

**THINK POSITIVE PEACE IN PRACTICE:  
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE**

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**Abstract**

The insistence of the return of violence in countries where the UN has intervened to promote peace has fuelled a debate about the effectiveness of international instruments for conflict resolution. This article reflects on the progress that these instruments were having in response to the recurrence of violence in light of what has been an approach to the concept of positive peace of Johan Galtung. From two case studies (Guatemala and Haiti) marked by changes in the discourse and practice of the United Nations that this approach inspired, it is argued that the UN instruments for peace would be so much more effective when they respect the author's proposal, not only with regard to results they intend to achieve, but also in the way positive peace is operationalised on the ground. Analyses – as difficulties in implementing more comprehensive, local and inclusive processes that would affect the promotion of more sustainable peace – also contaminate the mechanisms used to assess their effectiveness.

**Keywords**

Peacebuilding; Positive peace; Evaluation of effectiveness; Guatemala; Haiti

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**Introduction**

Conflict resolution practices conducted by the United Nations have evolved significantly in recent decades, trying to respond more effectively to the recurring return of violence in post-conflict situations by searching for instruments that aim at more sustainable solutions. Especially from the 1990s, this effort has been made to a large extent, and there has been conformity to these instruments for a concept of peace that surpassed its minimum size of non-war and the resolution of conflicts by the containment of violence.

This conceptual expansion of peace, evident in the evolution of the United Nations discourse in recent decades, appears to be an appropriation of the concept of positive peace proposed by Johan Galtung, which has been realised in the evolution of peacekeeping for instruments of a much broader spectrum already associated with the concept of peacebuilding. This materialisation has come to assume more resources – both human and financial – as well as a much greater coordination of various actors from security to humanitarian spheres, which include liaisons with all development and state strengthening actors with a more long-term perspective that addresses the structural causes of conflict.

This new configuration of the United Nations conflict resolution architecture has not always presented effective results.

In this paper, we argue that this theoretical approach brings with it a propitious approach for more sustainable peace solutions. With respect to the proposal of Galtung, this would be much more effective for the results desired as well as the processes to achieve them.

The evaluation of the effectiveness of the UN in promoting peace is still mainly focused on results rather than evaluating procedures. The United Nations may have a difficulty in its implementation, considering that problems extend beyond intentions or objectives. We therefore suggest a review focused more on processes, providing more significant contributions to the debate about its impact on the ground.

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There has been a transition of the United Nations narrative to that of positive peace (consecrated as well on the ground) through greater attention and involvement of the organization in political processes for the resolution of armed conflict, in particular, by integrating UN mediation teams. How this involvement takes place may be a more effective conditioning factor on the ground, a dynamic that we have tried to verify through comparing two case studies.

### **Positive peace in the discourse of the UN**

In 1964 in the first issue of the *Journal of Peace Research*, Johan Galtung, regarded as one of the founding fathers of studies for peace, alluded to an alternative concept of peace that would mark a rapture in the way of conceptualising and making peace. Its reflection had been generated by concerns about the vicious cycle of violence that returned to previously interventions (Galtung, 1964).

Contrary to the dominant tendency to see peace from the point of view of the study of war, which deeply conditions conflict resolution practices on the ground, Galtung proposed an autonomisation of the debate on peace.

He called this perception of peace "positive" (in front of its minimum negative version associated with the absence of war) and suggested a more comprehensive itinerary of social construction that could provide a creative transformation of political, economic, cultural, religious conflicts as well as other forms of social renewal and proximity that come out of the variants of violent opposition. Galtung conceived a process of collective construction that sought balance and social justice, denying violent structures that were the basis of more visible violence that assumes, in its limited shape, the contours of war.

The most significant validity of its proposal, beyond offering a new analytical category to understand the phenomenon of peace, is its new understanding about violence, which moves towards a more direct observation of it as well as the structure from which it originates.

The concept of *structural violence* that Galtung associates with economic exploitation, political repression, social injustice and inequality, suggested that to reply to direct violence (of a more episodic character) it is essential to resolve the deeper causes of conflict in view of invisible violence that exists in a continuous form in whole social structures (Galtung, 1969)<sup>2</sup>.

More than suggesting a goal of a fairer, more-balanced society, Galtung proposed a guide a response to conflicts that achieves a profound transformation in the structural causes of violence, which uses in-depth knowledge of its context, actors, dynamics and incompatibilities. This guide suggest that, instead of a *dissociative* approach to resolution of conflict that breaks relationships among parties, the containment of violence, A *associative* approach that advocates the bringing together of parties in a collective and integrative effort to construct peace.

