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Coherence Without Rationality, Rationality Without Coherence

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RESUMEN

Es una opinión generalizada que la coherencia de nuestras actitudes es la marca, y quizás la marca distintiva, de la racionalidad que gobierna las actitudes proposicionales. Contrariamente a lo que se da a entender en las aproximaciones actuales, en esta pieza arguyo que los requisitos sobre la racionalidad de actitudes no son, o no son distintivamente, una cuestión de coherencia. Los sujetos pueden ser impecablemente coherentes y fallar en su racionalidad, mientras que la racionalidad puede llevar también a incoherencia. Estos puntos son de interés para una elucidación más profunda de la racionalidad y de su relación hacia putativos requisitos de coherencia.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *coherencia de actitudes, racionalidad de actitudes, requisito, satisfacción racional/ de coherencia, actitud intrínsecamente racional.*

ABSTRACT

It is widely assumed that coherence among attitudes is the mark, and perhaps the hallmark, of the rationality governing propositional attitude relations. Contrary to what is intimated or assumed in current approaches, in this piece I argue that requirements of attitude-rationality are not, or not distinctively, a matter of attitude-coherence. Subjects may be impeccably coherent while failing to be rational, whereas rationality may also lead to incoherence. These points are of interest for a profounder elucidation of rationality and its relation to putative requirements of coherence.

KEYWORDS: *Attitude-Coherence, Attitude-Rationality, Requirement, Rational/Coherence Satisfaction, Intrinsically Rational Attitude.*

INTRODUCTION

It was probably through the work of philosophical giants such as W.V.O. Quine and Donald Davidson that the idea of coherence playing an essential role in the rationality of our beliefs and actions was first prominently and rigorously put under focus.¹ But it is only recently that

intense discussions concerning highly specific principles of attitude-coherence and the way they affect rationality are brought at the centre of the scene. In these discussions, it is widely assumed that coherence among attitudes is the mark, and perhaps the hallmark, of the rationality governing propositional attitude relations or attitude-rationality for short. Thus, for instance, John Broome seems to speak for many when he assumes without argument that:

What rationality requires of you is proper order in your mind. It requires your mental states to be properly related to each other. That is to say, it requires your mind to be coherent in particular respects [Broome (2013), p. 152].

Broome takes coherence to be not merely a main concern of rationality [Broome (2013), p. 136] but also one that is distinctive with respect to other sources of requirements:

Rationality is concerned with coherence among your attitudes such as your beliefs and intentions, whereas morality, prudence and other sources of normativity are rarely concerned with those things [Broome (2013), p. 193].

The existence of a tight, defining connection between attitude-coherence and attitude-rationality is maintained even in the work of those who deny that requirements of coherence are themselves normative or as such requirements of rationality. For instance, Niko Kolodny, the most prominent advocate of this view, observes that “it is relatively clear how we might settle questions about what rationality requires; it is whatever is necessary for coherence” [Kolodny (2005), p. 511] and also that “if we follow our reason, then our attitudes will be formally coherent” [Kolodny (2008), p. 462]. These quotations strongly suggest that, even among staunch critics of the idea of ‘rational requirements of formal coherence as such,’ [Kolodny (2007a), (2008)] attitude-coherence is seen both as a sufficient and as a necessary condition for attitude-rationality.

Even if not always explicitly stated, this standpoint is a central feature of leading recent developments.² Since it is typically fleshed out in terms of requirements for a subject, this general consensus invites us to initially examine (1), for any attitude A and subject S:

1. Rationality requires A of S iff A is required for coherence among S’s attitudes.

Note right off that the requirements of rationality at stake concern structural relations between a subject's attitudes and not requirements of substantive rationality concerning attitude-determining reasons. In other words, the focus is on the question of whether rationality requires subjects to have an attitude or set of attitudes given other attitudes or set of attitudes they have, and not on the question of whether there are reasons to have an attitude or set of attitudes. We may keep both notions of rationality separate for present purposes even if, for some authors, answers to questions of the former kind are reducible or accountable in terms of answers to questions of the latter kind.

