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Religious Believers in Spain by Social Classes: Results over 268,261 Individuals: 2013 to 2022

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Abstract

In March 2022, 60% of Spaniards identify themselves as religious (believers). This percentage is the lowest since data is available. In 2000, 80%, while in 2019 was 70%. Almost all people who define themselves as Believers indicate that they are Catholics (97%). The variability of religious identification is established by gender, age, educational attainment, and ideology. 102 data files from the CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Spain) have been merged, obtaining a sample size of 340,532 interviewees between January 2013 and February 2022. This file also includes additional information on occupation, professional situation, and the economic activity of the respondents. From this information, a social class model has been generated (sample size of 268,261 respondents) following to Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero (EGP) classification. The results show that religious identification varies significantly by social class: the higher the social class, the lower the religious identification.

Keywords: religious identification, believers, social inequality, social classes, Spain

Creyentes Religiosos en España por Clases Sociales: Resultados de 268.261 Personas: 2013 to 2022

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Resumen

En marzo de 2022, un 60% de personas en España se identifican como religiosas (creyentes). Este porcentaje es el más bajo de los datos disponibles en las series históricas. En el año 2000, era del 80%, 70% en 2019 (casi todas católicas, 97%). La variabilidad de la identificación religiosa puede verse por género, edad, estudios alcanzados e ideología. Se han fusionado 102 archivos de datos del Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) en España y obtenido una muestra de 340.532 personas entre enero de 2013 y febrero de 2022. Este archivo incluye información adicional de la ocupación de las personas entrevistadas, de su situación profesional y de su actividad económica. Con esta información hemos creado un modelo de clases sociales (muestra de 268.261 personas) siguiendo la clasificación de Erikson, Goldthorpe y Portocarero (EGP). Los resultados muestran que la identificación religiosa varía significativamente por clases sociales: los de clases sociales altas se identifican menos como personas religiosas (creyentes).

Palabras clave: identificación religiosa, creyentes, desigualdad social, clases sociales, España

Social inequality studies are of great relevance in academic, social, political, and economic debates in OECD countries. Economic crash and reports of poverty and inequality have breached the political agenda, placing these analyses and their recommendations at the forefront of institutional action (Atkinson, 2018). It is the defining challenge of our time, with a recurring question: if you were born into a low - income family, what are your chances that you will rise, that your 'luck' will change? (Mijs, 2021; Marrero & Servén, 2021; Marqués, 2015). The OECD (2018) points to the existence of a growing perception in the population that increasingly family advantages, and fortunes play an important factor in people's lives and social destiny. This translates into the irruption and, growth, of a certain pessimism in society since personal situations in terms of education, occupation and income are strongly correlated with family social background (OECD, 2016, p. 32), thus undermining social cohesion and favouring political and ideological extremisms (Kelley & Evans, 2017).

Spain, for example, is among the nations where inequality continues to grow (Cabrera, Marrero, Rodríguez & Salas, 2021; OECD, 2017; Carabaña, 2016; Requena & Stanek, 2015).

Where does religious identification in Spain stand in this context of ongoing crisis? Can it be said that social inequality has weakened religious identification in Spain? Is there variability in the religious identification of citizens by social class? This article studies the variability of religious believers and, by the opposition, non-believers, with respect to their social class in Spain in the last ten years, from January 2013 to February 2022. This period includes critical and convulsive moments in Spanish society, mainly generated by the covid pandemic, falling employment and incomes, and the loss of purchasing power due to the rise in inflation, according to the data provided by Institute National of Statistics (INE, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c), without computing the effects derived from the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

A variable, social class, has been constructed to categorize the Spaniards interviewed by the CIS, following the social class model EGP (Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero (1979, 1982, 2010). It has been verified, in parallel, that the identifying variables of gender, age, educational attainment, and ideology, nuance the religious identification of Spaniards in the different class positions, again modulated by the effect of the passage of time, the evolution of the social behaviour and citizen attitudes (annual comparisons over a

decade). The information obtained from unification of 102 CIS barometers adds up to a total of 340,532 respondents. This sample size allows a multidimensional analysis, and supports the results and conclusions found. Namely, in advance: a general decrease in religious identification over time, which, in turn, is polarized with less religious identification in the highest social classes (60%), and a greater religious identification in the lowest (79%). Within each social group, disaggregation by gender, age, studies, and ideology introduces a further separation in religious identification by class.

Thus, the lower classes vary their religious believers by gender, age, education, and ideology: older, less educated, and ideologically right-wing women make up the most religious group. At the other extreme, upper classes, the group formed by younger, less educated, and ideologically left-wing men is the least religious group. Between the two groups, religious identification (believers) ranges between 100% and 16%, respectively.

A starting point is that religious identification in Spain (which varies between 60% and 80%, depending on the year considered) is, by itself, heterogeneous by social class: the popular classes identify themselves more as religious (believers) than the upper classes, made up of managers, professionals, and high-level technicians. It is also assumed that, within them, there is heterogeneity in religious identification by gender, age, education, and ideology, in addition to the effect of the passage of time. In short, a priori, a stereotype of less religious 'rich upper-class' versus more religious 'poor lower class' more religious is detected, an image of religiosity more associated with people with less economic means, poorer and more distant from society and the material goods that are alien to them, and, secondly, it is observed how the passage of time weakens and undermines the religious identification of all Spaniards as a whole, regardless of their social class.