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<sup>2</sup> Galtung works later on a third concept of violence called cultural violence, which is inherent in the previously stated dimensions. This involves the symbolic aspects of everyday life that are manifested in the systems of norms, religion, ideology and language, which legitimise direct and structural violence (Galtung, 1990).



The holistic view of positive peace is not only associated with the end of direct violence, but also the transformation of structural causes of violence that come to have considerable impact on the discourse and international practices for the resolution of conflicts after the cold war.

In the 1990s we watched the exponential multiplication of interventions for peace led by the United Nations in intra-State conflicts. These new interventions are the combination of new approaches to peace that articulated peace-keeping through military intervention to contain violence, which is more centered on peace-making. This is related to political reconciliation and peace-building, which integrates measures of social reconstruction and development (Woodhouse; Ramsbotham, 2000). The United Nations has taken a leading role as a mediator in several internal conflicts, and has coordinated this function with new peace missions that have mandates far broader than their predecessors.

### **The implementation of discourse in the practice of building peace**

Transition in the dominant discourse of the United Nations, as shown in particular by the inclusion of a version of peace in key documents such as the *Agenda for Peace*<sup>3</sup> of 1992 and its addendum in 1995, came to transform practices on the ground. However, this functionality does not necessarily demonstrate greater effectiveness in resolving violent conflict, and there has still often been returns to violence in situations that had already experienced interventions.

This inefficiency is reflected in the history of peace-keeping operations, the United Nation's mechanism of excellence in this area.

There are 17 ongoing peacekeeping missions of the United Nations<sup>4</sup>. A closer observation enables us to divide them into two main subgroups. The first would correspond to missions with long durations (in some cases for the last 40 years, e.g., UNTSO<sup>5</sup>, the first UN peacekeeping operation in the Middle East), being almost all first generation operations prior to the transition that here we treat as the 1990s. More than half of all current peace-keeping operations are deployed in countries that have experienced previous missions, a second subgroup that corresponds to replica missions.

The characterisation of each subgroup itself calls into question the effectiveness of these instruments in achieving sustainable peace, whether imposing an international presence over time or whether military forces return to previous situations.

Of the 54 peace missions already completed<sup>6</sup>, a vast majority have the same objective as previous or current missions, or centred in neighbouring areas that still present large regions of instability (as would be the case of the missions in the Great Lakes or in the Middle East, which saw violence move to surrounding areas). From these completed missions, we can highlight a small set that is treated in the literature as successful

<sup>3</sup> Full text available at [http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/47/277), accessed on 11 February 2016.

<sup>4</sup> See data provided by the Department of UN Peacekeepers at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>, accessed on 11 February 2016.

<sup>5</sup> The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso>

<sup>6</sup> See data provided by the Department of UN Peacekeepers at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/>, accessed on 11 February 2016.



resolutions to conflicts such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, East Timor and Cambodia, which share a common theme of strong involvement of the UN in the conflicts' political resolution.

The apparent sustainability of peace processes in these cases, and therefore the notion of the UN being more effective in solving these armed confrontations, suggests the need for an evaluation framework. This would therefore make it possible to understand the implemented procedures that have made certain peace models more successful.

Reflections on the effectiveness of international mechanisms of conflict resolution are the preoccupation not just of study centres, but also the decision-making spheres of the UN, which have developed a debate on new concerns about indicators and successful results.

The evaluation of multi-dimensional and complex processes of peace are not without difficulties. Because of this, the UN itself has experimented with different routes to success. Internally, the organisation has formed structures able to stimulate this reflection through the creation of working groups that set clearer objectives, and an institutional framework able to retrieve lessons learned from various stages of action.

An example of this is the creation in 2005 of the Peace Building Commission, which is an inter-governmental advisory body that coordinates between the General Assembly and the Security Council the instruments of peace keeping and peace building. The Commission has a specific working group to compile lessons learned and evaluate processes of the projects that their Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has financed. The evaluation of the UN's performance focuses on the analysis of results, which is more of a micro-project than an assessment of a set of the instruments that the organisation uses on the ground.

Although the PBF looks to fundamentally overcome the separation between efforts for the promotion of political peace of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the functioning of the two departments have separate mechanisms of evaluation.

