to find in this passage even the notion that the

23 *Ibid.*, p. 242.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 243.

activity of *phantasia* necessarily involves episodes of picturing. All that need be added to the basic sense experience is some interpretation of what is seen²⁵.

The object which appears here for Nussbaum is the object of perception; it is through *phantasia* appreciated as of a certain size. *Phantasia* is not, however, judgement, but a sort of "initial impression" that includes a small amount of interpretation. This degree of interpretation makes that which appears meaningful, and an appropriate object of desire.

A passage from the "Metaphysics" is cited by Nussbaum in this context:

Meta., V.29, 1024b 24-26: Things are called false either because they themselves are not or because the *phantasia* that results from them is of what is not²⁶. (Nussbaum's translation)

Aristotle, Nussbaum explains, distinguishes *phantasia* here from the initial presentations (perhaps images) which arouse it. Dream images, indeed, are in question, but are not, as such, instances of *phantasia*. Instead, *phantasia* as a false impression results from them:

phantasia me ontos should be taken not as 'a dream image of what is not' (he is speaking of all dreams, not just dreams about non-existent things or situations), but as the false impression that results from the dream²⁷.

In general, Nussbaum argues, contexts where the issue is truth versus falsehood of a presentation often prompt the use of "*phantasia*" as denoting the faculty of that which appears "as", but with special usefulness when the appearance is not trustworthy. *Phantasia* is the faculty that presents the appearance, and the deceitful connotation of "*phantasma*" is grounded on its more basic meaning, simply "appearance".

3) *Image Passages*- Even in contexts where images are pertinent, but with no great epistemological bearing, the meaning of *phantasia* is relative to "appear" and not based on the inclusion of images in the experience for Nussbaum. She treats the topic with regard to "Parva Naturalia" and the last part of III 3. She concedes that in the former,

25 *Ibid.*, pp 248-249.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 247.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 247.

memory and dreaming are explained not as a special sort of awareness of an actual object or state of affairs, but as the having of an image that is like something in the world and (in the case of memory) is regarded as a likeness²⁸.

But she attempts to avoid the conclusion that this may be significant evidence for the Imagination Interpretation by claiming: that images in these contexts need not fit the Imagination Interpretation's view of images -picture like in density and picture like in their resemblance representational function- for they may work more as symbols than as representations; and, that images are used by Aristotle more from the need of his physiological accounts than as explanatory instruments in his psychology. The passages in "Parva Naturalia" ultimately, then, even when they refer to decaying sense, do not point to the meaning "image" of "*phantasma*" for, again, the basic connotation is here "appear".

The last part of III 3 (428b 10- 429a 8), where *phantasia* is explained by referring to decaying sense, has been useful for the defenders of the Imagination Interpretation, since decaying sense resulting from subsistence of the initial impression but with the object no longer present seems imagination in the sense Nussbaum opposes. Given the canonical importance customarily assigned to III 3 this is then considered the fundamental sense of *phantasia*. Nussbaum rejects this line of thinking by disallowing III 3's canonical role, and by arguing that this chapter lacks the unity required to consider the end passage the conclusion towards which the previous passages were leading. Too many connotations of "*phantasia*", distant from the meaning the Image Interpretation has for the end passage, are present in III 3: the sun example (428b 2-4) is a case of perception without images; voluntary imagining (427b 17ff) is not the *phantasia* of decaying sense passages; and the indistinct perception and after images of 428a 14 are not picture-like subjective images.

C. Definitive conclusions (the other questions)

1) "*Phantasia and Perception*- Why is *aisthesis* insufficient to present the object in such a way that the animal is moved to act? Why does it need *phantasia*? Nussbaum begins her search for an answer to these questions with passage 428a 5-16; of the arguments there -the fourth was decisive for Schofield- only the fifth is found helpful:

28 *Ibid.*, p. 249.

The statement that *aisthesis* is always accurate, but *phantasia* can be false (428a 11-12) is more clearly helpful in that it emphasizes the mechanical, reproductive side of *aisthesis* in Aristotle's theory; this will prove the key to understanding the large role he gives *phantasia*²⁹.

The physiological distinction between perception and *phantasia* in the MA is claimed to be more enlightening. In chapter seven of the MA, Nussbaum explains, *aisthesis* is characterized as "just a bodily alteration", while the alteration in *phantasia*, where the object need not be present, is considered different, as follows:

Phantasia or thought accompanied by *phantasia*, works by presenting the animal with the form or essence of its object, which has an effect like that of the object itself (701b 1-9ff, 703 b1-9ff). The forms presented by *phantasia* were called the forms "of the pleasant or painful" (701b 21), or, equivalently, "of that which produces the affections". These remarks seem to imply whereas in *aisthesis* the animal becomes just like the object, when *phantasia* is operative he becomes aware of the object as a thing of a certain sort³⁰.

These physiological differences, for Nussbaum, point to a type of awareness in *phantasia* (the awareness of an object as something) different from that of sensation. The latter, as suggested in 428a 11-12, just involves an *aisthema* passively received. And this means that *aisthesis* by itself cannot provide the meaningful object of experience.

She further substantiates this view by referring to Book II of DA, chapter 12. There we find Aristotle's account of *aisthesis* as something resulting from an affection upon each sense organ which yields in each case what he calls, "a special object sense". In this characterization of sensation Aristotle, Nussbaum explains, make *aisthesis* play an entirely passive role. She stresses that though Aristotle speaks of forms when referring to what is received in sensation, he means and clearly states so, sensible qualities, that are received by the special sense in question. The passivity of sense conjoined with the fact that what is perceived are sense qualities must make us recognize, she argues, that *aisthesis* just gives us "the rose *qua* white", not "the rose *qua* rose". The latter she later calls the object under "a formal description". Her position is the while perception deals passively with sensible qualities, *phantasia* has to do with forms in another sense:

29 *Ibid.*, p. 256.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 257.

The forms said to be presented by *phantasia* were forms of the pleasant and the fearful, hence necessarily of the thing as a unitary object under some description, not just as an assortment of various perceptible characteristics. We are always passively perceiving perceptual stimuli; but when we actively focus on some object in our environment, separating it out from its context and seeing it as a certain thing, the faculty of *phantasia*, or the *phantasia*-aspect of *aisthesis*, is called into play³¹.

Nussbaum sees additional evidence for this interpretation in a passage from the second book of DA, 420b 31ff. In Aristotle characterizes voice by saying:

But that which does the striking must be a living creature, and must be with some *phantasia*; for voice is a noise that is indicative (*semantikos*) of something³². (Nussbaum's translation)

Voice, she claims, requires *phantasia* for the animal must be aware of something in the world, it conveys something that is experienced, which cannot be a subjective image.