Measuring Religious Identification: The State of the Art

Religious identification has been constructed from the dichotomization of the categories of the question asked by the CIS in the different barometers from January 2013 to February 2022: *How do you define yourself in religious matters: practicing Catholic, non-practicing Catholic, believer in another religion, agnostic, indifferent or non-believer, or atheist.* This polytomous categorical variable has been dichotomized: *believers* (identified as religious

Catholics, practicing or non-practicing, or as believers of another religion); and *non-believers* (agnostics, non-believers, atheists).

This dichotomization, which may correspond to the religious-secular binomial (*Catholics and believers of another religion and not believers, atheists and agnostics*) is common in religious research (Panadero, Gilart & Ortí, 2022; Ruiz, 2022, 2017; Voas & Chaves, 2016; González-Anleo, 2016; Pérez-Agote, 2014, 2012, 2007; Martín-Huete, 2015; Casanova, 2012; Brañas-Garza, García-Muñoz & Neuman, 2011; Inglehart & Foa, 2010; Pérez-Agote & Santiago-García, 2005). At the same time, it favours the creation of multidimensional explanatory models, which allow the generation of cross tabulations with descriptive information for numerous groups and allows the expression of a very powerful binomial logistic model, a proposal included in this work. It is not intended, with this, to reduce the meaning of the religious fact to two exclusive categories, since the objective is not to study the meaning of the concepts nor their historical contextualization (Berian, 2015).

In Spain, research on the relationships between religious identification, measured binary (declaring oneself religious yes/no), religious-(believer)/secular, and other variables, such as gender, age, ideology, educational attainment of the interviewees or the effect of time (reference historical years) has been common. These are mainly descriptive and bivariate analyses (Panadero, Gilart & Ortí, 2022; González-Anleo, 2016; Pérez-Agote, 2014, 2009, 2007; Inglehart & Foa, 2010; Pérez-Agote & Santiago-García, 2005). Multivariate analyses (Pérez-Agote, 2012; Brañas-Garza, García-Muñoz & Neuman, 2011) have been infrequent and conducted with limited samples ($n < 1,500$). On the other hand, qualitative research on religious minorities in Spain carried out with an immigrant population without Spanish nationality (Díez de Velasco, 2010; Urrutia, 2016; Cornejo, 2012; Estruch, Gómez, Griera & Iglesias, 2007), population not interviewed by the CIS, has been more frequent.

In summary, the results found in the researchers conducted in Spain recurrently show that the most religious people (believers) are women, with a lower educational level, over 65 years of age, and ideologically situated to the right, as well as the existence of more religiosity in the past than in the present (Panadero, Gilart & Ortí, 2022; Ruiz, 2022, 2017; González-Anleo, 2016; Pérez-Agote, 2014, 2012, 2009, 2007; Brañas-Garza, García-Muñoz &

Neuman, 2011; Inglehart & Foa, 2010; Pérez-Agote & Santiago-García, 2005). These results for Spain do not differ substantially from those found in other European countries (Casanova, 2021; Ferrara, 2019; Conway & Spruytt, 2018; Bruce & Glendinning, 2010; Davie, 2007; Crockett & Voas, 2006).

In Spain, no studies have been found on religious identification by social classes and that have been so based on the educational attainment, socioeconomic well-being, and intergenerational social mobility of the population. The classification of social classes EGP has been and is one of the main methodological tools to show the weight and influence of these in our lives. Religious studies in Spain have not incorporated this analysis methodology in order to calibrate and scrutinize the variability of religious identification by social class. This is one of the great contributions of this article. Another important contribution is the construction of a database, sufficiently extensive, that allows providing relevant and multidimensional information on this religious identification by social class and with insights of sociodemographic variables such as gender, age, and educational attainment, as well as positional variables such as ideology and time (year of obtaining responses from the interviewees), as developed below.

Data and Method

The data file used in this work has been generated from 102 microdata files of the CIS (January 2013 to February 2022 (with sample sizes varying between 2,500 and 4,000 respondents), plus the addition of some specific macro barometers of electoral consultations in that period (with sample sizes around 15,000 respondents). Monthly microdata and macro barometers are freely available on the CIS website (<http://www.cis.es>).

This combination of files has generated a database of 340,532 respondents initially, reduced to 333,687 when they have been identified as religious or not, and finally in 268,261 when social class is introduced as a variable, which records the information on the occupations of the respondents and their relationships with the media and the economic activities of the productive system. Sampling errors are $\pm 2\%$ or lower for each of the 102 sample files. The created file was weighted considering the regional sample sizes (Data from the CIS technical files of each barometer) and their respective population sizes (INE population data, 2022d, from the population censuses in Spain).

All the tables and figures shown in this work have been made by the authors from the information collected in the indicated sources.

Dependent Variables

Religious identification (believers) with two categories: This variable is available in the 102 CIS barometers that have been merged. First category will be coded as 1 and included who declares himself as Catholics or believers of another religion, and second one, coded as 0, means Not believers, atheists, or agnostics. From now on, and throughout this working document, the first category will be referred as Believers, and the second one as non-believers.

Independent Variable

Social class: Main independent variable of this work. It should be noted that the social position implies a parallel condition of income (of wealth/well-being). In Spain, the latest INE data for 2019 (and 2013) on average earnings (in euros) by occupation, year, and gender, as of May 2, 2022 (INE, 2022e) (Table 1).