The UN Peacemaker was created under the DPA in 2006 and included a Mediation Support Unit. It aims to facilitate the work of UN, supporting political transitions and trying to achieve peace agreements. This tool compiles information on previous cases, integrates documents with lessons learned and guides texts for dealing with situations on the ground.

Within the framework of the DPKO's peacekeeping operations, and given its evolution in recent decades, its assessments have become increasingly more complex. For example the 2008 Capstone Doctrine<sup>7</sup>, the fundamental doctrinal document of peace operations, contains principles and guidelines for actions on the ground, as well as a framework for broader indicators of success (see table).

In 2010, the United Nations also published a guide to monitoring the consolidation of peace (United Nations, 2010). Demonstrating an increasing concern with the claimed needs of national actors in the definition of criteria and monitoring indicators, it continues to be by nature a general guide that offers a standardised framework for

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<sup>7</sup> Available in English at [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone\\_eng.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf), consulted on 11 February 2016.



following ongoing processes. However, it serves to provide information to the UN in order to better update its strategy rather than critically and effectively analysing the impact of the UN on the ground (Stave, 2011).

Benchmarks suggested by the Capstone Doctrine for new peace operation mandates, including:

- The absence of violent conflict and human rights abuses on a large scale and respect for the rights of women and minorities
- Compliance with the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants (men, women and children) and progress in the restoration of institutions of State security
- Capacity of national armed forces and the national police to ensure security and maintenance of public order under civil observation and respect for human rights
- Progress in establishing an independent and effective legal system
- Restoration of state authority and the working of public services throughout the country
- Return or resettlement of internally displaced people generating disturbance or conflict in resettlement areas
- Successful formation of legitimate political institutions after free and fair elections, where women and men have equal rights to vote and political office

This picture shows how the United Nations itself has chosen to extend the indicators of success to more extensive factors in a clear move towards the materialisation of the concept of comprehensive peace. This effort has, however, replicated the dispersion of instruments of conflict resolution within the framework of the United Nations without having a centralisation of the analysis on the ground. It does not, therefore, assess, in a given context, how all the instruments available to the organisation (in its full spectrum) have been effective in the consolidation of peace as a whole.

But more significant still is the fact that these mechanisms favour, above all, an analysis of the effectiveness of UN action in the light of indicators established by the organisation itself, without favouring peace indicators that conform to a peace model locally, and neglect accountability led by recipient countries.

Each of these mechanisms allows a more complete reading of the UN's action than about an intervention as such. Mechanisms to broaden the UN's knowledge – and particularly for its employees – on the contexts in which they act are needed as they lack critical assessment of what the UN is doing right and wrong on the ground. In some way, the uniform action of the organisation for promoting peace is accepted, because based on a framework of universal values and on external and technical projects of State construction, it can overcome political and local versions of the model of peace that it wants to advance.

In this context, rarely local players enjoy oversight mechanisms of international action in accordance with their own needs and often go beyond essential steps of national



political dialogues, because it is accepted as a single procedure to achieve a stable peace, a prescriptive UN-driven model.

### **Evaluating peace beyond results**

Considering that several cases of relative success of UN intervention in promoting a stable peace may have coincided with a greater attention to political reconciliation, we wanted to investigate the potential of this factor as a more effective generator to prevent a return to armed political violence.

Assuming that the legitimising narrative of the UN's interventions in the framework of the promotion of peace has moved towards the concept of broad peace, we look at evaluation mechanisms that allow the consideration of the effectiveness of the UN with regard to their conformity with the proposal of positive peace, both in goals as in the guide.

We emphasise the missions that were linked to political reconciliation processes through mediation. Mediation is an instrument of conflict management that is particularly relevant, since it facilitates and influences the design of procedures that shape dialogue on the one hand, and the agenda of the negotiations on the other. Without impinging with the central actors of a peace process, the mediator has the power to shape a series of variables that, taken together, are the model of peace that comes out of a negotiating process, and have a significant impact in post-conflict situations.

We rely on a recent investigation<sup>8</sup> which tried to design an evaluation framework that is as near as possible to Galtung's concept of positive peace. This, as we mentioned initially, offers a goal to reach as well as a process to reach this objective.

We decided to test this evaluation framework by reviewing two case studies that were consistent with new framework of action post-1990s. One case coincidences with new framework of values and principles that the United Nations has absorbed, and the other with reconciliation arising from a more political intervention (although with a military in nature), with a peace operation mobilized to support the implementation of their peace agreements.