Nussbaum's definitive view with regard to *phantasia* and perception is that they are two aspects of a unitary process (perception in its more comprehensive sense), which starts with a passive reception of a given (perception in restricted sense), involves interpretation through *phantasia*, and yields as end product a meaningful object of experience. *Phantasia* enables the apprehension of objects as invested with an essential form, and only such objects can move desire. She best summarizes her position as follows:

The theory of *phantasia*, then, helps Aristotle to account for the interpretive side of perception; and it does more. The claim that *aisthesis* and *phantasia* are "the same faculty" now amounts to the contention that reception and interpretation are not separable, but thoroughly interdependent. There is no receptive "innocent eye" in perception. How something *phainetai* to me is obviously bound up with my past my prejudices, and my needs. But if it is only in virtue of *phantasia*, and not *aisthesis* alone, that I apprehend the object as an object, then it follows that there is no uninterpreted or "innocent" view of it, no distinction -at least on the level of form or object-perception- between the given, or received, and the interpreted. *Aisthesis* still seems to present uninterpreted colors, sounds, etc.; to this extent Aristotle is still a believer in the given³³.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 259.

32 *Ibid.*

33 *Ibid.*

2) "*Phantasia*" and Thinking- Nussbaum's final remarks about thinking reaffirm the two points she had discovered in her examination of action contexts: that all thought is linked to *phantasia* and to physiological change in the subject; and that *phantasia*'s role in action ensures that there is no abstract object of desire. Her definitive views about these two points will complete our exposition of what is most important in her article.

In the case of the relation between *phantasia* and desire, Nussbaum's account of perception showed that only with the input of *phantasia* can the object of perception arouse desire. In thinking relative to action, again, in order to appreciate an object as desirable -i.e., as pleasurable or painful- it must be received "under a formal description" in an awareness that involves *phantasia*. All thinking conducive to action requires *phantasia*. In such thinking, for Nussbaum, the object pursued characteristically is not present, and *phantasia* links the thought to a perceptible object. She writes:

In DA III.7 he (Aristotle) takes the further step of invoking *phantasia* to explain how we can be moved to action by thinking of a non present object: the noetic faculty is said to be provided with the form of its object by *phantasmata*, which provide a starting point for the operations of desire. *Phantasia* ties abstract thought to concrete perceptible objects or situations, the form of which it presents to the noetic faculty³⁴.

Phantasmata are the source of the forms of perceptible objects; they relate thinking to the concrete, and enable the noetic faculty to apprehend the essential form of the object. And yet these *phantasmata*, for Nussbaum, need not be considered mental images.

The second aspect that, according to Nussbaum, is important in the relation of *phantasia* to thinking is the physiological dependence of thinking upon *phantasia*, what she calls "the physicalist" aspect of thinking: the view that for Aristotle, in sublunary creatures, all thought must be accompanied "by a quasi-sensory awareness of the form of the object, and this is necessary linked to some physiological change"³⁵. The "quasi-sensory awareness" here is a *phantasma*. It links thought to perceptible objects and to the physiological affections in the body. All thinking requires *phantasia* in this way.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 260-261.

IV. Criticism and my interpretation

A. Schofield's article

Our criticism of Schofield will address the three basic aspects of his interpretation: 1) his assessment of DA III 3; 2) "*phainetai*" as indicative of the fundamental meaning of *phantasia*; and, 3) the role of imagination in *phantasia*. We will, however, treat the last topic at the end of this paper with our concluding interpretative remarks.

1) *The importance of III 3*- Schofield's interpretation of III 3 as the canonical source of the meaning of *phantasia* seems to me untenable, for reasons that I will present under the headings: Diversity of Contexts and Uses; *Phantasia* in III 3; A Problem for Schofield.

a) *Diversity of Contexts and Uses*- An initial reading of the different uses of "*phantasia*" in Aristotle suggests various meanings for this faculty, seemingly not all compatible. *Phantasia* is relevant in many contexts, in most of which it relates to other psychological faculties. It is also considered occasionally in its relation to the soul as a whole. Like Nussbaum, in the search for the fundamental meaning of "*phantasia*". I believe it is arbitrary to accept, early in our inquiry, a particular context as canonical. An unbiased point of departure entails identifying first the contexts where *phantasia* is used and its different connotations; only afterwards should we address the question about their relative importance. Schofield does not do this; he begins by placing complete confidence on III 3's canonical significance, believing that this chapter contains Aristotle's only express attempt to provide *the* characterization of *phantasia* in it, and without attention to other contexts in their own right.

Nussbaum's claim about action contexts -they seem important enough to contribute significantly to the meaning of "*phantasia*"- seems to me sufficiently correct to weaken Schofield's position with regard to III 3. *Phantasia* is important in action situations, as evinced by the text especially dedicated to the explanation of local movement in animals -MA- and by chapters 9-11 of book III of DA. The relevance Aristotle gives to local movement, as one of the functions the soul explains, and the importance of "*phantasia*" for this movement suggests, that it is arbitrary to approach action contexts, as Schofield does, with the view that they must be accommodated to the meaning of "*phantasia*" found in III 3, rather than treated as a source of information elucidating this faculty's meaning.

Schofield's feeble attempt to avoid the objection that his interpretation disregards action contexts fails, not only because his approach to them is biased, but because the meaning he gives to *phantasia* in these contexts is too distant from the meaning he considers fundamental. If *phantasia* is the faculty that enables Aristotle to explain "the operation of our sensory equipment in a variety of non-standard ways"³⁶. Its meaning as the source of presentations with motivational significance seems completely different. To suggest, as Schofield does, that "*phantasia*" means visualizing in action cases, but not imaginative interpretation, and to claim that its basic meaning is relative to a dubious presentation, but not so in motivational appearances, amounts, on the part of Schofield, to introducing a significance for *phantasia* which does not really fit his interpretation.

Contexts where Aristotle speaks of dreams, memory and delusive presentations, seem quite relevant to *phantasia*. If, unlike Schofield, we approach them without a ready-made interpretation, they contribute to the meaning of *phantasia* considerably.

b) "*Phantasia*" in III 3- *Phantasia* in III 3 does not play the role Schofield claims. Aristotle alludes to *phantasia* in this chapter with a concern in mind quite different from providing its essential characterization. *Phantasia* is not here the main issue. It is only considered because it is relevant to what is addressed as main topic: thinking. Having explained sensation in Book III of DA, Aristotle undertakes the characterization of thinking beginning in chapter three. Sense-perception and thinking are treated as two independent faculties in DA. Once they have been examined only the role of the soul in local movement remains to be considered. This is the topic of the last chapters of DA where *phantasia* is again relevant but not central.

