

INTRODUCTION

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This collection resulted, in part, from a symposium on national identity and nationalism that I organized at the request of the *Asociación de Historia Actual* (Current History Association) at the University of Cadiz, Spain, in September of 2014. I must thank the organizers of the Conference for their kindness and hospitality, especially Professor Julio Pérez Serrano, Chair of the Group for the Study of Current History, Professor Francisco Villatoro Sánchez for all his help and assistance, and the wonderful group of students and professionals that made the Conference possible. The volume, however, also benefited from contributions written by other scholars who did not participate in the Cadiz Conference. They possess a long-standing and distinguished record of scholarship on these very complex topics and have added to the value of the collection. I must of course very much thank all the selected authors for kindly agreeing to make revisions, rewrites, and changes to their original papers following the recommendations of the editor and two anonymous reviewers. It goes without saying that we all very much appreciate the input of the anonymous reviewers; their critical and constructive comments, insights, and suggestions have definitely enriched and bettered our papers.

Why worry about the nation and nationalism? At this time of globalization this question may seem of secondary importance. The papers that comprise this volume, however, demonstrate exactly the opposite. First, and unlike what was predicted in the early 1990s, during the last decades issues connected to national identity and the ways in which people think of their nations have strongly infused international and

domestic policymaking. Second, as nationalist/ethnic/religious conflict has risen to prominence, the agendas of international organizations (World Bank, IMF, IBD, The UN, etc.) have again become focused upon the rights of nations to self-determination. Third, both governments and civil society alike are openly acknowledging that national identity, nationalism, and the sovereignty of nations are inseparable from present apprehensions about the future of democracy. The study of “the nation” and “national identity”, therefore, is not only of academic interest but also of practical importance. Contrary to what has been argued nations indeed are no longer an “exception” to world history.¹ In our world they provide, in fact, the stuff of history.

The militancy of non-profits and religious organizations on behalf of the right of nations to self-determination, as well as the World Bank or the United Nations’ initiatives to protect indigenous cultures and historical sites, has added to the already traditional public centrality of nations. Of no lesser importance, states and nations are becoming explosive combinations. Most of today’s wars are either fought by nations that want to have their own state or by ethnic and religious groups that aspire to become independent nations under the same state. We know that terrorism and unabashed conflict in the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe and elsewhere is connected to the uneven distribution of resources in those regions. But we also know that these kinds of conflict are

¹ McNeill, William H. (1986), *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, pp. 28-30.

fueled by clashes between different ideas of the *national* strongly tied to ethnicity, institutions, culture, and religion.

The strong nationalistic posture of China and Russia or the efforts of the United States to strengthened national sentiment at home, not to mention clashes over national self-determination in Hong Kong and the Ukraine, have also encouraged interest in the nation, nationalism, and national identity. In Europe, this question is more pertinent than ever. Among other events, separatist movements and regional governments in Spain, Italy, and England have declared themselves to represent separate nations or to have the right to stand as independent national communities on their own right. Members of the European Union, including its major makers, France and Germany, have shown increasing concern about their populations' manifest discontent regarding the loss of national values, cultures, and ways of life. Furthermore, many quarters have perceived increasing migration as an invasion that threatens nationality and unity. To this, one needs to add constant streams of refugees seeking asylum not only in the United States, Canada, or Western Europe but also in African countries, Turkey, Egypt, Australia, Costa Rica and others.

In Latin America, the discussion about national identity has been uneven. In some cases, we see a return to old forms of nationalism with no substantial changes in terms of the definition of national identity or nationality. In other instances, countries have claimed to create "new" national "models" (Argentina or Venezuela). In reality, these two cases represent old fashion types of state nationalism, almost identical to the sort of nationalism associated in the past with traditional populism. State-driven nationalism in these two "models" reproduces populism and other forms of strong-leader, *caudillo* type systems that have historically been commonly found in Latin America and elsewhere. Yet this does not make their focus on state nationalism the less important. In these and other systems in the region (Brazil) the encompassing character of nationality is giving way to a narrower definition of the nation that is conceived as the community of those who follow the leader and/or respect the system. They become *supreme leaders of the*

nation, to borrow the concept analyzed by Agustin Ferraro in his essay bellow. The justification for their actions, right or wrong, is that these leaders can save the county from the iniquities of an international system that has turned against them, or from conservative and backward forces that lurk within.

Chile or Uruguay, on the other hand, has not openly engaged in questions of national identity or redefinitions of the nation but a discussion about self-determination and indigenous rights has started. Like in the past, the question of nationalism has come up attached to social movements, political parties, and incumbent presidents that claim to best represent the national community. In the case of Uruguay, large political sub-cultures have long emphasized to incarnate the best of the Uruguayan nation and have competed for ownership over historical myths and symbols connected to nationality. Radical changes in the region regarding national identity and redefinitions of "the nation", however, have taken place mostly in Andean countries and, up until now with less consequence, also in Brazil. In the Andean countries, as Yamandu Acosta's examination of the Constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador makes plain, a redefinition of the nation has gained momentum. When it comes to redefine nationality and the inclusion of hitherto excluded groups from "the nation", Fernán E. González also shows that the 1991 Constitution of Colombia constitutes an interesting landmark.

