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## **Understanding Universal Vouchers at Urban Public School Districts in Santiago de Chile: Educational Administrators' Responses to Choice**

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# **Understanding Universal Vouchers at Urban Public School Districts in Santiago de Chile: Educational Administrators' Responses to Choice**

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## **Abstract**

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In this study we examine how school leaders in urban districts have responded to the Chilean universal school voucher system. We conducted interviews with public district school officials and principals in Santiago, Chile. We found that school leaders in the wealthy public schools have confronted the market policy by implementing similar cream-skimming measures as private-voucher schools. In comparison, the poorer public-municipal schools are not able to select their students. The respondents in our study elucidated that parent and student choice is limited because specific family and student characteristics (i.e. SES background, test scores), as well as the family/student residence within the city (in a relatively wealthy or poor section of the city) influence the spectrum of opportunities a student will have and the school he/she will enter. As a result, the voucher system introduces educational opportunities for students who have the capital (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) to enable a move from one public school to another within an area, from a public school to private-voucher school within an area, from one district to another, or from a public school within an area to a private school within another district.

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**Keywords:** vouchers, school choice, social justice, poverty, school leaders.

# **Entendiendo el Sistema de Vouchers en los Distritos Públicos Urbanos de Santiago de Chile: Respuestas de los Administradores Educativos al Mercado Educativo**

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## **Resumen**

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En este estudio examinamos cómo han respondido los líderes escolares de distritos urbanos al sistema de vouchers universales en Chile. Hemos hecho entrevistas con funcionarios y directores de escuelas públicas en Santiago, Chile. Vemos que los líderes escolares en las escuelas públicas ricas han afrontado la política de mercado con la aplicación de medidas de cream-skimming similares a las de las escuelas privadas. En comparación, las escuelas públicas municipales más pobres no pueden seleccionar a sus estudiantes. Los participantes apuntan a que la elección de padres y estudiantes es limitada porque las características específicas de la familia/estudiante (e.g. nivel socioeconómico, resultados de exámenes), así como la residencia de la familia/estudiante en la ciudad (en un área relativamente rica o pobre) influyen en las oportunidades de un estudiante y en la escuela a la que accederá. Como resultado, el sistema de vouchers genera oportunidades educativas para aquellos estudiantes que tienen el capital (material e inmaterial) que les posibilita un movimiento de una escuela pública a otra en su misma área, de una escuela pública a una escuela privada en su misma área, de un distrito a otro, o de una escuela pública en un distrito a una escuela privada en otro distrito.

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**Palabras clave:** vouchers, elección de escuela, justicia social, pobreza, líderes escolares.

The push to extend voucher programs rests on the primary assumption that the programs will spur competition between public and private schools, make them more responsive to families and students, increase student achievement, and improve effectiveness (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1962; Gallego, 2002, 2004; Peterson, 2009; Sapelli & Vial, 2002). In addition, some researchers (e.g. Ladner & Brouillette, 2000) have pointed out that vouchers will prompt inter-district competition and competition between districts and private schools, as well as create an education market that will improve student success.

Evidence from the Chilean voucher implementation proves instructive for voucher debates in the U.S. and elsewhere due to its immense scale and scope. The system has grown steadily, increasing its enrollment throughout the years to a point where about 93% of all students are now included in the voucher system, with the roughly 7% of remaining students attending private-paid independent schools that do not receive vouchers. Overall, the voucher system has generated an expansion of student enrollment within the private school sector since its creation in 1981 under dictatorial supervision. Since 1990, the voucher system has continued unabated under democratic governments. Particularly, private-voucher enrollment increased from 33% in 1990 to 48% in 2007 in both primary and secondary schools (Larrañaga, Peirano & Falck, 2009a). By 2014, private voucher enrollment has risen to 55% in Chile (Ministry of Education: Research and Statistics Department, 2015).

In parallel, there was an expansion in the number of private-voucher schools from 2,425 in 1990 to 3,343 in 2007 at both primary and secondary levels, especially within urban areas and in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (Larrañaga, Peirano & Falck, 2009a). By 2014, this number had increased to 6135 schools (Ministry of Education: Research and Statistics Department, 2015). As a result, vouchers resulted in steep enrollment declines for public schools since first being implemented, and from 1990 onward. In particular, the public schools experienced a decrease in their student enrollment from 59% in 1990 to 45% in 2007. In 2014, public schools represented 36% of student enrollment at the national level (Ministry of Education: Research and Statistics Department, 2015<sup>1</sup>).

