NATIONAL INSECURITY, SECURITIZATION AND THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC ANTHROPOLOGY IN TURKEY[1]

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Resumen

El artículo explora la condición de los estudios antropológicos en Turquía a lo largo de la era republicana. Su objetivo es demostrar que la antropología científica fue imposible en el pasado y sigue siendo imposible en el presente y en el futuro cercano. Con este fin, el autor teoriza y evidencia la securitización nacionalista del estado y la nación contra la no-turquedad. El resultado de este casi centenario ejercicio de securitización es una concepción oficial y un funcionamiento histórico del Estado frente a la diversidad cultural. Este último, a su vez, constituye el principal objeto de estudio de la antropología científica. Por lo tanto, los estudios antropológicos han permanecido subdesarrollados dentro de Turquía, estando subordinados a los imperativos de seguridad del estado y, por lo tanto, incapaces de cumplir con la condición

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científica esencial del campo. Los académicos extranjeros y locales activos fuera de Turquía, por lo tanto, tienen una ventaja comparativa que aprovechan para publicar valiosas investigaciones científicas sobre la riqueza cultural de este país, que sigue siendo un asunto arriesgado según las leyes turcas.

Abstract

The paper explores the condition of anthropological studies in Turkey throughout the republican era. It aims to demonstrate that scientific anthropology was impossible in the past and remains impossible in the present and the near future. To this end, the author theorizes and evidences the nationalist securitization of the state and nation against non-Turkishness. The result of this almost centennial exercise in securitization is an official conception and historical functioning of the state against cultural diversity. The latter, in turn, constitutes the main object of study for scientific anthropology. Anthropological studies have thus remained underdeveloped inside Turkey, being subordinated to the state's security imperatives and thus unable to meet the field's essential scientific condition. Foreign and local scholars active outside Turkey therefore have a comparative advantage that they capitalize on to publish valuable scientific research on this country's cultural richness, which remains a risky affair under the Turkish laws.

Introduction

In a 2010 survey in Turkey, the respondents identifying themselves as ethnic Turks formed the majority of the total population (76.7 per cent and more than 64 million people).In the same survey, non-Turkish and non-Sunni Muslim ethno-linguistic and religious minorities represented a significant 23.3 per cent, or around 19.5 million people (KONDA 2011, 12-13).The state, however, has never recognised officially this cultural richness, in line with a restrictive interpretation of relevant provisions in the foundational,1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Minorities are thus peripheral to nationhood, the Kurds and the Alevi, in particular, having been treated from the very beginnings of the Republic as potential enemies to the Turkish national project. The long history of violence explains to some extent the predominancein the public space of formal/informal narratives of national insecurity/securityconstructed logically against minority rights, especially for the Kurds.

Here, the discussion is situated on the borderline between the dominant discourse in Turkey about national insecurity/security and the alternative discourse about cultural diversity in anthropological keynote. The main question addressed is whether the scientific study of this

country's diverse cultural past and present is possible at all. Such intellectual exercise is necessary because it contributes to the broader discussion about how anthropology on scientific bases can help a better understanding of the value that diversity represents fora country like Turkey. To this end, following the theoretical introduction below, the first section explains the obsession with national insecurity in Turkey and the historical mechanism of national securitization, with a focus on legislation settingitto this day *against* cultural diversity in general and minorities in particular. The second section will then explain how, under such conditions, anthropology has historically evolved, oftenagainst the state's imperatives. I will then conclude addressing the question whether and under which conditions anthropology on scientific bases could ever be possible in Turkey.

Broadly speaking, anthropology is the 'science of man' (Tax 2009), being concerned with the cultural diversity of humanity in a wide and ever-growing variety of territorial locations and configurations across political, social, economic and cultural systems (Hannerz 1996, 56-64; 2010, Chapter 3). The field includes numerous subfields, such as biological or physical anthropology, linguistic anthropology, social and cultural anthropology (including ethnography and ethnology). In certain intellectual contexts, history and archaeology are also considered part of anthropology. Concerning space, this science has therefore little to do, at least in theory, with the demarcation of the globe in territories of exclusive state jurisdictions. It does study human ways of life that are determined by spatial locations, but these are understood aschanging over long periods of time, and often not congruent withspaces of state sovereignty (Hannerz 2010, 60).

This is not to say that this broad field is completely divorced from formations and structures of political authority. The anthropological study of colonial "others", for instance, was subordinated to conceptions of otherness in metropolitan loci of power ever since Europeans begun to explore the world (e.g.,Asad 1973; Van Bremen and Shimizu 2000; Mehos 2008). The modern paradigm of the nation state has also built a special relation with anthropology in the logic of methodological nationalism, an aspect to which I return below. By the time Hans Kohn (1965, 136) differentiated between ethnic groups and "real peoples" capable of sovereignty, nation states had already had a history of employing anthropology in general and ethnology in particular in their nation-building projects. Particularly in the eastern half of Europe, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, anthropology, and especially ethnography, were instrumentalised in the construction of ethno-national identities against oppressive imperialisms. Nation-states were built on those identities and on the ruins of the respective empires, and the role of nationalist ethnographic studies in the process cannot be

overemphasised(Smith 1991, 12; Hroch 1996, 78-97; Gellner1996, 137).