Can this renovated upsurge of nationalism and sweeping redefinitions of identities at the global scale be interpreted as a weakening of today's international system? Are these different claims to nationality and the strengthening of nationalism bad signs that presage even more conflict to come in an already conflictive global structure? There are alarming precedents. When the crises of 1914 erupted into full-fledged war, nationalistic, religious, and ethnic conflict had also reached high levels. Contrary to the perception of many contemporaries, these developments were making the system less stable. We expect that the international community today will deal with rising levels of conflict, the plea of smaller nations to be autonomous, religious strife, war, and problems connected to the violations of human rights whenever they arise. We also expect that evils

can be contained and be short lived. Much evidence indicates that this has not been really the case. Back in 1914, on the eve of WWI the socialist Jean Jaures understood that things could rapidly change: “Europe has been afflicted by so many crisis... that (we) have almost ceased to believe in a threat and are watching the Balkan conflict with decreased attention and reduced disquiet”. Are we making similar misreads today when we look at the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Eastern Europe?

The argument can be made that there is a big difference between the early 1900s and our own times. In the twentieth first century several international institutions exist that have been charged with maintaining the peace and guaranteeing that economic development reaches most corners of the earth, hence helping to prevent conflict. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, there were also international institutions watching over world peace. After 1815 The Concert of Europe, for instance, that collection of Great Powers that was supposed to keep the peace, had been fully established. Yet at some point its members ceased to believe that concerted action could avoid conflict, and the world order began to break down. Today, the UN can be seen as sort of a successor of the Concert. It has at times intervened successfully in the name of peace but the Security Council does not work as expected. Russia and China usually vote against UN intervention, which they see as a cover to promote the interests of the West. Most importantly, many countries have successfully defied the dictums of the UN. Assad or Kim Jong-un, to mention only two cases, constitutes good examples of disobedience of UN regulations.

Will the theory of mutually assure destruction in the twentieth first century work as well as it did during the Cold War? Most people doubt it. It is not my place here to dig deeper into the tribulations of our global system, but the world of nations today has demonstrated a proclivity to conflict that has already surpassed that of the years prior to WWI. Andreas Wimmer has published an illuminating book in which, among other things, gives exact numbers as to the current ethno-nationalization of war. He finds that these figures are higher than ever, includ-

ing the period prior to WWI.² This interesting piece of data is significant because the Great War erupted after a relatively peaceful period among the Great Powers of Europe. In that overall peaceful context, however, there were unresolved issues of nationalism and nationality that finally triggered the 1914-1918 war. It is sobering to remember that unlike in the early twentieth century, today there are nine countries with nuclear arsenals, including Pakistan, almost a failing state, not to mention North Korea, a proven repressive and reckless regime. Depending on who next gets the bomb (Iran, perhaps?) numerous other states are likely to resort to their own nuclear options. This makes for a far more dangerous world. If present day scenarios of conflict would lead to a Balkanization-like situation, the consequences could be worse than those that resulted from the Great War. Issues connected to national identity, shifting ideas about the nature of national communities, and obviously nationalism, are key factors that must be seriously addressed. This collection materializes an effort in that direction.

Can new national identities result from the merging of existing ones? Would this offer a formula to avoid further conflict? As some top brass in the American Army have pointed out, not to mention many scholars that have laboriously shown the long historical processes that this would require, national communities cannot be built overnight. The idea that “successful” military operations (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc.) would be more than an instrument of power to defeat opposing forces is wishful thinking. More than ever before in human history the construction of new states from scratch (Iraq, Afghanistan, and in the minds of many also the future of Syria) has become almost an impossible task. The same applies to the construction of new national identities. Recent history has demonstrated that pursuing “nation building” from afar and through military missions may be delusional. After centuries of rivalry and oppression in the hands of one another, different ethnicities and nationalities in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe

² Wimmer, Andreas (2013), *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. Cambridge University Press See especially figures 1.2 and pp. 3-5.

have rejected to live under the same institutional umbrella or through the “protection” of some superpower beyond their borders. Others have decided to unite with members of their same ethnicity or religion living in neighboring states to form a new nation. Most states in today’s global system are devoting time and resources to encourage national unity and nationalism. More than ever in human history the right of groups (nations) to self-determination, their militancy in terms of aspiring to building their own states, and the shifting linkages uniting states and nations, make the twentieth first century a different but not necessarily more stable global system.

Before introducing the contributions that conform this volume, a last question needs to be addressed because it has been an implicit concern for most of the authors. Do democracies devote as many resources to building national identity as stronger/authoritarian states do? Approximately fifty years of standard scholarly arguments about the weak connection between democratic rule and nation worshiping have been undermined by globalization and democratization itself. It has become apparent that authoritarian or populist states are not the only ones that are encouraging nation worshiping and strong nationalism.³ Actually, contemporary democracies do likewise. Both in Europe and Latin America rural and urban sites representing nationality as well as museums and memorials have been eagerly reconstructed, renewed, and preserved. Civil society and religious organizations have not stood idly behind. They have indeed joined the state in defending national values, customs, cultures and ways of life. Unlike what it was argued during the Cold War, at the time of this writing nation building is part of the open agendas of democracies and counts with the full support of important sectors of civil society. To this we should add the almost complete cooperation of regional bu-

³ During most of the Cold War and beyond communist and other strong states were characterized as the strongest sponsors of state nationalism. It followed that the building of strong nationalist cultures differentiated those states from the rest. The Soviet Union became an archetypal example. See, among others, Brooks, Jeffrey (2001), *Thank You Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.

reaucracies and international organizations. As some of the essays in this volume show, national identity and nationalism are ingrained into the everyday lives of individuals and modern political systems, whether authoritarian or democratic.