In addition, despite the population growth in Chile of about 4 million, the overall number of public schools decreased from 6,000 in 1990 to 5,572 in 2007— mainly at the primary level and within urban areas (Larrañaga, Peirano & Falck, 2009a). In 2014, this number corresponded to 5331 public schools (Ministry of Education: Research and Statistics Department, 2015).

The voucher system, therefore, spurred intense market competition for students amongst Chilean schools, and thus, provides a useful “test case” for the potential impact of large-scale voucher systems in the U.S. and elsewhere. A number of researchers in the U.S. have, in fact, examined the effects of vouchers on schools over time in Chile and found that such systems have led to few improvements in achievement and increased stratification between schools (Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004; Gauri, 1998; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2004, 2006; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000).

However, there is a shortage of studies to date that examine how voucher systems, either in Chile or the U.S., affect schools and school districts and how school leaders and officials respond to them. Voucher programs are intended to have similar competitive effects on school districts as upon individual schools, spurring competitive market pressures at both levels (Ladner & Brouillette, 2000). As a result, studying the local/district level could provide policymakers in Chile and the U.S. with needed insight into the responses of district and school leaders to voucher programs— a level of analysis that is rarely attended to in debates about market-based school reform.

### **Main Purpose and Research Questions of this Study**

In general, studies of voucher effects in Chile have been analyzed either at the national (aggregate) or school (disaggregate) levels, and only a few consider how vouchers affect districts (see, for example, Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004). To date, most voucher studies have focused on a quantitative analyses of the effects of vouchers on student achievement (Bellei, 2009; Bravo, Contreras & Sanhueza, 1999; Gallego, 2002, 2004; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000; Mizala & Romaguera, 2000, 2003; Portales & Vasquez Heilig, 2014; Sapelli & Vial, 2002), between- and within-school stratification and segregation (Elacqua, 2006; Gauri, 1998; Parry, 1996;

Valenzuela, Bellei & De los Rios, 2006), or on a combination of both (Auguste & Valenzuela, 2004; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2004, 2006). However, fewer have used the local/municipal level as the unit of analysis (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2004, 2006; Larrañaga, Peirano & Falck, 2009b; Raczynski & Salinas, 2009; Salinas & Raczynski, 2009), and none have qualitatively examined district leaders' responses to vouchers.

A small number of researchers point out that vouchers have a significant impact on districts in Chile, and even less indicate that vouchers affect different types of districts in distinct ways. For example, when analyzing student enrollment gains and losses over time among public schools at different localities, existing studies (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2004, 2006) show that the flight of students from public to private schools, and between public schools, has not been homogenous across districts. Some local public school systems lost more students than others under vouchers, and some local public school systems gained enrollment because better-off students (of middle-income backgrounds or higher ability) enrolled in their schools.

What currently remains unknown are the specific competitive pressures that district leaders perceive they are facing under vouchers and the resulting organizational and strategic responses they have implemented. Few analyses exist in Chile and elsewhere on the impact of vouchers at the local/municipal level or on how district leaders have responded to market pressures. Thus, the main purpose of this paper is to qualitatively study how Chilean school leaders in urban districts have responded to market pressures under the Chilean school voucher system. Particularly, we analyze and compare the measures undertaken by public school district officials and public school principals at the local level in Santiago de Chile, the Chilean capital city, to retain or attract students to their public schools, as well as to explain why they have either succeeded or failed in achieving this goal in the midst of universal vouchers.

In sum, this study asks the following overarching research questions:

1. How have public district leaders operating schools in Chile and particularly in Santiago been affected by, and how have they responded to, the pressures of competition for students in the context of extended vouchers?

- 1.1 Were public school leaders in Santiago able to attract and maintain students over time responding to the competitive market pressures of vouchers? Or did they lose students?
- 1.2 What strategies are school leaders employing for attracting and retaining students?
- 1.3 How do district contexts help explain some of the enrollment gains/losses observed across districts and in different areas or sections of the city?