Turkey represents a case of the pattern sketched above.The emergence of the Turkish Republic representedthe culminationof a national liberation war in which peasants of Anatolia, led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, fought against foreign invaders. It was therefore natural that republican ethnology and ethnography wouldserve the Turkish nation-building project in conjunction with the nationalist agenda of the new elites. Anthropology hasnevertheless remained to this day generally subordinated to the grand narrative of Turkish nationalism and the narrow limits it imposes on various public expressions of cultural diversity.

Here I maintain that, unless conditions detailed below change, an academic discussion about scientific anthropology is bound to remain futile for the foreseeable future in Turkey. The main hurdle is an enduring perception of state and national insecurity, and the consequent securitization of both,*against* the cultural diversity of this country. Building on this historical insecurity complex, state authorities have developed an authoritarian discourse of securitization that treats non-Turkish and non-Muslim identities as permanently potential enemies of the nation. This is reflected in the country's laws, the education system, in artistic productions and the media, which all speak of a perpetual conflict with cultural otherness making scientific anthropological studies difficult at best. In what follows, I explain the Turkish insecurity complex and national securitization logic with focus on the expression of that logic in selected pieces of legislation.

The logic of national insecurity and securitization in Turkey

Conspiracy theories, particularly those constructed in nationalist logic, have been commonplace in the Turkish society for generations. One of the most complex, with ramifications in many other types of discourses, is the so-called "Sèvres syndrome", i.e., the collective fear of foreign powers and internal conspiratorsbent on underminingTurkish national unity and statehood. This serves as a sort of foundational metanarrative for nationalist patriotism in domestic politics and foreign policy (Karaosmanoğlu 2000; Guida 2008). It is in relation with this sentiment of collective, ontological insecurity (Rumelili and Çelik 2017) that a dominant discourse of securitization has been articulated and also encoded in nationalist legislation treating minorities as potential enemies.

The concept of securitization broadens the meaning of security to include not only military, but also non-military aspects, such as cultural, or societal security. It is defined as the speech-act of a subject actor declaring that a valued referent object (what needs to be protected) is under an identified threat. A successful securitization is one that is accepted and supported

by the target public of the respective speech act (Buzan,Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 31; Wæver 2011, 468). To this end, securitizing actors must (1) convincingly identify existential threats to the valued referent object, which in turn legitimize emergency action, (2) undertake emergency action addressing the respective security issue and, in this way, (3) affect the entire environment of the securitization process 'by breaking free of rules', i.e., of liberal democratic checks and balances (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 26).

The outcome is a metanarrative of (in)security that needs little if any factual support, and is exceptionally unchecked because it is understood to produce existential responses to existential threats. The security issue is placed under emergency rules, where it can be dealt with expediently, beyond public scrutiny and often silencing alternative political possibilities (Buzan,Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 21-25, 178, 210; Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 71; Jutila 2006, 172-73). Viewed in this way, securitization can be interpretedas the production by a structure of power-knowledge-security (the state) of a specific 'anthropological place' defined by specific anxieties, language of fear, specific myths, related political spectacles and rituals (Ercolani 2016, 45-46). When the valued referent object is the nation, securitization situates on one side the speaking subject of the respective discourse and itsvalued object, that is, the nation.On the other, enemy side, one finds invariably the threats to the valued object, i.e., external and internal enemies clearly identified in the securitization speech-act. The outcome is aninside-outside, friend-enemy relation in which the declared insecurity of the inside-friend(nation) justifies emergency measures against the designated outsiders-enemies: foreign powers and their agents, fifth-column collaborators of foreigners inside the nation, minorities, etc.

Given its roots in an era difficult to explore factually, the "Sèvres syndrome"plays perfectlyin the logic of national securitization in Turkey, producing a separation line difficult to erase between thestate and potentially inimical others, i.e., external enemies in league with internal foes (minorities). What is securitized in this scheme is state and nation *against* minorities among other threats (e.g.,Karaosmanoğlu 2000; Bilgin 2005, 2007; AkgulAcikmese 2013) and not minorities themselves (e.g. KarakayaPolat2008, 2009).[3] Perpetuated by state laws, policies and practices for generations, the national securitization logic has become institutional reflex and encourages to this day impunity for crimes against minority people. This in turn explains to some extent why the rare reformation efforts have always failed to produce an environment friendlier to cultural diversity in Turkey. In the remainder of this section, I focus on relevant details, especially constitutional law and primary legislation evidencing the

[3] For a clarification concerning this logic, see also note 18 in Bilgin 2008, 610.

perspective explained above.

The formal starting point was the exclusive interpretation of relevant provisions in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which serves as legal foundation for the international recognition of the Republic of Turkey. The issue of minorities is addressed in Part 1, Section III (Articles 37-45), under the title 'Protection of Minorities' (Lausanne Treaty 1923). In the complex context of the time (Bayar 2014), Ankara's representatives at the Lausanne conference insisted that religion was the new nation's supreme identity marker and the notion of minority was then applicable only to non-Muslims. Turkey has therefore interpreted Section III ever since as referring only to religious minorities (Meray 1969, 154, 160). However, these were not to be treated as full members of the Turkish nation.