Now, the target requirements of rationality and coherence are more accurately characterized if we specify a temporal context and consider relations among attitudes, rather than specific attitudes in isolation. We can capture this by introducing combinations or ordered n -tuples κ of attitudes and a time t as in (2):

2. Rationality requires combination κ of attitudes (A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n) of S at t iff κ is required for coherence among S 's attitudes at t .³

We may take the ordering of the tuples to express a certain structure in the normativity involved in a given combination. For ease of exposition, we may simply assume that κ is an ordered pair of attitudes (A_1, A_2) where typically A_1 corresponds to a normative condition on A_2 . Since κ can be either a detachable or non-detachable combination, (2) encompasses both narrow and wide scope requirements, respectively.

Consider, to illustrate, the profusely discussed *enkrasia*, which dictates that a subject S is required to intend to do what S believes S ought to do. In the simplest formulation, for any action φ the target combination κ_E is therefore an ordered pair constituted by the belief S ought to φ and the intention to φ .

κ_E . (Believe one ought to φ , Intend to φ)

The ordering in the pair captures the normative structure of the requirement in that the first element is a normative condition on the second element — and not the other way around.⁴ This specification is neutral regarding the narrow/wide-scope distinction. On a narrow-scope interpretation, κ_E expresses a detachable combination such that the requirement operates whenever S believes S ought to φ . It is detachable in that one just considers the first element of the combination in order to

determine what is normatively required (viz. that S intends to φ). By contrast, on a wide-scope reading, κ_E expresses a non-detachable combination such that the requirement operates indistinctly on the two elements in the pair. On this interpretation, if S believes S ought to φ , S may simply withdraw the belief in order to comply with κ_E .

Both the ordering and the detachability of a given combination are aspects that determine the way in which the combination is normatively significant and go beyond a mere extensional or state specification of the required attitudes. We may follow Kolodny in assuming that “one is rational or irrational not only in virtue of the attitudes that one has at any given moment, but also in virtue of how one forms, retains, and revises one’s attitudes over time” [Kolodny (2005), p. 517]. For present purposes, therefore, we will consider combinations κ that specify both what the required attitudes are and also what the required ways of having the attitudes are. Once these relevantly specified combinations are in view, what is at issue in the assessment of (2) is whether every combination κ required for coherence is a combination required by rationality, and conversely.

For present concerns, we may reflect upon (2) abstracting away from questions concerning its normative status or its relation to reason-based accounts of rationality and its requirements. In this piece, I shall argue that it is extremely doubtful that rationality concerns attitude-coherence in anything like the sense at issue in (2). Contrary to what is intimated or assumed in current approaches, requirements of attitude-rationality are not, or not distinctively, a matter of attitude-coherence. Subjects may be impeccably coherent while failing to be rational, whereas rationality may also lead to incoherence. These points are of interest for a profounder elucidation of rationality and its relation to putative requirements of coherence.

I ATTITUDE-RATIONALITY AND ATTITUDE-COHERENCE

It seems natural to suppose that both the coherence and rationality of a given subject is a matter of degree and that there is a wide spectrum to cover from sheer irrationality/incoherence to full rationality/coherence. Since no ordinary subject is fully (ir)rational, we may also exclude from consideration the case of the fully (ir)rational subject for present concerns.⁵ To sharpen the notion of requirement of attitude-rationality or rational requirement for short we may appeal to the notion of a rational condition via Rational Satisfaction:

Rational Satisfaction (RS): For S to satisfy a rational requirement r regarding κ at t is for S to improve or maintain her rational condition by respecting κ at t .

Since, according to RS, one may simply maintain one's rational condition via satisfaction of a requirement r , it is natural to assume that requirements in the relevant sense include also rational permissions. Besides, RS means conversely that for S not to satisfy r regarding κ at t is for S to diminish her rational condition at t . Note, finally, that, on this account, for r regarding κ *not* to be required by rationality is for its satisfaction to neither improve nor maintain (i.e. to diminish) one's rational condition, and therefore to be in fact rationally prohibited in the present context.