The initial reference to *phantasia* in III 3 results from an effort to characterize thinking in a context where its identification with perception is rejected. Aristotle starts out by suggesting that thinking has been erroneously considered perceiving (Empedocles) but neither practical thinking nor speculative thinking are perceiving. In the first case, he explains, the fact that all animals perceive but few have practical thinking shows that these faculties are not the same. With regard to speculative thinking he adds:

Further, speculative thinking is also distinct from perceiving -I mean that in which we find rightness and wrongness- rightness in prudence, knowledge, true opinion, wrongness in their opposite; for perception of the special object of sense is always free from error, and is found in all animals,

36 M. Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination", p. 102.

while it is possible to think falsely as well as truly, and thought is found only where there is discourse of reason as well as sensibility. For imagination is different from either perceiving or discursive thinking though it is not found without sensation, nor judgement without it³⁷.

Beyond distinguishing perception in its strictest sense -that of the special objects of sense- from thinking, on account of perception's infallibility, not shared by thinking. Aristotle defends here the view that thinking involves judgement (discourse of reason) and sensibility. Imagination (*phantasia*) judgement, and thus depriving thinking of its sensibility aspect, is also warned against.

Since Aristotle's concern is to offer an appropriate characterization of thinking, he outlines a plan for this purpose that shows the relevance of *phantasia* in III 3. He says:

Thinking is different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgement: we must therefore first mark off the sphere of imagination and then speak of judgement³⁸.

In order to understand thinking *phantasia* ("imagination") must be characterized. But this is not singling it out as a faculty which is to be understood *per se*; only that of *phantasia* significant for understanding thinking is relevant in this context. Indeed, Aristotle does not refer here to aspects of *phantasia* which are treated elsewhere. Similarly, in chapters 9-11, Book III, he examines *phantasia* but in a way that yields facets important for action.

In all cases where *phantasia* is alluded to, that I have found, it has contextual significance relative to an aspect of soul which is being explained: either the role of *phantasia* in thinking, perceiving, acting, dreaming, remembering, and deceptive experiences, or its significance as a faculty of the soul. In this last respect, it is not, as thinking and sense-perception, examined as an independent faculty of the soul. I agree thus with Nussbaum's rejection of a canonical context, though I grant III 3 considerable importance, insofar it offers many different and important insights about *phantasia*.

c) *A Problem for Schofield*- One last difficulty in Schofield's position with regard to III 3 is the contrast between what I take to be the most important remarks about *phantasia* in the chapter, and what is central to his interpretation. Aristotle offers the characterization of *phantasia* (relative to thinking) in the last passages of III 3, after having rejected its identification with other discrimina-

37 Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, p. 587, 427b 8-16.

38 *Ibid.*, p. 587, 427b 28-30.

tory faculties and with sensation and opinion jointly. Schofield does not ground his interpretation on this part; even worse, he has to recognize that it presents a problem for him, since *phantasia* as a derivative movement from sensation, relative to the special objects of sense, is said to be mostly infallible - not then a non-paradigmatic sensory experience. If III 3 is canonical because it provides the characterization of *phantasia*, it should be clear where this characterization is offered and what it emphasizes. Once we realize that a part of III 3, not argument four, stands out as most important in this respect, the basis for Schofield's interpretation is recognized to be weak and not fully furthered by the preeminence he gives to III 3.

2) "*Phainetai*"- "*Phainetai*" for Schofield, we saw, works when conjoined with "*phantasia*" as a linguistic indicator of unclear and dubious presentations. As such it points to the basic meaning of *phantasia* as the faculty of non-paradigmatic sensory experiences. The fourth argument of 428a 5-16 gave Schofield this insight, which thereafter became basic to his interpretation of other passages. The connotation of "*phantasia*" "free imagining" in passage 427b 16-24, accordingly, is taken to signify interpretative imagination as an aspect of non-paradigmatic sensory experiences. Schofield's inquiry practically stops with argument four. His method is defective in that he relies too heavily upon his initial discovery and makes the rest of the passages in III 3 depend on it. Our remarks above, pointing to the difficulties for his interpretation of the last part of III 3, relate to this. Schofield underestimates this last part, and considers argument four more important as a result of the significance he grants "*phainetai*" for the meaning of "*phantasia*". Had he approached this part without the definitive interpretation at hand, its prominence would have weighed against a view it cannot be reconciled with.

Ultimately a direct critical approach to Schofield's interpretation has to address the question: Is "*phainetai*" in argument four the linguistic indicator Schofield makes it out to be? I believe that indeed it plays the role of a linguistic indicator: Aristotle is pointing to a meaning suggested by the usage of this term in contexts where that which appears can be false. But he is just emphasizing what he has already suggested in the previous argument ("Again, sensations are always true, imaginations are for the most part false"³⁹): that *phantasia* must be distinguished from sensation on account of its fallibility. The point of argument four is that, as linguistic usage also suggests, *phantasia* is fallible; we associate

39 *Ibid.*, p. 587, 427a 11.

phantasia with error, as in cases of indistinct perceptions where what appears impresses us in a way that may turn out to be incorrect.

If we interpret the fourth argument in this way, we can maintain its relevance within the context of the distinction between *phantasia* and sensation. Indeed, the experience in question would be an instance of Schofield's non-paradigmatic sensory experience, only that it is used to stress *phantasia*'s fallibility against the infallibility of sensation of the special sensibles. "*Phainetai*", then, is here a linguistic indicator in a restricted context; it does not point to the experience in question as indicative of *phantasia*'s basic meaning.