Directors and Managers quadruple the incomes of unskilled workers, while Professionals triple it. Both groups (upper classes) have higher incomes than the rest, almost doubling or tripling their incomes compared to the rest. Income improvements between 2018 and 2013 show that time widens the differences in their averages for the indicated groups. In all categories, women's earnings are lower than men's in both 2013 and 2019, 2020 and 2021 earnings are not yet available, but everything points to a drop due to the COVID pandemic and the Russia invasion of Ukraine.

The social class model EGP has been used to define the categories of variable. This model proposes, adapts, and updates the social positions of an individual based on his material wealth, in the form of ownership and control of resources, social prestige and political power.

94 *Cabrera & Rosa-González - Religious Believers in Spain*

Table 1.

Average annual earning (euros) per worker and gender in Spain: years 2013 and 2019.

Category	Occupations	Year	Women	Men	Both
A	<i>Directors and Managers</i>	2019	48,668	60,781	56,635
		2013	45,033	55,090	51,594
B	<i>Health and Education scientific and intellectual professionals and specialists</i>	2019	32,136	35,488	33,199
		2013	28,335	33,252	29,808
C	<i>Other Scientific and Intellectual Specialists and Professionals</i>	2019	33,916	40,334	37,244
		2013	31,560	39,309	35,886
D	<i>Specialists; support professionals</i>	2019	25,951	31,816	29,247
		2013	24,960	31,027	28,502
E	<i>Office employees who do not deal with the public</i>	2019	20,585	25,634	22,355
		2013	19,251	23,844	20,983
F	<i>Office employees who deal with the public</i>	2019	18,810	22,438	19,970
		2013	16,620	21,070	17,864
G	<i>Catering and trade services workers</i>	2019	14,982	18,155	16,142
		2013	13,398	16,761	14,643
H	<i>Health services and personal care workers</i>	2019	15,418	21,006	16,816
		2013	14,444	18,346	15,241
I	<i>Protective and security services workers</i>	2019	26,187	29,339	28,785
		2013	21,040	26,484	25,711
J	<i>Skilled agricultural, livestock, forestry, and fishery workers</i>	2019		22,112	21,232
		2013		18,221	18,217
K	<i>Skilled construction workers, except machinery operators</i>	2019		21,070	20,827
		2013		19,504	19,463
L	<i>Skilled manufacturing industry workers, except installation and machinery operators</i>	2019	17,573	24,406	23,170
		2013	15,676	22,682	21,790
M	<i>Stationary plant and machine operators, and assemblers</i>	2019	20,327	27,672	26,152
		2013	17,367	24,289	22,465
N	<i>Mobile machine drivers and operators</i>	2019	17,258	20,920	20,662
		2013	16,786	20,125	19,934
O	<i>Unskilled services workers (except transport)</i>	2019	12,411	17,347	13,797
		2013	11,315	16,173	12,602
P	<i>Agricultural, fishery, construction, manufacturing, and transport industry laborer</i>	2019	16,009	18,921	18,241
		2013	13,246	16,863	15,889
	All Occupations	2019	21,682	26,934	24,396
		2013	19,515	25,675	22,698

Note. Blank cells indicate observations less than 500 and subject to variability.
Source: INE (2022e)

The identification of the categories of social class model EGP is based on the ownership of the means of production or companies, the number of

employees of these, the distinction of technicians, qualified or unqualified, manual or non-manual occupations, types of economic activity and employment relationship (Gil-Hernández, Vidal-Lorda & Torrejón-Pérez, 2022; Clemenceau, Fernández & Rodríguez, 2016, p. 24-28; Carabaña, 1999, 1995; Instituto de Estadística y Cartografía de Andalucía, IECA, 2018a, 2018b; ILO, 2012; Rose & Harrison, 2010). The Table 2 summarizes the proposed model with two social class options: 7 categories and 3 categories, identified as EGP7 and EGP3. First of them, will allow contextualizing the general variability of religious identification and second one, will do it on religious profiles of social classes by subgroups created from sociodemographic variables and ideological and temporal position with respect to the year of response about respondent’s religious identification.

Table 1.

Categorization (EGP) of social class with seven (EGP7) and three (EGP3) categories.

<i>Social classes</i>			
<i>EGP7</i>		<i>EGP3</i>	
<i>Name</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Description</i>
Classes of service (I and II)	1	HIGH	<i>Managers and Administrators and high-level Officials. Directors of large industrial establishments or Owners of large companies with more than 25 workers.</i>
Intermediate Classes (IIIa and IIIb)	2		<i>Professionals, Administrators and Officers of medium-low level. Managers of Small Industrial Establishments (less than 25 workers). Supervisors of non-manual workers.</i>
Petty Bourgeoisie (IVa and IVb)	3	MIDDLE	<i>High-level routine white-collar employees in administration and commerce.</i>
Farmers, Fishermen and Tenants (IVc)	4		<i>Low level routine white collar employees (sales and services). Service and security workers.</i>
Workers Qualified (V)	5		<i>Small owners, artisans with employees (less than 25 workers).</i>
Working Class (VI)	6		<i>Small proprietors, artisans without employees.</i>
Unskilled and Agricultural Workers (VIIa and VIIb)	7	LOWER	<i>Farmers, tenants, and other self-employed workers in the agricultural and fishing sector.</i>