### **Market-Based Theory: District Vouchers and School Leader Responses**

Understanding the impact of vouchers on public school enrollment and how district and school leaders respond to market pressures is a critical issue in Chile because the flight of students from public to private schools has surpassed a national-level tipping point, wherein the number of students attending private-voucher schools is now greater than the number of students attending public schools within the country (Ministry of Education: Research and Statistics Department, 2015).

Additionally, while prior research examined the effects of vouchers on schools in Chile in terms of student achievement or stratification, none have qualitatively examined how local/district administrators have responded to the competition for students. It is clear that public districts play a central role in the functioning of schools in Chile, and “competition” under the voucher system is theorized to affect not only schools, but also districts and how they function. Thus, a district-level perspective on analyzing school leaders’ responses to vouchers— their strategies and arrangements—is important for three main reasons. First, local districts are important for Chilean public schools because they receive funding from the central government, and, in turn, make funding allocations. Individual schools have little power in deciding issues such as funding and other resource allocation, school closures or consolidations, and the contracting or relocation of teachers within a district. Even in their most decentralized version, when local districts delegate expenditures and contracting decisions to individual schools, they continue to be legally responsible. Thus, the ability of public schools to “compete” with private-voucher schools is significantly shaped by

the local government and by the district-level policies and organizational practices implemented.

Second, administrators in local districts have the power to decide many strategic issues that affect school-level enrollment. Administrators are in charge of making investment decisions such as physical plant improvements and transportation ameliorations, and have the responsibility for planning the development of local public schools, both in the mid and long terms. Previous literature suggests that these matters are relevant for attracting enrollment (Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe, 1995; Wylie, 1994, 1995, 1997).

Lastly, districts, through local education offices, help to build and market the reputations of public schools that influence their enrollment paths (Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe, 1995; Lubienski, Gulosino & Weitzel, 2009). When choosing a public school, people not only care about the school's reputation, but also about the reputation of the administrating district and the neighborhoods where they are located (Gewirtz, Ball & Bowe, 1995). We consider how local schools' historical reputations and marketing, public and private, impact educational options for the few at the expense of the many.

Thusly, we seek to understand how the universal Chilean voucher system elicits responses from public district officials and school leaders in Santiago, Chile, the capital and largest voucher market in the country. We interviewed school leaders from public districts to understand the market context within which they operate, seeking to understand whether within-sector heterogeneity is an important consideration in the midst of universal vouchers.

## Methods

Qualitative methods were employed to analyze how public school officials and public school principals have sought to attract and retain students to their schools at two municipal districts in Santiago de Chile. Santiago was chosen due to its status as the national capital city and due to the fact that it is the largest voucher market in Chile. Specifically, we conducted interviews in Spanish with public school officials and public school principals working at two municipal district education offices in Santiago (*Las Parcelas* and *San Antonio*<sup>2</sup>), each located in very different sections or areas of the city.



Overall, 14 interviews with public school district leaders and officials and public school principals were conducted— seven from each municipal district (see Appendix: Table 8 for more details). Interviewees were recommended by and made available to the research team by the Education Directors (ED) from each municipal district. All interviewees recommended by the EDs agreed to share their thoughts and experiences with us. Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and took place at the corresponding school or district central office. The interviews were audio recorded for transcription.

The interviews corresponded to semi-structured or part-structured conversations (Hartas, 2010). We developed a list of relevant themes and questions to ask to respondents, while at the same time allowing for new themes and topics to emerge during the meeting. Main topics included: Perception and judgment of public school enrollment gains or losses within the district under vouchers; Consideration of potential factors affecting public school enrollment in the area; Strategies used for attracting and retaining students to public schools, and reasons for using them; Analysis of strengths and weaknesses of strategies employed; Challenges at the district levels for increasing/maintaining enrollment; Supports needed from central government or the district itself to ensure adequate levels of enrollment (see Appendix: Table 7 for more details).

The audio-recorded interviews were transcribed by a graduate student and were then analyzed using the constant comparative method (Patton, 1990). Charmaz (2005) suggested that the flexibility of qualitative comparative analysis empowers researchers to move beyond surface observations, and to delve deeper into phenomena of interest with informants as they arise during the research process. Respondent passages were initially coded by the transcribing graduate student, and could receive multiple codes. We then coded phrases that had meaning in relation to the main topics and purposes of the study.