The comparison served to contrast a concluded UN intervention, which integrates the framework of past missions with the subgroup that is associated with relative success (as no return to political violence in post-conflict was observed), with another less successful intervention where the violence and military presence did return and still remains on the ground.

The two cases chosen – Guatemala and Haiti - demonstrate two types of intervention that have a similar genesis but differ dramatically in their implementation, which translates into profoundly different results.

An attempt was made, in this comparison, to associate an evaluation of the results of each intervention to the very process of reaching a positive peace, a process that should be broad, transformative, integratory and primarily local.

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<sup>8</sup> Moita, Magdalene (2015) *La ONU y la Construcción de la Paz en Haití y Guatemala*, Tesis doctoral, Universidad Complutense de Madrid.





First we tried to lay out a framework of indicators with information and data available in the two countries that correspond faithfully to the idea of peace and national perspectives collected by interviews in accordance with the expectations generated nationally by peace agreements<sup>9</sup>. This presupposes an extension of indicators of success beyond the minimum framework for elections, a ceasefire and minimal stability.

Scope	Indicator/criteria
Policy framework: democracy and inclusion policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Government stability</li> <li>• Democracy index (including electoral process, functioning of government, political participation and political culture)</li> <li>• Deterioration of public services</li> </ul>
Socio-economic development: inclusion and equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GDP</li> <li>• Poverty and economic deterioration</li> <li>• Uneven development</li> <li>• Social indicators, including spending on education, years of schooling, literacy rate, life expectancy and infant mortality</li> <li>• Human development index</li> </ul>
Sustainability of peace process: the absence of direct/indirect violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violent deaths</li> <li>• Scale of political terror</li> <li>• Respect for civil liberties</li> <li>• Number of years passed until the return to armed conflict</li> <li>• Degree of State autonomy: official development assistance</li> <li>• State fragility index</li> </ul>

A local perspective was favoured, enriching the international vision of the peace process and complementing more cross-sectional indicators that respond to national expectations.

In the combination of results and process, we looked to also open an analysis about the coherence among various instruments of conflict resolution used by the UN, particularly the links between policy instruments such as mediation with additional instruments that included military and peace operations established in another country.

An evaluation framework of the OECD was used that focuses on mediation. We considered this to be particularly useful for being, on the one hand, the primordial point of UN intervention in each study stage, and on the other, for having marked the evolution that each peace process made in each of the countries. Lanz, Wählisch, Kirchhoff and Siegfried (2008) tried to adapt the OECD evaluation framework associated with projects that develop conflict resolution processes, which is presented in the following table.

The combination of complementary evaluation frameworks of a more quantitative character with qualitative indicators that use a mediation framework reached conclusions that are relevant to the effectiveness of UN instruments in the promotion of lasting peace and sustainable.

<sup>9</sup> The comparative table below also added some specific indicators for each country with particular issues related to the peace process, such as sample data to investigate the greater presence of indigenous people and women in the Guatemalan political framework, given these are very relevant themes within the mediation process.





From the quantitative comparison, all indicators showed that Haiti was in a more fragile situation than Guatemala, in relation to the successful implementation of a comprehensive peace model.

Politically, government instability in Haiti was manifested in several political crises, from a coup in 2004 to several long periods without an executive branch of government, contrasting with party rotation in the Guatemalan government, with various presidencies complying with full terms.

<b>Relevance</b>	How did the mediation process relate to the context of the wider conflict?
<b>Effectiveness and impact</b>	What were the direct/indirect, intentional/unintentional and positive/negative effects of the mediation process?
<b>Sustainability</b>	To what extent have the benefits of the mediation process continued after its ending?
<b>Efficiency</b>	How do the costs of the mediation process relate to its benefits?
<b>Coherence, coordination and linkages</b>	What were the relationships between the process of mediation and other conflict management activities?
<b>Coverage</b>	How were the actors' mediation process, issues and more relevant regions included/excluded?
<b>Consistency with values</b>	Was the mediation process consistent with the values of the mediators and the international community, for example, with regard to confidentiality, human rights and the impartiality of the mediator(s)?