Source: Clemenceau, Fernández & Rodríguez (2016, p. 28), IECA (2018a, 2018b), ILO (2012)

Sociodemographic Variables

Other independent variables have been considered to measure religious identification by social class, due to the variability they provided by sociodemographic perspective and ideological and temporal positions. Thus, it has been considered, as sociodemographic variables: *Gender*, man or woman; *Age*, from 18 to 98 years, later categorized into six dummy variables for different cohorts (18-25 years old, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65 and 65 and older); *Educational attainment*, classified with 4 categories, following the International Standard Classification of Education, ISCED-2011, UNESCO: ISCED 0-1 (primary education or less), ISCED 2 (lower secondary), ISCED 3-4 (secondary) and ISCED 5-6-7-8 (tertiary education); and as position variables, one ideological, *Ideology*, with values from 1 (left) to 10 (right), which later is categorized in three, left, center and right, and a temporary one, *Year*, with ten values, one per year, from 2013 to 2022.

Models

The scenarios and models used in this work will be:

A. Multidimensional descriptive with percentage of frequencies of respondents who identify themselves as religious (believers):

Dichotomous *Religious identification* (believers or non-believers) will be the dependent variable of the model. *Social class* is the main independent variable and, as additional independent variables, four of the previously defined sociodemographic variables will be used, *Gender*, *Age*, *Education attained* and *Ideology*. Which together produce a joint model of visible categories of 432 subgroups with the first three variables (double, 864 subgroups, considering that the dependent variable consists of two categories). The size of the file allows us to always find subgroups with a relevant sample size with the first three variables and when using the four variables there are a few subgroups with less than 25 cases that will be not considered.

B. Multiple correspondence analysis that includes the variable year of the survey in the previous model:

A *Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA)* allows to generate a result where the objects of the same category will be represented closer than those of another category. In this way, there will be homogeneous subgroups for similar categories, thus allowing them to be classified. It can be considered like realization of a multifactorial contingency table.

In this work, this analysis is carried out, using the previous model with the inclusion of the Year variable to check if there is a variation of Religiosity over time. The incorporation of the year variable is intended to verify the effect of the passage of time. Thus, the suggestions of incorporating temporality ascribed intrinsically to the evolution of social time, or the social phenomena, that produce changes in people's attitudes and opinions (Griera, Martínez-Ariño & Clot-Garrell, 2021) is followed.

C. Logistic regression model with seven variables:

As dependent variable of the model, dichotomous *Religiosity* (Binomial variable) will be used, with a coding where believers category will be the reference value. The main independent variable will be *Social class*, using EGP3 categorizing. Three additional variables are introduced in the model, one will be *Gender*, and the other two will be used as semi-continuous, scalable ordinal variables, *Ideology* (10 categories on a scale from 1 to 10) and barometer reference *Year* (10 categories, from 2013, year by year, to 2022).

Results

Religious believers in Spain, although it is still the majority, has fallen from 80% at the beginning of the century to around 60% in 2022. In recent years, this drop has been more pronounced: 73.1% (2019) to 60.9% (2022), as shown in Table 3. Significant independence is founded ($p < .0001$ for χ^2 test) between *Religiosity* and *Year*.

The variability of religious identification by social class is notorious and reaches up to 28% between *Managers & Professionals* (classes I and II) and classes *Unskilled Workers* and *Skilled Agricultural, Forestry & Fishery Workers* (VIIa and VIIb) (Table 4).

98 *Cabrera & Rosa-González - Religious Believers in Spain*

Table 3.

Religious Identification (%) by year in Spain.

	Religiosity (%within year)		Total	Cases
	Believers	Not believers		
2013	74.6	25.4	100.0	27,010
2014	73.7	26.3	100.0	26,824
2015	73.8	26.2	100.0	26,971
2016	74.1	25.9	100.0	32,879
2017	73.2	26.8	100.0	26,912
2018	71.8	28.2	100.0	28,736
2019	73.1	26.9	100.0	78,518
2020	64.6	35.4	100.0	37,304
2021	62.1	37.9	100.0	41,039
2022	60.9	39.1	100.0	7,496
SPAIN	70.7%	29.3	100.0	333,689

Source: 102 barometers CIS (January 2013 to February 2022)

Table 4.

Religious Identification (%) by Social class in Spain

EGP	Category	Religiosity (%within social class)		Total	Cases
		Believers	Not believers		
<i>I & II</i>	<i>Managers & Professionals</i>	60.5	39.5	100.0	54,463
	<i>Technicians, Clerical</i>				
<i>IIIa & IIIb</i>	<i>Support Workers, Service and Sales Workers</i>	66.7	33.3	100.0	98,193
	<i>Small Entrepreneurs, with or without workers</i>	71.4	28.6	100.0	7,032
<i>EGP7</i>	<i>Farmers, Tenant</i>				
	<i>IVc</i> <i>Farmers, Forestry & Fishery</i>	76.8	23.2	100.0	1,961
<i>V & VI</i>	<i>Technicians (low level) & Supervisors, Skilled Workers</i>	76.0	24.0	100.0	53,841
	<i>VIIa</i> <i>Unskilled Workers</i>	76.3	23.7	100.0	42,302
<i>VIIb</i>	<i>Skilled Agricultural, Forestry & Fishery Workers</i>	88.4	11.6	100.0	10,469
	<i>Lower</i>	78.7	21.3	100.0	52,771
<i>EGP3</i>	<i>Middle</i>	70.1	29.9	100.0	161,027
	<i>Higher</i>	60.5	39.5	100.0	54,463
	<i>Employed</i>	69.9	30.1	100.0	268,261
	SPAIN	70.7%	29.3	100.0	333,689