To triangulate the coding, the faculty members of the research team examined the coding for concurrence. Disagreement was rare due the overlap of the multiple coding strategies. Axial relationships were considered for the development of emerging themes from passages that received singular and multiple codes. The axial relationships were developed

to identify consistent emerging themes within the phrase coding. This process was described by Lincoln and Guba (1986) as the "saturation of categories" or the "emergence of regularities," and by Moustakas (1994) as "essence description" (see Appendix: Table 11 for more details). After the coding process was complete, thematic summaries were written to create the descriptions of participants' motives and circumstances. These summaries are presented in the Qualitative Findings section.

The matrix of major themes and issues resulted in the identification of five main themes: 1) District and District Corporation main characteristics; 2) Factors associated with public school enrollment change in the area; 3) Reasons for preferring public or private-voucher schools in the area; 4) Strategies for attracting and retaining students to local public schools; and 5) District position and status within the city. Each of these themes was described and analyzed with the purpose of contrasting and comparing the specific situations that emerged in each of the localities. All these topics and themes helped to build an understanding of district level response to vouchers and private school competition in Santiago de Chile.

For synthesis, informant counts by category were conducted to understand the representativeness of the dominant codes generated in the field interviews. To check the authenticity of the work and to provide the researchers with background and contextual information, qualitative data were compared with field notes, archival materials provided by schools and local media reports in Chile. Also, to moderate the validity threats of description and researcher bias, a graduate student and two faculty members conducted member checks by examining field interviews, reviewing the data, helping to develop the emerging themes and participating in group sessions throughout the research process from transcription to the completed manuscript.

### **Selection of Sample**

Taking into account the quantitative findings of Portales and Vasquez-Heilig (2014) and how Chilean municipal districts distributed in terms of public school enrollment gains or losses between 2000 and 2009 (see Appendix: Tables 1 and 2), two typologies of extreme to moderate cases of public

school enrollment change at the local/district level were built, one for the national level (see Appendix: Tables 3 and 5) and another for the Santiago Metro Area (see Appendix: Tables 4 and 6). Each of these typologies is compounded of four categories ('big loser', 'moderate loser', 'slight loser' and 'retainer') that are useful for analyzing and comparing local public districts across the country and/or within the Santiago Metro Region.<sup>3</sup>

We recognized that pure categories are rarely consistent year to year, and that a combination of contiguous quartiles is more representative and accurate. Considering the Santiago Metro Region classification, the first district chosen for analysis was Las Parcelas, which represents a combination of the 'retainer' and 'slight loser' categories. The second district selected is San Antonio, which represents a combination of the 'big loser' and 'moderate loser' categories. Districts were chosen from a pool of local/municipal options and were invited to participate in the study. Both districts immediately accepted our invitation to be a part of this research.

The primary criteria for selecting these districts was the degree of public school enrollment change each district had during the period analyzed, thereby choosing two communities within the city of Santiago that have very different levels of public school enrollment change between 2000 and 2009. Las Parcelas has been able to retain— and only slightly lose— enrollment over time (-10.1%, see Appendix: Graph 3 for more details), thereby falling into the "retainer" category of the typology. San Antonio has hugely decreased its enrollment during the period analyzed (-43.7%, see Appendix: Graph 4 for more details) thereby falling into the "big loser" category of the typology.

In addition to the primary criteria, we chose these two districts in Santiago based on their differing socioeconomic profiles, characteristics and location within the city. Las Parcelas is an urban district located in Northeastern Santiago, the most affluent section of the city. The area has a small percentage of low-income population (4.3%), makes district expenditures on education personnel wages and related fixed costs that do not surpass the total voucher received from the central government (representing 95.7% of the voucher), obtains student achievement results for local public schools above the 75th quartile of 237 points (obtaining 277 points) and has a moderate private voucher penetration of 33.3%. Finally,

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student achievement results for public schools in Las Parcelas (277 points on average) surpass private-voucher average results in the area (256 points). (For more details, see Appendix: Table 9)

In comparison, San Antonio is an urban district located in Northwestern Santiago, one of the lowest income sections of the city. The area has a medium to high percentage of low-income population (11.6%), makes district expenditures on education personnel wages and related fixed costs that surpass the total voucher received from the central government (118.2%), obtains student achievement results for local public schools below the 25th quartile of 220 points (obtaining 216 points) and has a moderate private voucher penetration of 20%. Finally, student achievement results for public schools in San Antonio (216 points on average) are below private-voucher average results in the area (261 points). (For more details, see Appendix: Table 10).