We may assume that something along the lines of RS is a constitutive feature of rational requirements [cf. Broome (2013), Chap. 5; Fink (2014)]. On this account, rational requirements are those which affect a subject's rational condition to a certain extent and at a certain time.

The notion of coherence is also plausibly gradual. In a similar fashion, therefore, we may trivially speak of requirements of attitude-coherence or coherence requirements for short to refer to those requirements whose satisfaction either improves or maintains coherence among a subject's attitudes as in Coherence Satisfaction:

Coherence Satisfaction (CS): For S to satisfy a coherence requirement c regarding κ at t is for S to improve or maintain the coherence of S's attitudes by respecting κ at t .

CS also conveys a decrease in coherence whenever c is not satisfied or is satisfied but not required by coherence in relation to κ at t . Although there is a local reading available, relevant rationality and coherence requirements are meant to be global in that they affect a subject's total attitudes or attitudinal situation at a given time. The (lack of) satisfaction of the requirements has an impact on a subject's rational condition or coherence concerning the totality of a subject's attitudes at a time.

II. REQUIREMENTS OF ATTITUDE-COHERENCE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT FOR REQUIREMENTS OF ATTITUDE-RATIONALITY

Now, claim (2) can be split into two conditionals. Let us examine the right-to-left entailment first.

(2a) If combination κ is required for coherence among S's attitudes at t, then rationality requires κ of S at t.

(2a) is false because rationality may involve asymmetric requirements, whereas coherence is completely symmetric. This means that we may find combinations κ that are required or permitted by coherence but that are prohibited by rationality.

This point has been independently used to argue against wide-scope formulations of rational requirements or obligations [Schroeder (2004), (2009), pp. 226-228; Kolodny (2005), (2007b); Lord (2014a)]. In concentrating upon the alleged wide-scope or narrow-scope character of rationality requirements, however, the difference between coherence and rationality requirements has gone largely unnoticed. In fact, the point of concern here is silent about the wide-narrow quandary. Rationality may very well issue both symmetric wide-scope requirements *and* asymmetric narrow requirements [Titelbaum (2015); Worsnip (2015)]. However, asymmetry just shows that, in central cases, rationality does not require merely one's coherence, but one's coherence in a certain restricted way. While proponents of attitude-rationality on the model of coherence have clearly noticed and tried to handle the asymmetric nature of rationality requirements, their attempts only confirm that these requirements are not rightly seen precisely as 'coherence' requirements.

We may illustrate the kind of problem that asymmetry raises for (2a) by returning to the case of enkrasia. For, in fact, it's not only κ_E which is required or permitted *from the point of view of coherence*. The combinations of attitudes licensed by enkrasia-coherence consist of the ordered pairs (κ_E) and (κ_E^*):

κ_E . (Believe one ought to φ , Intend to φ)

κ_E^* (Not intend to φ , Not believe one ought to φ).

Coherence regarding enkrasia may either involve satisfaction of requirements in line with (κ_E) — where the first conditional element is the belief one ought to φ —or satisfaction of requirements in line with (κ_E^*) — where the first conditional element is, by contrast, the lack of the intention to φ . Let us call this kit of combinations of coherent attitudes the Enkratic Kit (EK). If we move from the consideration of coherence to the consideration of rationality, however, we can easily appreciate that combinations in EK are not always combinations that bring about the satisfaction of rational requirements.

Let us suppose, for instance, that S has for long and on the basis of correct deliberation come to believe that S ought to ask for a salary rise. In this case, it seems correct to suppose that S is rationally required to intend to ask for the rise. S is in particular not rationally required and indeed rationally required not to withdraw the belief that she ought to ask for the rise were S not to find the courage or the resolution to form the required intention. That is to say, S is rationally required not to withdraw the belief *simply because* S lacks the intention.