Data from the components of the Democracy Index of the Economic Intelligence Unit<sup>10</sup> (including, for example, the functioning of government or the electoral process) as well as detailed data of the State Fragility Index<sup>11</sup> (that includes figures on the deterioration of public services) were analysed. All these data show a significant difference between the performance of Guatemala in relation to Haiti, especially when considering the years of exponential increase of international financial and technical support for state-building in Haiti. Also in terms of economic development, the two countries showed disparities in post-intervention years, which are very evident on the charts that follow.

<sup>10</sup> Available at [www.eiu.com/democracyindex](http://www.eiu.com/democracyindex), accessed on 11 February 2016.

<sup>11</sup> Available at <http://global.fundforpeace.org>, accessed on 11 February 2016.




**Figure 1 – gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (current US \$) 1985-2010**



Source: World Bank data<sup>12</sup>.

**Figure 2 – Poverty and economic deterioration (2005-2014)**




Source: data of the components of the state fragility index<sup>13</sup> (scale from 0 to 10).

<sup>12</sup> Data available at <http://data.worldbank.org/>, accessed on 11 February 2016.

<sup>13</sup> Data available at <http://global.fundforpeace.org>, accessed on 11 February 2016.



**Figure 3 – evolution of uneven economic development (2005-2014)**



Source: data of the components of the state fragility index<sup>14</sup> (scale from 0 to 10).

Also the comparison of social indicators such as literacy rate, average life expectancy and infant mortality, which coincided with some of the main concerns expressed by the populations, always favoured Guatemala.

Finally, the third field analysed by indicators – the peace process sustainability with regard to the absence of direct violence – shows a distancing of Guatemala from Haiti again. In this context, it is necessary to highlight that there are probably higher incidence in Guatemala of direct violence of a criminal nature, with clear links to drug trafficking. This phenomenon has origins in the weaknesses of the peace process in both countries, the fragility of the security and of institutions of justice; however, it is important to note that there is more evidence of this effecting the political sphere in the case of Guatemala. Criminal violence in Haiti has been linked to political interests as well as political violence – albeit on a smaller scale – which continues to be an instrument of contestation.

In February 2016, we watched the delays of Haitian elections because of episodes of violence that were jeopardising the security of citizens, leading to the appointment of an interim president. In contrast, in 2015, we saw Guatemalan society rally against a corrupt president, removing him from power through widespread street protests. In the frameworks, the use of violence is distinct.


Indeed, the participation of the UN in Guatemala finished an armed conflict that found its roots in a political and economic regime marked by exclusion. Power spaces opened up to the population, and the Guatemalans have complaint mechanisms of accountability and non-violent channels, meaning that a return to violence with a profile similar to the one that had existed during the armed conflict unlikely.

<sup>14</sup> Data available at <http://global.fundforpeace.org>, accessed on 11 February 2016.



In contrast, for Haiti, UN intervention did not overcome fully the reality that existed, and perpetuated power structures that continue to marginalise a large majority of the population, with episodes of political violence continuing to emerge. The clearest indicator of the lack of sustainability of the peace process in Haiti is the attempted coup of 2004 that urged the establishment of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission, which remains in place today and ignores a transformative solution to the structure of violence.

**Figure 4 – evolution of Guatemala and Haiti in their world classification of State fragility (2005-2011)**



Source: adapted from data on the index of State fragility.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, all other indicators from this field shows Haiti negative evolution, especially when compared with Guatemala.

Specifically, the Haitian State is more dependent on international aid, is more poor and unequal, less able to provide citizens with public services, is living in a shadow of government instability, lacks protection of human rights on various levels (political, economic and social) and lives with violence as a way to resolve the friction that this has generated.

Considering the disparity in results, we then analysed the process – through the framework mentioned by the OECD – to see if political reconciliation after intervention had respected the desired guide moving forwards.

The case of the UN's mediation in Guatemala was rather unusual, possibly being the case that the guide for positive peace was more faithfully observed. Measures included a strict adaptation of mediation processes in order to remediate the causes of conflictual and relational dynamics that the conflict kept between the parties.

The UN led a group of complementary mediators (national and international) that facilitated the integration of the roots of the violence on the peace agenda, allowing a broad dialogue on structural issues of Guatemalan society. The negotiations led to the signing of peace accords on far more complex topics than just operational issues linked

<sup>15</sup> Data available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failedstates>, accessed on 11 February 2016.



to the end of the conflict (such as the cease-fire or the demobilisation of combatants), and focused on so-called substantive issues, such as indigenous rights, land reform and women's rights.