Could one interpret today’s developments as a backlash against the widespread adoption of neo-liberal policies? Most authors in this volume either argue or suggest that the current significance of national identity has deeper roots, and that the rising importance of nationalism and the re-definition of national communities cannot be interpreted as side effects of globalization (Carlos Escude, Fernando Lopez-Alves, Fernán González, Matthias vom Hau). At the opposite end stand those who have argued that neoliberal packages threatened local identities and provoked a nationalist reaction. It would be an exaggeration, however, to make of globalization and neo-liberal policies the most important factor responsible for the rising awareness of nationality and nationalism. The present situation is part of a long historical process going back to the dawn of modernity (Lopez-Alves) colonial rule (Carlos Escude, Matthias vom Hau) and, in some cases, even further back in time (Escude).

Nationalism

Despite the centrality of issues connected to national identity and nationalism in today’s global affairs, their study has been surrounded by much conceptual confusion and overlapping terminology. Concepts like nation, nationalism, national identity, the nation-state, the national-state, and patriotism, as well as psychological dimensions of national identity such as the “national character”, “the national sentiment” or “love of nation” have weaved an intricate, and at times contradictory, tapestry of meanings. In addition, some of these topics have received more attention than others, making for an uneven scholarly offer in connection to these problems.

For more than one and half centuries, for instance, the study of nationalism has taken the forefront. The concept of nationalism possesses several layers of meaning: the defense of the nation (however conceived), the character of nationalist ideology, the collective action that

this ideology generates, and the foreign policy that it shapes. It is therefore, clearly different from the concept of “nation” or “national identity”. The popularity of nationalism does not of course mean that authors that have studied it did not also focus on national identity, nationality, or the conundrums that surround the notion of “nation” as a “special kind” of community. Yet specific scholarship on the latter has been less prevalent. The reasons why scholars and journalist have devoted so much time and energy to write about nationalism, both as an ideology and engine of collective action, is more than justified.

This volume, however, does not focus on nationalism as it connects to war and conflict. Rather, it discusses nationalism in a different way that is very much connected to issues of identity and nationality. The authors indeed establish clear distinctions among these concepts because they are, after all, not one and the same. That alone makes the volume outstanding. Indeed, established names in the field whose contribution is beyond doubt do not always pause to make these analytical distinctions. Benedict Anderson’s welcome contribution, for instance, furnishes a good example of such confusion.⁴ In his work, most times the relation between nationalism, the nation or nationality is either assumed or fuzzy. Or, alternatively, these concepts are treated as a package, e.g. his “modular” notion of nationalism. In such formula nationalism maintains a direct but not clearly defined connection with the nation and national identity. The former, it seems, plays the role of independent variable while the latter concepts become dependent ones.⁵

Nationalism has for the most part been strongly associated with war, terrorism, and conflict, a topic that is not the focus of this collection. A few words, however, should be said about the importance of nationalism and its connection to

war. Ruling elites and states have for hundreds of years been interested in creating unity and sponsoring nationalism. In the scholarly universe, however, specific interest in nationalism started in earnest in the early twentieth century. Needless to say, no period has received more attention than the decades before WWI, with some authors depicting those years as a “modern event, the most complex of modern time, perhaps of any time so far”.⁶ Modris Eksteins and Barbara Tuchman, among others, vividly and beautifully showed that WW I inspired and triggered enthusiastic and vibrant nationalism across Europe, especially among the youth. Nationalism became a force that brought about intense cultural, ideological, and social transformations in the Old Continent even before the war actually began.⁷ Christopher Clark has showed how the workings of nationalism paved the way to the kind of terrorism and international conflict that we experience today. In other words, the nationalist organization behind the terrorist attacks in Sarajevo functioned in a similar way to twentieth first century terrorist organizations.⁸ Nationalism and terrorism soon emerged as two sides of the same coin.

⁶ Clark, Christopher (2012), *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*, Penguin Books, p. 6. Similar arguments have been put forward by others, for instance Max Hastings (2013), *Catastrophe 1914: Europe Goes to War*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Random House.

⁷ Modris Eksteins offers a canning analysis of the pervasive influence of nationalism that characterized Europe at that time in addition to the political atmosphere, cultural change, and bellicose renovation that preceded WWI. See his (1989), *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company. Barbara Tuchman delightful book *The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World Before the War, 1890-1914* (1966) New York, Ballantine Books, is a detailed study of political alliances, elite mentality, and nationalist ideology during that period. For a broader view of Europe and nationalism by the end of WWI and beyond, see also Johnson, Paul (1993), *Modern Times: The World from the Twentieths to the Nineties*, New York, Harper Perennial.

⁸ Clark, Christopher, *The Sleepwalkers... op. cit.*, pp. 9 and passim. He depicts a vivid picture of the terrorist/nationalist organization that was behind the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo.