Schofield's interpretation of "*phainetai*" seems erroneous also in his analysis of passage 428a 24-b 9, where the term is said to perform the same role it has in argument four. Aristotle, having established that *phantasia* is fallible, but not sensation, asks himself whether it be opinion. He answers that it is not opinion, for opinion involves belief and discourse of reason, neither of which is necessary to *phantasia*. The question, 'May it not be some kind of combination of opinion and sensation?', then brings up the reference to the sun example. As a counter-example it suggests a disparity between the presentation of *phantasia* and a concurrent judgement or opinion about it, which is asserted not to be possible if *phantasia* were a blend of opinion and sensation. But there is nothing in the presentation similar to the dubiousness that Schofield considers distinctive of a non-paradigmatic sensory experience. The presentation of the sun shows it small, there is no doubt about this; it even appears thus when opinion denies it. This last point is what the example underlines: the contrast between appearance and opinion. A process of corrections with additional experiences, and the intervention of reason as the arbiter proclaiming what to trust, must have led to the opinion which shows the candid impression of *phantasia* not to be trustworthy. Yet at the stage where the opinion is already formed the presentation still shows the sun small⁴⁰. *Phantasia* here, then, is quasi-perceptual, and non-critical; its presentation too is fully meaningful. "*Phainetai*" in this passage points not to a dubious presentation; it just refers to an appearance *qua* an appearance, i.e., taken in a

40 Schofield uses passage 460b 3 Sqq. (*De Insomniis*) to ground his interpretation. Mine seems to be clearly borne out by a previous passage (458b 27-29): "So, even when persons are in excellent health, and know the facts of the case perfectly well, the sun, nevertheless appears to them to be only a foot wide", Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, p. 617, 458b 27-29.

non-critical fashion that accepts it at face value, even when there exists the concurrent opinion that considers it erroneous.

Schofield's interpretation of "*phainetai*" with regard to memories and dreams seems implausible to me. But I will criticize Nussbaum's views before in my concluding remarks explaining the significance of "*phainetai*" and "*phantasia*" in memories and dreams.

B. Nussbaum's article

Nussbaum seems to me nearer the correct interpretation of *phantasia* in Aristotle than Schofield. The view that this faculty has a perceptual significance in many action contexts and in the case of the sun counter-example of 428a 24 b 9 is better than interpreting *phantasma* in such cases either as a non-paradigmatic sensory presentation or as a subjective image. Her emphasis on the fundamental "appearance" connotation of *phantasma* also seems to me sound. Yet, I do not agree with Nussbaum's effort to diminish the importance of images in many contexts where *phantasia* is the relevant faculty. Nor do I find acceptabler what is most important in her account: the view that the basic role of *phantasia* is to complement perception by enabling the initially given, not by itself meaningful, to acquire the status of a full-fledged object of experience.

There are three basic aspects in Nussbaum's interpretation that I find objectionable: 1) the use she makes of action contexts; 2) her account of perception in relation to *phantasia*; and 3) the relevance she gives to subjective images in *phantasia*.

1) *Action Contexts*- In spite of Nussbaum's awareness of the need for an unbiased point of departure, and her rejection of a canonical passage, in the search for the meaning of *phantasia*, the importance she grants action contexts as the source of her initial hypotheses is not counterbalanced by a comparable treatment of what other passages suggest. Thus, we find in her article the same one-sidedness she criticizes. She never really challenges her initial findings; and though she sees problems for her interpretation, she does not give them the importance they deserve. Her article resembles Schofield's in that it obtains its crucial insight from a particular context and approaches others for validation, not in search of the significance of *phantasia* in them and their bearing on its fundamental meaning. Action contexts yield the insight which serves as basis for Nussbaum's line of interpretation -the view that *phantasia* is necessary to perception and to thinking in all action cases- and this insight orients the rest of her inquiry.

Nussbaum's basic hypothesis results from her decision to consider passage 702a 18 ff (MA) crucial, even when she acknowledges that

three other passages in the same context of the MA suggest the opposite: that "the combinations desire + sense perception and desire + thinking would be sufficient to 'move' the animal, without any involvement of *phantasia*⁴¹. It leads her inquiry to the question: How is it that *phantasia* is indispensable to perception and to thinking? It sets, in this way, the style of approach to other contexts, which are examined in the search for an answer to this question. Objectivity in the treatment of other passages is therefore lost.

2) *Perception and "Phantasia"*- The center of Nussbaum's interpretation is her account of the relation between perception and *phantasia*. Thinking for her relies upon a meaningful object, which is made available, without the object being present, by *phantasia*; but the distinctive aspect of *phantasia* is to yield, in completing perception, the meaningful object of experience. The question that is most important in a criticism of Nussbaum's interpretation then is: Does *phantasia* play in perception the role she ascribes to it? I will address this question by examining two of her fundamental tenets: the "basic hypothesis"; and her account of perception as passive.

a) *The Basic Hypothesis*- Nussbaum's "basic hypothesis" with regard to perception is that whereas perception by itself cannot arouse desire, perception and *phantasia* can. Since desire requires a meaningful object of experience, she asserts, as a concomitant thesis, that perception needs *phantasia* to attain objects of experience proper.

That desire must be presented a meaningful object of experience is consistent with Aristotle's reiterated account of the way ordinary objects arouse desire. But Nussbaum's basic hypothesis and the concomitant thesis above seem to me unwarranted. The former is questionable for various reasons. To begin, as Nussbaum herself recognizes, there are several passages in the MA that suggest a disjunctive interpretation of the role of the discriminatory faculties with regard to desire. Passage 701a 31-39, for example, says:

For whenever a creature is actually using sense-perception or *phantasia* or thought towards the thing for-the-sake-of-which, he does at once what he desires ... "Here's drink", says sense-perception or *phantasia* or thought. At once he drinks. This, then, is the way that animals are impelled to move and act: the proximate reason for movement is desire, and this comes to be either through sense-perception or through *phantasia* and thought⁴².

41 M.C. Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*, p. 232.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 41 & p. 42, 701a 31-39.

It is clear that the faculties are referred to here as each capable of arousing desire through presenting the end object of action. Even though the last sentence uses "and", not "or", the disjunction with respect to perception is unquestionable. Moreover, *phantasia* by itself, Aristotle also tells us, can, in cases of non-rational behaviour, complement desire.

In passage 700b 17ff of MA Aristotle distinguishes two aspects of action: the appetitive and discriminatory aspects. All action involves some form of desire -choice, wish or appetite- and a discriminatory faculty -thought, sense-perception, or *phantasia*:

Now we see that the movers of the animal are reasoning and *phantasia* and choice and wish and appetite. And all of these can be reduced to thought and desire. For both *phantasia* and sense-perception hold the same place as thought, since all are concerned with making distinctions -though they differ from each other in ways that we have discussed elsewhere⁴³.

"Desire" and "thought" are used here as the general words for the faculties of appetite and of discrimination respectively, but it is clear that different faculties are grouped under each general term. And *phantasia*, sense perception, and thought are each identified as able to perform the role of a discriminatory faculty before an appetitive faculty.