Although insignificant in numbers, the Greek and Armenian Christians were initially the state's main targets, being blamed for cooperation with the invading forces during the Great War and the Turkish War of Independence. For some members of the Grand National Assembly (GNA), those non-Muslims were not 'true owners of the nation' and Mustafa Kemal himself declared that the new country did not belong to them (Bayar 2014, 115).[4] Primary legislation followed this line of thought. The 1926 Law on Public Employment, for instance, allowed only for 'Turkish people' (not "Turkish citizens") to work in government institutions. A policy of imposing Muslim Turks in the private sector also put pressure on minority citizens and their businesses (Içduygu and Soner 2006, 458-459). Following the population exchange of 1923 between Turkey and Greece, systematic discrimination and the mass xenophobic riots of September 1955 in Istanbul, the numbers of minority citizens declined even more. Toward the end of the twentieth century, the few thousands of Greeks, Armenians and Jews would represent only 0.1 per cent of the country's entire population (Dündar 2000, 138). Thus, the only minorities posing a real challenge to the national project remained the millions of religious Alevi and ethno-linguistic Kurdish minorities.

Initially, the official narrative promoted a civic conception of the nation (Hanioğlu 2011, 134-38) and the first constitution under the Lausanne Treaty, ratified by the GNA in April 1924, did not contain the notion of ethnicity. Article 88 defined Turkishness as 'a political term' and established that a person holding Turkish citizenship 'is a Turk' regardless of racial and religious identities (Earle 1925, 98). The constitution contained nevertheless no provision protecting the linguistic rights of 'Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech', as explicitly demanded in Article

[4]For Atatürk's original declaration in Turkish, see Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu 1997, 130.

39 of the Lausanne Treaty. The implication was that non-Turkish Muslims, such as Albanians, Arabs, Bosnians, Circassians, Georgians, Kurds, Lazes and others did not exist as minority citizens under the country's laws. The subsequent practice shows that they were to be assimilated to the Muslim Turkophone majority (Mutlu 1996; Kadıoğlu 2007, 284-85).

The Alevis were not recognised either, being instead assimilated to the Sunni Muslim majority. Their houses of worship, *cemevis*, function to this day in legal uncertainty and do not receive the fiscal protection and financial aid that the state provides for Sunni mosques. Although numbering significant millions according to some scholars (Grigoriadis 2006, note 12; Kurban 2007, 12), the imperative of Turkish national securitization continues to exclude the Alevis from the official discourse of the nation. In effect, they remain exposed to assimilation policies and are at times subjected to criminal violence and threats. Although debated upon in a series of workshops in 2009, their grievances have remained unaddressed and the perpetrators of crimes against them largely unpunished (Grigoriadis 2006; Bardakçi 2015; Borovali and Boyraz 2015).

The state's approach to the Kurds is even more problematic, marked by perpetual conflict. Many confrontations took place during the first decades of the republican era, when national armed forces crushed major Kurdish rebellions in 1925, 1930 and 1938. Tens of thousands of Kurds were killed or deported to western provinces and thousands of villages, previously bearing not only Kurdish, but also Greek, Laz, Armenian or Arabic names, were destroyed or Turkified (Tunçel 2000, 28-31; see also Olson 1989, 107-27; Kahraman 2003, 168-69). In an interwar global context favouring such views, the new ruling elite also adopted an ethno-racial conception of the nation that the state had to protect against internal and external enemies. The Kurds and other minorities were treated as undesirable races, inferior and potentially inimical to the dominant Turkish race (Özdoğan 2001; Yıldız 2001; Çağptay 2004; Maksudyan 2005a). Atatürk himself spoke repeatedly against alternative national ideologies, which he portrayed as inferior to Turkish nationalism. He thus encouraged the state officials and the citizens to defend the nation at any costs against elements and ideas foreign to Turkism (Üngör 2011, 185). Others, such as Justice Minister Bozkurt, employed much stronger language describing the Turks as 'the only masters and owners of this country', while people 'not of pure Turkish stock [had] only one right […], the right to be servants and slaves' (quoted in Van Bruinessen 1994, 154).

The campaign for popularizing the Turkish language was subordinated to this logic of securitizing the nation against whatever the elites perceived as internal threats. An important role in the campaign was entrusted to a countrywide network of organisations called Turkish

Hearths (*TürkOcakları*). While enhancing literacy in rural areas (Winter 1984), the Hearths were also agents in a campaign essentially inimical to cultural diversity, minorities being prevented from speaking their mother tongues in public. The nationalist ideology demanded the promotion of Turkishness as to "civilise" the racially inferior non-Turks, particularly the Kurds often being described as tailed, animal-like, inferior people. Confirming that securitizing the new state against non-Turkishness was the essence of that policy, Prime Minister Inönü declared for the press that the mission of the Hearths was 'to make Turks all those who live in the Turkish fatherland. We will cut out and throw away the minorities who oppose Turks and Turkism' (quoted in Bali 2006, 44; see also Üngör, 2011, 184-85).