Source: 102 barometers CIS (January 2013 to February 2022)

The evolution of religious identification by social class over the years, series from 2013 to 2022, is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Religious Identification (Believers: %) by Social Class (EGP7) and YEAR. Spain, N=268,261

It can be seen how the range of differences is lower in 2022 than in 2013. Believers are reduced over the years to 60% in 2022, actually are 54% in the case of employed workers considering the social classes as an independent variable. The service classes (Managers and Professionals) are less believers than the other classes and are located throughout the series always below the total and at a distance of 18% with respect to the groups of agricultural, forestry and fishing workers and the unskilled workers. The distance in 2022 of 18% between these groups decreases from 28% in 2013. The drop in religious identification in recent times reduces the gap in religious identification by social class. This fall does not generate a linear regression model, but it ventures two changes of slopes in the trends.

Models

A. The results for a **Multidimensional Descriptive model** used to analyze the percentage of frequencies of respondents who identify themselves as religious (believers) shows how the general descriptive study of the percentage variability of people who identify themselves as religious by *Social class* is substantially expanded when is disaggregated by other variables of interest: *Educational attainment*, *Gender*, *Age* intervals and *Ideology* of the interviewee (Table 5). Then, the percentage variations are more evident, and the religious identification is extended to the interval that goes from 16-17%.

100 Cabrera & Rosa-González - *Religious Believers in Spain*

This model makes it possible to compare the religious identifications of almost 432 groups (really double if the inverse categories are counted). This forms a total of 864 groups in which only a few groups (27 of 432; 54 of 864) do not allow multiple descriptive comparisons. These results could be summarized in:

1. Religious identification in Spain (70%) is majority, but significantly different according to social class: the lower classes identify more as religious (79%) than the upper classes (61%), while the middle classes reproduce the general trend (70%).
2. The introduction of the variables *Gender*, *Age*, *Education attainment*, and *Ideology* allows observing a significant increase in the precision of the proportions of religious identification.
3. Young people are less religious than older ones: religious identification increases with age and the differences in religiosity between men (less religious) and women (more religious) are maintained for the different age groups. They only decrease and equalize when men and women have university studies.
4. In all the groups compared, the ideological position of the interviewees biases their religious identification: those who identify with the left are much less religious than those who identify with the right.
5. Ideologically leftist groups with higher education have the lowest percentages of religious identification, both for men and women, and this trend is accentuated when they are upper class.
6. The upper classes are less religious than the lower classes and even less the more educated they are, both for men and women.
7. The effect of social location is closely related to education. It has not been possible to find respondents with primary education in the upper class (empty cells with less than 25 respondents and some with no respondents).
8. Respondents from higher social class and higher education are clearly the least identified as religious (believers) when they identify with the left. The proportion of believers reaches, in this case, the lowest percentages.
9. The proportions of religious identification, in general, in each of the columns considered increase by *Ideology* (Left, Center, Right), *Age* groups, *Educational attainment*, and this is also observed, as one goes

from the group of men to the group of women. On the other hand, decrease by the social classes (Low, Middle, High).

Table 5.

Religious identification (% of Believers) by Social Class, Gender, Age, Education attainment and Ideology

