



FROM SYNTAX TO PHRASEOLOGY: A PHRASEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SCHEMATIC CAUSED-MOTION CONSTRUCTIONS IN ENGLISH

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ABSTRACT. This article presents the main grammatical characteristics of English constructions generally referred to as *complex transitive constructions* (Quirk et al., 1985), *causative resultatives* (Goldberg and Jackendoff, 2004) and *caused-motion constructions* (Goldberg, 1995, 2006, 2018). It is claimed, in light of some empirical corpus-based studies (Hampe, 2010; Rosa, 2020; Xia, 2017) that low-level phraseological constructions such ‘*talk some sense into somebody*’ play a crucial role in motivating the entrenchment and use of highly schematic caused motions such as ‘*Frank sneezed the foam off the cappuccino*’. In order to support this view with empirical data, we present the analysis of 1284 caused-motion utterances extracted from the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), out of which we were able to identify 12 fixed expressions and 9 statistically attested phraseologisms. At last, we discuss the implications that such relationship between grammar and phraseology may present in the understanding of schematic structures such as the caused motion.

Keywords: Construction Grammar, caused-motion constructions, phraseologism, schematic constructions, teaching, get.

DE LA SINTAXIS A LA FRASEOLOGÍA: UN ENFOQUE FRASEOLÓGICO A LAS CONSTRUCCIONES ESQUEMÁTICAS DE MOVIMIENTO CAUSADO EN INGLÉS

RESUMEN. Este artículo presenta las principales características gramaticales de las construcciones inglesas generalmente denominadas *construcciones transitivas complejas* (Quirk et al., 1985), *causativas resultantes* (Goldberg and Jackendoff, 2004) y *construcciones de movimiento causado* (Goldberg, 1995, 2006, 2018). Se afirma, a la luz de algunos estudios empíricos basados en corpus (Hampe, 2010; Rosa, 2020; Xia, 2017), que las construcciones fraseológicas de bajo nivel como ‘talk some sense into somebody’ desempeñan un papel crucial a la hora de motivar el afianzamiento y el uso de movimientos muy esquemáticos provocados como ‘*Franksneezed the foam off the cappuccino*’. Para respaldar este punto de vista con datos empíricos, presentamos el análisis de 1284 expresiones de movimiento causado extraídas del Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), de las cuales pudimos identificar 12 expresiones fijas y 9 fraseologismos comprobados estadísticamente. Por último, discutimos las implicaciones que dicha relación entre gramática y fraseología puede presentar en la comprensión de estructuras esquemáticas como el movimiento causado.

Palabras clave: Gramática de la construcción, construcciones con movimiento causado, fraseologismo, construcciones esquemáticas, enseñanza, *get*.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The role played by formulaicity in real communication is of indisputable importance in current linguistic theory (Ellis, 2008, 2013; Moon, 1998; Wray & Perkins, 2000; Wray, 2002, Wulff, 2008). However, not until recently had cognitive models of language recognized its importance in speakers’ cognition. This may be due to the long-lasting commitment to a modular view of language, which pulled syntax and the lexicon apart as independent modules. Contrary to this belief, are the various current cognitive linguistic approaches (Goldberg, 1995, 2006, 2013; Langacker, 2013) for which no clear-cut boundaries can be drawn in the structure of language (Evans, 2012; Lakoff, 1991). Instead, for cognitive linguistics, as well as for other empirical approaches to language, such as corpus linguistics (Gries, 2006, 2008, 2012; Sinclair, 1991, Wulff, 2008), syntax and the lexicon are believed to form a continuum of conventional symbolic units (Langacker, 1987), or constructions (Goldberg, 1995), which exhibit different levels of complexity, specificity and schematicity (Evans, 2012).

In other words, these nonmodular views of language are able to accommodate, within the same theoretical framework, highly schematic argument structure constructions such as the caused-motion construction in (1) as well as conventional phraseologisms that instantiate these schematic constructions as (2).

- (1) She takes after my dad's side of the family, which is a drag because they're all alcoholics and *drink themselves into an early grave*. (MAG/2002) ¹
- (2) First, we'll invest in the American worker. We will *breathe new life into your very rundown highways, railways, and waterways*. (SPOK/2018)

Constructions in (1) and (2) are analyzed as two ends of a continuum. In (1), considering that the oblique argument *into an early grave* is not subcategorized by the prototypical argument structure of the predicate *drink*, this oblique argument can be said to respond to demands at a more schematic, abstract, constructional level. In spite of instantiating the schematic and abstract [Subj V Obj Obliq] construction, expressions like *[they] drink themselves into an early grave* may thus serve as evidence of speakers' constructional knowledge of this syntactic structure. In (2), on the other hand, *breathe new life into your very rundown highways, railways, and waterways*, which is also a structural instance of the scheme [V Obj Obliq], seems to be a rather stable, fixed and semantically condensed version of this scheme, that is, a phraseologism. Evidence to that is that *breathe* is the first lemmatized collocate in the verbal slot of the scheme *V life into* on COCA Corpus (Table 1), as well as the fact that *breathe life into* is recognized as an idiom², thus a kind of phraseologism, in some dictionaries³.

Table 1. COCA search for Verb '*life into*'

Verb	Freq. V + ' <i>life into</i> '	General Freq. of V	% of V + ' <i>life into</i> '	MI score
breathe	886	20288	0.34	9.11
bring	813	197497	0.01	4.13
inject	812	2883	0.14	7.84
pour	419	15385	0.03	4.42
blow	391	37579	0.01	4.13
pump	345	14814	0.01	4.48
divide	207	15899	0.01	4.37

As the data above show, *breathe life into* shows a considerable level of syntactic fixedness which is evidenced by the high level of attractiveness between *breathe*

¹ The examples provided here have all been taken from COCA. The information at the end of the sample refers respectively to the textual genre the sentence was taken from as well as the year of publication.

² The word *life* in *breathe life into something* can be modified by the adjectives *new* or *fresh*. Thus, the phraseologism is a type of *formal idiom* (Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor, 1988) in which not all slots are lexically fixed.

³ *Breathe life into something* appears as a conventional idiom in the following online dictionaries: Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, Cambridge Academic Content Dictionary and Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary.

and *life into*. The MI score⁴ of 9.11, way above the conventionally accepted 3.0 for statistical significance, indicates a strong probability for *breathe* and *life into* to occur in the data (McEnery and Hardie, 2012; Brezina, 2018).