A similar view was expressed in a report for the GNA from that same period. Referring to the Latin script reform initiated in 1928, the report justified it in terms of relations of power: the Turks and the Kurds could not coexist 'on the same land with equal power and authority' (quoted in Yeğen 2009, 600). Imposing the official state language was thus part of a strategy of nation-state survival demanding the elimination of Kurdish linguistic identities. The implementation of that policy until after the Second World War also presupposed the banning and destruction of books of Kurdish, Armenian, Syriac, Circassian and other minority literatures. Instead, the state promoted intensively the Turkish literature and a heavily distorted version of the history of peoples in Anatolia, which either excluded or erased evidence about minorities (Çağaptay 2004; Çolak 2004; Üngör 2011, 224-32). The surnames reform, implemented with Law No. 2525/1934, also served the national securitization logic by imposing the adoption by all citizens of family names from a list of what the authorities considered "pure" Turkish surnames. The ending *oğlu* (son of) was preferred, but surnames such as *Arnavutoğlu* (son of the Albanian), or *Kürtoğlu* (son of the Kurdish) were implicitly banned (Çolak 2004, 82; Türköz 2007, 895).

Rebellions of Kurdish tribes in southeast Anatolia intensified after the republican regime initiated the relocation of entire communities with the purpose of homogenising the nation, under the Resettlement Law 2510/1934 (*İskan Kanunu*). They culminated with the 1937-1938 Alevi Kurdish uprising in the Dersim region, which exacerbated the state's national securitization drive. The authorities responded with massive bombing campaigns killing thousands of people and destroying Kurdish villages. Non-military actions included the Turkification of more names of localities, roads, streets and public venues to erase their previous, non-Turkish identities. Dersim itself was renamed "Tunceli". Also banned were the Kurdish language and traditional costume. The state adopted an official discourse, which survived until recently, which denied the very existence of the Kurds altogether. They were

officially called "mountain Turks" and the Minister of Internal Affairs proclaimed triumphantly that the Kurdish problem no longer existed. Almost a decade later, central media boasted that, 'in Turkey no Kurdish minority ever existed, either nomadic or settled, with or without national consciousness' (quoted in McDowall 2004, 397; see also Van Bruinessen 1994, 145-47).

The policy of securitizing state and nation against non-Turkishness continued after the Second World War and the dawn of multiparty politics. The new, Democrat Party-led government, apparently in collusion with state security agencies, orchestrated the mass riots against the Greeks of Istanbul in September 1955. The pogrom determined thousands of Greeks, Armenians, Georgians and Jews to emigrate and remains a wound in the collective memory of future generations on all sides (de Zayas 2007). The religious conservatism and increasing authoritarianism of the Adnan Menderes government ended with the military staging their first coup in 1960. The junta returned the authority to a civilian government under a new constitution in 1961, which expanded certain civil liberties (Toktaş 2005, 408-10; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 15-16).

However, the new charter also encoded a constitutional mechanism of national securitization against minorities that has survived until nowadays. In Articles 2 and 3, it affirmed the 'nationalistic' character of the Republic and its indivisibility 'comprising the territory *and* people', with Turkish as sole official language (Turkish Constitution 1961; italics added). Although being different from the majority was not made explicitly illegal, the public expression of cultural diversity remained technically unconstitutional and no piece of legislation recognised minorities other than Jewish, Armenian and Greek. Non-Turkish linguistic identities were eventually erased from official scripts starting in 1965, when the State Institute of Statistics ceased to publish data about mother tongues other than the official state language. With minority surnames already outlawed in 1934, the 1972 Population Law no. 1587 also forbade new-borns being given 'such names which are not in accordance with our national culture'.[5]

During a period of increasing turmoil, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*PartiyaKarkarên Kurdistan*, PKK) emerged toward the end of the 1970s with a Kurdish securitization and separatist agenda fighting, among other aspects, Turkey's policy of denying the Kurds' existence and identity (Özcan 2005). The organization's terrorist activities after 1984 not only

[5] My translation from official text of Population Law No. 1587 (1972), "Nufus Kanunu no. 1587", *Resmî Gazete*, no. 14189/16.05.1972, https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc055/kanuntbmmc055/kanuntbmmc05501587.pdf

overshadowed the Kurdish cause, but have also legitimised ever since Ankara's securitization strategy against the perceived threats from minorities. Indeed, the open military conflict with the PKK terrorist organisation, aggravated in the 1980s, justified further and harsher securitization measures.

Following the 1980 coup, a new constitution was adopted in 1982 that reflected this development in articles still in force despite numerous subsequent reforms. The indivisibility of the territory and nation is reiterated in Articles 2 and 3. Article 2, in particular, deserves attention from the analytical perspective adopted here. It proclaims Turkey's loyalty 'to the nationalism of Atatürk [...] based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble'. Among those tenets is '[t]he recognition that all Turkish citizens are united in [...] their rights and duties regarding *national existence* [...]'. Article 4 then makes non-amendable the first three articles and, implicitly, the Preamble (Turkish Constitution 1982; italics added). These formulae, still present in the constitutional text, practically lock political life in the logic of national securitization against potential minority contestations of "existence" exclusively according to whatever ideals the country's securitizing actors decide upon. Article 14 also conditions the exercise of rights and freedoms on that not 'violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation [...], or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas' (Turkish Constitution 1982). Such provisions are highly restrictive for individual and collective cultural rights, especially in conjunction with vague laws on terrorism. Pro-minority militancy in any form can easily be and has been in fact interpreted in courts as anti-constitutional and anti-national throughout the last decades of the twentieth century.

