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## Truthmakers A-Way

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### RESUMEN

En este artículo, presento diferentes elaboraciones y aplicaciones posibles de la idea de que hay más de una manera en que una entidad puede ser un relata de la relación *ser un hacedor de verdad*. En particular, muestro cómo la idea puede ser usada por el partidario de la “verificación sin hacedores de verdad”, es decir el punto de vista según el cual a pesar de que la verdad se fundamenta en la realidad, no por ello deben existir entidades especiales como estados de cosas, hechos o tropos, que actúen como hacedores de verdad.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *verificación, adverbialismo, verdad, hechos.*

### ABSTRACT

In this paper I discuss some possible elaborations and applications of the idea that an entity may enter the truthmaker relation in different ways. In particular, I show how the idea can be used by the friend of *truthmaking without truthmakers*, i.e. the view that although truth is grounded in reality, there need not be special entities like states of affairs, facts or tropes, acting as truthmakers.

KEYWORDS: *Truthmaking, Adverbialism, Truth, Facts.*

### INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this work is to explore some of the implications of what I regard as a powerful idea about truthmaking introduced by Gonzalo Rodríguez-Pereyra in his recent paper ‘Resemblance Nominalism, conjunctions and truthmakers’ (2013). An important part of this paper is devoted to explaining how a *resemblance nominalist* can ‘tell different truthmaking stories about (1) and (2)

(1) <Socrates resembles Plato and Socrates resembles Aristotle>

(2) <Socrates resembles Plato and Plato resembles Aristotle>

The task of giving different accounts for the truth of (1) and (2) is initially problematic for the resemblance nominalist because the resemblance nominalist is committed to the following two theses:

- Conjunctions are made true by the truthmakers of the conjuncts.
- The truthmakers of true propositions asserting resemblance between two particulars are the resembling particulars themselves. So Socrates and Plato themselves are the truthmakers of <Socrates resembles Plato>.

These two theses lead to the conclusion that (1) and (2) have the same truthmakers, namely Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. Rodriguez-Pereyra takes this to be ‘implausible, given that they are different propositions saying different things about different things: one of the things (1) says is that Socrates resembles Aristotle, but this is not said by (2). It would be better for Resemblance Nominalism if it could provide different accounts of what makes (1) true and what makes (2) true’ [(2013), p. 24].

Here I will not be so much concerned with resemblance nominalism, the resemblance relation, or the peculiarities of (1) and (2). I just want to focus on an idea that is central to Rodriguez-Pereyra’s proposed strategy for giving different accounts for the truth of (1) and (2): *the idea that there are different ways in which the same entities can enter the truthmaker relation*. I find this idea extremely appealing and, in what follows, I would like to explore the prospects of applying it to a different but related issue: that of whether it follows from the idea that truth is grounded in reality that there are facts, states of affairs, or tropes in virtue of which truths are true. This is, as we will see, the issue of whether there could be *truthmaking without truthmakers*.

I will proceed as follows: in section I, I will present Rodriguez-Pereyra’s view that there are different ways in which the same entities can enter the truthmaker relation, a view that I will call ‘*Adverbial Modification*’. I will also introduce in section I the issue of whether there could be truthmaking without truthmakers (*TWT*, for short). In section II, I shall describe one way in which *Adverbial Modification* could be appropriated by the friend of *TWT*. This is a strategy that I find interesting but do not ultimately subscribe to, because the resulting view denies a thesis about truthmaking that I find plausible: the thesis that different portions of reality are involved in making true different basic truths. In section III, I shall consider a version of *TWT* that does respect this thesis, the one

outlined by Rychter (2014), and see how it could benefit from the idea behind *Adverbial Modification*.

## I. TRUTHMAKERS, ADVERBIAL MODIFICATION, AND TRUTHMAKING WITHOUT TRUTHMAKERS

Let us first bring into focus the idea introduced by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2013) that the same entities can ‘enter the truthmaking relation’ in different ways. Rodriguez-Pereyra simplest case is that of propositions (3) and (4):

(3)  $\langle P \vee Q \rangle$

(4)  $\langle P \& Q \rangle$

Let us just quote Rodriguez-Pereyra here:

Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that propositions are made true by facts, and that there are such facts as [P] and [Q]. If so, it would be standard to say that the disjunction is individually or separately made true by [P] and by [Q], while the conjunction is jointly made true by [P] and [Q].

