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Introduction: Celebrating Professor Carlos Moya's Career

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This special issue gathers a set of articles celebrating Professor Carlos Moya's philosophical career. Moya taught philosophy at the University of Valencia for more than forty years until his retirement in 2020. He was a member of the Department of Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge until it merged with other departments in the current Department of Philosophy, which he headed just before retiring. Moya is an analytic philosopher who has mainly worked in the areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of action, and also in epistemology. More particularly, his most significant contributions to philosophy are in action theory and the debate about free will and moral responsibility. In 1990, he published an influential introductory monograph, *The Philosophy of Action* (Polity Press), which has been used to teach courses in this discipline at several universities around the world. And since the turn of the century, his research has mostly focused on the metaphysical problem of free will and its consequences for moral responsibility, engaging particularly with issues such as the compatibility question, the role of alternative possibilities, Frankfurt-style cases, the notion of control, and so on. He has argued for a libertarian view, specifically grounded in the necessity of alternative possibilities, which also accommodates certain central compatibilist contributions. On these topics, he has published many articles in leading international journals and the books *Moral Responsibility: The Ways of Scepticism*, Routledge (2006), and *El libre albedrío: un estudio filosófico*, Cátedra (2017), as well as several edited volumes. He is also the author of an introductory book on philosophy of mind [*Filosofía de la mente* PUV (2004) (2006), 2nd ed.] and editor of several volumes.

Carlos Moya's work has been crucial for introducing and consolidating philosophical research on mind and action in Valencia, and in Spain. Particularly, thanks to his work, Valencia's Philosophy Depart-

ment has consolidated a line of research on free will and moral responsibility. He achieved this, in addition to his publications, by leading several research projects on these topics and by organizing outstanding international symposia (in the years 2006, 2008 and 2012) on free will, moral responsibility and epistemic responsibility, which brought to Valencia some of the most prominent names in these fields. Moreover, he has also actively promoted the institutional establishment of analytic philosophy in Spain by participating in the foundation of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy (SEFA), of which he was the first president. No doubt, his research, organization of scientific activities and initiatives have enriched our department and greatly benefited both his colleagues and younger researchers who have followed the path he opened up, as I have tried to do myself.

Personally, I see Carlos as a philosophical father whose sensible advice, both on philosophical issues and on matters of academic life, I have always taken very seriously. I have found in him an exemplar of intellectual virtue and moral sensitivity. As a thinker, he stands out for his rigour and analytical capacity, and his thoroughness in his analysis of issues, but without losing sight of what matters. Carlos is someone who never ceases to strictly follow the rational force of arguments, but with a sense of what needs to be prioritized. As an academic and as a person, his integrity, both intellectual and moral, is remarkable, as well as his generosity and concern for others.

To express our gratitude towards him, some of his colleagues in the University of Valencia organized the workshop *Agency, Reasons, and Possibilities* in his honour in 2022. And this special issue of *Teorema* adds to this purpose by gathering contributions on topics that have interested Carlos throughout his academic career, authored by his colleagues, in addition to one written by himself. Some of these authors have been his colleagues and friends for almost a lifetime. Others are long-time collaborators and yet others are more recent colleagues. To me it is both a pleasure and an honour to edit this special issue of *Teorema* in recognition of Carlos Moya's philosophical career.

In what follows, I will briefly summarize the contents of the contributions to this special issue, while making connections to Moya's research.

The first contribution is from Carlos Moya himself. Moya's ambitious aim in this paper is to reconcile the two main views of moral responsibility currently present in the literature. On the one hand, the traditional view assumes that moral responsibility requires freedom understood as a capacity of control over our decisions and actions. On the

other hand, in the last few decades a different view, known as “attributionism”, has emerged. According to this view, one can be morally responsible for actions, and even for attitudes, without having control over them. What makes someone responsible for their actions is not that they are performed freely, but rather that they are expressions of certain mental features of the agent. This makes the truth or falsity of determinism irrelevant to responsibility. In the article, after presenting both of these views in detail, Moya argues for reconciling them in a unitary conception which aims at retaining the advantages of both approaches while avoiding their main difficulties.