Reforms over the next period, especially in the context of Turkey's process of accession to European Union membership, have failed to alter the logic of national securitization against minorities. After coming to power in November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (*AdaletveKalkınmaPartisi*, AKP) seemed determined to usher in a new era for the state's approach to cultural diversity. The government initiated so-called "democratic openings" toward all minorities and even started a so-called peace process with the PKK. However, they never altered the essential principle established at the foundation of the Republic. The state continues not to recognize the existence of all minorities, while law making and jurisprudence remain blocked in the logic of securitization hostile to non-Turkishness.

Despite multiple constitutional amendments, the restrictive provisions in the preamble and in the articles mentioned above have remained unchanged. Although legislation adopted during the first decade of the AKP rule allows for associational activities and the public

expression of minorities in their languages, those freedoms have been drastically curbed in practice over the last decade. Article 26 in the constitution continues to condition the exercise of freedom of expression on it not being against 'the basic characteristics of the Republic and the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation' (Turkish Constitution 2017). The practice of banning non-Turkish onomastic remains in place. It was with reference to the 1934 Surnames Law and to the constitutional principle of national unity that the Constitutional Court rejected in 2011 the request of a Syriac Turkish citizen to revert to the family's old Syriac surname (European Commission 2011, 40). A local court also ruled in July 2012 that giving a Kurdish name to a park and a cultural centre is against an anti-terror regulation adopted in 2006 and formulated in accordance with the constitutional principle of state and national unity. The government even eliminated from the official nomenclature names of animals containing the words "Kurdistan", or "Armenia" for representing threats to the unitary state and nation (Bayır 2016, 105-108 and note 88).

The Kurdish peace process was also abandoned and the military conflict restarted in 2015, with the PKK responding violently from locations inside and outside Turkey. Militancy for Kurdish democratic autonomy and alleged cooperation with "the terrorist organization" led to numerous pro-Kurdish politicians and elected officials being prosecuted and imprisoned over the last years. At the moment of writing, the government has appointed state trustees to administer 59 out of the 65 municipalities that the pro-Kurdish HPD has won in the last local elections in 2019.

To the above must be added legislation that does not allow for the explicit political representation of minorities and drastically limiting freedoms to protect state institutions and national security. Articles 299 and 301 in the Penal Code continue to criminalize public discourse deemed as insulting the Turkish state and nation, the President of the Republic, state institutions and officials. Tens of thousands of people have been arrested, prosecuted and condemned for public speeches and acts interpreted by prosecutors and judges as crimes under the respective articles, in corroboration with the vaguely formulated in anti-terror legislation (Gunter 2007, 119-21; Coşkun 2010; Hughes 2010, 573-74).

The current regime reversing reforms and the revival of PKK terrorism thus reinvigorate and legitimise the logic and narrative of anti-minority national securitization. Speaking publicly *pro* and about cultural diversity in Turkey remains a highly risky affair. According to the state legislation and jurisprudence, the indivisibility of the state and nation is far superior to individual and minority rights, blocking their exercise and even, at times, the free public debate about them. As explained in the next section, under these conditions, scientific concerns with

cultural diversity in Turkey under the title of anthropology have been inevitably distorted and subordinated to national security imperatives.

National securitization, methodological nationalism and the impossibility of scientific anthropology in Turkey

Asserting that Turkish anthropology is non-existent would be wrong. On the contrary, it has a rich history, which I shall illustrate with examples below. Talking about scientific anthropology *in* Turkey is nevertheless a more difficult task. Research in this broad field means structuring a theoretical approach and applying it to explore and evidence the riches of cultural diversity. Such effort demands what Ercolani has called a clinical 'anthropological gaze' cutting through and deconstructing the fear-anxiety-anguish imposed by national securitization against diversity and minority cultures. Only in this way the anthropologist could become apt to question the strategies of securitizing actors and adopt a 'cosmopolitan look' (Ercolani 2016, 59) necessary for identifying and analysing empirically the always-multicultural society hidden by but surviving beyond the veil of nationalist securitization. This is still a daunting task in Turkey and in other countries where nationalism and anthropology have been historical accomplices in the respective nation-building projects.

In the age of nationalism, which started gaining impetus in Europe and around the world in the nineteenth century, anthropology often became an instrument in the hands of those who proposed the nation as cultural as well as political ideal. The scientific, anthropological study of human cultures was thus subsumed under the grand category of methodological nationalism, i.e., the conception that the national state represents the only relevant unit for the experience and analysis of cultural, social and political life (Smith 1983, 26; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 303-6). In the logic of methodological nationalism, (national) statehood determines (national) culture and local, subnational cultures are inferior to and subsumed under the superior nation (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 305). Anthropological research bound to such limits is thus essentially anti-scientific; it tends to gloss over local and regional specificities and hide their age-old manifestations under a thick blanket of invented features of national cultures.