Do these propositions have the same truthmakers? Yes, they do. Both are true in virtue of the facts [P] and [Q]. For the fact that the conjunction has collective or joint truthmakers does not mean that it has an individual truthmaker of a rarefied kind. That the conjunction is jointly made true by [P] and [Q] does not mean that it bears the *true in virtue of* relation to some individual entity that somehow subsumes both [P] and [Q]; it means that it bears the *true in virtue of* relation to [P] and [Q] collectively without bearing it to both of them individually.

Thus (3) and (4) have the same truthmakers. For the things to which the disjunction is related by the truthmaking relation are the same as the things to which the conjunction is related by the truthmaking relation. But there is a difference in how those very same things are related by the truthmaking relation to those two propositions. The truthmaking relation relates [P] and [Q] individually to the disjunction, but it relates them collectively to the conjunction. That is why the disjunction is *individually* or *separately* made true by the facts [P] and [Q] but the conjunction is *collectively* made true by the facts [P] and [Q]. This is simply a difference in how these facts enter the truthmaking relation, and so the fact that the conjunction has joint or collective truthmakers does not bring in any additional ontological commitments [Rodriguez-Pereyra (2013), p. 25].

I would like to highlight three central ideas in this paragraph. First, (3) and (4) are true in virtue of the same facts: the fact that P and the fact that Q. So they are *different propositions that have the same truthmakers*. Of course, this is true only in a loose sense of ‘having the same truthmakers’. Strictly speaking, they don’t: [P] is a truthmaker of (3) but not of (4) – at most, it is a partial truthmaker of (4). However, for our present purposes we can stick to this loose sense, since other more complex examples discussed by Rodriguez-Pereyra -like (1) and (2) above- appear to show that even strictly speaking different propositions may have the same truthmakers.<sup>1</sup> Second, even if the same facts make true (3) and (4), they do so in different ways. They make (3) true *individually*, and they make (4) true *collectively*. In other words, the fact that P and the fact that Q bear the truthmaker relation individually to (3) and collectively to (4). So, *there are different ways in which an entity may enter the truthmaker relation*. This is the view that I call ‘*Adverbial Modification*’. This label is not Rodriguez-Pereyra’s own, but it is suggested to us by his use (at least in a relatively informal level of discussion, of which the above quotation is a good example) of different adverbs (‘collectively’, ‘individually’, etc) to indicate the different ways the truthmaker relation holds. I do not mean to imply that adverbial locutions should be present in the canonical language used to express the facts about truthmaking – much less that Rodriguez-Pereyra is committed to something like that. Thirdly, *Adverbial Modification does not imply, at least prima facie, any new ontological commitments*: as Rodriguez-Pereyra emphasizes, saying that [P] and [Q] collectively make (4) true does not commit us to a conjunctive fact, or any other ‘individual entity that somehow subsumes [P] and [Q]’. Also, and here I go a step beyond what Rodriguez-Pereyra explicitly says, just saying that [P] and [Q] *collectively* make true (4) does not commit us to the existence of the collective way. So, in principle, talk of different ways in which an entity may enter the truthmaker relation does not bring with it any new ontological commitment.

As I said before, I want to borrow from Rodriguez-Pereyra the idea that truthmakers may enter the truthmaker relation in different ways (i.e. what we called ‘*Adverbial Modification*’) and explore the possibility of applying it in a way and to an end that are not Rodriguez-Pereyra’s own. For our purposes, we can (and do) remain neutral on the details of his proposal. However, before moving on, it will be useful to say something more about some of the ways in which, according to Rodriguez-Pereyra, the truthmaker relation holds. For our purposes, we can keep things simple and consider just three of those ways: *individually*, *collectively*, and *groupally*. These are ways in which relations other than the truthmaker relation hold.

Take for instance the *surrounding* relation. Two persons, A and B, may *individually* surround a tree by each of them putting their arms around it. They can also do it *collectively*, by holding each other's hands around the tree. Finally, we may say that a group of four people A, B, C and D *groupally* surround the tree even if they do not do it individually or collectively. This may happen if A and B collectively surround the tree while being on top of C and D, who are also collectively surrounding the tree.