⁴ Anderson, Benedict R. (1983), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso.

⁵ Overlapping definitions of nationalism, national identity, or the nation can also be found in Breuilly, John (1993), *Nationalism and the State*, Manchester: Manchester University Press. See as well Dann, Otto & John Dinwiddy (1988), *Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution*. London Hambledon, and Wimmer, Andreas (2013), *op.cit.*

After the 1918 settlement, nationalism did not die; in fact, it became stronger. Michael Hechter, for instance, writes: “Nationalism and its close cousin, ethnicity, currently are the most potent political forces in the world. To appreciate (that)... consider the world in 1994...eighteen of the twenty-three wars being fought were based on nationalist or ethnic challenges to states. About three-quarters of the world’s refugees were fleeing from, or were displaced by, ethnic national conflicts.”⁹ He is not alone; many have seen the combination of nationalism, religion, and ethnicity as a complex equation leading, more often than not, to conflict.¹⁰ No need to add current clashes in the Middle East and Africa to reinforce this idea. The study of nationalism, therefore, although intimately linked to the study of the nation and national identity, has produced its own literature and traditions, usually associated with domestic war and international conflict. This collection, again, deviates from literature strictly focused on the connections between nationalism and conflict and concentrates, instead, more on the nation and national identity. The authors, however, do acknowledge its importance. This is especially true of Matthias vom Hau and Fernán González’s contributions, and partially true in the case of Fernando Lopez-Alves and Carlos Escude’s.

The Nation

Today’s widespread accepted beliefs that communities, no matter their size, character, or world significance, possess an inalienable right to self-determination have added to their importance as global actors. Indeed, as some contributors to this volume show (Yamandu Acosta, Fernán González) communities that would not have qualified as “nations” in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries do so today. Unlike most literature, this collection offers definitions of the nation and national identity that facilitate comparisons and contribute to a

more comprehensive theory of nationality. The term “nation” has indeed been one of the most controversial concepts in the social sciences. During the late 1660s and the early 1700s “nation” alluded to a people who could be either united by religion, language or ethnicity, planning collectively for the future, sharing a past, and in possession of a specific territory. They have been defined as the binding force that united individuals in the belief that they were part of a larger whole. Nations can go back to antiquity but most times they have been associated with the development of modern governmental institutions and their functions.

Part of the definition of nations is that they are players in a global system composed of different “nations”, so that their identity also derives from the fact that they exist and develop in an international context in which they have to differentiate themselves from other nations. Here is where definitions get a bit tricky because in order to stand as international actors nations must be connected to states; hence the terms nation-state or national-state. As a result, we usually talk about “nations” assuming that those who do not have their own state lack international influence. National identities result therefore from the association of nations with states (Lopez-Alves) and a very dynamic process in which both “nationals” and “foreigners” had an input in shaping the imagery of nationality (Matthias vom Hau, Carlos Escude, Fernán González).

According to some authors in this volume (Lopez-Alves) a monumental transformation in national consciousness came along with the rise of the modern state. At the dawn of the nineteenth century Hegel argued that events preceding the rise of the modern state belonged into pre-history. This, he suggested, applied also to nations. He used the same term, “nations”, for groups that existed before and after the rise of the modern state. Yet pre-modern nations were very different from modern ones. The latter belonged to a different, superior phase in the Spirit’s path toward self-consciousness. The way nations had been defined traditionally (ethnicity, language, and so forth) made little sense to Hegel. He argues, for instance, that languages are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of nations in the true historical sense because

⁹ Hechter, Michael (2000), *Containing Nationalism*. Oxford, University Press. His differentiation between “peripheral nationalism”, “irredentist nationalism”, and “unification nationalism” is quite useful, as well as his definition of nationalism and patriotism. See pp. 17-18.

¹⁰ See, among others, Hastings, Adrian (1997), *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism*, Cambridge, University Press.

"...those nations—notwithstanding the develop of language among them—never advanced to the possession of a *history*. The rapid growth of language, and the progress of dispersion of Nations, assume importance and interest for concrete Reason, only when they have come in contact with States, or begin to form political constitutions themselves."¹¹ After reading Carlos Escude's essay in this collection, one might be tempted to challenge this argument, although Escude's main focus is not on ancient nations but on modern ones.

Yamandu Acosta, Carlos Escude, Fernando Lopez-Alves, Matthias vom Hau and, to an extent, Fernán González and Agustin Ferraro, take different positions in this debate. In recent times scholars have rephrased this controversy and basically put forward two different arguments about the meaning of the term "nation". On one side stand those who support the idea that the nation is defined by "civic nationalism" (all people living within the same borders are part of the nation). On the other are those who believe in "ethnic nationalism" (nations are defined by a shared heritage which includes a common faith, a common language, and common ethnic ancestry). The first group associates nations with the rise of the modern state, notions of citizenship, republican revolutions, and modernity. The second argues that nations can even precede the state and, especially, the modern state.¹²

Carlos Escude shows the importance of a common language in the forging of a transcontinental identity in Latin America that goes back to colonial times and the dissolution of the Spanish empire. After the fall of two of the most important empires in human history, the Roman and the Spanish, Escude submits that two different linguistic scenarios developed. This would explain the surge of two different kinds of national identities in the Old and New

Worlds. Focusing on the use of vernaculars and the linguistic heritage of those empires, he constructs an exciting argument about why and how different types (stronger, weaker) of national identity emerged in Europe and Latin America. The fall of these Empires structured very different social, political and, especially, linguistic scenarios.