The problem is not that S would be acting against the reasons S has for his belief he ought to ask for the raise. To repeat, our concern is here with structural or attitude-to-attitude rationality and not with the substantive rationality derivable from one's reasons. The problem rather is that there is something structurally irrational in S's withdrawing his belief only on the grounds that S fails to have the appropriate intention. This structural irrationality is not captured by EK and reveals that attitude-coherence does not suffice for attitude-rationality. Our subject can be enkrasia-coherent via (κ_E^*). Patently, belief retraction in this kind of cases may be required or permitted for coherence, *but not for rationality*. In the terms introduced via RS and CS, retraction maintains S's attitude coherence at the price of diminishing S's rational condition. In scenarios of this sort the falsity of (2a) is plainly visible.

Authors that take coherence to be the mark or the hallmark of attitude-rationality have noticed and discussed the asymmetry of rational requirements in these cases. They however tend to think that a theoretical supplementation or amendment of coherence requirements can be used to deliver results in line with rationality requirements. For instance, Broome observes that while the asymmetry of rationality need not be explained by wide-scoped enkrasia alone, further diachronic requirements or 'basing prohibitions' can do so via restrictions on the ways in which an attitude can be based on (the lack of) another [Broome (2013), §8.2 and §10.4]. Similarly, Kolodny gestures at asymmetries of the relevant sort by emphasizing the priority of process requirements, that is to say, requirements that not only state what combination of attitudes are required but also the way in which they are to be respected or 'what to do' in so respecting them [Kolodny (2005, 2007b)]. However, the theoretical attempts to accommodate asymmetry from the point of view of coherence simply make the distinction between coherence and rationality requirements more vivid. For these attempts to constrain coherence in the right way are just tacit acknowledgements of the view that coherence requirements do not as

such provide, and hence are not sufficient for, rationality requirements. It is only with the appropriate sort of supplementation — such as basing prohibitions or process requirements — that attitude-coherence can be made to yield what rationality requires.

Similar considerations readily carry over to other central cases in which ordered pairs of attitudes plausibly define combinations required or permitted for attitude coherence but not always required or permitted by rationality, such as means-end coherence, belief consistency or belief closure.

III. REQUIREMENTS OF ATTITUDE-COHERENCE ARE NOT NECESSARY FOR REQUIREMENTS OF ATTITUDE-RATIONALITY

Let us consider now the second, left-to-right conditional:

- (2b) If rationality requires combination κ of S at t, then κ is required for coherence among S's attitudes.

The falsity of (2b) is somewhat more contentious, for it entails that rationality may require or permit combinations of attitudes that are not required by coherence, that is, neither required nor permitted by coherence in the terms proposed here (see Section I). Since we are calling into question the very assumption that (2b) is true, it may suffice for present purposes to demonstrate that (2b) is conditionally false. In particular, I shall argue that (2b) is false if either (i) there are intrinsically rational attitudes or attitudes that turn on necessary conditions of a subject's rationality or (ii) there are individually assessable constitutive rational commitments of attitude types, such as truth or worthwhile action.

Let us consider intrinsically rational or irrational attitudes first. It is plausible that there are some attitudes possession or lack of which constitutes a necessary condition of a subject's rationality, that is to say, attitudes which subjects are absolutely rationally required to have or lack in a particular context, no matter what other attitudes they actually have or lack. More precisely, in the terms of the proposed analysis, to possess (lack) an intrinsically rational attitude at time t is to maintain or improve (diminish) one's rational condition at t whereas to possess (lack) an intrinsically irrational attitude at t is to diminish (maintain or improve) one's rational condition at t. Here are some plausible candidates of intrinsically rational attitudes in the required sense:

- (a) The desire for one's own survival
- (b) The belief that it cannot be both that p and not p
- (c) The intention to do what one believes one ought to do

In the present context, these attitudes are not meant to be intrinsically rational in the sense of being attitudes one has absolute or decisive reasons to have. By contrast, they are candidates for intrinsically rational attitudes in the sense that their possession (*vis-à-vis* the lack thereof) involves an improvement of one's rational condition regarding one's structural relations between desires, beliefs and intentions, respectively.