Therefore, the constructional approach to the expressions exemplified in (1) and (2) is able to provide an integral account of their form-functional properties under the same framework by positing that the schematic caused motion in (1) and the caused-motion phraseologism in (2) are two ends on a continuum, that is, the completely schematic (1) on one end and completely lexicalized (2) on the other end. Additionally, empirical studies on corpora data (Gries, 2006, 2008, 2012; Hampe, 2010; Sinclair, 1991, Wulff, 2008) show that low-level phraseological constructions play an essential role in the entrenchment and use of grammatical structures in adult language use (Hampe, 2010), in learner production (Rosa, 2020) as well as in first language acquisition contexts (Goldberg, 1995; Israel, 2004, Tomasello, 2003). All things considered, this paper adopts a constructional “what you see is what you get” approach (Goldberg, 2003: 229) to the relationship between schematic constructions and phraseologisms and seeks to contribute to this literature by claiming that phraseologisms – crystalized instances of schematic constructions – contribute to the entrenchment of abstract structures, along the lines of what has been claimed in Rosa (2023) in the context of English language teaching.

The following sections advocate for the significance of phraseology to the entrenchment of abstract grammatical constructions (the caused-motion construction) by showing that English has a number of prefabricated caused-motion phraseologisms which are independent from their corresponding abstract structures. After that and in the form of a case study, the paper then offers an empirical discussion of the highly polysemous predicate *get* and its most frequent phraseologisms based on the compilation and analysis of 1284 utterances extracted from COCA Corpus.

2. BACKGROUND TO CAUSED MOTIONS: COMPLEX TRANSITIVE CONSTRUCTIONS

Transitive complementation has been one of the main foci of attention in grammatical studies due to the centrality that verbs have always had in the analysis of grammar. Dating back to Fillmore’s case grammar (Fillmore, 1968), the canonical analyses aimed at identifying the semantic roles (called *cases* in Fillmore’s theory) required by different verbs. These semantic requirements, determined in the deep structure, would be held responsible for the wellformedness and/or (un)grammaticality of the surface structure constructions. With that in mind, sentences such as (3) and (4) below would be rendered ungrammatical as a result

⁴ McEnery & Hardie (2012: 247) define MI score as “a statistic that indicates how strong the link between two things is. Mutual information can be used to calculate collocations by indicating the strength of the co-occurrence relationship between a node and collocate”.

of the omission of essential cases demanded by the predicative relations established by the verb.

(3) *Mary gave the book.

(4) *I saw.

In case grammar parlance, the ungrammaticality (or unacceptability) of the sentences above results from what the conceptual structures of the verbs *give* and *see* require as complements. *Give* is a three-place predicate that demands a subject, a direct object and an indirect object, whereas *see* is a two-place predicate that requires a subject and an object. The ungrammaticality of (3) and (4) was accounted for by the absence of all the case relations established in the deep structure. As such, the semantic relations could not be mapped onto the syntax on the surface structure, thus affecting the wellformedness of the sentences. These predicative relations, as established by verbs and their semantic-syntactic requirements, have been the norm in mainstream linguistics (Chomsky, 1965, 1981; Lyons, 1968, 1977) ever since, but they have also been widely adopted in general language studies, from descriptive grammars (Carter and McCarthy, 2006; Quirk et al., 1985) to pedagogical grammars of English (Celce-Murcia; Larsen-Freeman, 1999).

Based on the lexicalist approach exemplified in (3) and (4), valency relations were determined by specific classes of verbs and their complementation patterns. For instance, by the name of *complex transitive complementation*, Quirk et al. (1985) analyze sentences such as (5) and (6) below by projecting the semantic relations of specific verbs onto the structure of clauses.

(5) She presumed *that her father was dead*.

(6) a. She presumed *her father to be dead*.

b. She presumed *her father dead*.

(Quirk et al., 1985: 1195)

In the analysis proposed, Quirk et al. (1985) claim that the italicized elements in (6b) are to be analyzed in association with the predicative relations between a nominal subject and a predicate in simple nominal clauses. The post-verbal complements *her father* and *dead* are then analyzed respectively as an *object* and an *object complement*. Thus, *her father dead* in (6b) would be a small and reduced version of the infinitive clause in (6a), which could in turn be expanded into the *that*-clause in (5). The complementation of *dead* in relation to *her father* is exemplified below.

(7) She presumed [*her father* [*dead*]].



The same analysis is extended to complex transitive sentences in which the post-verbal complements denote respectively a THEME and an oblique complement with a directional interpretation, as (8) and (9) below.

(8) In a normal setting, she would *push* them *out of the way* with a flick of the fingers (Fiction/2017)

(9) Men's Central? Yeah. I want to *get* him *into protective custody*. (TV/2016)

According to Quirk et al. (1985), in sentences such as (8) and (9), the italicized PPs following the direct objects are *predication adjuncts* which, say the authors, are customarily of two types: 1) prepositional phrases of space; and 2) prepositional phrases of direction. The examples provided are given below.

(10) I slipped the key *into the lock*.

(11) He stood my argument *on its head*.

(12) The attendant **showed** us *to our seats*.

(13) May I **see** you *home*?

(14) They **talked** me *into it*.

(Quirk et al., 1985: 1201)

Sentences (10), (12), (13) and (14) all exemplify adjuncts denoting *direction*, whereas (11) presents a spatial adjunct with a metaphorical reading. The authors draw attention to the fact that this clause pattern takes causative verbs (e.g. *put, get, stand, set, lay, place, send, bring, take, lead, drive*, etc.), but also accepts non-causative events such as the ones in (12), (13) and (14), whose verbs could, respectively, be paraphrased as *conducted, escort* and *persuaded*.

The analysis satisfactorily accounts for data of the type exemplified in (10) and (11), given that the clause patterns are mirrored by the verbal semantics. That is, one need not even posit directional or locative phrases labelled *adjuncts*, since they are predicted by the lexical-semantic demands of the main predicate. Instead, these directional and locative expressions could be considered complements. On the issue of PPs as complements, Lyons (1977: 495 - 496) states that "most recent treatments of case-grammar tend to give the impression that only nominals may fulfill valency-roles in the propositional nuclei of sentences. This is not so. Locative (and directional) adverbs may also occur as the complements of the appropriate verbs [...]".

Should one consider that the predicative relations in clauses are derived from the conceptual structure of verbs, the directional in (10) and the locative in (11) cannot

be adjuncts since adjuncts are *circumstantial* and *non-core* elements in the structure of sentences. Another descriptive problem that emerges from considering directional expressions, this time in (12), (13) and (14), as adjuncts lies in the fact that, as Quirk et al. (1985) themselves stated, verbs such as *show*, *see* and *talk* are not causative in their prototypical use. If *to our seats*, *home* and *into it*, respectively in (12), (13) and (14), were real adjuncts, hence non-core sentence elements, their deletion would not jeopardize the grammaticality and/or acceptability of the sentences, which is what the sentences below seem to demonstrate, with the exception of *talk*, which is intransitive.