In terms of content, as well as procedures, this mediation process was unprecedented. A broad agenda combined the integration of civil society in discussions through the creation of a parallel advisory board in the Assembly of the Civil Society. This arrangement allowed negotiations to extend and reflect political and social frameworks to fringes of Guatemalan society after the civil war, transforming the peace process into a project of national renewal.

The dialogue included political, economic, structural and cultural specificities that comprise the social fabric of Guatemala, which had one given rise to armed conflict. This allowed the opening of spaces which were previously closed to the great majority of Guatemalans. This deep and comprehensive national dialogue permitted the creation of necessary mechanisms so that issues could be treated through non-violent institutional means, an essential step to initiate the construction of a more lasting peace.

This corresponds to a large extent with the proposed guide to peace positive (of an integrative character and its associative approach) by encouraging a national consensus on the peace model which raised negotiations that gave it far greater legitimacy and durability.

The UN also coordinated its various instruments well and used additional mechanisms in line with the objectives of their efforts as leading mediators. This is what happened with the appropriately timed implementation of the MINUGUA peace mission, which had an extensive mandate and signed agreements that served in tense moments as a deterrent against violence. The same occurred with diplomatic instruments, which positively influenced parties at critical moments. As a whole, the UN's intervention responded positively to the criteria suggested by the evaluation framework:

- relevant to the context in which it acted on the integration of the causes of conflict;
- effective in the more immediate resolution of the conflict and had a high impact on the transformation of the Guatemalan political framework, enabling a broader opening to spheres of the population;
- sustainable not just because it avoided a return to political violence as an instrument of dispute, but also because it allowed the signing of agreements with some level of specificity, which today serve in public policy agendas;
- efficient, because the costs of the intervention, including the peace mission, had been balanced with the benefits brought;
- consistent and guided by good coordination among complementary instruments of conflict resolution (i.e. diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping and later peace-building);
- a significant level of coverage, integrating broader factions of Guatemalan society and included traditionally excluded groups, such as indigenous peoples and women;
- and a significant consistency with the values and positive peace proposals of the United Nations.



In contrast, the mediation process initiated by the United Nations in conjunction with the Organization of American States in Haiti showed huge weaknesses in matching these criteria.

Initially, the UN joined a mediation team that was unable to reach a satisfactory consensus among the parties, which led to a different strategy that used the threat of use of force to persuade parties to reach agreement. This mediation was focused exclusively on the elites who vied for power and aimed to restore the simplified political framework prior to the 1991 coup d'état that had overthrown Jean Bertrand Aristide.

The UN authorised a military intervention led by the United States after the imposition of economic sanctions that, although weakening the elites, drastically affected the living conditions of Haitians.

This allowed a very fragile democratic order to return that, years later, led to armed violence – the privileged tool for parties wanting to seize power. Ten years after the deployment of an international military mission in Haiti, a new coup broke this fictitious stability.

The UN response to this second coup d'état was to deploy a new peace-keeping mission (MINUSTAH) with the same scope as before, underscoring what today is called an integrated mission. MINUSTAH still exists today to ensure security in the country through predominantly military force, leading national institutions into a series of reforms to strengthen the State, particularly in the areas of security and justice reform.

Permanent instability continues to justify a very considerable military presence, but no clear exit strategy exists; it has been considered before, but dropped several times in recent years. Moreover, little progress has been made on deeper political dialogue and the underlying causes of the conflict.

When looking at the criteria proposed in the evaluation, we concluded that the process of moving toward positive peace was largely sterile:

- In terms of relevance, mediation focused exclusively on operational issues relating to the ceasefire and the return to the previous democratic framework, avoiding a more comprehensive reading of the political conflict that was behind the violence. In interviews, many actors from the UN insist that there is a pending political conflict and even violence, which continues to legitimise a robust military force.
- The UN was unable to reach an agreement satisfactory to both parties, having authorised the use of force as a means of persuasion and subsequently deciding to establish the first peacekeeping mission (UNMIH) without a real peace to maintain.
- The lack of sustainability of these options was later revealed by the return to the use of force with a new coup in 2004.
- As for the cost-benefit analysis, the intervention in Haiti turned out to be much longer than that of Guatemala and started from a fragile mediation process. There were instruments used that had high costs for the population (such as ineffective economic sanctions) and for the UN, with the multiplication of missions, including the far-reaching MINUSTAH that had a large annual budget (around 500 million US dollars).