Let us now turn to the related issue we are interested in: the issue of whether there could be *truthmaking* without special entities like facts, states of affairs, or tropes, acting as *truthmakers*. As a first step, we must bring into focus what we take to be the central principle of Truthmaker Theory:

(TM) Necessarily, for any proposition  $p$ , if  $p$  is true then there is some entity  $e$  that is a truthmaker of  $p$ .

What does it take for  $e$  to be a truthmaker of  $p$ ? It is generally agreed that at least part of what it takes is that the existence of  $e$  entails that  $p$  is true. This is the view usually known as *truthmaker necessitarianism*.<sup>2</sup> The view has important ontological consequences: under normal assumptions about what is contingent and what necessary, *truthmaker necessitarianism* implies that the world is not composed of ordinary objects like chairs and cats. It must also contain objects of a different sort, like facts or states of affairs, in order to act as truthmakers for contingent predications. Axel the cat is white, but he could have been brown. Thus, Axel himself cannot be the truthmaker of the proposition that Axel is white, since he could exist and the proposition fail to be true. The *fact* that Axel is white, on the other hand, does the job: again, under normal assumptions about what is necessary and what contingent, the fact that Axel is white cannot exist without the corresponding proposition being true. This is why so many truthmaker theorists postulate facts (or states of affairs, or some other suitable entities) as additional entities over and above ordinary objects and their properties.

Many have thought, however, that these ontological consequences of TM are a good reason to be suspicious about it. These critics of truthmaker theory hold that TM is an over-reaction to the sensible idea that truth must be grounded in reality, and that it is possible to vindicate this sensible idea without accepting TM and its ontological consequences. This is the view that I call *Truthmaking without Truthmakers (TWT)*, and which we can pin down as the conjunction of two theses:

- (i) truth is grounded in reality.
- (ii) it does not follow from (i) that there are states of affairs, or that TM is true.<sup>3</sup>

Typically, friends of *TWT* reject the view that every truth has a truthmaker, or that every truth bears the truthmaker relation to some worldly feature (where ‘truthmaker’ and ‘truthmaker relation’ should be understood as partially defined by TM). But some of them may still want to say that it is worldly features that ground the truth of true propositions. How can they do it?

## II. NON-PROPORTIONAL ADVERBIALY-MODIFIED *TWT*

A first attempt to ground truth in worldly features without appealing to truthmakers would instead appeal to ordinary concrete individuals, i.e. things like Axel, chairs, atoms, etc. Given that snow is white, why not say that it is just snow that grounds the truth of <snow is white>? This option is initially open for the *TWT* theorist: since she is not committed to truthmakers, she is not committed to truthmaker necessitarianism either.<sup>4</sup> But the suggestion of taking snow to be what grounds the truth of <snow is white> faces an initial problem concerning different truths about the same subject matter. It seems, for instance, that what accounts for the truth of (5) and (6) below cannot be the same:

(5) <snow is white>

and

(6) <snow is cold>

On the proposal under consideration, we have just one thing, snow, acting as the grounds of the truth of both (5) and (6). So, it seems to follow that what accounts for the truth of (5) and (6) is the same, and this is implausible. And so, it seems that if we want to distinguish between what accounts for the truth of (5) and what accounts for the truth of (6), we need *facts*: the fact that snow is white and the fact that snow is cold. If so, the *TWT* theorist’s first attempt to ground all truths in ordinary concrete things fails.

Now, I think that something very close to *Adverbial Modification* (the view that things may enter the truthmaker relation in different ways) could be used at this point by the *TWT* theorist in order to resist the postulation of facts. As I will explain below, I do not subscribe to the strategy I am offering here to the *TWT* theorist, but I think it is worth considering anyway, both for its intrinsic interest and as a preparation for our discussion in section III.

The *TWT* theorist could say: even if there is only one thing, snow, that grounds the truth of (5) and (6), it does so in different ways and therefore we do have different *accounts* for the truth of (5) and (6). That is to say, snow enters the grounding relation to (5) *whitely*, and it enters the grounding relation to (6) *coldly*. *Whitely* and *coldly* are different ways in which one and the same thing, snow, bears the grounding relation to different truths. Needless to say, ‘whitely’ and ‘coldly’ are not to be understood in this account as having their ordinary meanings. Instead, we should think of ‘whitely’ as meaning the way snow makes a proposition true if and only if that proposition is true because snow is white. More generally, *F-ly* is the way *x* makes true *p* if and only if *p* is true because *x* is *F*. Coming back to our example, if snow grounds the truth (5) and (6) in different ways, we can say, using Rodriguez-Pereyra’s words, that ‘what accounts for [the truth of (5) and (6)] is not the same’. Although there is only one thing involved in the accounts, the accounts themselves are different. Nothing of this requires facts.