(15) The attendant **showed** us ~~*to our seats*~~.

(16) May I **see** you ~~*home*~~?

(17) *They **talked** me ~~*into it*~~.

As the examples above show, the deletion of the so-called adjuncts does not compromise the acceptability of the sentences, considering that the valency of *showed* and *see* is satisfactorily completed by *us* and *you* functioning as complements. However, in spite of the grammaticality maintained in (15) and (16), can we still paraphrase the verbs in (15), (16) and (17) to mean *conducted*, *escort* and *persuaded*? The answer is clearly “no” and this seems to suggest that such verbs only accept new meanings when they are integrated with sentential structures that predict the realization of directional PPs as sentence arguments. In order to reconcile the analysis of directional PPs as adjuncts and non-causative verbs that conform to the patterns in (15), (16) and (17), the explanation should posit that the verbs *show*, *see* and *talk*, for instance, would respectively mean:

- (i) to conduct someone up to a place by showing the way;
- (ii) to escort someone somewhere;
- (iii) to persuade someone to do something by talking to them.

Such an explanation, though efficient with the data above, would face empirical problems, given the number of verbs which could conform to such a pattern. Also, should the verbs really encapsulate the meanings in (i), (ii) and (iii), the directional PPs would have to be essential elements for the grammaticality of the sentences with such verbs and their deletion would render the constructions unacceptable. As (15), (16) and (17) showed, this is not the case. Instead, these data seem to be on better descriptive grounds if we propose a rather simple and intuitive explanation. That is, as we have discussed before, such verbs seem to mean what they mean only when the sentential pattern, one with a caused-motion meaning, *coerces* them to denote a causative event. In other words, the schematic [Subj V Obj Obl] frame, rather than the verb, subcategorizes an oblique argument which can be instantiated

by a directional PP. This seems to elegantly account for the type of expressions exemplified thus far, especially those of a more schematic nature such as (1).

Proposals of schematic events at the semantic level that operate with pre-event notions of MOTION, EFFECT, RESULT, etc. and that do not rely on the verbs that instantiate these relations, had already been put forward (Lyons, 1977), but not until the advent of construction grammar (Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor, 1988; Goldberg, 1995; Langacker, 1987) did the idea of meaningful sentential schemes gain momentum in linguistics. In the following section, we describe a Cognitive Construction Grammar account of these complex transitive constructions.

3. FROM VERBS TO CONSTRUCTIONS

Goldberg (1995, 2006, 2013) also addresses the descriptive problems of accounting for the data (15) to (17) through a postulation of extra verb senses or by compositionally explaining the meaning of such constructions via processes of integration between the semantics of the verb and the prepositional phrase. For the linguist, such impossibilities back up an alternative explanation that defends the existence of an independent construction formally codified as [Subj [V Obj Obl]], where V is a nonstative verb and Obl is a directional phrase. This independent construction functionally portrays a central scene in which an X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z encompassing all expressions of the kind below.

(18)They *laughed* the poor guy out of the room.

(19)Frank *sneezed* the tissue off the table.

(20)Mary *urged* Bill into the house.

(21)Sue *let* the water out of the bathtub.

(22)Sam *helped* him into the car.

(23)They *sprayed* the paint onto the wall.

(Goldberg, 1995: 152)

To Goldberg, the expressions above behave quite idiosyncratically since their grammatical properties cannot be satisfactorily explained via processes of compositionality. The first point of refutation comes from the fact that certain verbs that appear in caused motions are not causative per se ((24) to (26)), that is, they do not denote any sort of dislocated motion when they appear in contexts other than the constructional pattern [Subj [V Obj Obl]].

(24)Joe *kicked* the dog into the bathroom.

(25) Joe *bit* the ball across the field.

(26) Frank *squeezed* the ball through the crack.

(Goldberg, 1995: 153)

Kick and *bit* do not exhibit any trait of dislocated causation and *squeeze* does not imply any sort of motion caused by the event on its object. Furthermore, verbs with different numbers of arguments can be hosted by the construction. Caused motions can host and are licensed with one-place predicates like *laugh*, *sneeze*, *cry* (27), two-place predicates like *speak*, *drink*, *help* (28) and three-place predicates like *put*, *get*, *add* (29). These data reinforce the thesis that the constructional properties of motion and causation found in the sentences cannot reflect the argument structure semantics of the verb.

(27) a. But I guarantee he's going to *laugh* you out of his office. (TV/2004)

b. Thought he'd *sneeze* himself right off the shrouds on the way up here (Fiction/2007)

c. I think in some quite literal sense, he *cried* himself into a space where he couldn't continue (Fiction/2005)

(28) a. After all He created it and I figure anyone who can *speak* the universe into existence also has the power to control climate. (Blog/2012)

b. You said your brother *drank* himself to death literally. (Spoken/2014)

c. Gavin *helped* him into the box. (Fiction/2012)

(29) a. We're going to box these things up in just a minute and *put* them on some trucks (Blog/2012)

b. I can *get* you into the house on two conditions. (TV/2010)

c. please share with me which ones you like, so I can *add* them to my list. (Blog/2012)

In defense of a constructional explanation for independent caused motions, Goldberg also discusses the treatment given by some analyses that aim to account for the data above based on the association between compositionality and the pragmatic inference of the construction. Gawron (1985) and Pustejovsky (1991) both defend that caused motions are the result of a compositional *co-predication* between the verb and the directional PPs, the latter being either considered adjuncts or arguments, while the reading of causation would be pragmatically inferred. Goldberg refutes the idea that the directional PPs are arguments required by the conceptual structure of verbs because, as we have already discussed, this could only

be envisaged in a model that would force verbs to have extra senses (see (i), (ii) and (iii) above). This model would even force one-place predicates like the ones in (27) to have an additional meaning to account for the two internal arguments (= Obj and Obl), none of which are licensed by the actual meaning of *laugh*, *sneeze* or *cry*. On the other hand, treating the directional PPs as adjuncts could not be the case, since these do not have the semantic reading of usual PP adjuncts (as in *she left the note* in the room); also, as discussed previously, were these adjuncts, we could expect them to allow for deletion without compromising the meaning of the verb. Lastly, on the idea that the causation is pragmatically inferred, this analysis would not rule out the fact that certain verbs are not allowed in the caused-motion construction like *encourage*, *persuade* or *convince*.

(30) *She *encouraged/persuaded/convincd* me into the room.