Aristotle's treatment of local motion in DA offers no passage as clear as those of the MA indicating that each of the three discriminatory faculties can complement desire. In chapter ten, in search for an answer to the question, "What faculty of the soul accounts for local motion?", he speaks initially of two faculties that must intervene jointly:

Both of these are capable of originating local movement, mind and appetite: (1) mind, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e., mind practical (it differs from mind speculative in the character of its end); while (2) appetite is in every form of it relative to an end: for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of mind practical; and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action. It follows that there is a justification for regarding these two as the sources of movement, i.e., appetite and practical thought; for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement, the object of appetite being to it a source of stimulation. So too when imagination originates movement, it necessarily involves appetite⁴⁴.

43 *Ibid.*, p. 38, 700b 17ff.

44 Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, p. 598, 433a 13-21.

Aristotle explains here how we have ends for our activity from having appetites. Mind practical he tells us calculates means to an end. *Phantasia* (imagination) is alluded to in the last sentence as also capable of complementing appetite and it would seem that it plays a role analogous to that of mind practical -it is capable of somehow correlating means to ends. *Phantasia* indeed is described as "deliberative" by Aristotle in this same context, though he clearly indicates that images (*phantasmata*) are not concepts, which suggests that *phantasia* relates means to ends, but in a way different from that of mind.

Now, the role of *phantasia* and of thought involves also presenting the object of appetite. It is this object which as an end stimulates mind practical, thereby initiating movement. Aristotle, after the passage above, emphasizes the role of the faculty of appetite as the real originator of movement inasmuch its object, presented by imagination or thought, is the first factor in the initiation of action:

it follows that while that which originates movement must be specifically one, viz. the faculty of appetite as such (or rather further back the object of that faculty; for it is that itself remaining unmoved originates the movements by being apprehended in thought or imagination) the things that originate movement are numerically many⁴⁵.

The presentative role of thinking and imagination, each by itself, seem clear in these passages. Moreover, if practical mind may have perception fulfil its presentative needs in some action situations the passage cited before would accord with our interpretation. That it does is suggested by a passage in the *M¹* where Aristotle, having explained how a reasoning process often precedes action (practical syllogism), adds:

But as sometimes happens when we ask dialectical questions, so here reason does not stop and consider at all the second of the two premises, the obvious one. For example, if taking a walk is good for a man, it does not waste time considering that he is a man. Hence whatever we do without calculating, we do quickly. For whenever a creature is actually using sense-perception or *phantasia* or thought towards the thing for-the-sake-of-which, he does at once what he desires. For the activity of desire takes the place of questioning or thinking. "I have to drink", says appetite. "Here's drink", says sense perception or *phantasia* or thought. At once he drinks⁴⁶.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 598, 433b 10-15.

46 M.C.Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*, p. 40, 701a 26-33.

Perception, as well as the other two discriminatory faculties can present the object pursued to practical mind. The passage of DA above, that treats of practical mind, would hence admit perception as one of the discriminatory faculties that complement desire, and it states that thought and *phantasia* may do so. We have seen ample evidence, then, for the thesis that the three discriminatory faculties can each complement desire.

b) *Perception Passive*- Nussbaum defends her view of sense-perception as passive on the basis of her reading of chapter 12 of Book II of DA and chapter 7 of the MA. Though this view collapses with the basic hypothesis, as part of the concomitant thesis, I believe it worthwhile to show its defects. In Book II (DA), from chapter 6 onwards, Aristotle provides an account of sensation. He explains sensation as a qualitative alteration in the perceptual organ caused by an external object through a medium, which involves the awareness of the sense-quality produced. What he calls "special objects of sense" and qualifies as, e.g., a "color patch", seem to be "sensa" which result passively from the action of external objects upon the perceiver. In Book II he is mainly concerned with each of the senses individually, and their function relative to the special sensibles. And yet Aristotle does not limit sensation to the special sensibles. As Schofield indicated when examining Ross' interpretation of 428b 18-30, in the sixth chapter of Book II, sense-perception is explained as providing not only the "special sensibles" but the "common sensibles" and "incidentals". And, even when the most immediate aspect of perception is that of the special sensibles, it belongs to the faculty of sensation to actively integrate the information of the different senses. Aristotle indicates this -without involving *phantasia* in any way in this process- in the first two chapters of Book III, when speaking of the unifying role of the general faculty of sensation. It is general sensibility, he also tells us, and not a particular sense, that makes available the common sensibles. Only if we limit perception to the apprehension of the special sensibles, as Aristotle does not, would Nussbaum's passive account of perception seem plausible.

Another argument against passive perception was provided by Schofield against Ross (*supra* pp. 12-13). Though not appropriate against Ross⁴⁷, it serves against Nussbaum. If *phantasia* is

47 The passage quoted by Schofield from Ross to suggest his passive view of sensation (*supra* p. 12, note 14), continues as follows: "But for the most part Aristotle describes imagination in a way that involves no such reversal of his doctrine; and it may be doubted whether the passage just referred to repre-

complementary to passive perception because it completes the perceptual process, why did not Aristotle explain this in his account of perception? And, why would he start the last part of III 3, where *phantasia* is the issue, by restating his views of perception of the special objects of sense, the common sensibles and the incidentals, and describe *phantasia* as a subsistent motion derived from each of these types of perceptions? Nussbaum's claim, that the passages previous to the last part of III 3 do not lead to it, seems to me untenable. She sees correctly that her passive view of perception would not accord with a characterization of *phantasia* as derivative from a perception that yields already common sensibles and incidentals. But her argument to show this part unreliable is flawed; the last part does contain the characterization of *phantasia* in this context, and it is entirely what would be expected after its negative characterization in the previous passages (not sensation, nor opinion, etc.). The positive features of *phantasia* that are there offered are just what typically would follow its negative treatment.

Nussbaum's defense of her passive view of perception on the basis of chapter 7 of the MA is, I believe, the product of a mistake. Aristotle in this chapter deals with the physiological account of the beginnings of motion. He explain bodily movements in analogy to that of machines, as if using cables (sinews) and pegs (bones). The parts of the animal are said to change size: "expand because of heat and contract again because of cold"⁴⁸, and this alteration is the first motion of the body. In this account Aristotle suggests that all three discriminatory faculties can bring about the alteration; he says:

Alteration is caused by *phantasiai* and sense-perceptions and ideas. For sense-perceptions are at once a kind of alteration and *phantasia* and thinking have the power of the actual things. For it turns out that the form conceived of the [warm or cold or] pleasant or fearful is like the actual thing itself. That is why we shudder and are frightened just thinking of something. All these are affections and alterations; and when bodily parts are altered some become larger, some smaller⁴⁹.