		SOCIAL CLASS												
		LOWER					MIDDLE					HIGH		
		IDEOLOGY					IDEOLOGY					IDEOLOGY		
		TOTAL	LEFT	CENTER	RIGHT	TOTAL	LEFT	CENTER	RIGHT	TOTAL	LEFT	CENTER	RIGHT	
GENDER	AGE	79	61	82	91	70	47	75	89	61	32	67	89	
Primary or less	MAN	18-25	63	55	67	86	59	47	59	73	80			
		26-35	68	56	70	84	61	43	67	74	61			
		36-45	79	66	83	87	75	65	75	86	82			
		46-55	85	75	89	94	83	72	86	94	80	47	87	89
		56-65	89	76	92	94	85	75	88	95	84	62	86	98
		66-98	94	83	94	98	89	75	90	98	89	68	89	98
	WOMAN	18-25	71	59	71	87	76	61	78	81	89			
		26-35	83	85	82	83	79	57	85	74	91			
		36-45	91	88	92	91	86	76	87	97	88			
		46-55	93	86	93	95	90	81	92	94	88			97
		56-65	95	90	95	98	94	84	95	99	91	73	94	100
		66-98	97	92	98	100	97	90	97	99	96	83	96	100
Lower secondary	MAN	18-25	58	44	61	74	53	38	57	70	47	22	44	70
		26-35	63	45	69	74	62	44	66	75	61	41	63	88
		36-45	70	54	75	84	69	48	73	86	70	42	73	85
		46-55	78	60	82	91	75	58	80	90	76	51	79	85
		56-65	83	70	86	94	79	64	83	96	81	48	87	92
		66-98	91	73	88	100	87	69	88	97	82	56	81	96
	WOMAN	18-25	67	57	70	77	63	42	68	70	52	34	54	93
		26-35	77	65	81	87	73	57	77	83	64	44	67	
		36-45	83	73	85	91	79	61	82	93	80	54	83	90
		46-55	88	76	91	96	85	69	89	95	84	61	90	88
		56-65	90	77	93	99	88	70	92	97	89	71	91	98
		66-98	95	82	97	98	93	74	95	100	95	72	96	100
Secondary	MAN	18-25	46	24	51	67	45	24	52	68	44	19	48	76
		26-35	52	31	56	71	50	28	57	73	43	22	47	67
		36-45	63	42	67	84	58	36	65	82	54	27	59	83
		46-55	71	48	77	91	65	42	72	87	61	35	65	84
		56-65	71	51	76	91	68	46	76	91	67	34	73	90
		66-98	85	64	93	96	81	57	84	95	83	49	86	95
	WOMAN	18-25	59	36	63	77	53	31	60	76	48	22	56	83
		26-35	69	48	74	87	63	39	69	82	54	30	58	79
		36-45	76	52	83	93	70	47	76	89	69	40	72	91
		46-55	79	56	87	93	74	53	80	92	73	50	77	91
		56-65	83	64	88	94	78	59	85	95	80	51	83	97
		66-98	94	91	94	100	89	72	91	98	89	64	89	98
Tertiary	MAN	18-25	46	20	57	58	39	18	45	63	38	17	42	72
		26-35	47	21	68	74	41	19	48	77	41	18	49	74
		36-45	60	35	68	85	50	24	59	79	52	25	59	81
		46-55	60	38	71	76	59	31	66	86	59	30	65	86
		56-65	71	48	69	91	59	35	67	87	61	33	69	89
		66-98	95				74	32	80	94	76	38	80	96
	WOMAN	18-25	48	20	59	88	47	24	57	85	46	16	55	86
		26-35	56	36	65	90	51	27	61	81	48	24	58	85
		36-45	71	45	77	92	62	34	72	90	59	32	69	92
		46-55	77	57	82	83	67	42	74	91	66	38	75	92
		56-65	78	44	85	100	68	48	76	90	67	41	77	96
		66-98	91				84	57	89	98	82	51	85	98

Source: 102 barometers CIS (January 2013 to February 2022)

B. The results for A model, *Multidimensional Descriptive model*, when variable *Year* is added to it, are obtained through multiple comparisons by categories of these variables and can be visualized by a conjoint graph of categories applying a two-dimensional multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) (Figure 2). The MCA reflects Euclidean distances projected on a plane, near or far depending on the proximity of the categories of the variables in their projection on the plane. The inclusion of the year as a variable in the model provides an MCA with seven variables and thirty categories.




Figure 2. Multidimensional correspondence model of Religiosity by Gender, Age, Educational attainment, Social class, Ideology and Year.

Regarding the reference points given by the categories Believers and Non-believers of the variable *Religiosity*, the distances over the dimension 2 do not affect largely. Therefore, for the exploratory analysis given by this model the disposition on dimension 1, which corresponds to the abscissa axis, will be taken as a reference. A greater religiosity corresponds to its right side, while the smaller values of this are found to the left of this line. Thus, in a first approximation, people with primary education, over 65 years old, of lower

class, right-wing ideology and woman would present the highest level of religiosity, while the lowest level would be found for the upper class, with university studies, of left-wing ideology, age less than 55 years old and men.

Analyzing the graph for each of the dependent variables, it is observed that women have a higher level of religiosity than the men, Regarding *Age*, it is observed that from 56 years a higher level of religiosity is shown, while lower ages tend to approach positions of low religiosity. The two lower educational levels, primary or less and lower secondary, as well as the lowest social classes are in the area of greater religiosity while the other categories are in the left area, which marks a lower index of religiosity. Of the above is deducible that an increase in schooling shows a fall, while the decrease in social position, increases the religiosity of the individual.

The ideological categories show that, although the left and the right positions are clearly situated on low and high levels of religiosity, on the other hand the individuals who have declared themselves centrist present a certain tendency to religiosity but remaining in a middle term. Graphically, it is observed how the years prior to 2019 are place next to greater religiosity while the subsequent ones, 2020, 2021 and 2022, do it on the side of less religiosity.

As a summary, the graph of joint categories shows the closeness between the believers of the categories corresponding to the lower classes, Lower and Middle. Women, older people, with a low level of education and right-wing ideology, as opposed to non-believers, who present a density of categories, but who, for example, are not associated by proximity to the higher social class or of the highest educational level. This is in line with the idea of looking for an exploratory analysis rather than the explanatory one provided by the MCA.

C. The results for the **Binomial Logistic Regression model** proposed to explain the behavior of percentage of respondents who identify themselves as religious (believers) are developed below.

The variables used are the same that in the Multidimensional Descriptive model developed previously, so they are introduced in the model taking their first category as a reference. All are significant, and a post hoc Wald forward is performed to check the final variables in the logit model. The Logistic regression coefficients obtained are on Table 6.