The refutations to a lexicalist view, that is, that such constructions are operated by the semantics of the verbs or licensed by general pragmatic principles, corroborate the idiosyncratic nature of the caused-motion construction and reinforce the constructional thesis, for which (27) to (29) exemplify an independent kind of structure that features in the grammatical knowledge of speakers. Caused motions are then one independent kind of construction and are schematically represented in the matrix below.




Figure 1. Central caused-motion construction (Goldberg, 1995, p. 160).

The matrix above represents the central sense of the caused motion, that is, the construction is a form-function pairing in which the *Sem*(antics) specifies a scenario in which X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z and the *Syn*(tax) is structured as [Subj [V Obj [Obl]]]. The PRED(icate) position in the matrix above is meant to host the main verb of the construction.

As was said previously, the central meaning of the caused motion is one in which an X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z, but the construction also exhibits different and extended senses. These distinct senses result from the integration between a prototypical kind of causation presented in Fig.1 and different verb classes. Goldberg (1995) presents three extended senses that are motivated by the central meaning and claims that

each particular sense represents a modified extension of the causation in the central construction, that is, the central caused-motion construction motivates, via semantic linking rules of polysemy, all of the following types of caused motions: causes to move by *enabling* (31), causes *not* to move by *preventing* (32) and causes to move by *helping* (33).

- (31) a. ...*allow* people out of the dark and into the sunlight as well.
(News/2005)
- b. We're not truly free unless we can *release* them into the world.
(Movie/2016)
- (32) a. ...injuries *kept* him out of the ring for nearly two years. (News/2019)
- b. This is the type of thing that can *trap* people into the lower classes.
(Blog/2012)
- (33) a. I wish I could *show* you out of my garden... (Blog/2012)
- b. Telling you, man, I just *walked* her out of the bank. (TV/2007)

Therefore, the model is able to motivate the use of slightly different instantiations without the need to postulate new and independent constructions. This is how the model sees the relationship between schematic grammatical argument structure constructions, such as the caused motion, and more conventional and lexicalized expressions, such as the caused-motion phraseologisms *get the message out*, *get the word out*, etc. for instance.

4. FROM CONSTRUCTIONS TO PHRASEOLOGISMS

Thus far we have examined the relationship between a central caused-motion construction and its so-called extended senses. These are said to inherit their form-functional properties from the central sense X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z via semantic links of polysemy. Nevertheless, inheritance relations can be mediated by different types of semantic links: polysemy, metaphorical extension and instantiation.

The *instance links* (abbreviated I_i) occur when one construction in particular is considered to be a special case of another construction, that is, an instance of a more general pattern, as the name itself suggests. Thus, lexically specified constructions with a fixed and conventional/idiomatic meaning, and which are formally similar to other more schematic constructions, are said to inherit their formal and/or semantic properties from such more general constructions via links of instantiation. Goldberg (1995) exemplifies this relation with the idiom *drive X crazy/bananas/bonkers/over the edge* whose result argument is restricted to a group of words connoting *insanity*. In *drive x crazy*, both the formal aspects and the semantics of the expression resemble the more general resultative construction in that prototypical resultatives are formally structured as [Subj V Obj Obl_{Adj}] while

functionally representing a scene in which X CAUSES Y TO BECOME Z, that is, exactly the scene portrayed by *drive x crazy* in (34) and (35) below.

(34) The whole women equality thing *drives me crazy* on a more personal level than the workplace. (Web/2012)

(35) ... and had a rattail in back to throw off the flattop and *drive us crazy* with mystery. (Fiction/2019)

It is important to remember that, given Goldberg (2006) definition of constructions, lexicalized expressions like *drive x crazy* can be considered constructions in their own right, as long as they are conventionalized ways of conveying the ideas they express.

Any linguistic pattern is recognized as a construction as long as some aspect of its form or function is not strictly predictable from its component parts or from other constructions recognized to exist. In addition, patterns are stored as constructions even if they are fully predictable as long as they occur with sufficient frequency. (Goldberg, 2006: 5)

To test whether *drive x crazy* empirically has a constructional status in language use, a search on COCA for the lemmatized verbs co-occurring with the result argument *crazy* was conducted. The search generated the figures in Table 2.

Table 2. COCA search for Verb Obj '*crazy*'.

Verb	Freq. V + ' <i>crazy</i> '	General Freq. of V	% of V + ' <i>crazy</i> '	MI score
know	886	2112737	0.04	0.69
go	813	1262075	0.06	1.31
think	812	1493360	0.05	1.06
call	419	371200	0.11	2.12
drive	391	120747	0.32	3.64
get	345	1744578	0.02	-0.39
make	207	1028279	0.02	-0.37
like	145	2368863	0.01	-2.09
say	142	969302	0.01	-0.83
see	138	1258974	0.01	-1.25

The search utilized to generate the results above established a span of three positions for the occurrence of the result argument *crazy*. Therefore, many of the verbs contained in the table are not grammatically related to the argument *crazy* in a causative relation. This is the case of *know* for which most instances are sentences

like *I know you're crazy* or *I know it sounds crazy, but if you just...* Thus, *drive* is the first verb occurring with *crazy* which describes a CAUSE TO BECOME scene. On top of that, *drive* is the only verb whose MI score is above the conventionally accepted 3.0 and, which shows that it occurs statistically significantly with the result *crazy*. The figures for *drive* should then be read as follows: *drive* occurs 120.747 times in the entire corpus, out of which 391 occurrences collocate with *crazy*. This corresponds to a general percentage of 0.32 and represents a level of mutual attraction between *drive* and *crazy* of 3.64, which is above the conventionally accepted 3.0 for statistical significance. Despite being fully predictable from the schematic caused motion, these figures corroborate that *drive x crazy* is a frequent, conventional and entrenched expression while also being an independent construction on its own, given its attested level of discourse salience (Langacker, 2013; Boswijk and Coler, 2020). All things considered, one cannot dispute the fact that the formal and functional properties of the expression are inherited from the more schematic resultative constructions though, since it also features a [Subj V Obj Obl_{PP,Adj}] form and a scene in which someone causes someone else to become something, exactly what schematic resultatives represent. The relationship between resultatives and the idiom *drive x crazy* is represented in the matrices below.




Figure 2. Resultatives and 'driveX crazy' (Goldberg, 1995, p. 80).

Inheritance links, claims Goldberg (1995), are an important aspect of language knowledge in that they can be viewed as cognitive strategies that speakers make use of to generate new linguistic material. Thus, recurring inheritance links that mediate processes between constructions and that account for the motivation of certain constructions in light of others can be said to have a high type frequency, thus having a determining role in the productivity of newly learned constructions, especially in the context of L2 learning (Rosa, 2020). In other words, recurring inheritance links can be the closest idea in Construction Grammar to general

grammatical rules, since they can be seen as the strategies that speakers will productively resort to in the creation of new language expressions while extending these from other existing constructions.