There is evidence here for our position on the discriminatory faculties. But our concern now is Nussbaum's use of this passage to defend her view of perception on the one hand, and thinking

sent his deliberate view", Sir D. Ross, *Aristotle*, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966, p. 143.

48 M.C. Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*, p. 42, 701b 15.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 42, 701b 16-27.

and *phantasia*, on the other, points to a difference in the type of awareness of these experiences (*supra* p. 22). But Aristotle is not concerned here with the discriminatory faculties *per se*. The specific affections heat and cold and the change in size they bring about in parts of the body are his main concern. These affections may be concomitants to a sensual experience of another sort, vision for example; and such the latter could be said to start motion. But the alteration in vision is qualitative and, though this is a physiological change for Aristotle, it is not a change in size of bodily parts. Heat or cold may be concomitants of vision but are not the basis for the sensory awareness of color.

Aristotle in the passage above does emphasize the proximity between the alterations that yield sensations in general and the alterations underlying heat and coldness, and he also suggests that each discriminatory faculty may arouse the thermic sensation which explains the quantitative change in body parts whereby motion is initiated. But this physiological change is different from the one that accounts for the sensory experience as awareness, and should not be used, as Nussbaum does, as a criterion by which to distinguish the awareness of perception as passive from those of *phantasia* and thinking.

C. Concluding interpretative remarks

The critical part of this paper contains a significant portion of our interpretation. Now, in accordance with our methodological indications, we shall further that interpretation by first briefly examining various contexts in which "*phantasia*" is used, and afterwards, sorting out its different connotations in search of its fundamental meaning.

In III 3 *phantasia* is approached in order to clarify its relation to thinking. In this effort Aristotle compares *phantasia* to her discriminatory faculties and relates it to imagining and to dreaming. A considerable amount of information about *phantasia* is available from this chapter. The basic feature of the faculty in this context is being the sensibility-aspect of thinking, which, however, does not make of it sense-perception. Aristotle, as I indicated before, is interested in avoiding the suggestion that it be considered sense-perception, in order to disclaim that thinking is perception. This is behind the distinction between sensation and *phantasia* in 428a 5-16, where, as we saw, the third and fourth arguments stress *phantasia's* fallibility.

In the first argument of 428a 5-16 the two faculties are distinguished as follows:

(1) Sense is either a faculty or an activity, e.g. sight or seeing; imagination takes place in the absence of both, as e.g. in dreams⁵⁰.

The terms "faculty" and "activity" here make us think of *potentia* and actuality, and the reference to dreams suggests the contrast between perception of the external object and the mere representation of it in consciousness. If we emphasize this last point, the denying of potentiality and actuality to imagination seems equivalent to asserting that it is not a faculty for perceiving external objects, in a process that actualizes this potency in the perceiver, no such *potentia*, nor process occurs in the case of *phantasia*.

In the fifth and last argument of 428a 5-16 Aristotle seems to go back to this point:

And (5) as we were saying before, visions appear to us even when our eyes are shut⁵¹.

Since this statement follows argument four, it would seem that it has to do with *phantasia's* fallibility, but what it stresses most is the contrast between sense-perception, as a source of presentations of external objects where the perceptual organs are involved, and the type of presentation (that of *phantasia*) which does not use the perceptual organ (in the same way) and bears no direct relation to the real perceptible object.

In Aristotle's effort to distinguish *phantasia* from sensation we get the impression that the objects of *phantasia* are subjective picture-like presentations, like those of dreams or other "visions". This agrees with the passage that Schofield interprets as referring to imagination, 427b 16-24. There, Aristotle, interested in the judgement aspect of thinking, in this same context of III 3, distinguishes *phantasia* from opinion by saying:

That this activity is not the same kind of thinking as judging is obvious. For imagining lies within our own power whenever we wish (e.g. we can call up a picture as in the practice of mnemonics by the use of mental images) but in forming opinions we are not free...⁵².

Imagination seems clearly the function in question. The passage not only provides the criteria of wilfulness, distinctive of *phantasia* as free conjuring of images, but the practice of mnemonics it

50 Aristotle, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, p. 587, 428a 6-7.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 587, 428a 15.

52 *Ibid.*, p. 587, 427b 16-20.

refers to is explicitly said to involve subjective picture-like images. Aristotle adds that the experience lacks the emotional involvement of belief, for it is like "looking at a painting". This strengthens the "representative image" interpretation.

In distinguishing *phantasia* and opinion Aristotle clearly states, immediately before referring to the sun counter-example of 428b 1-2, that whereas opinion involves discourse of reason and belief, *phantasia* does not. The counter-example is offered to preclude that it be considered sensation and opinion together, and seems difficult to harmonize with the previous emphasis on subjective images. As we stated in our criticism of Schofield (*supra* p. 28), *phantasia* is here a quasi-perceptual faculty that yields a meaningful candid presentation which results from what at first sight seems a perception of the sun. It is not a perception proper, however, because the object it offers seems to have a size it does not have. It would seem that the deceptive character of the presentation brings about the usage of the term "*phantasia*", for otherwise Aristotle would call the experience "perception". In any cases it is clear that the presentation is not a subjective image but what we take to be the external object appearing as it is not.

This view of *phantasia* as quasi-perceptual is borne out by its use in action contexts. As one of the discriminatory faculties that complements desire it is important for animal behavior and that of men in special conditions. Aristotle says in the last sentence of III 3:

And because imaginations remain in the organs of sense and resemble sensations, animals in their actions are largely guided by them, some (i.e. the brutes) because of the non-existence in them of mind, others (i.e. men) because of the temporary eclipse in them of mind by feeling or disease or sleep⁵³.

Phantasia in various works is linked to human action under perceptual conditions which promote deception. In such cases the presentation does not provide the external object itself, but something that at most has some similarity to it, something that does not accord with what the true perception of the external object would be. This usage suggests a presentation of *phantasia* that is not epistemologically reliable and agrees with what we have called the "quasi-perceptual" role of *phantasia* in the sun counter-example. In brutes *phantasia* would seem to be either the "perception" of animals, or an aspect of their perceptual experience. As such it would be significant for most of their motivational presentations. These

53 *Ibid.*, p. 589, 429a 4-8.

are presentations that lack the influence of reason and are thus highly fallible. According to Aristotle, then, in men and animals, *phantasia* role in action is not that of presenting a subjective image but that of providing what, in the case of men, must be called "a quasi-perceptual experience" -the initial meaningful sensory impression which lacks the input of the critical faculty and should not be called "perception"- and, in the case of animals, results from their limited and fallible form of perception.