He finds that linguistic fragmentation in Europe followed the fall of Rome. In the aftermath of that long and complex process of dissolution, a "partial amalgamation" took place, coupled with other developments that were connected to the rise of smaller states and their own process of power centralization. This favored linguistic fragmentation, which remained a feature of the European world. The invention of the printing press and the uses of the vernacular did not favor, in fact, linguistic homogeneity. Contrastingly, the Spanish Empire had managed to create a more homogenous linguistic world in colonial Latin America. After independence, this allowed for a widespread feeling of identity and familiarity across the continent, at least among the elites. This, Escude submits, "is of the utmost importance if we are to understand Iberian America."

His thesis is that in Latin America one finds a "relative weakness of a national consciousness within its individual societies" that results from "the relative strength of pan-Latin American commonalities (which are even stronger, of course, if we limit our analysis to Spanish America)." Europe stands at the opposite end of this weak/strong national consciousness spectrum. All is, of course, relative. The weakness of national consciousness in Latin America is such only in comparison to the Old World's, where Escude detects states characterized by deeper and more resilient national consciousness. In other words, this European scenario is directly associated to sharper linguistic dissimilarities separating European societies. Iberian America, contrastingly, possesses a sort of linguistic kinship that Europe lacks.

Major variables that most literature has seen as definers of nationality --territory and geographical distance-- do not play a fundamental role in Escude's argument. Geographical closeness does not lead to share identities: "Indeed, the comparison between the 505 kilometers that

¹¹ Hegel, Georg (2009), *The Philosophy of History*. IAP, Scotts Valley, CA, p. 71.

¹² A major question is obviously whether or not we use the same words ("nation", "nationality") to refer to different phenomena. It is apparent that in the seventeenth and eighteenth century the term "nation", for instance, was not used to capture the development of larger multicultural communities that have today become more the norm than the exception.

separate two Spanish cities with distinctively different Latin tongues such as Madrid and Barcelona, vis-à-vis the 10.766 kilometers that separate two Castilian-speaking Spanish American cities like Tijuana and Ushuaia, is impressive enough to make the point. A Chilean and a Madrileño understand each other as if they belonged to the same society, but such is not the case of a Madrileño untrained in Catalan vis-à-vis a Catalonian villager who is not bilingual. And the 7827 kilometers that separate worlds as different as Washington DC and Moscow are a significantly shorter distance than the 10.055 kilometers separating Ciudad Juarez, in the Mexican state of Chihuahua, from Punta Arenas, the Chilean port in the Strait of Magellan.”

On his part, Matthias vom Hau shows that the colonizers’ imagery of the nation --or the way in which it was perceived in the ex-colonies— becomes an important tool in the forging of nationality among the colonized. Comparing Argentina, Mexico, and Peru, he argues that during colonial administrations and long after a positive image of the colonizer endured through Latin American interpretations of Spanish history and the role of Spain in the world at large. This, in part, shaped national identity in the three countries. Remarkably, state-sponsored memory discourses about Spanish colonialism in Mexico, Argentina, and Peru continued to be an important part of national history long after mid twentieth century. It was at that point, vom Hau argues, that Spain lost its attributes as a “civilizing force” and started to be considered a backwards influence in official nationalist narratives. He writes: “During the 1930s in Mexico the new representation of Spanish colonialism became fully institutionalized as a regular product of state organizations. During the 1940s in Argentina the official commemoration of the colonial period shifted, but remained contested.... in Peru during same time period the civilizing narrative about Spanish colonial rule managed to persist.”

The author makes clear that this does not mean to argue that “patterns of colonial rule and the subsequent commemoration of colonialism” can be taken as cause and effect. Levels of colonial rule, he submits, do not determine the way post-colonial states develop collective memories of the colonial era. Vom Hau uses

primary sources and approaches the problem comparatively, doing discourse analysis of history textbooks (primary school-level) from the late nineteenth century onwards; these comparisons reveal the importance of what he calls the “commemoration of Spanish colonialism” in his three cases. It also shows the enormous power of images of the “mother country” elaborated during the colony and how the state, through the educational system, added or subtracted value from these already established notions. One suspects that this may be also true of other countries in the region and beyond.

One is also tempted to travel north and to add that in eighteenth century United States and all the way through most of U.S. history to the present time, British narratives of nationality have provided an honorable predecessor of national identity for the first Republic. They also helped to conceptualize the “American nation”. Indeed, despite a bloody war of independence and other lingering skirmishes the prestige of Britain never waned. Before and through the process leading to the American Revolution of 1776, the colonies embraced ideas and definitions of the “nation” that endured long after. In fact, the definition of the new nation (a special kind of people devoted to freedom and destined to a grand missionary future) nicely dialogued with notions of national identity that developed during the colony. Civil religion in America added a very important ingredient to national self-consciousness because it reinforced the ties uniting the *American Nation* as a republic with a pre-revolutionary notion of the nation under British rule.¹³ Carlos Escude and Matthias vom Hau’s papers, therefore, show the importance of colonial pasts and pre-modern times in the forging of nationality.