Therefore, these inheritance operations, and instance links in special, are important phenomena in the explanation of language use, both in general language description and also in the foreign language learning and teaching contexts. In the context just mentioned, for instance, learners may either fail to use some of the links recurrently applied by native speakers in certain constructions or make use of different links when compared to the ones natives productively use. We pursue this line of reasoning to defend that inheritance links of instantiation are the mediators between generalized caused motions and specific phraseologisms, which will for its part serve as important exemplar tokens for the entrenchment of the schematic type. This view is believed to be endorsed by some empirical corpus-based analyses of constructions, such as Boas' concept of 'mini constructions' for resultatives (Boas, 2003), as well as some theoretical usage-based positions that claim for the relevance of verb-specific constructions such as Croft (2012).

In the usage-based, exemplar analysis, a speaker's knowledge of language consists of a cluster of occurring exemplars to which the speaker has been exposed. The exemplar cluster may license novel Resultative constructions, with novel verbs and Result phrases (and combinations thereof) if the cluster is large enough – i.e. high enough type frequency – and semantically sufficiently coherent (Bybee 1995; Barðdal 2008) (Croft, 2012: 391)

The view defended above is that low-level, lexicalized expressions, as constructions themselves, are capable of licensing novel uses of the schematic constructions to which they correspond as long as they are sufficiently frequent and semantically coherent. The relevance of low-level constructions, that is phraseologisms, for the constructional category as a whole has been foregrounded in some corpus-based analyses, as we will show in the next section.

5. FROM PHRASEOLOGISMS *BACK* TO CONSTRUCTIONS

Hampe (2010) addresses the issue of *causative resultatives*, the term used by Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004) to name constructions known as *caused motions* and *resultatives* in the constructional tradition. Nevertheless, differently from Goldberg (1995), Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004) and Barðdal (2006), Hampe (2010) claims about the relationship between schematic and lexical constructions, as observed in children and adult language corpora, support a research agenda that foregrounds the importance of the lexical material in the use and productivity of general caused motions (Boas, 2003; Croft, 2003; Goldberg, 2006; Xia, 2017). For Hampe (2010), though, the role of low-level lexical constructions is significantly relevant in the evaluation that metaphors play in the interpretation of caused motions and resultatives. In special, Hampe (2010) aims to reevaluate the role that

metaphorical extensions play in the sanctioning of resultatives from caused motions by proposing that such extensions are lexically motivated. In her own words,

Viewing metaphorical extensions as a strictly local, lexically determined phenomenon, and emphasizing the role of verb-class based constructions (vis-à-vis totally schematic ASCs), this study works towards an alternative account of the growth of a constructional network. (Hampe, 2010: 188)

In other words, the proposal aims to offer, in a similar fashion to what has been proposed by Croft (2012), an alternative explanation for Goldberg's metaphorical reading of the PP *to anger and boredom* in (37) as a metaphorical extension from the spatial denotation of the directional *out of the way* in (37) (Goldberg, 1995).

(36) The warm air pushes other air [_{PP} out of the way] (literal motion)

(37) At times it drove his audience [_{PP} to anger and boredom] (figurative motion)⁵

In metaphorical caused motions like (37), the host object, claim Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004), is said to be caused to change its state, just like what happens to prototypical resultatives (eg. *she drives me crazy*). Thus, in metaphorical caused motions, the PP argument is said to acquire a resultative meaning. Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004) call these two types of constructions *path* (eg. *get you into the party*) and *property* resultatives (eg. *get you into trouble*). The same sort of analysis had already been put forward in Goldberg (1995), for whom these language data were explained in terms of metaphorical link extensions, as we discussed previously. Hampe (2010) objects to this reinterpretation of the data by stating that the unification of both constructions under the title of *causative resultatives* represents a symbolic discrepancy for metaphorical caused motions, since they are *formally path* and *functionally property*. Hampe (2010) seems to view the phenomenon in similar fashion to some research (Boas, 2013; Xia, 2017), which shows that in cases where the prepositional complement of a caused-motion construction has a non-spatial figurative reading (as in (37))⁶, the PP complement seems to form a lexicalized expression with the verb (eg. *put __ in order*). This can be evidenced by

⁵ The terms *figurative* and *metaphoric* here are not being used interchangeably. Following Dancygier and Sweetser (2014), *figurative* will be used to refer to the reading that certain expressions might have as a result of a metaphoric or metonymic relationship maintained between that expression and another *literal* one. Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) definition of the terms state that “**figurative** means that a usage is motivated by a metaphoric or metonymic relationship to some other usage, a usage which might be labeled *literal*. And *literal* does not mean ‘everyday, normal usage’ but ‘a meaning which is not dependent on a figurative extension from another meaning’”.

⁶ The *property resultative* ‘*get __ into trouble*’ was also analyzed as a low-level construction in Rosa (2014). Based on naturally occurring data extracted from COCA, the analysis showed a high level of statistical attraction between the phrasal pattern ‘*V __ into trouble*’ and the lexeme ‘*get*’. The quantitative analysis motivated us to consider ‘*get __ into trouble*’ a recurring phraseologism, or a low-level construction.

the intolerance caused by the substitution of *in order* by other elements: **put _ in chaos*, **put _ in disaster*, **put _ right*. In other words, this means that the lexicon is preempting some form of general syntactic or semantic operation while sanctioning the expression *put _ in order*. Were this not the case, that is, if *put _ in order* were a simple instantiation of the schematic caused-motion construction, in theory, commutations of the PP argument should not generate unacceptable sentences as they do for the verb *put*. The low-level constructional status of *put _ in order* is also backed up by the fact that other verbs do not seem to be constrained as *put* is in *put _ in order*. In *push _ out of the way/the road/the car/the city/the universe*, the verb accepts different kinds of directional PPs without compromising the acceptability of the sentences.

Hampe's analysis of the ICE-GB corpus with VPs parsed as <cxtr> returned a total number of 4019 sentences out of which 3514 sentences contained complex argument structures (both caused motions and resultatives) and 3707 resultative phrases (the number is higher than 3514 due to multiple resultative phrases in cases of verbal ellipses). Of these, 1937 verb tokens occur with one or more object-related adverbials and 908 with one or more adjectival predicates. 10,8% of the lexical types used in the corpus are shared between caused motions and resultatives, showing a clear case of overlap in the use of lexical material. Among these are *put* and *make*, which are said to be "path-breaking" verbs in the acquisition of caused motions and resultatives respectively (Goldberg, 2006: 77-79).