We have seen Aristotle refer to dreams as if they were instances of *phantasia* in the first argument of 428a 5-16. And *phantasia* is the faculty involved in the mnemonic practice of 427b 16-24. In "De Insomniis" and "De Memoria" these psychological functions are said to belong to the faculty of sense-perception as presentative. This presentative faculty is there characterized in a way that suggests to us that it is the same as *phantasia*.

Aristotle addresses in the two works of "Parva Naturalia" the question, "To which faculty do dreams and memories belong?" In each case the question is posed against the possibility of answering by ascribing the function to thinking (intelligence) or to sense-perception. And for both dreams and memories, the answer is that they are part of the faculty of sense-perception, and may only incidentally be intellective. But they are not sense-perception in its ordinary sense. In "De Insomniis", for example, Aristotle says:

But since we have, in our work on the Soul, treated of presentation, and the faculty of presentation is identical with that of sense-perception, though the essential notion of the faculty of presentation is different from that of a faculty of sense-perception; and since presentation is the movement set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function, while a dream appears to be a presentation (for a presentation which occurs in sleep -whether simply or in some particular way- is what we call a dream): it manifestly follows that dreaming is an activity of the faculty of sense-perception, but belong to this faculty *qua* presentative⁵⁴.

The distinction between sense-perception and the faculty of presentation here is not clear, and we may not see any difference in sense-perception involving a movement of a sensory faculty (as Aristotle frequently says) and a movement in presentation "set up by a sensory faculty when actually discharging its function". A distinction, however, is intended. Moreover, Aristotle also tells us that a dream does not engage the perceptual organs as sense-perceptions do, that while it is not opinion, "yet (it) is not an affection of the faculty of perception in the simple sense. If it were

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 619, 459a 15-22.

the latter it would be possible [when] asleep to hear and see in the simple sense⁵⁵. It is clear that dreams are not sense-perception, for they do not provide access to the external perceptible object and do not use the physiological perceptual system in the way perceptions do. They do, however, affect the perceptual faculty as decaying subsisting motions, as Aristotle explains in this context, and do this in a way that yields a "perceptible object" similar to the real one.

One is tempted to look for the difference between sense-perception and the presentative faculty in the distinction (characteristic of the contrast between dreams and memories on the one hand, and perceptions, on the other) between having and not having the external object. Aristotle's emphasis on the "actual discharge" of the function of a sensory faculty seems to me, however, to stress the actual "presentation" as phenomenal awareness, against, in the case of sense-perception, the awareness of the external object, and, in dreams, the awareness only of what is merely subjective. This would mean that the notion "presentative faculty" is useful to Aristotle in relation to "presentations" in a technical sense that would include meaningful conscious contents, not external perceptions. Such contents may only be subjective, or may turn out to be, on the evidence of additional or previous presentations, external objects. A presentation, as such, belongs to *phantasia*. A presentation considered a real object is an instance of perception.

The reference in the passage above to a part in DA where the presentative faculty was treated alludes, I believe, to the last part of III 3, where Aristotle characterizes *phantasia*.

But since when one thing has been set in motion another thing may be moved by it, and imagination is held to be a movement and to be impossible without sensation, i.e. to occur in beings that are percipient and to have for its content what can be perceived, and since movement may be produced by actual sensation and that movement is necessarily similar in character to the sensation itself, this movement may be (1) necessarily (a) incapable of existing apart from sensation, (b) incapable of existing except when we perceive, (2) such that in virtue of its possession that in which it is found may present various phenomena both active and passive, and (3) such that it may be either true or false⁵⁶.

Phantasia, we are told here, may be discharged concurrently with sensation. It is also a derived motion from sensation, as the first lines above imply, and Aristotle says explicitly in the next para-

55 *Ibid.*, p. 619, 459a 10-12.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 588, 428b 10-19.

graph. It is fallible and has as its object "what can be perceived". One has to infer that its object is "perceptible" insofar phenomenally it is similar to the presentation of the external object, for the latter may not be present in *phantasia*. To speak of motion concurrent with sensation which is *phantasia* and not sensation would seem equivalent to be speaking of presentation. Subsistent derived motion, however, would seem to refer to presentations in which the external object is absent, as in dreams. This crucial passage of DA, the last part of III 3, then, accords with a view of *phantasia* as a faculty for subjective appearances and also of perceptual or quasi-perceptual presentations considered just as presentations. It is consistent with the part of the "De Insomniis" that we believe refers to it, and confirms our interpretation that *phantasia* is the presentative faculty to which dreams and memories are attributed.

This interpretation agrees with the way Aristotle relates the presentative faculty responsible for dreams to deceptive experiences in "De Insomniis". He says "that the faculty by which, in waking hours, we are subject to illusion when affected by disease, is identical with that which produces illusory effects in sleep"⁵⁷. The faculty in question is responsible, too, for appearances like the sun of the counter-example, to which Aristotle alludes in stressing that even when we are healthiest it may deceive (*supra* p.28, footnote 40). He calls this faculty here "the presentative faculty" whereas in DA the inaccurate sun presentation was attributed to *phantasia*. And like *phantasia* the presentative faculty is, in "De Insomniis", said to belong to the general faculty of sense.

We saw Aristotle distinguish opinion from *phantasia* in DA. In "De Insomniis" dream appearances are characterized as different from, and liable to be assisted by, opinion, for:

Sometimes, too, opinion says [to dreamers] just as to those who are awake, that the object seen is an illusion: at other times it is inhibited, and becomes a mere follower of the phantasm⁵⁸.

The contrast in dreams between the phantasm (as the initial appearance which lacks reason) and opinion, is similar to the contrast between appearance and opinion in the sun counter-example. In the latter, however, the experience is quasi-perceptual, not a subjective dream appearance. What appears in both cases is a *phantasma*. In a dream, it may be recognized as just a dream presentation, though, as Aristotle will explain, "the ruling faculty" (reason) is weakened

57 *Ibid.*, p. 619, 458b 26-28.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 619, 459a 7-10.

in that state and the appearance may be taken for real. When we are awake it may oppose an existing opinion, as what is immediate and candid against what results from coherent rational integration of extensive experience.

This contrast between the initial presentation as candid and lacking reason's involvement seems clear in the following passage of "De Insomniis", which also shows the use of the term "phantasm" for another type of conscious presentation:

So too, in sleep we sometimes have thoughts other than the mere phantasms immediately before our minds. There are cases of persons who have seen such dreams, those, for example, who believe themselves to be mentally arranging a given list of subjects according to the mnemonic rule. They frequently find themselves engaged in something else besides the dream, viz. in setting a phantasm which they envisage in its mnemonic position. Hence it is plain that not every 'phantasm' in sleep is a mere dream-image, and that the further thinking which we perform then is due to an exercise of the faculty of opinion⁵⁹.