Agustin Ferraro’s contribution points in a similar direction. His examination of “executive supremacy” in the Americas confirms the importance of fifteenth century ideas (in this case notions originating in the 1430s at the University of Salamanca by one of its professors, Juan de Segovia) to explain how nations are conceived and ruled. Latin America developed su-

¹³ See, among many others, Bellah, Robert (2000), “Civil Religion in America”, *Daedalus*, v. 117, no. 3, pp. 97-118.

preme leaders of the nation, while the United States did not. Ferraro seeks an explanation by going back, among other things, to the writings of Argentine founding father Juan Bautista Alberdi. Ferraro reminds us that Alberdi thought that the U.S. model would not really fit Latin America; rather, according to Alberdi (and he was not alone in the region making that argument) superior administrative authority did. It was during the War of Succession (1701-1714) that the notion of “supreme administrative authority” consolidated. At that time the Spanish monarchy created the office of *intendant* as a bureaucratic agency directly dependent upon the Crown. This centralizing move had repercussions in the colonies long before the Cortes met at Cadiz: “Viceroys assumed in some cases the office of superintendent”. Despite these precedents, and interestingly enough Ferraro tells us that the 1853 Spanish Constitution “finally avoided employing the formulation of ‘supreme authority’ to refer to the head of the executive power”. In Latin America, however, this notion endured. One can conclude that two conceptions of the nation, therefore, emerged. In one, supreme leaders made major decisions with much lesser due process and consultation. In the other, Presidents were constrained by administrative structures that tended to diffuse power through different agencies. One can conclude that different degrees of presidential power may help us to better understand the construction of a more hierarchically designed nation in Latin America and, at least in theory, a more equalitarian one in the United States.

Fernán E. González’s in-depth study of Colombian national identity finds that twentieth century state institutions play a fundamental role in shaping Colombian nationality. Yet he also acknowledges the importance of colonial institutions and argues that a sort of “cultural identity” predated independence going back to the times of the Viceroyalty, a proto-nationality that surfaced in connection to the idea of belonging to the same colonial state. One is reminded that during the colony Colombia was a major center of administrative power. Trying to discern whether a “sense of belonging” comparable to national identity characterized the colonial state, González looks at the linkages that populations developed with the *Real Audiencia*. Citing Jaime Jaramillo, he maintains that the population was developing “*ciertos hábitos y*

conciencia de pertenecer a un Estado que cubría con su acción los límites del virreinato”. González points out that these habits and consciousness are worth exploring, although, at the time, they did not suffice to establish an overarching national identity *per se*. Very importantly, he brings up the role of the Catholic Church in the forging of nationality. It was the interaction of state and church that shaped the nation; thus, the state was not the only actor capable of nation building. In addition to the Church, the development of other institutions associated with Republican rule, such as political parties and pressure groups, fundamentally contributed to construct collective national consciousness.

Lopez-Alves’ contribution in this volume can be placed on the side of those who study the evolution of the modern state from the late eighteenth century on as a crucial variable to explain collective consciousness about the nation and nationality. Hegel and Weber, for different reasons, coincided that national identity and the consciousness of belonging to a nation were closely connected to the institutional frameworks of the state, to the point in which neither the nation nor the state can exist separately. Lopez-Alves takes this argument further. He claims that the modern state is the most efficient and powerful conceptualizer of nations and that it sets up the frameworks of meaning that makes national consciousness possible. He submits that after mid nineteenth century modern state bureaucracies became *arbiters of meaning* regarding the connotations that defined the “national community”. The result was the emergence of a collective consciousness of nationality. He treats nationality as an ideology, that is, an organized set of concepts that map notions of belonging and sameness.

Before the rise of the modern state, he argues, one can find ideas and notions of nationality but not integrated into a complex network of meaning (ideology of nationality) able to encompass seemingly contradictory notions into a coherent body of meaning. The rise of this type of ideology is tied to the process of institutional differentiation that characterized the modern Western state and its bureaucracies. A constant dialogue and negotiation with civil society in terms of the characteristics and connotations of identity was established by which the Western

state developed what he calls an “ideological practice of nationality” (IPN). The rise of such ideological practice explains why at the present time and all over the world most individuals associate their personal identity with their nationality, and why they use a limited and familiar gamut of concepts when defining it. He concludes that the consolidation of IPN means that the conceptual lexicon used to define the nation, nationality, and national identity has become more and more alike across the board and the range of concepts used to describe them more familiar to all.

Constitutions and Linkages Between States and Nations

All our authors discuss the state as an agent, a framework, and/or a force intimately connected to nation building. This is inevitable. Literature has either seen the state as the major creator of identity or else as having a secondary role but almost no scholar has been able to discard the state completely and/or eliminate it from the picture of national identity altogether. Historically, authors have associated the concept of “nation” with legal structures such as Common or Roman law and political institutional arrangements (democracy, communism, socialism, authoritarianism, and so fourth). Terms such as *nation-state*, *national-state*, *state-nation*, and the like have been part of a scholarly lexicon that has focused not only on the state but also on the linkages uniting states and nations. Much work still needs to be done in terms of building a comprehensive theory of these linkages. One also ought to be weary of an old unresolved problem: whether or not literature has resorted to circular definitions in which scholars try to define one of the elements that compose these equations by discussing the other instead, and vice versa.