- (38) Spatial caused motions: and we *put* lemon and cucumber and orange
[PP in the Pimms]
- (39) Metaphorical caused motions: I thought I'd be able to *put* his mind
[PP at rest] very easily
- (40) Resultatives: But I think *making* people [_{AdjP} aware that anybody can
do it], uhm, is quite important.

(Hampe, 2010; 191)

Put is not attracted by the resultatives, in the same way that *make* is not attracted by caused motions. However, the collexeme analysis carried out in the ICE-BR corpus shows a great salience of *put _ right* and *make _ into y*. This suggests that these are not instantiations of the general, argument structure construction, but rather that they instantiate lower-level constructions, that is, lexicalized instantiations of both constructions. These seem to be cases of rather fixed phraseological units, or *formal idioms* in Fillmore's terminology.

In the analysis of the caused motion data, two basic uses and also the verbs more frequently used in the construction were identified:

- I) Verbs taking directional adverbials (denoting causation of motion):
put, place, bring, get, set, take, turn, send, push, shove, force, lay;
- II) Verbs taking locative adverbials (denoting prevention of motion):
keep, leave, bear, hold, base.

This difference is not said to be syntactic, but rather a lexical one that is made possible by the non-adjacent interaction between a verb and an adverbial [V [NP] Adv]; that is, verbs and adverbials in these low-level constructions seem to function similarly to how *formal idioms* are structured (Fillmore, Kay and O'Connor, 1988), that is, as a semi-fixed expression in which one syntactic slot is open. Another important aspect of the data analyzed in Hampe (2010) has to do with the interpretation of the actual caused motion. Both types (those denoting causation of motion and prevention of motion) were found to be denoting either a *literal motion* (physical movement) or a *figurative* one. In the figurative cases, the adverbial will identify a state or condition, but the construal will still be spatial, that is, a metaphorical construal that is motivated by primitive metaphors such as STATES ARE LOCATIONS/BOUNDED REGIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES/CONDITIONS ARE SURROUNDING (Grady, 1997) will motivate the figurative reading of caused motions. These metaphors are then thought to license the interpretation of the caused motions below.

(41) She just needed to *get* her life [PP back in order].

(42) I'm not trying to *get* more people [PP in trouble].

(Rosa, 2014: 191)

(43) The clown *laughed* the boy [PP out of his depression].

(44) *Coax* a two-year old [PP from an incipient meltdown].

(Dancygier; Sweetser, 2014: 133)

Following Hampe (2010) analysis of low-level caused motions and Rosa (2014) description of phraseological caused motion units with *get*, examples (41) and (42) are analyzed as lexicalized instances of the caused-motion construction, which display a figurative reading. No literal movement is implied in the directional PPs *back in order* and *in trouble*. As for (43) and (44), both *laugh* and *coax* do not take directional prepositional arguments and thus could not form lexicalized expressions with these, like *get* can with *back in order* and *in trouble*. Language data show, though, that the schematic caused-motion construction can itself be interpreted figuratively, irrespective of the lexical material instantiating it. On this matter, Dancygier and Sweetser (2014: 133) state that

[...] scenarios involving Caused Change of State, which is metaphorically understood as Caused Motion, are expressed with the Caused-Motion construction (*laugh someone out of their depression, coax the two-year old away from an incipient meltdown*). In some of these expressions, there is nothing which expresses either spatial motion or change of physical state, and thus no motion words which could be interpreted metaphorically to mean Caused Change of State [...]. The most plausible hypothesis is therefore that the Caused-Motion Construction itself is interpreted metaphorically in these cases, to mean Caused Change of State.

The effect that low-level, lexicalized phraseologisms have in the interpretation of caused motions as well as the fact that schematic caused motions can generally be interpreted figuratively are of utmost importance for constructional representation, as well as for other related matters such as language processing and language learning.

With that in mind, the following section presents an analysis caused-motion phraseologisms headed by *get* aiming at contributing to the relevance of phraseological knowledge in the productivity and use of general constructions. The choice of the predicate *get* for the empirical discussion was based on its high discourse salience in English as a whole⁷, as well as the attested semantic and syntactic versatility of this verb. The aim, therefore, is to show whether or not the data corroborate Hampe's view on the lexical fixedness of certain verbs and oblique arguments, such as *put ____ in order*, with a highly frequent, salient and polysemous verb as *get*.

6. A WAY INTO THE WORLD OF CAUSED MOTIONS: PHRASEOLOGISMS WITH *GET*

This analysis is based on a subset of data comprising 1284 instances of caused-motion constructions headed by the predicate *get* in a universe of 2449 causative utterances extracted from COCA (Rosa, 2014; Rosa and Tagnin, 2015). The syntax search on COCA used the lemmatized form of *get* and determined a span of two positions to the right to search for the most frequent nominal collocates. After that, the analysis selected the first fifty collocates for their semantic variability and randomly extracted 5% of the total number of concordance lines for each of the fifty collocates. This amounted to 9210 concordance lines, which were then subjected to a manual semantic classification in view of their argument structures. The argument-structure constructions adopted as criteria for classification was based on Goldberg (1995).

From the 9210 occurrences, 2449 (= 26%) were instances of general causative structures. The distribution of the different types of causative constructions in the data, of which the caused motion is the biggest part, can be seen in Table 3 below.

⁷ The lemmatized form of *get* is the fourth most frequent verb on COCA with 606659 occurrences.

Table 3. Distribution of causative constructions in the study corpus.

Construction	Absolute Frequency	Relative Frequency
Caused motion	1284	52,42%
Analytic Causative	874	35,60%
Resultative	293	11,96%
Total	2449	

As shown above, the semantic categorization applied to the 2449 utterances identified 1284 caused-motion constructions corresponding to 52.42% of all sentences exhibiting a form of causation. The 1284 caused-motion constructions showed a range of prepositions of movement forming a series of lexically underspecified sentence patterns such as *get NP across*, *get NP away*, etc. Table 4 shows the most frequent patterns in the data.

Table 4. Patterns with *get* + NP + Prep. with a caused-motion reading.

Pattern	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Pattern	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.
get NP out (of)	260	20,24%	get NP down	29	2,25%
get NP in	139	10,82%	get NP away	24	1,86%
get NP off	81	6,30%	get NP up	13	1,01%
get NP into	61	4,75%	get NP through	12	0,93%
get NP on	47	3,66%	get NP over	10	0,77%
get NP to	46	3,58%	get NP across	9	0,70%
Total:				731	56,93%

In addition to the sentence patterns with prepositions, fully specified phraseologisms such as *get the story out*, *get one's hands on* and *get the message across* also emerged in our data. Table 5 below shows phraseologisms with a caused-motion reading with more than two lexically specified items.