Arguably, to have these attitudes is in itself to satisfy a rational requirement whereas to lack these attitudes is to fail to do so and, consequently, to diminish one's rational condition to a certain extent. The key point is that a subject may be rationally required to have these attitudes no matter what incoherence they bring about at a certain time. For instance, let us assume that on the basis of impeccably coherent reasoning at t, S reaches the desire that S does not survive — perhaps as an instrumental desire for a desired end (such as the strong desire for one's family earning a good sum through the life insurance). On the assumption that (a) is an intrinsically rational desire in the sense described, one will eventually be rationally required to disregard one's coherent reasoning at t in order not to diminish one's rational condition.

Similarly, in the case of (b), we may suppose that S has for many years firmly held the belief that p. Suppose further that at t, S goes through a perfectly coherent train of thought that ends up in the belief that not p. Coherence with respect to the train of thought would seem to lead S to believe that not p at t. However, coherence in this case will come at the price of giving up (b) and any situation in which this is the case is arguably a situation in which a subject's rational condition is (severely) diminished. Rationality in this case seems to require S to withdraw the belief that not p (and maybe also the belief that p) in spite of the incoherence this brings about in relation to S's irrefragable reasoning at t.

Similar considerations hold for the enkratic intention (c). A situation in which this intention is withdrawn would arguably automatically shrink one's rational condition, no matter how coherent one turns out to be in one's withdrawing (c).

Altruism can be used to offer a particularly clear illustration of the same point. Thomas Nagel (1970) famously argued that altruism is a “mo-

tivational condition of rationality” [(1970), p. 3], an inescapable rational commitment to countenance other people’s needs and interests in one’s reasons for action. This is not the place to offer a defense of Nagel’s position but we may, for the sake of the argument, simply assume that it is correct to consider altruism in this sense as a structurally intrinsically rational attitude regarding one’s desires, beliefs and intentions. If some such view were correct, it would eventually thwart, and would indeed usually be set against, perfectly coherent attitudes concerning self-interest or one’s own interests.

Thus, for instance, coherence may require of S that she intends to stand completely still given, say, S’s desire to obey the order not to move an inch just given and S’s strong beliefs about the goodness of impeccable discipline. However, were S to come to realize she is stepping on somebody else’s gouty toes briefly after, altruism would cancel out the positive rational effect of S’s perfectly coherent combination of attitudes and rationally require of S that she intends to move swiftly or help remove the gouty toes from under S’s heels [cf. Nagel (1970), pp. 84–85]. This is so in spite of the incoherence this intention would produce regarding S’s desires and beliefs.

Note that in this case rationality issues or allows incoherent attitudes at *t* as opposed to coherence that respects the intrinsically rational attitudes at *t*. This is so even if the case may be read as involving a violation of *enkrasia* and, thus, as rationally requiring the recalibration of one’s desires and beliefs in the light of the altruistically required intention and the corresponding *akratic* stance [Hinchman (2013); Coates (2013)]. The appearance of an altruistic scenario at *t* might be sudden or unexpected, and S’s beliefs and desires may, as a consequence of this, be forced to remain unaltered at the very moment in which an intention for the altruistic action is rationally called for. Intending to move goes against S’s perfectly coherent attitudes regarding S’s interests or wishes at *t* and, even though S could appreciate this, S may also simply lack the time to work out a coherent attitudinal or *enkritic* stance at *t*. Even if S may be subsequently rationally required to recalibrate beliefs and desires in accordance with S’s altruistic purposes, if altruism is an intrinsically rational attitude or, at the very least, an intrinsically rational attitude at *t*, then rationality would require of S that she moves at *t* no matter what attitude-incoherence this brings about at *t*. Since the altruistic attitude is by assumption intrinsically rational, by committing *akrasia* at *t*, S’s rational condition is improved or maintained even if S’s attitude coherence clearly is not. Thus, if there are intrinsically rational attitudes, (2b) is false:

Requirements of attitude-coherence are not necessary for requirements of attitude-rationality. This train of thought generalizes easily to other doxastic and conative counterparts of the altruistic case.