Table 6. Coefficients of Regression Logistic Model

Variables	Categories	B	S. E.	Wald	d. f.	p - value	Odds Ratio
Gender <i>Woman (reference)</i>	<i>Man</i>	-.546	.011	2,678	1	<,001	.579
	<i>Primary or less (reference)</i>			3,089	3	<,001	
Educational attainment <i>Primary or less (reference)</i>	<i>Lower</i>	-.371	.023	254	1	<,001	.690
	<i>Secondary</i>	-.823	.022	1,370	1	<,001	.439
	<i>University</i>	-	.024	2,151	1	<,001	.335
Social class <i>Lower (reference)</i>	<i>Middle</i>	-.227	.015	216	2	<,001	.797
	<i>High</i>	-.388	.020	396	1	<,001	.579
	<i>Year</i>	-.066	.002	979	1	<,001	.936
Scale <i>(1 to 10)</i>	<i>Ideology</i>	.469	.003	22,05	1	<,001	1.598
	<i>Age</i>	.035	.000	7,887	1	<,001	1.036

Source: Own elaboration from data file CIS (102 barometers, Spain, January 2013 to February 2022). N=268,261

S.E.: Standard Error.

The interpretation of the logistic model will be done through the odds ratios. Thus, values less than one found for the *Social class* indicate that *Religious identification* decreases when moving from the lower to the middle class (.797), and to the upper class (.579). Something similar is observed when the odds ratios of the *Educational attainment* variable are analyzed, since all categories, University (.335), Secondary (.439) and lower secondary (.690) present a lower *Religious identification* than the reference studies, primary or less. Alternatively, *Religious identification* declines while *Educational attainment* improves. By Gender, it is observed that *Religious identification* also decreases, which indicates that men are less religious than women (.579; inverse exponent 1.73, almost in a ratio close to 2 to 1).

The passage of time (taken as an ordinal-scalable variable for the given years), *Year* variable, decreases *Religious identification*. On the other hand, a greater *Religious identification* with the ideological right is observed, in this case there is an increase of 50% for each point of the scale with respect to the previous point, so it can be said that *Religious identification* increase with variable *Ideology*, as defined in this work. A similar effect, although of lesser magnitude, occurs with Age, where each year of those respondent between 18 and 98 years old increases her religious identification as a believer by 3.6%.

Discussion

Religious identification in Spain continues to fall over time. The sharp decline in religious identification in the last three years has led to point to a Spain that is heading towards atheism, and even in the case of young people (Panadero, Gilart & Ortí, 2022). Secularization is gaining ground as the years go by. In parallel, there is a lack of religious commitment reflected in a lower religious participation in the acts and ceremonies of believers (Ruiz, 2022; Itçaina, 2019; González-Anleo, 2016; Martín-Huete, 2015; Pérez-Agote, 2012). Something similar occurs in other European countries (Riccardi, 2022; Casanova, 2021; Ferrara, 2019; Obadia, 2014; Bruce & Glendinning, 2010).

In what describe as a trivialization of those who identify themselves as believers, but not practitioners, since they do not engage in cults or active religious practice (Conway & Spruyt, 2018; Molteni & Ferruccio, 2018). Thus, multiple interpretations of secularizations appear (Wohlrab-Sahr & Burchardt, 2012), full of singularities due to the permeable cultural bond that

manifest itself in Spain today, where immigration has meant the presence of slightly more than five million people in the Spanish territory, which represents 11.3% of the census population, which reaches forty-seven million in 2021 (INE, 2022d). Something similar occurs in other European countries with this permeabilization of cultures and religions that could favor cultural nexus and make the receiving countries more cosmopolitan (Driezen, Verschraegen & Clycq, 2021; Martínez-Ariño et al., 2011).

The religious decline of the Spanish population is visible, as in all Western Europe, since the beginning of the century (Palard, 2002; Arroyo, 2008; Davie, 2007) and continues to spread in the first two decades (Molteni & Ferruccio, 2018). This fall, throughout the Western world (Inglehart & Foa, 2010), is linked for some researchers to the market economic model (Itçaina, 2019; Pollack, 2008), to the individualization of people in this Western capitalist world (Pollack, 2008; Molénat, 2014), to the debates of religious weakness of Christian thought (secularization and post-secularization) that fails to maintain and attract the least believers, although British and American societies can still give examples of vitality religious (Díaz-Salazar, 2007; Pollack, 2008; Casanova, 2012; Ferrara, 2019; Casanova, 2021). In recent years, a cultured religious approach proposed by (Astor & Damon, 2020; Obadia, 2014) or egalitarian multicultural secularism (De Botton & Pulido, 2012) has also emerged.

The consequences of societal diversity in religiosity (the centrality of religion to one's life) for individuals' endorsement of conventional personal morality have been neglected in previous research. In societies where the population exhibits a wide range of religiosity, social conservatives (religiously devout or socially traditional) feel that their beliefs and way of life are threatened, even when others in their society (secular or socially liberal) have no desire to threaten them, or to discriminate against them, or even to proselytize (Evans & Kelley, 2021).

Social inequality is a source of uncertainty and social insecurity. To the extent that social inequality is related to religious identification, these threats felt by the devotees may be identified more as threats to their class position than from their beliefs. These distances of religious identification by social class in Spain have been obtained and it has been verified that the upper classes are considerably less religious than the lower classes. It is also found that these upper classes have higher incomes than the lower ones: four or three

times more. And that triple or double the income of the middle classes. There remains, then, a certain implicit image of religiosity associated with poverty. On the other hand, the higher earnings of men compared to women, visible in all occupational groups, may also be implicitly associated with the lower religious identification of men compared to women. Religious identification suffers, consequently, with higher incomes and the well-being associated with them, loss of spirituality and gains in the satisfaction of material consumption.