Table 5. Caused motion phraseologisms with *get*.

Phraseologism	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.	Phraseologism	Abs. Freq.	Rel. Freq.
get [det] message out	82	6,38%	get [det] foot in the door	32	2,49%
get the word out	74	5,76%	get [det] story out	21	1,63%
get one's hands on	74	5,76%	get SN back on track	17	1,32%
get [det] message across	58	4,51%	get one's hands off	15	1,16%
get [det] information out	37	2,88%	get one's hands around	12	0,93%
get [det] point across	34	2,64%	get [det] shot off	11	0,85%
Total:				467	36,54%

Despite appearing a lot less frequently than simple sentence patterns with prepositions (Table 5), both in absolute and relative terms, the phraseologisms in the table above demonstrate a greater level of structural fixedness. The expressions identified in our data were subjected to a calculation aimed at measuring the level of *attraction* between the predicate *get* and the phrasal pattern in the entire corpus (Schmid, 2010), so as to determine whether they were attested phraseologisms or not.

$$\text{Attraction: } \frac{\text{Frequency of an item in a construction} \times 100}{\text{Total frequency of the construction in the corpus}}$$

Exemplifying with the phraseologism *get the message across*, we would have that $(267 * 100) / 292 = 91.43\%$ ⁸, that is, in 91.43% of the times the sequence *___ the message across* appears in the corpus, it appears with the verb *get* occupying the verbal slot. In other words, *get the message across* is a phraseological unit given that it is the co-occurrence of two or more linguistic items that form a semantic unit and that shows frequency that is higher than expected by chance (Gries, 2008; Rosa, 2014). In Table 6 below the levels of attraction for phraseologisms with caused-motion readings are presented.

Table 6. Statistical analysis of attraction of *get*-phraseologisms with a caused-motion reading.

Phraseologism	Pattern freq.	Attraction	Phraseologism	Pattern freq.	Attraction
get [det] message out	515	87,18%	get [det] foot in the door	133	87,96%
get the word out	479	76,40%	get [det] story out	175	48%
get one's hands on	3624	32,28%	get SN back on track	39	71,79%
get [det] message across	292	91,43%	get one's hands off	398	14,57%
get [det] information out	222	57,65%	get one's hands around	355	12,11%
get [det] point across	194	97,42%	get [det] shot off	53	64,15%

As the table above shows, with the exception of *get one's hands on*, *get one's hands off* and *get one's hands around*, all the other phraseologisms show a level of attraction of about 50%, which speaks in favor of their phraseological status. That is, the expressions analyzed in here do not seem to be simple instantiations of the schematic caused motion, but independent low-level phraseological constructions (Hampe, 2010; Rosa, 2014; Rosa and Tagnin, 2015; Xia, 2017).

⁸ A search on COCA in September 2022 generated different figures, but the proportion was about the same. The current numbers are $(536 * 100) / 590 = 95.25\%$.

Having both identified and attested the phraseological nature of the expressions in Table 6, it is now possible to show the relationship between the schematic caused-motion construction and one of their lexically crystalized instances. Below we exemplify with the phraseologism *get the message out*, but the same analysis applies to the other phraseologisms as well.




Figure 3. Caused-motion construction and the phraseological instance *get the message out*.


As the matrices in Fig. 3 present, the phraseological unit *get the message out* inherits both of its functional and formal properties from the schematic caused-motion construction via a link of instantiation, that is, this expression, as well as the others in Table 6, have been conventionalized in the language as frozen instances of the abstract X CAUSES Y TO MOVE Z construction, which means that speakers, as well as language learners, might have access to these without necessarily resorting to the schematic construction⁹. Below is a sample of some concordance lines from our data.

⁹ Rosa (2020) presents an analysis of English caused-motion constructions by EFL learners. The results show a great reliance on lexicalized material by learners on the interpretation of the schematic caused motion.

We're just saying it's very difficult to get	the message	out . We have a new president . He's fairly popular
Thank you , Tavis . Thanks for helping us get	the message	out . " New Partnership for America's Future . " Tavis
be addressed . LG : if only we could get	these messages	out there . We did well with mammograms , base lines for
inspirational . So it's just that we're getting	the message	out there . RIVERA : Could you call -- Debbie , call
hosts broadcasting in English and in Spanish are getting	that message	out to a worldwide audience of 25 million people . It's
both Macks , the primary focus now is to get	the message	out to as many Black men as they can about annual exams
be in the spotlight . She's going to get	her message	out to conservatives , which is her base of support , and
and the attorney general says that helping the sheik get	that message	out to his followers makes Stewart a co-conspirator in
something that Art Ulene just mentioned -- let's get	the message	out to parents and grandparents . Your children are the ones most
they're seeing a little bit of a problem getting	their message	out to the media and so they've decided the blogs were
a way for the president to get out and get	his message	out to the people , and it's an interesting way to

Figure 4. Sample of concordances of the phraseological unit *get the message out*.

The concordance lines above show lexical instantiations of the pattern *get NP out* in which the NP is filled by *the message*. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, the pattern with the particle *out* was quite productive in the data and that is reinforced by the fact that other expressions belonging to the same semantic field of communication appeared to occupy the nominal position.



It is important to note that, as the concordances in Fig.4 exemplify, the caused-motion phraseologism *get the message out* does not always specify the oblique argument, that is, the *path* along which the metaphorical object of communication is dislocated. However, many of the occurrences show that the oblique arguments are realized either by the adverbial *there* or by the preposition *to* introducing the goal of the dislocation.