One might worry that the problem that I am pointing out in the foregoing is merely that the rational requirements may *locally* require one to enter into an incoherent state in ways which would seem to be acknowledged or most plausible regarding a conception of rationality on the model of diachronic coherence. The violations would be merely local not in the sense that they are restricted to a particular time, but more importantly, in the sense that they would seem to concern only a subset of the subject's overall attitudes and hence only a part of the subject's attitudinal situation. This sort of local violation, the objection would go, is unsurprising from the angle of the advocate of attitude-rationality as attitude-coherence: it is only natural to expect that the satisfaction of a rational requirement regarding one part of one's attitudinal profile eventually leads to tensions elsewhere.⁶

In reply, note that, according to the proposed analysis, a combination is required by rationality at a given time if to bring it about would either maintain or increase one's rationality condition at *t*. As noted, although requirements so characterised certainly allow a local reading, the requirements under consideration are global in the sense that their satisfaction or violation lead to a change in the subject's globally considered attitudinal situation at *t*. For instance, the altruistic but incoherent (akratic) subject at *t*, faces a situation in which her rational condition at *t* is improved with respect to a coherent (enkratic) but not altruistic subject at *t*. The improvement is not local — in relation to a particular subset of *S*'s attitudes — but global in relation to *S*'s overall attitude-to-attitude structural relations.

This result does not allow us to establish that one can find attitude incoherence in the mind of a fully or ideally rational and omniscient subject. Nor does it tell against the view that we cannot satisfy all requirements of rationality without satisfying at least some requirement of coherence. The result does not allow us either to deny that coherence is a typical or regulatory feature of structural attitude-to-attitude rationality. All the same, the result shows that a subject's rational condition is eventually globally improved or maintained by being incoherent at a given time.

Now, it is perhaps more customary to speak of rational aims or commitments of attitude types rather than intrinsically rational attitudes. Insofar as these commitments turn on individually or marginally assessable conditions that affect a subject's rationality condition, they also go against (2b). For instance, deep-rooted, inspirational work of authors

such as Bernard Williams (1973) or Elizabeth Anscombe (1957) has led many contemporary philosophers to adhere to the view that rational belief aims at truth or that rational intention aims at worthwhile action. However, a perfectly coherent set of beliefs may lead one to believe something obviously false or, if motivationally efficacious or supplemented with the relevant desires, to intend something obviously not worthwhile. In such cases, rationality may seem to require to stick to incoherent combinations of attitudes at a given time as against the initially coherent set.

We may risk some simplification in order to attain a perspicuous formulation of the point. Consider the perfectly coherent set of beliefs Σ and let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that b^* is a belief that Σ requires for coherence which happens to be obviously false. On the assumption that truth is an assessable constitutive rational commitment of the belief-type individually applicable to b^* , adding b^* to Σ would result in the satisfaction of a requirement of coherence (an improvement or maintenance of the coherence) but in the lack of satisfaction of a requirement of rationality (an impoverishment of one's rational condition).

This result is replicated when we look for other, say, less objective kinds of constitutive aims. More precisely, so long as (i) attitudes are individually or marginally assessable in relation to the aim, and (ii) the aim is not question-beggingly assumed to be coherence or coherence-entailing, the foregoing line of thought reproduces again for any candidate aim. For instance, perhaps rationality is aimed at internally accessible evidence or warrant about the truth of one's beliefs or the worthwhile appearance of one's actions. Rationality may then require of one that one holds on to the beliefs that are most supported by evidence, or to the intentions directed at actions that appear to be most worthwhile. All the same, these candidate aims would apply independently of whether their corresponding rational requirements are set against inconsistencies regarding a perfectly coherent set. Perhaps we suddenly turn out to have an overwhelming amount of evidence in favour of attitude A, in spite of A being inconsistent with all the attitudes we have taken ourselves to have evidence for so far. In such conceivable cases, rationality would (globally) require or permit one's attitude incoherence. Conversely and generally, for any rational aim constitutive of an attitude type α , if α is an individually-attitude-assessable aim different from coherence itself, it might be that coherence (globally) requires an attitude A that fails to comply with α .