In the first sentences quoted above "phantasm" is used for a conscious content that is contrasted to what results from ordering a list of subjects according to a mnemonic rule. Such a phantasm is a passively given meaningful presentation. In the last sentence of the passage "phantasm" is used for something different from a "mere dream-image" -the one previously denoted "phantasm". What results after the active intervention of reason, the opinion, is now a "phantasm". The genus that affords this distinction between two different meanings of "phantasm" is that of "presentation". And the two meanings are, candid initial non-critical presentation, and, secondary rationally processed presentation.

The foregoing twofold usage of "phantasm" is inconsistent with Aristotle's use of the term as the object of *phantasia*. In denying that *phantasia* is opinion on the grounds that it lacks rational discourse, and in stressing its presentative significance, Aristotle leads us to believe that this faculty does not include the rationally processed presentation which he here calls "a phantasm". The combination of both usages, though infrequent, suggests a meaning whereby the term "phantasm" would accommodate most, if not all, phenomenal contents. This lends itself to the interpretation of *phantasia* as the general faculty of sensory and quasi-sensory presentations so earnestly rejected by Schofield. We can avoid that interpretation by simply recognizing as more feasible the view that

59 *Ibid.*, p. 618, 458b 17-26.

"phantasm" for Aristotle designates, at least occasionally, more than the presentations of *phantasia*.

In "Parva Naturalia" Aristotle, as Nussbaum acknowledges, uses !! *phantasia* as the faculty for subjective presentations in dreams and memories which resemble the external perceptible object. These are image presentations which could be taken for the real thing. His view that dreams are not a function of the intellect but of sense-perception as presentative is stressed by showing their proximity to deceptive experiences. Both belong to the presentative faculty, being neither opinions nor ordinary perceptions. The comparison of dreams and deceptive presentations rests on their common deceptive character. The latter feature is significant in the case of deceptive waking experiences, for it shows that the appearance is not really a perception and belongs to the presentative faculty. In the case of dreams, deceptiveness may result from "what appears" (*phainetai*), but it is not correct to interpret that aspect, with Schofield, as their *phantasia*-aspect. Rather, they are objects of *phantasia* as appearances, i.e., as subjective meaningful contents yielded by the presentative faculty.

Three aspects of *phantasia* are prominent from our analysis of its different uses, which make it out to be: (1) the faculty of subjective presentations; (2) the faculty for quasi-perceptual experiences; (3) the presentative faculty, i.e. the faculty of conscious contents considered as presentations. If we stress the opposition between the perceptual nature of quasi-perceptual experiences and the subjective meaning of phantasm in the other two functions of *phantasia*, an inconsistency would be found. But there is an obvious proximity in these different functions, which stands out best in the third meaning of "*phantasia*": *phantasia* is the faculty of those presentations that are not perceptions of external objects but either conscious contents just considered as such, or recognized to be wholly or in part subjective. While quasi-perceptual presentations are not images they include a subjective distorting addition to what the true perception would be that requires, for both psychological and epistemological reasons, that they be distinguished from perceptions. The objects of *phantasia*, then, are presentations understood and considered within the context of consciousness, mainly without the reference to the external world that many presentations are believed to provide or to represent. When this reference is present (in quasi-perception) the experiences are instances of *phantasia* in that they too are partially subjective, and not perceptions of real external objects.

To conclude, unlike Nussbaum, we must recognize that images as pictorial resemblances of external objects, not always willfully conjured, are basic in Aristotle's conception of *phantasia*. They are

the presentational contents upon which thinking is built, the objects of imagining, and the contents of dreams and of memories. And we may even say, in proximity to Schofield, that images are involved in quasi-perceptual experiences. As the subjective aspect of a meaningful candid presentation, and not as imaginative contents conjured in order to address the problem of dubiousness, they are important for the distinction between a quasi-perception and a perception.

Aristotle's notion of *phantasia* suggests the recognition of consciousness as the domain where everything significant for us appears. It seems called for by end the need to address the Protagorean thesis that equates reality and appearance, and the concomitant problem of distinguishing pure subjective contents from the presentations of external reality. Aristotle needs to distinguish between the faculty of the soul that experientially provides access to the external world and the faculty whereby the life of consciousness, understood as consciousness, may be explained. !! *phantasia* has this enormous role to play relative to perception. In thinking it serves to link perception and conceptualization. Physiologically and phenomenally the consciousness entailed in thinking for Aristotle is grounded in the concrete, and while the intellect of man places him in the summit of reality, *phantasia* maintains him, even in the foremost flights of speculation, bound to his corporeal nature.

University of Puerto Rico (Mayagüez)

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RESUMEN

En este artículo se trata el tema de la *phantasia* en Aristóteles tomando como punto de partida los artículos sobre el mismo de Malcolm Schofield ("Aristotle on the Imagination") y Martha Nussbaum ("The Role of *Phantasia* in Aristotle's Explanation of Action"). Para el primero, *phantasia* en Aristóteles es una facultad que complementa a la percepción en el caso de experiencias anómalas en que nuestro aparato perceptual no funciona bien, experiencias a las que llama "experiencias sensoriales no-paradigmáticas". Martha Nussbaum, a su vez, sostiene que la *phantasia* es una función complementaria de la percepción y el pensar, según Aristóteles, que permite que los objetos de estas facultades adquieran pleno sentido, tal que puedan motivar el movimiento de los animales. La *phantasia* es, según ella, aquello que complementa la *aisthesis* en Aristóteles, de por sí pasiva, y que nos permite la experiencia de objetos y no sólo la percepción de datos sensoriales.

Aquí, en cambio, se sugiere comenzar con un análisis imparcial de las distintas significaciones que la *phantasia* parece tener en diferentes contextos. Siguiendo este método se establecen como preeminentes los siguientes tres significados de "*phantasia*": 1) es la facultad de presentaciones subjetivas; 2) es la facultad de experiencias cuasi-perceptuales; 3) es la facultad presentativa, es decir, la facultad de contenidos de conciencia considerados en tanto presentaciones a la conciencia solamente. Se concluye destacando que el último sentido parece el más importante, de manera que los otros puedan entenderse en relación a éste; así la *phantasia* sería la facultad de presentaciones que no son consideradas como presentaciones del objeto externo mismo (las que da la percepción), sino como contenidos de conciencia solamente, o de índole tal que se reconocen dudosos o enteramente subjetivos.