With the rise of states that wished to tighten their rule over heterogeneous and larger populations, governments devoted larger resources to nation making. States drew legitimacy from standing as the major defenders of the nation and at the same time they shaped the nation that they were supposed to defend. Connections between states and nations have intrigued philosophers and thinkers for centuries. In the eighteenth century and through the nineteenth, nations were ranked by whether or not their

social organization (institutions) and the skills of their people (human resources) made for an effective combination. In the late 1700s it was claimed that in order to achieve the status of “nations” groups of people needed to be a part of a state regardless of whatever identity they had developed prior to that association. Self-consciousness of nationality was one major defining criterion. That self-consciousness, however, was usually tied to, or was a consequence of, the institutional framework of a state. As Hegel claimed, while different kinds of nations may exist some are “still not totally self-consciousness of themselves” as nations, while others are. Contact with the state was needed to create such consciousness.

Political Constitutions had long been seen as the foundations of nations. By the end of the 1400s and in the *Discourses*, Machiavelli, for instance, had already spoken of beginnings and foundations as an indispensable variable when studying the polity, and wrote of the very important role of Constitutions for the general health of the larger polity.¹⁴ He had Rome in mind, of course, and claimed that especially in Republics these foundational documents were crucial to keep the system alive and well since Constitutions expressed “combinations” of different kinds of power (in his case a prince, a nobility, and the people). According to Machiavelli, if the right strategy and objectives were in place, this could be a sound formula to avoid conflict. The Constitution should guarantee that these three powers kept each other reciprocally in check. Therefore, there are records of an ancient and venerable tradition that sees Constitutions as central pieces of data in the analysis of the polity and identities. American political science, for instance, had for a long time been at the forefront of this approach and the study of comparative constitutions became almost a sub-field of their own.

In this volume, Fernán González and Agustín Ferraro consider Constitutions as indispensable variables that should be incorporated into the study of nationality. González claims that in particular the Constitution of 1991 contributes a more inclusive notion of the nation where indigenous communities became finally visible.

¹⁴ Machiavelli, Niccolo (2003), *The Discourses*. London, Penguin Classics.

For Ferraro, the Cortes the Cadiz and the ensuing 1823 Constitution are both fundamental landmarks that needs to be taken seriously when explaining the characteristics of the nation, both in Latin America and in Spain. Among all authors that comprise this volume, however, Yamandu Acosta is the one who takes the study of Constitutions as the major centerpiece of his analysis. He looks at them as texts that need to be philosophically approached and examined. Following a well-known philosophical tradition, he looks at Constitutions as manuscripts that must be analyzed through careful and detailed discourse analysis.

Acosta offers a thorough and in-deep scrutiny of the Bolivian and Ecuadorian Constitutions and claims that these documents define new conceptions of the “us” and the “them”. For a number of Latin American states today unity in diversity is the ultimate goal of identity building. These two Constitutions are taken as examples. As Acosta makes clear, recognizing subaltern identities long buried under the one nation-one state label is a major goal of the new constitutions he examines. The state recognizes the sovereignty of national identities only under certain conditions structured by the state itself, which echoes Lopez-Alves’ argument about how state bureaucracies set the framework for the discussion on nationality. Using a Hegelian approach to tackle the question of new identities and the relation of the whole to the parts, Acosta argues that a new sense of equality is emerging in these Latin American societies. He indicates that analysis of these constitutions contributes to an ongoing philosophical discussion centered upon the nature of the state, the definition of identities, and the concept of human rights. These documents not only changed the very definition of the nation but also of the state. Acosta reads them as “utopian narratives” that depict both nation and state not only as they actually are but also as they should be. He concludes that nationality in these two countries is becoming a more integrating notion, embracing those who for a long time remained outside the nation, as it was conceived. In other words, these Constitutions create, according to Acosta, new “communities” in which individuals are envisioned as centerpieces of an equalitarian equation that understands “nation” in a different way.

The picture drawn by Fernán González also points to the role of the state as a mediator in terms of the participation of indigenous peoples in the political life of Colombia and in the civil wars that long ravaged the country. This, and Acosta’s argument about the role of indigenous peoples in the Constitutions of Bolivia and Ecuador, takes us to the already traditional discussion about the subaltern meanings of nationality. As has been argued, there are indeed interesting and important differences among countries in the region. Despite widespread popular mobilization and claims for national participation during the 19th century, for example, peasants acquired a place in Mexican but not in Peruvian national politics.¹⁵

Acosta raises the question of equality as one of the revolutionary feature that distinguishes the definition of these two nations (Bolivian, Ecuadorian). Equality, in the sense in which is used in these Constitutions, means that these are not straightforward collectivistic Constitutions that toss the individual aside in the name of local identities. Rather, the individual is still a key central actor even if indigenous or other types of national communities are recognized as such in the new Constitutions. His discussion on equality, however, should not to be confused with Benedict Anderson’s definition of a “nation” as a community of horizontal solidarity. Solidarity does not enter into the equation discussed by Acosta; rather, equality in the context of multiculturalism does. Indeed, reminiscent of arguments about the nation that have been made on the basis of the European experience, and especially that of England, these Constitutions appear to define nations as networks of equals where cultural differences are nonetheless respected and integrated.¹⁶

¹⁵ See, for instance, Mallon, Florencia E. (1995), *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

¹⁶ For nations as egalitarian communities in which individual members shared the benefits of their nationality on equal basis, see Greenfeld’s argument about England, both in Greenfeld, Liah (1992), *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Harvard, University Press, and, especially, in her (2003), *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth*, Harvard, University Press.