In Turkey, under the historical impact of the securitization strategy against minorities, the instrumentalisation of anthropology in the logic of methodological nationalism has been particularly intense. As illustrated in the previous section, the country's cultural diversity was politically assigned the historical role of enemy of state and of national unity. So, instead of being employed for 'unthinking ethnocentrism' (Hannerz 2010, 49) and revealing the actual, cultural richness that has survived centuries of turmoil, Turkish republican anthropology has

served the opposite. When studying local cultures, it has tried to hide them within the grand narrative about the time and space appropriated by the nation. The result is either the outright negation of diversity, or, at best, a relation of subordination, long ingrained in society, in which the local ethnic cultures are inferior to the superior national culture.

Although there were incursions into the field during the Ottoman times, the first institutionalisation of anthropology in Turkey took place under the Republic in 1925, with the establishment of the Anthropology Institute (*AntropolojiEnstitüsü*) under the Faculty of Medicine at *Istanbul Darülfünun* (renamed Istanbul University in 1933). The main preoccupation of this institution was with physical anthropology and with demonstrating the superiority of the Turkish race by comparison with others. This was illustrated in research published by the *Turkish Review of Anthropology* from 1925 until 1939 (Maksudyan 2005b). Another Anthropology Institute was established in 1935 under the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography at the University of Ankara, which will become the more prominent of the two until the late 1960s. One of the main works of the Ankara-based institute, at the request of Atatürk himself, was the cephalic measurement of 64,000 men and women to demonstrate that Turks were a Caucasoid race. Archaeological work during that period aimed to substantiate the racial theories of the time and practically no research aimed at exploring the country's cultural diversity (Erdentuğ 1998, 14-16; Birkalan-Gedik 2018, 6222).

The ideologists of the Republic wanted primarily a decisive break with the Ottoman past. In a historical context when fascist nationalism and racial views combined throughout Europe, the Turkish nation-building project was also contaminated. Equating the Turkish and white European races, based on the common geographic origins of the two in the depths of Asia, served multiple purposes. Crucially, it helped representing the Turks as equals to the self-proclaimed superior races of Europe, concomitantly legitimising claims of Turkish superiority in relation with local minorities. The deeply racist and supremacist logic in the public discourses of republican leaders, mentioned in the previous section, were reflected in anthropology-related but blatantly anti-scientific governmental theses.

Launched publicly at the first Turkish Historical Congress in 1932, the Turkish History thesis became state doctrine and influenced history-teaching curricula for generations. In corroboration with the Sun Language Theory, launched in 1932, it claimed the antiquity of Turks and their language as an Aryan race descending from the oldest white peoples. According to a leading ideologue of the time, ZiyaGökalp, the Turkish civilisation was so old that it had laid the foundations of others, including the Pelasgians, Etruscans and Chaldeans, while also influencing the emergence of ancient Egyptian and Chinese civilisations (Gökalp 1959, 267-71;

Çağaptay 2006, 48-55). It is suggestive that Eugen Pittard, the Swiss anthropologist that authored an influential racist theory of humanity, was elected the honorary president of the second Turkish Historical Congress in Istanbul, in 1937. One of the main conclusions of that congress was that all Anatolian populations, including even the Hittites, were descendants of an ancient white Turkish race. Subordinated to this logic, studies of the time in anthropology, ethnography, ethnology, linguistics and archaeology were far from basic scientific standards. They mainly aimed to demonstrate that Central Asia and Anatolia (hence the Turks), and not Mesopotamia and Eastern Mediterranean were the original sites of the most advanced civilisations. This was essential for legitimizing the official claim about the national civilisation being superior to local minority cultures (Aydın 2000; Çağaptay 2004; Atakuman 2008).

Some of the ethnographic research, especially in eastern Anatolia, was in fact a cover for actions decidedly against minority cultures. At the Third Congress of the Turkish Hearths, in 1926, on the topic of anthropological studies, some participants gave fierce speeches against the use by minorities of their traditional costumes and mother tongues (Üstel 1997, 186-206; see also ÖzbudunDemirer 2011). During the next congress in 1928, one of the participants reported emphatically that he had personally 'confiscated many books written in foreign languages' in the region, which included Armenian, Kurmanci, Zazaki, Syrian Aramaic, Circassian and Arabic. The campaign of confiscating books in local languages and replacing them in libraries with Turkish literature continued at least over the next two decades (Üngör 2011, 226).

That ethnography and comparative ethnographic research (ethnology) were far from scientific standards is also indicated by the two disciplines not receiving official status at the Anthropology Institute in Istanbul, where physical racist anthropology was dominant. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself insisted on the importance of physical anthropology for establishing the place of the Turkish race among the other human races (Maksudyan 2005a, 99). He personally supported the Institute's efforts in that direction, including the publication of relevant works in the Turkish Journal of Anthropology (*TürkAntropolojiMecmuası*). Until late 1940s, ethnographic and ethnological research under the Turkish Houses, which replaced the Hearths in 1931, also presupposed their involvement in the campaign for replacing names of localities in minority languages with Turkish names and the promotion of "national" folklore in the east. This was a daunting task, given the predominance of minority populations in that region to this day. Nevertheless, the network of Houses published and circulated books and other materials that simply called "Turkish" the Kurdish and other non-Turkish cultural manifestations, including folkloric songs, handworks, dress codes and customs (Üngör 2011, 190-92).