Although more data are needed in order to come up with overarching generalizations, the occurrences of *get NP out* systematically occurred around terms of verbal communication. That is, despite exhibiting a reading of figurative dislocation, the underlying structure is that of a [Subj V Obj Obl] in which the Obj is instantiated by *communication terms* that are metaphorically interpreted as objects. This has been extensively discussed in light of the productive *conduit metaphor* (Reddy, 1979). Also, the fixedness of the expressions above as attested in Rosa (2014) and the metaphorical reading of the Obl argument discussed in Hampe (2010) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2014) reinforce the phraseological and constructional status of the expressions in (45). Similar form-functional behavior was found in the other caused-motion phraseologisms with communication terms, as samples of the concordance lines show.

years old . Right now we 'd like to get	the word	out about these two girls . If we find both these girls
And I hope folks who are watching at home get	the word	out and get tested , and do whatever they can , and
O'Brien says they rely on MySpace and e-mail to get	the word	out and Gray 's family has its own Web site . There
And so it 's the band 's job to get	the word	out and make sure that does n't happen . " # Bradley
effort in retailers branding their own products is getting	the word	out as to why that product is better than the other brands
crowded his wife . It helps to get	the word	out early , " he said , feeling foolish . " Cuts
saliva all over the place because I could n't get	the words	out fast enough . " " Was that when you told Leo
he says . People who want to get	the word	out fasten the loops around bikes parked around town . " Macomb
me for an answer . # I could hardly get	the words	out of my mouth . " I reckon that 's her .
on the real ' ' chopping block . " Get	The Word	Out Quickly This February rewarded the efforts of my store with
gasping for breath , telling Dad when she could get	the words	out that a little girl like me had no business breaking horses
we need your help . We need help in getting	the word	out that children in child care need to be immunized , and
if I have to . I 'm going to get	the word	out that Joe Stanky is something special . And you know what
up a resource Web site . # " We got	the word	out that meth is coming into Michigan , " said David Bush
himself , he knows how vital it is to get	the word	out that prostate cancer is the second most deadly cancer in men
means of communication , this is his chance to get	the word	out that the island survived , but still needs help . " "
week , my friends , because we tried to get	the word	out to everybody as soon as we heard that our " Legends
the first place . They were in it to get	the word	out to other people . " said Pennyman , adding that education
if she just kept this investigation alive , kept getting	the word	out to the public , that there was a really good chance

Figure 5. Sample of concordances of the phraseological unit *get the word out*.

33 minutes that we 've been maligned about we got	more information	out of that interview than all of these attorneys did in all
are taking a turn where people are starting to get	more information	out of them rather than just yelling ? ED-HENRY-CNN-SR-W : It
the pain that we 're going through trying to get	this information	out of you . Mr-PHELPS : If you listen to the tapes
that deals with prevention , and then education to get	this information	out there to people to change their lifestyles . We know how
's not really job searching , it 's just getting	the information	out there . TORY-JOHNSON-1ABC# (Off-camera)
've got is people worldwide trying to help Iranians get	this information	out there . One thing we 're seeing online right now ,
very -- it 's very , very important to get	the information	out to our viewers as soon as possible , and you want
can make in people 's lives . And to get	the information	out to people who can benefit feels good . When I began
The sense has been that we 've gotten	the information	out to people and helped a lot of small employers , especially
us and also gives us reason to want to get	this information	out to the public and to our partners around the world that
need to be getting -- we need to be getting	accurate information	out to these communities and the African-American community is

Figure 6. Sample of concordances of the phraseological unit *get the information out*.

S-O'BRIEN : How hard is it for journalists to get	the story	out in Iraq when you keep hearing not only the violence that
I -- I want to ask your story and get	your story	out just as gently as we possibly can because I want you
said , sensing that Aunt Bes3 was trying to get	the story	out of her . " We certainly love having him here .
besides Jaime , and I think that we 're getting	the story	out there that he may have not been interested himself and that
all of this has been : the delay in getting	the story	out there to the press . Cheney clamming out , the way
Mr. Rollins said his client was " anxious to get	the story	out " and intended to deny any knowledge of efforts to discourage
interest is accountability , getting the facts out , getting	the story	out , and I think putting it in some new and different
cycle , increasing exponentially the opportunities to get	the story	out -- and to get it wrong . # " If there
and the skills and abilities politicians must have to get	their storie:	out . Although the women who responded to the survey enjoyed this
this was a way that we 're going to get	the story	out . And Ted Koppel arrived about two days later and said

Figure 7. Sample of concordances of the phraseological unit *get the message out*.

As was discussed, both in the introduction and in section 5, this paper defends a “what you see is what you get” approach (Goldberg, 2003: 229) to schematic caused motions by claiming that the attested phraseologisms above are all fully lexicalized instances of the *formal idiom* (Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor, 1988) *get NP_{communication} Out*. The open nominal slot in the structure of this semi-fixed expression allows for the creation of new instances of the caused motion by lexically specifying the NP in the domain of communication terms, but also by diversifying other parts of the expression such as the verb and the oblique argument. This process of new token creations of the construction leads to the entrenchment of the schematic type (Bybee, 2010), enhances the productivity of the instance link (Jiang and Wen, 2022) and also increases the network of lexicalized constructions.




Figure 8. Relations between schematic and phraseological caused motions.

The network of caused-motion constructions above aims at exhibiting an example of the process of instantiation between schematic and phraseological instances. That is, the underspecified, formal idiom *get NP_{communication} out* sanctions lexicalized phraseologisms such as *get the message out*, *get the word out* and *get the story out* and these will in turn license other expressions while speakers abstract from these fully specified constructions by replacing parts of the expression with semantically coherent alternatives (eg. *put* in place of *get*, *across* in place of *out* and *a kick* in place of *the story*). This is captured by the double arrows amongst the constructions at the bottom. Most importantly, though, is that the network shows that lexicalized expressions such as *get the message out* may not be seen only as instantiations of caused motion generalizations, but also as sources from which speakers can derive and create new expressions by working with concrete lexical material. This perspective has been used in Rosa (2023) as a theoretical support for teaching and learning applications. However, in spite of being a reasonable account in L2 acquisition settings, we side with Xia (2017), Croft (2012), Boas (2013) and Hampe (2010) who reinforce the importance of the lexical material to the whole network of constructions.

7. CONCLUSION

This article aimed at providing an overview of the form-functional properties of the caused-motion construction by discussing the treatment given to this language structure both in descriptive grammars of English (Quirk et al., 1985) as well as in

the constructional tradition (Goldberg, 1995; Goldberg and Jackendoff, 2004). However, the role of low-level phraseological instances has been emphasized both in the literature review (Hampe, 2010; Rosa, 2014; Rosa and Tagnin, 2015) and in an analysis of 1284 caused-motion constructions taken from COCA. From such data, we presented and discussed statistically attested caused-motion phraseologisms headed by the predicate *get* reinforcing the relevance that lexically specified language units have in speakers' grammatical knowledge. Most importantly, the data discussion and analysis aim at endorsing the main claim of this paper that lexical phraseologisms can be the source for the creation of other lexical instances as well as serving the purpose of contributing to the entrenchment of the schema.

The analysis with *get*-phraseologisms targeted a rather small set of language data, but we believe it is sufficiently robust to advocate for the importance that crystalized language structures have in language description as well as in language learning. Future developments aim at extracting and analyzing more language data, possibly with different predicates, so as to contribute to the understanding of this and other language constructions.

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