Before we go on, I would like it to be noted that this same thing could be said by the friend of Truthmaker Ostrich Nominalist in reply to Rodriguez-Pereyra’s argument against it on p. 45 of his (2002). There Rodriguez-Pereyra says:

For how can the same thing make true ‘*a* is white’, ‘*a* is spherical’, and ‘*a* is hot’. In general, what makes a *F* must be something different from what makes it *G*, if *F* and *G* are different properties. Thus, it takes more than just *a* to make those sentences about *a* true (...) an account of what makes them true must include something more than merely *a*. And it is obvious what this extra is in each case, namely the facts that *a* is white, that *a* is spherical, and that *a* is hot.

Now, the Truthmaker Ostrich Nominalist could say:

I agree that ‘it takes more than just *a*’ to make these sentences true: what it takes, in addition, is that *a* enters the truthmaker relation in one particular

way (whitely, hotly, spherically) or another. I agree that ‘an account of what makes them true must include something more than merely *a*’. Such account must mention the different ways in which *a* enters the truthmaker relation.

### III. PROPORTIONAL ADVERBIALY-MODIFIED TWT

We have just seen how the *TWT* theorist could use *Adverbial Modification* in order to ground all truths in ordinary things, thereby resisting the postulation of facts. But as I said above, I do not ultimately subscribe to this strategy. This is because, in addition to (i), I want to keep a second idea that I take to motivate many truthmaker theorists:

(PROPORTIONALITY) Different portions of reality are involved in the explanation of different fundamental truths.

That is to say, assuming that <snow is white> and <grass is green> are fundamental truths, I want to say that different things, different portions of reality, are involved in the explanation of their truth. (At the very least, snow will be involved in the explanation of the former, but not in the explanation of the latter). But it is clear that this idea is not respected by the strategy I offered above for distinguishing the grounds of (5) and (6), and this is why I cannot ultimately accept it.

In this section, I will consider a version of *TWT* that does respect (PROPORTIONALITY), the account that I elsewhere call *Proportional and Relational TWT (PR-TWT)* [Rychter (2014)]. After offering a sketch of *PR-TWT*, I will show how this account could use the idea behind *Adverbial Modification* in order to deal with negative predications.

Let us start with the outline of *PR-TWT*. First, *PR-TWT* requires the introduction of properties and relations in our ontology. If these entities are part of reality, then it is easy to point to different portions of it when explaining why (5) and (6) are true: snow and the property of being white are the portions of reality that ground the truth of (5), whereas snow and the property of being cold are those that ground the truth of (6). Second, *PR-TWT*, rejects truthmakers in general and so does not make room for the relation *being a truthmaker of*. Since there are no truthmakers, nothing bears the truthmaker relation to anything else. But the view is committed to *truthmaking*, and to the idea that truthmaking is relational in nature: truths are true in virtue of a relation that they bear to the world. This relation is not a binary relation between a proposition and a



feature of reality (as the truthmaker relation is, at least in the case of atomic propositions). Rather, it is a relation of a higher adicity that holds between any number of things, of which one is a true proposition and all the other are the features of reality on which the truth of the proposition is grounded. Among these features of reality there could be properties and relations, as well as individuals. So, for instance, it is true that snow is white because this ‘grounding relation’, as I will call it, holds between this proposition, snow and the property of being white. This can be represented as follows:

$$G(p, \text{snow}, \text{whiteness})$$

where  $G$  is the poliadic grounding relation and  $p$  is the proposition that snow is white.

More generally, Rychter (2014) schematically characterizes the grounding relation as ‘a relation that holds between a proposition  $p$ , an object  $x$  and a property  $F$  just in case  $x$  is  $F$  and  $p$  is true because  $x$  is  $F$ ’ (p. 284).<sup>5</sup>

We are not told, however, how this admittedly sketchy account could be applied to propositions with a more complex structure than just ‘ $x$  is  $F$ ’, and one might worry that no single relation  $G$  will be able to carry all the weight once these other propositions are considered. I will discuss here the case of *negatives* (propositions of the form ‘it is not the case that  $x$  is  $F$ ’), and show why it may be useful to appeal to the analogue of *Adverbial Modification*: the idea that there are different ways in which an entity may enter the *grounding* relation.