The field experienced an increased focus on ethnography and ethnology toward the 1960s, with numerous folkloric and monographic village studies authored especially by NerminErtuğu and SenihaTunakan. However, political pressures hindered progress and the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 delayed the full emergence of non-political, scientific research. Poorly funded and affected by an increasingly tense political atmosphere toward the 1970s, it was gradually reduced to almost nothing. The emergence of the PKK and the intensification of terrorist actions in the 1980s led to the military coup of September 1980, martial law for almost three years and the highly restrictive constitution of 1982. As detailed above, the charter instituted barriers against the use of minority languages and, in corroboration with other pieces of legislation, made the public expression of minority cultures, especially Kurdish, practically illegal.

Minority associational activities and their cultural and political expression and representation became impossible under the Political Parties Law (Law 2820/1983) and the Law on Publications and Broadcasts in Languages other than Turkish (Law 2932/1983). All these legal texts and similar others were in line with the constitutional principle of national indivisibility (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, 54; Yeğen 2009, 604-5). The scientific study of cultural diversity in Turkey was thus legally impossible and the field remained in infancy. This explains why, even today, anthropologists trained locally are still preoccupied with debates on what the discipline is about, while its impact in the society is low at best (e.g., Erdentuğ 1998, 42-3; Atay 2000; Özmen 2000; Aydın 2000; Özbudun, Balkı and Antuntek 2005; Tandoğan 2008, 101).

This does not mean, nevertheless, that there is absolutely no anthropological research *about* Turkey. Examining the last decades, one can find, for instance, valuable work mapping the ethnic groups in the country (Andrews 1989), exploring Alevism and Alevi rituals (e.g., Stokes 1996; Bahadır 2005; Öztürkmen 2005; Tambar 2010; Dressler 2013), or the Gipsy culture (Aksu 2003). Hart (2013) among others studied traditional customs of Sunni Islam in rural areas, while the anthropological study of urban areas and urbanisation also received particular interest (Tandoğan 2008, 104; Birkalan-Gedik 2011). Although often a risky affair, some researchers published studies on the anthropology of religious minorities (e.g., Özdoğan et al. 2009; Altınay and Çetin 2017; Hadjian 2018; Bali and Mallet 2015), or on the multiple cultures under the broad Kurdish identity. One must note the important contributions to this subfield by Van Bruinessen (1992; 2000), or Houston (2001; 2009) and an entire edited volume (Gambetti and Jorgenden 2015) dedicated to the study of the Kurdish issue from a 'spatial perspective' in political and anthropological terms. Çelik (2005) studied Kurdish migrants in

Istanbul, while Hakyemez (2017; 2020) does research on Kurdish dissidents.

However, most of these researchers have been trained and/or are based outside Turkey. And all studies start from the premise that the respective minority cultures are supressed to various degrees by the Turkish state and by the majority culture. Since the 1980s, a large number of minority citizens, especially Kurds, have been imprisoned for anti-national actions and alleged collaboration with terrorist organisations. The work of Serra Hakyemez (2017; 2020) investigates stories from Turkish prisons of such cases from an anthropological perspective. Scholars studying minorities have to take into account the possibility of them being prosecuted in case their work is interpreted as anti-national under legislation restricting, still, the expression of minority cultures. One of the illustrative cases in this sense is that of Ismail Beşikçi, a Turkish citizen persecuted for research on Kurdish culture.

After publishing a study, inspired by Marxist methodology, of the Kurdish society in Eastern Anatolia (Beşikçi 1969), he was fired by the Atatürk University in Erzurum where he had held a position of assistant professor. The official motivation was that his book violated the constitutional principle of the unity and indivisibility of the Turkish state and nation. After the military coup of 1971, the university's rector and deans denounced Beşikçi to the military administration. He was prosecuted for communist and anti-national propaganda and sentenced in 1972 to thirteen years in prison. Some of his former superiors and colleagues served as witnesses for the prosecution.

Beşikçi was freed following a partial amnesty in 1974, but was refused academic employment for the rest of his life. His subsequent work was banned and he was arrested, prosecuted and condemned to various prison terms from the 1970s until 2011 (Beşikçi 1975). In March 2011, Beşikçi was again sentenced to 15 months in jail for authoring a magazine article in which he used the word Kurdistan and for writing Qandil Mountains (Kurdish spelling) instead of Kandil (Turkish spelling). The justification of the judge was that, in this way, the author made propaganda for the recognition of the Kurdish alphabet and in favour of the "terrorist organisation" (Sazak 2011). Beşikçi is acknowledged today as one of the most important contributors to the history, sociology and anthropology of Kurdish cultures. However, this he paid with almost two decades in prisons of a state that still feels insecure in dealing with the cultural diversity of its own citizens.