Seen in this way, believers remain in lower class social positions, the least desirable for the population as a whole. This can generate religious detachment in the new generations who see through their families a differential religious behavior by social class. Being religious can be a stigma of class location, one more to count in social studies of social inequality where social positions are not only related to income, but also show changes in attitudes, behaviors, and opinions of different class groups, modulated by gender, ethnicity, age, educational attainment, occupation, and social class (Grusky, 2014; Kerbo, 2012). Subsequently, these unequal social positions are permanently questioned and used in policies and ideological debates (Mijs, 2021). This is where being a believer loses ground since the merits of access to the best occupations (closely related to education: Goldthorpe, 2010, 2013; Palomino, Marrero & Rodríguez, 2019), reflect less religious identification, more secularization.

The weight and passage of time seem to generate changing patterns of behavior, individual positions, and actions. Changes in religious identification are perceived in all generations and seems to be related to class positions in the social structure and to the ascriptive variables of individuals. A growing secularization is observed in Spanish society with the decrease in the ability of religious institutions to influence individuals and groups and the loss of religious identification and religious practice (Panadero, Gilart & Ortí, 2022; Ruiz, 2022; Riccardi, 2022; Casanova, 2012), reinforcing the idea of not believing or belonging (Voas & Crockett, 2005; Wood, 2009; Arroyo, 2008) and of multiple secularizations (Gil Gimeno, 2017) and multiculturalism secularity (De Botton & Pulido, 2013). An intimate Individual, a la carte religiosity (Griera, Martínez-Ariño & Clot-Garrell, 2021; Molénat, 2014; Cornejo, 2012; Flanagan & Jupp, 2007), circumscribed to the permanent exchange between religious and non-religious people that contaminate and blur the religious clarity of the believer and where religiosity is perhaps not

presented as the refuge and consolation of the lower and helpless classes of society.

Note also that the gradual improvement of educational levels in Spain allows, in parallel, to improve with them the class positions due to access to better labor occupations (Goldthorpe, 2013), the social lift derived from individual educational achievement not ascribed to inheritance, is having a considerable effect on religious identification, which clearly decreases with studies, as also occurs with studies of ideology and acceptance of meritocracy as a means to social advancement (Mijs, 2021) and social mobility (Cabrera, Marrero, Rodríguez & Salas-Rojo, 2021).

Conclusions

The religious identification of believers languishes in Spain with the passage of time, with the increase in the studies of the population and with the lower religious identification of the upper social classes. These people are also a reference point for the other classes that see in them the symbol of social success and socioeconomic well-being.

This article relates the religious identification of individuals in Spain with their social positions (model EGP). The data from the CIS have made it possible to generate a database (268,261 respondents) that allows for detailed and multidimensional analyzes of religious-secular identification in Spain: believers (mainly Catholics) and non-believers. This religious/secular binomial is classic in analyzes and research on the religious evolution of Western societies (Casanova, 2021). Its study continues to be of interest since, at present, there is a large amount of demoscopic information available that improves the analyzes and allows showing the religious/secular variability through multiple channels and with a dynamic analysis of the effect of the social context on the changes of positions regarding religious identification (Pérez-Agote, 2014). With these variables has been found that religious identification (believers) is significantly different by social class. Workers in agriculture, fishing, and ranching (88%), unskilled (76%) and skilled workers (76%) and small agricultural, livestock and fishing entrepreneurs (77%) identify themselves as religious. The least religious are mainly those from the social classes of services, upper classes, managers, and professionals (60%) and somewhat less administrative support workers, service, and technical

workers (67%). These are the extremes in the comparison of the seven social classes created according to the EGP7. The range of variability in religious identification reaches 28% among these social classes. The interval is 18% when we reduce the social classes to three categories: high (60%), middle (71%) and low (78%). In the time horizon, religiosity decreases in all groups over time and the gap in 2022 compared to 2013 is significantly shortened by 10% at the extremes of social class, remaining at 18%.

The joint descriptive study of the percentage variability of people who identify themselves as religious by social class, introducing the variables of gender, studies attained, age in intervals and ideology deepens the variability in the intervals of religious identification that are between 16% and 98% depending on the group considered. The size of the file made it possible to compare 432 groups with differentiated profiles (double if one considers that when a subgroup identifies itself as religious, it can be extracted, in parallel, that the other does not). Among the main conclusions is that religiosity is more present in women from lower classes, less educated, younger, ideologically center, or center-right. And, on the contrary, these women, also, declare themselves less religious when they are from upper class and educated, more so when they are younger, but studies and class prevent a high religious identification. The passage of time affects religious identification in all profiles, decreasing more and mainly affecting the new generations and more in men.

The developed logistic regression model allows thousands of comparisons to be generated and studied. In all of them, the increase in religiosity with the lower classes and the decrease with the upper classes is verified. Class positions complemented by the ascriptive variables of gender, age, studies, and ideology open up the distances of religious identification and make social classes a true variable. The upper classes who identify themselves less as believers do so even more when they have university studies and are men, as well as more when they identify themselves as leftists and are younger.

The close association of social class and income level feeds the idea of greater religiosity (believers) with low incomes and less religiosity with high incomes, with believers being closer to the lower classes and incomes and non-believers to the higher ones, both for class as for rent.

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112 *Cabrera & Rosa-González - Religious Believers in Spain*

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