In a way, the tensions that one can detect between individual and collective identities in these Constitutions echo the conceptual distinction that Carlos Escude proposes when defining individual and collective national identity: “At the individual level, it describes a person’s self-representation as a discrete, separate entity. At the collective level, it refers to the self-inclusion of individuals in a shared, subjectively relevant “we,” capable of mobilizing loyalties and social action. Escude’s treatment of individual and collective identities can be useful here. According to him, identities possess a “plural” character: subnational, national, and supranational. This plurality manifests itself through diverse political and social practices. National identity represents a collective level of identity that requires that individuals feel that they are part of a larger group, and “thus defined, the most important aspect of a collective identity is whom it includes and whom it excludes”. This, however, neither means that individuals cease to be a plurality in terms of the different layers that conform their identities, nor that they may lose their individual identities when acting as nationals.¹⁷ Thus, despite clear distinctions between individual and collective identities and the existence of plural subjective national identity is still possible

As indicated, Agustin Ferraro also discusses the importance of Constitutions when he focuses on the international assembly of people from the New and Old Worlds that convened at Cadiz in 1812 and passed the famed Spanish Constitution associated with the *Cortes de Cadiz*. Representatives at this meeting, among other things, voted for the establishment of a “Supreme authority” looking over the administration of the state. Ferraro suggests that Latin American delegates took back home the concept of “executive supremacy”, which strengthened Presidential power and modeled the notion of “nation”. Contrastingly, the opposite was true of the United States. Alberdi, who wrote the Argentine 1853 Constitution, eagerly advised his contemporaries not to follow the model expressed in the United States Constitution.

¹⁷ Major components of this identity, according to Escude, are “race,” “ethnicity,” “social class”, “religion”, “gender”, and “the state and its territory”.

Finally, these discussions on national identity and Constitutions reveal important differences separating Latin America from Europe. Latin American nations were structured from the beginning by the one-state/one-nation model (nation-states) while European nations were not.¹⁸ In theory, Latin American republics conceived of the relations between nations and states as one single and indivisible entity. In practice, many subaltern identities survived as parts of an overarching “nation” that nonetheless contained many pockets of resistance. A similar argument can be made, of course, about France, but the evolution of the model was different, and it went from national state to nation state, if it ever achieved the latter status. Indeed, some scholars have doubted that it did.¹⁹ In Latin America, the model of “one nation only” became dominant after independence and reigned during the whole of the twentieth century and still does at the present time. Contrastingly, by the early 1900s European states had settled on a variety of models that deviated from the one-nation/one-state equation. Perhaps, again, the exceptions were France and Germany, or at least they claimed that they were. France evolved, as some argued, into a nation-state and in Germany the nation pre-existed the state.²⁰ The point is that in Europe a variety of identities conformed the nation. These older states had long recognized that different identities could exist and act as such under the blanket of one nationality. After WWII, and through the Cold War era, Spain, Italy, Austria, Britain, Switzerland and other European countries entertained different national identities under the same state jurisdiction. If anything, this model has endured and gained momentum. Indeed, in the twentieth first century in Europe and elsewhere, the

¹⁸ For a in depth analysis of this proposition, see Fernando Lopez-Alves (2011), “Nation-States and Nationalist States: Latin America in Comparative Perspective”, in Hanagan, Michael and Tilly, Chris (eds.) *Contention and Trust in Cities and States*, Springer.

¹⁹ Among them, Charles Tilly; see his (1992), *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1990*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, p. 18. See also this discussion in Lopez-Alves, Fernando (2011) “Nation States and Nationalist States”, op. cit.

²⁰ This is, of course, all controversial, and argument have been made that strongly question this somewhat established wisdom.

strengthening of regional identities and the aspiration of nations to establish their own state is on the rise.

From this perspective, recent events in Latin America appear, as Acosta tells us, revolutionary. Many countries are openly changing original models of nation-state relations, and Bolivia and Ecuador are cases in point. One can argue that states that have historically started as nation-states are now turning into something similar to what Charles Tilly, studying the evolution of European states, long termed “national states”.²¹ That is, a plurality of nations living under the same state. According to Tilly and many others, this represents almost the opposite alternative to the nation-state model. Whether this formula will work better in Latin America and elsewhere (Britain, Spain, Italy) in terms of avoiding internal conflict is still to be seen. Literature, in fact, has alleged the opposite: states that agglomerate multiple nations seem more prone to suffer from internal war because these nations often clash over rights of representation.²² Moreover, the few nations that are still not tied to a formal state structure in today’s global system seem even more disposed to engage in conflict since they feel unprotected or are often under pressure to join states in which they expect to have little or no representation.

²¹ Tilly, Charles (1992) op. cit.

²² Muller, Jerry (2008) “Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Nationalism”, *Foreign Affairs*, March/April. pp. 18-35.