Consider the truth of <snow is *not* black>. How do we explain it within *PR-TWT*? What are the features of reality involved in making this proposition true? I think that the most promising answer for the friend of *PR-TWT* is this: snow and *blackness*. That is, I think that it is the absence of blackness in snow, its failure to be exemplified in snow, that makes the proposition true. But if this is right, then blackness is involved in making true both <snow is not black> and <coffee is black>, represented as follows:

$$G(\neg q, \text{snow}, \text{blackness})$$

$$G(r, \text{coffee}, \text{blackness})$$

where  $G$  is again the poliadic grounding relation,  $q$  is the proposition that snow is black, and  $r$  the proposition that coffee *is* black.

But it is clear that if blackness is a relatum of the grounding relation in both cases, it must be so *in different ways*. It is by way of being absent in snow that blackness grounds the truth of <snow is not black>, and by way of being present in coffee that it grounds the truth of <coffee is black>. We are therefore appealing to the idea that one and the same entity can enter the grounding relation in different ways.

The appeal to different ways in which an entity can enter the grounding relation becomes necessary when we consider propositions involving relations, like <London is north from Paris>. The portions of reality that are involved in making this proposition true are London, Paris and the relation *being north from*. But exactly the same features are the ones that ground the truth of <Paris is *not* north from London>. That is:

$$G(s, \text{London, Paris, being north from})$$

$$G(\neg t, \text{London, Paris, being north from})$$

where  $s$  is <London is north from Paris> and  $t$  is <Paris is north from London>.

But even if the same entities ground the truth of both propositions, it also seems reasonable to say that they do it in different ways: London, Paris and *being north from* ground the truth of  $r$  by way of London and Paris exemplifying (in that order) *being north from*, and they ground the truth of  $\neg r$  by way of Paris and London not exemplifying (in that order) *being north from*.

In sum, what we learnt from *Adverbial Modification* as introduced by Rodriguez-Pereyra is that in order to give a full account of how the truth of a proposition is grounded in reality it may not be enough just to mention the truthmakers of the proposition. We may also have to mention the way in which such truthmakers enter the truthmaker relation. This moral can be stated in more general and neutral terms, dropping any commitment to truthmakers, as follows: in order to give a full account of how the truth of a proposition is grounded in reality it may not be enough just to mention the *portions of reality* that *ground* the truth of the proposition. We may also have to mention the way in which such portions of reality enter the *grounding* relation. So stated, the idea behind *Adverbial Modification* may be adopted by the PR-TWT theorist. And we have just seen how adopting such an idea may be useful for giving a full account of the truth of negatives.

Before concluding, let us consider two potential worries: first, there seems to be a difference between Rodriguez-Pereyra's ways and the ways about which, according to my proposal, the *TWT* theorist talks. Rodriguez-Pereyra's ways are: *collectively*, *individually*, *groupally*, etc. The ways we have been talking about are: *whitely*, *coldly*, and others we did not dare to mention (like the way in which London, Paris, and *being north from* bear the truthmaking relation to <London is north from Paris>). Rodriguez-Pereyra's ways are ways in which relations other than the truthmaker and grounding relations hold, relations like *surrounding* or *moving*, which find expression in natural language predicates. As a result of this, the predicate expressing the truthmaker relation exhibits similitudes with some natural language predicates: the truthmaker predicate can be combined with plural and super-plural terms, just like other predicates expressing relations that hold collectively. In contrast, our ways are peculiar to the grounding relation: they are ways in which only the grounding relation holds. And given that this relation is not of interest outside philosophy, we lack special linguistic devices to talk about the things that bear the grounding relation in these peculiar ways. The fact that these ways are peculiar and unfamiliar outside philosophy, makes them somewhat unattractive. But I do not think that this is too serious a problem. It is to be expected that when doing philosophy, we discover things, and the ways things are, that were not previously familiar to us, and for which our language does not have appropriate expressions. So, the fact that a philosophical postulate is unfamiliar should not count heavily against it. (And the fact that a philosophical postulate is familiar, or that we find in our language familiar resources to talk about it, should not count heavily as a reason for it).