We may summarize the discussion in this section as follows: Whenever there is an intrinsically rational or aim-assessable attitude A^* which

is required by rationality, and a set of perfectly coherent attitudes A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n , there might be a time t such that coherence with the set is against A^* at t . In those cases, rationality will globally require or permit to be incoherent as against the coherent set at t . It follows that (2b) is false at least conditionally on there being intrinsically rational attitudes or aims of rationality of an attitude type.

CONCLUSION

Here I have focused on normativity-neutral interpretations of rational and coherence requirements. When they are interpreted normatively, the distinction between requirements of coherence and rationality lines up and perhaps can be identified, respectively, with the distinction between mere or intrinsic correctness normativity and directive or full-blooded normativity [Shackel (2014)]. It is however an open question whether rationality or coherence must as such be considered normative and the thoughts pursued in the foregoing need not involve a commitment to the dual nature of normativity.

In this paper, I have argued that subjects may be and presumably often are coherent while irrational (e.g. when they are not coherent in the appropriate way), and arguably also rational while incoherent (e.g. when intrinsically rational attitudes or aims are relevantly in force) in having an attitude or combination thereof. If correct, this point urges us to sharply distinguish between requirements of attitude-rationality and requirements of attitude-coherence. These requirements clearly stem from different sources and eventually come apart in the life of a rational subject. This is so even if rationality may and usually requires one to be coherent, and even if coherence may make one rational in central cases. In short, coherence is perhaps a mark, but certainly not the mark, let alone the hallmark of attitude-rationality.

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NOTES

¹ Especially in connection with epistemic justification [Quine and Ullian (1970)] and truth [Davidson (1986)].

² Other works that assume the tight, distinguishing marriage between attitude-rationality and attitude-coherence include Broome (1999), (2005), Brunero (2010), (2012), Fink (2014), Kolodny (2007b), Scanlon (1998), (2007), Smith (1994), Way (2010), (2011) or Wedgwood (2011). In some recent contributions, the connection between coherence and rationality is articulated via the introduction of distinctive notions such as normativity of 'mere correctness' [Shackel (2014)], self-(mis)trust [Hinchman (2013)] or the notion of rational commitment [Shapll (2013)]. Lord (2014b) advances a view partially in line with the one presented here in that it questions the sufficiency of attitude-coherence for attitude-rationality through a particular account of the relation between reasons and rationality. Lord, however, also leaves coherence untouched as a necessary condition of rationality, a view I shall challenge in Section 3.

³ In what follows and for simplicity's sake I shall frequently use 'requiring combination κ ' as a shorthand for 'requiring that which brings about combination κ '. No confusion should arise because of this.

⁴ If we consider an n -tuple with $n > 2$ we might take each element in the ordering to correspond to different embedded normative conditions of varying complexity for the attitudes involved. These more complex combinations might be useful in e.g. the normative analysis of chains of theoretical or practical reasoning.

⁵ Here I side with Broome in thinking that, as far as (source) requirements are concerned, we "are more interested in coping with our actual imperfect situation than in how to be perfect" and hence that requirements of rationality are not concerned with the global property of being rational [Broome (2013), p 119]. As we will immediately see, however, the requirements under examination are global in another sense, namely, in that their (lack of) satisfaction affects a subject's total attitudes or attitudinal situation and rational condition/coherence at a given time.

⁶ I thank an anonymous referee for this journal for inviting me to address this worry.

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