The second contribution is from Stefaan Cuypers, from KU Leuven, a long-time collaborator and friend of Moya. In his paper, Cuypers asks and gives his answer to a fundamental question about Peter Strawson's work: what attributions of moral responsibility mean to him. Cuypers's novel answer is based on Austin's speech act theory. In particular, he argues that Austin's general theory of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary force explains attributions of Strawsonian moral responsibility much better than Austin's special theory of performative and constative utterances. Cuypers's conclusion is that, within a Strawsonian framework, attributions of moral responsibility are best understood by interpreting their truth-conditions as “dimensions of assessment” about control and knowledge.

The next article is authored by Pablo Rychter, a colleague of Moya for the last decade at the University of Valencia. Rychter addresses a topic to which Moya has made important contributions: the debate about Frankfurt-style cases. In contrast with traditional Frankfurt-style cases which involve “asymmetrical overdetermination”, Rychter explores the possibility of designing Frankfurt-style cases involving symmetric causal overdetermination. He does this systematically and in relation to the different theoretical roles that Frankfurt-style cases may be expected to play. His contention is that symmetric overdetermination is a live option for developing Frankfurt-style cases, and that there may be dialectical contexts in which it is the most appropriate one.

The following contribution is from another friend of Moya who has collaborated with him for at least a decade: Carlos Patarroyo, from Universidad del Rosario (Bogotá, Colombia). Patarroyo also addresses the debate about Frankfurt-style cases by directly discussing Moya's important challenge to them. According to Moya, seemingly insignificant alternatives can become significant and exempting due to the context in which agents find themselves. Given that Frankfurt-style cases involve

extreme situations, seemingly insignificant alternatives become robust and render Frankfurt-style cases ineffective against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Patarroyo's contribution provides an overview of the debate on Frankfurt-style cases and the contextual alternatives, presents Moya's strategy, and ultimately advances an argument intended to cast doubt on the effectiveness of Moya's attack on Frankfurt-style cases.

The following article is authored by Josep Corbí, an almost lifelong colleague and friend of Moya throughout his career at the University of Valencia. Corbí discusses a view defended by Gregory Currie in *Narratives and Narrators*. According to Currie, the value we attach to exemplary narratives rests on the assumption that a character's psychological profile plays a fundamental explanatory role in them, like the role a person's character plays in real life. If this is so, it appears that, inasmuch as situationist experiments challenge the explanatory relevance of a person's character in real life, they also undermine the value we attach to exemplary narratives. Against this conclusion, Corbí argues that some central situationist experiments, far from challenging the centrality of character in our lives, contribute to vindicating it in a way that enhances the value of engaging with exemplary narratives.

The next contribution comes from Benjamin Matheson, who was a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Valencia before joining the University of Bern. In his paper, he contends that the preservation of moral responsibility is at risk in some cases in which one freely and knowingly manipulates oneself, which he calls "cases of practically distinct self-manipulation". Matheson argues that this kind of self-manipulation does preserve moral responsibility to the extent that the self-manipulated person is *more* morally responsible than an other-manipulated person. He concludes that the self-manipulated person is not a fitting target of the reactive attitudes but continues to have wrongdoing-incurred reparative obligations. According to him, this explains the intuitive judgement about the self-manipulated person, provides a better explanation of "tracing" cases, and reveals important requirements for a plausible theory of moral responsibility. The issue of manipulation in connection to moral responsibility has been central to some of Moya's arguments against compatibilism.

The last article is authored by Tobies Grimaltos, also an almost lifelong colleague and a friend of Moya throughout his career at the University of Valencia. In his paper, Grimaltos explores the epistemic and moral duties we have as believers and communicators of beliefs. He argues that we have a duty in relation to what Bernard Williams called the virtues of truth: accuracy and sincerity. We ought to be reliable both in

forming our beliefs and in transmitting what we really believe. Grimaltos argues for two principles, one for each of these two virtues, which he considers to be both epistemic and moral at the same time. Regarding accuracy, he proposes a variant of Clifford's principle, and regarding sincerity he proposes that to assert that p , one must not only believe that p but also accept that p .

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