The second, related worry that I want to consider is this: it may be objected that the ways we are postulating are utterly mysterious and that we have not given a substantial metaphysical account of our talk of the ways the grounding relation may hold. In reply, I want to emphasize that we did say something about these ways and their criteria of identity: regarding the example above we said, for instance, that there is a way in which London, Paris and *being north from* ground the truth of the proposition <London is north from Paris>, and that this way must be different from the way in which the same entities ground the truth of <Paris is not north from London>, given that these are two different propositions grounded in the same things. We can thus at least partially characterize the different ways by their role in the explanation of how truth is grounded. These functional characterizations are perhaps not very informative and

give us no independent grip on the entities characterized. But I think this is a relatively common situation in metaphysics, particularly when abstract entities are concerned. To take just one relevant example, think of possible worlds, which are sometimes also regarded as *ways*. It is often agreed that all we know about them is the function they play within a theory – and perhaps there is really nothing else to know: they may be *insubstantial*, in the sense of Yablo (2000). In any case, whether the functional characterizations we are relying on could be further expanded or not, I think they are sufficient to make our proposal intelligible. And even in the absence of a fuller account, I think that by calling attention to the possibility that the grounding relation holds in different ways, we are pointing to a direction not previously explored in which *TWT* could be profitably developed.

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank an anonymous referee of *Teorema* for calling my attention to this point. I elaborate here on my claim that even strictly speaking different propositions may have the same truthmakers (doing their job in different ways). As I understand Rodriguez-Pereyra's proposal, (1) and (2) are examples of such propositions: their shared truthmakers are just Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. These three objects are, in both cases, the *relata* of the truthmaker relation on the truthmaker side. But they are so in different ways in each case. In Rodriguez-Pereyra's terms, while (1) is made true 'by Socrates and Plato together, together with Socrates and Aristotle together', (2) is made true 'by Socrates and Plato together, together with Plato and Aristotle together' [(2013), p. 28]. It is important to notice that, at the ontological level, there is nothing but Socrates, Plato and Aristotle acting as truthmak-

ers for both (1) and (2), even if these objects are referred to by different *terms* in each case. As Rodriguez-Pereyra says, a complex term like ‘Socrates and Plato together, together with Socrates and Aristotle together’ is a superplural term (it stands to the plural terms ‘Socrates and Plato together’ and ‘Socrates and Aristotle together’ as these plural terms stand to the singular terms ‘Socrates’, ‘Plato’ and ‘Aristotle’), and thus his view implies that the predicate ‘...is made true by...’ can be combined with plural and superplural terms in the second argument. But the use of these plural and superplural terms should not be understood as implying any new ontological commitments: we should not think of *pluralities* and *superpluralities* as the *relata* of the truthmaker relation. That is to say, in the case of (1) and (2), we should not take the two superplural terms used above as referring to two different superpluralities, one making (1) true and the other making (2) true. As I have just said following Rodriguez-Pereyra, at the ontological level there is nothing but Socrates, Plato and Aristotle acting as *relata* of the truthmaker relation [(2013), p. 28]. They just happen to be referred to by different terms on different occasions – terms which are in turn indicative of the different *ways* in which Socrates, Plato and Aristotle enter the truthmaker relation.

<sup>2</sup> I will be assuming that truthmaker necessitarianism is essential to the idea of a truthmaker, i.e. that the very idea of being a truthmaker involves the idea of being a necessitator. I think this assumption is widely shared. However, some may think otherwise and take truthmaker necessitarianism as just a very popular view among truthmaker theorists, but not part of the minimal notion of a truthmaker —which would be exhausted, perhaps, by the idea that truth is relational, and that truths do not float free from the world. On this alternative assumption, the view discussed below under the label ‘Truthmaking without Truthmakers’ could still be considered as a view of truthmaking *with* truthmakers. I am grateful to a referee of *Teorema* for inviting me to clarify this issue.

<sup>3</sup> *TWT* is in my view a fairly popular view. For a particularly clear and convincing defense, see J. Melia (2005).

<sup>4</sup> Notice that although *TWT* theorists reject truthmaker necessitarianism, they may still hold (and perhaps *should* hold) that if *p* is true because of *q*, then necessarily if *q* then *p*.

<sup>5</sup> Notice that, unlike what happens with the truthmaker relation, the existence of the *relata* is not sufficient for the grounding relation to hold. That is to say, the analogous doctrine to truthmaker necessitarianism does not hold for the grounding relation.

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