- The different instruments for conflict resolution used in Haiti had not benefited from adequate coordination, being often counterproductive to achieving a lasting peaceful situation. This included the use of economic sanctions and the threat of the use of force.
- The scope was also limited since it did not include broader sectors of the population in addition to the two warring parties, and so excluded the vast majority of civil society and Haitian citizens from the process. The UN was limited to facilitating dialogue between the elites who vied for power, without favouring inclusion and greater national support for the peace process.
- Finally, in terms of consistency with values, if it was a discourse based on respect for human rights and democracy that sparked the intervention in Haiti, these were integrated into the debate and the implementation of superficial peace, without the origin of its disrespect being considered effectively. The mediation team was also greatly affected by the interference of the United States, which at critical moments reduced trust among the parties.

The above context shows serious doubts about the effectiveness of the role played today by MINUSTAH. In the absence of a national army (which was dissolved by Aristide in the 1990s) and within the great debility of the security forces, MINUSTAH today assumes responsibility for maintaining order and security in the country. With this central objective, a transformation of existing structures which generate violence was neglected. Although using increasingly large instruments far beyond military resources, including instruments of governance and institutions, the mission still focuses mainly on containment of the conflict as opposed to its effective and lasting resolution.

This allows the maintenance of Haiti in a hybrid situation of pre-war/post-war, without salvaging a national resolution strategy that addresses the causes of conflict. The political process, like several other areas, has been stalled and lives in a situation of permanent instability (Duffield, 2007), perpetuating the need for an armed international presence though not resolving the problems that fuel it.

The concern with the primacy of political issues that we stress here were recently mentioned in the report of experts led by Dr José Ramos-Horta, which was commissioned by the Secretary-General to assessment the effectiveness of<sup>16</sup>peacekeeping operations.

The report states:

*"The number of peace operations today are deployed in an environment where there is little or no peace to keep."*

In this context, the same document recommends:

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<sup>16</sup> Full text available at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/95), accessed on 11 February 2016.





*"Lasting peace is achieved not through military and technical engagements, but through political solutions. Political solutions should always guide the design and deployment of United Nations peace operations. When the momentum behind peace falters, the United Nations, and particularly Member States, must help to mobilise renewed political efforts to keep peace processes on track."*

This recommendation seems to have relevance for situations of instability like the Haitian case, where a concordant intention that led to intervention in Guatemala saw its implementation deviate from the guide suggested by the concept of positive peace, skirting the indispensability of a political solution.

The comparison brought here has allowed not only the verification of disparate results, but above all, the identification of what stages and procedures of the UN intervention may be at the root of a less sustainable peace process. Alert to the possibility of external intervention itself has negatively influenced a longer-lasting reconciliation.

The mechanisms for evaluating the activities of the UN focus mainly on results established in mandates it designed, have blocked a critical observation of the procedures employed to achieve them. On the contrary, evaluations contemplate the process itself, in order to appreciate how peace projects are materialised in practice (as was tested in comparison here) and can offer more concrete answers to the mechanisms for the sustainability of peace.

## **Conclusions**

The evolution of the UN's discourse, particularly in their guidance documents, from the mentioned agenda for peace of the Brahimi Report in 2000 to the 2008 Capstone Doctrine of 2008, was done by broadening the concept of peace to move closer to Galtung's perspective of positive peace; however, its implementation on the ground continues to see serious weaknesses in the guide that this same conceptualisation has suggested.

In terms of evaluation of the effectiveness of these mechanisms, within a framework of patent difficulties on the ground to promote more sustainable peace, the UN continues to focus mainly on the verification of results established internally, more than critically assessing the procedures put in place to achieve them. Without dramatically altering this implementation, it would hardly be able to overcome the obstacles which have repeatedly been found.

The recent Ramos-Horta report mentions some relevant concerns in terms of procedures, such as the need to expand the spectrum of UN partners and overcome the current exclusivity assigned to elites, the urgency of essential political issues and focus on reconciliation processes based on extended mediation frameworks as well as the obligation to intervene with more flexibility in accordance with contexts and local priorities.

Promoting evaluation mechanisms that also address whether such procedures are being complied with, instead of one observation restricted to results, would facilitate a more



critical view of performance on the ground, enabling an analysis of what aspects of international intervention may be affecting the implementation of a plan for lasting peace.

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