Overall, anthropological studies remain infant in Turkey. The country's first Anthropological Association was established only in 1992 and is still active organising congresses, panels and publishing bulletins to connect the work of its members. Anthropology

departments currently function in ten universities throughout the country.[6]However, research in those institutions is limited by the imperatives of the country's securitization strategy against cultural diversity. In defiance of Article 39 in the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey continues not to recognize the existence of its linguistic minorities. Building on this core principle, a number of laws regulating political, socio-cultural, economic and associational activities practically ban the presence and active participation of linguistic minority citizens *as such* in the country's public, cultural and political life.

After being a champion of minority rights during its first decade in power, the current regime is responsible for serious regress in this field over the last years.Theatre plays in Kurdish have been banned or cancelled for security reasons on numerous occasions and life in the Kurdish-majority regions in eastern Anatolia is highly restricted under a state of emergency instituted in 2016 and prolonged until 2024 (Köylü 2021). Confirming the governmental intentionality regarding the persecution of the Kurds, the President of Turkey announced emphatically in November 2020, with a discourse reminding of the early decades of the republic, that, "there is no Kurdish issue" in Turkey, but a terrorism issue in which Kurdish politiciansare involved (Toksabayand Butler 2020). However, the Kurds are not the only targets of this revigorated hostility.A December 2021 report by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom evidenced that even the rights of religious minorities recognized by Turkey have regressed under the current regime, which has also become a threat for various religious groups in the broader region (USCIRF 2020). It was part of this trend that the President approved the conversion of old churches into mosques, such as Hagia Sophia in Trabzon (2013) and the Hagia Sophia and Chora churches in Istanbul (2020), to please conservative nationalist supporters. An old Armenian church in Akşehir was also transformed into a cultural centre dedicated, ironically, to humoristic Turkish art (Balancar 2020).

Conclusions

Cultural diversity seems to remain an issue that Turkey feels uncomfortable with and scientific anthropological studies will thusbe difficult to realise at best for the foreseeable future. Following almost a century of exercise in national securitization, the borders between the friendly-inside and enemy-outside spaces as conceived by the securitizing authorities have remained profoundly incised in the society. In the inside-friendly space we find a state and a

[6] Yükseköğretim Kurulu, Antropoloji Programı bulunan tüm üniversiteler. https://yokatlas.yok.gov.tr/lisans-bolum.php?b=10006

nation whose unity and indivisibility represent the cornerstone of the securitization discourse and practice. Building on the old “Sèvres syndrome” and on decades of ethno-racial thinking, the securitizing authorities have also imposed a long-lasting definition of the targeted audience, i.e., the nation, as the property of the Muslim, Turkish-speaking majority.

Outside the borders of national securitization, in the enemy-outside zone of second-class citizenship, we find the minorities.According to all available surveys, these represent almosta quarter of the population, i.e., millions of Turkish citizens that do not identify themselves asSunni Muslim and/or ethno-linguistically Turkish. Their cultures are barely mentioned in the education curricula and teaching their languages and histories, where possible, encounters many institutional barriers. They cannot establish civil society organisations and political parties to represent their distinct identities *as such*, on equal par with the majority. Even more, the state continues to treat them as potential enemies through hostile legislation in the logic of national securitization against non-Turks. Ironically or not, the PKK has always had a major contribution to this strategy by legitimizing securitization and military measures through its terrorist acts.

Until all the unfavourable conditions evidenced here change, starting with a new constitution friendly and not inimical to cultural diversity, it is difficult to imagine scientific anthropological studies becoming possible. When that happens, it would be in fact a very important sign about a profound and irreversible transformation of the Turkish state from one fearing, into one embracing all its people as they are. In the meantime, the study of cultural diversity in Turkey will continue abroad, for the benefit of foreign entities, starting from the premise that minorities are oppressed in that country. Local anthropologists will continue to fear that they may have to go through ordeals such as that of Ismail Beşikçi and others. The foundation bearing his name and focusing on the promotion of human and minority rights has recently published a report.The title translates in English as “Violations of Academic Rights in the Field of Kurdish Studies in Turkey’s Universities”. The report is full of evidence about such violations and one of its main conclusions is that self-censorship is a major, widespread problem concerning academic freedom in the field of Kurdish studies. One of the accounts of a Master of Arts student interviewed by the rapporteurs epitomizes the general situation. When explaining the bibliography to the jury, the candidate also gave the numbers of Kurds, Armenians, Yazidis and other populations in the Ottoman Empire.A nationalist jury memberstopped the candidate with the words “what Kurd? You cannot write Kurd! [...] You have to write Turk!” To questions from the candidate about whether he/she should tamper with the data, the nationalist scholar responded as following: “I am a jury member now and you cannot answer back. Whatever is necessary will be written down [in the thesis]”

(TepeDoğanandYarkın 2020, 41). There are numerous other such examples in the over ninety pages of the report.

Although cultural diversity has survived, the scientific anthropological study of this richness remains therefore difficult at best. Researchers in the field have to be prepared for intimidation, censorship and self-censorship, administrative and legal repercussions, violence, possible prosecution and even imprisonment. Their works can be easily interpreted as threats *against* state and national unity under the current laws and state practices, which continue to securitize the state and the nation *against* citizens. In the end, this means that while many other countries capitalise on their diversity in cultural and economic fields, Turkey remains at war with its own.

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