By choosing these cases we were able to compare how administrators in districts with different SES demographics, mean student achievement results for local public schools, education funds, resources available and locations within the city, but with similar overall population changes, elicit very different organizational responses and strategies for attracting and retaining students to their public schools, and obtain very different enrollment outcomes as a result.<sup>4</sup>

### **Findings**

#### ***Las Parcelas' Administrative Responses to Vouchers***

What has *Las Parcelas District* done in response to competition for students under vouchers? Considering the specific educational context the area confronts, the specific factors that influence its public school enrollment changes over time and the position it occupies within the city, *Las Parcelas* has responded in particular ways to the task of attracting and retaining students to local public schools.

**Main characteristics of *Las Parcelas'* public school district.** One of the main characteristics of *Las Parcelas* is that it has a decentralized system for

administrating schools. This implies that many decisions such as the elaboration of the annual budget, expenditures choices and the contracting of teachers are a school level, rather than a district level, responsibility. However, school expenditures accountability and teaching and learning support services remain at the district office. The respondents explained that the decentralization change started in 2000 and gave school principals and their staff the opportunity to manage more independently. In general, public schools in Chile usually depend on budget and expenditures, and on contracting decisions made at the district level. As a result, *Las Parcelas* represents a novel district within the educational system.

Managerial innovation at *Las Parcelas* implied various changes for the Municipal District Corporation<sup>5</sup> in the area that occurred between 2000 and 2004. First, principals and school staff in the district were trained on managerial and administrative issues and were empowered for making decisions. Second, the district office personnel was reduced and accommodated. Since new District Corporation functions were mainly related to expenditures, supervision and accountability, a small group of accountants were kept and other professionals were discarded. Teaching and learning support services were handed over to an external organization that took responsibility for helping schools with curricular and pedagogical issues. Consequently, the District Corporation Education Director held all responsibility for district curricular issues and was the liaison for outside contractors.

Overall, changes empowered public school principals and their staff to make the bulk of educational decisions. According to respondents, the positive side of the transformation was that it gave more discretionary power and managerial flexibility to school principals and their staff, thereby making the system more efficient and less bureaucratic. However, modifications also implied less coordination between schools and greater isolation of school staff when doing their work. A *Las Parcelas* principal responded, “Decentralization implied greater school isolation. Sometimes, the predominant model in the district is that each school has to resolve issues on its own.”

Decentralization did not imply a complete reduction of the district office power over schools, but its redefinition. *Las Parcelas District Corporation*

continues to have the power to contract— hire, fire or relocate— public school principals, has assumed stricter school expenditure supervision procedures, and has implemented new academic accountability devices by which schools are periodically measured on math and language student achievement. These district tests are seen as a key element in the new district education structure and function as key inputs for both schools and the district office.

Another mechanism that ensures district power over schools is the implementation of a system of rewards. *Las Parcelas District Corporation* devolved decision-making power to local public schools; however, it continues to oversee their actions and demand they create specific annual goals in both financial and academic areas. Each school defines these goals at the beginning of each academic year, and if they comply with them by the end of the year, the school staff receives a financial incentive from the District Corporation in addition to their regular wage.

Overall, and despite decentralization to the school level, all these mechanisms guarantee a relevant role for the district office. As one public school principal from the area indicated:

By implementing decentralization, our schools obtained more freedom. However, the District Corporation continuously oversees the pedagogical and expenditure administration we do, and when we need advice or support they give it to us. (Public school principal, *Las Parcelas*)

### **Factors Associated with *Las Parcelas*' Public School Enrollment Retention and Stability**

In *Las Parcelas*, the low percentage of low-income population (4.3%), the sufficiency of the voucher received from the central government for paying education personnel wages and the average student achievement results for local public schools that are above the 75<sup>th</sup> quartile of the city's public school achievement distribution attracts students. As demonstrated by Portales and Vasquez Heilig (2014), these local/district factors intermingle to minimize public school enrollment losses (-10.1%) despite the moderate private-voucher penetration in the area (33%). Considered alone, this

penetration level should be considered a risk factor associated with moderate to high public school enrollment losses in the area; however, the ideal profile of the community has mitigated public school enrollment losses.

According to public school officials and public school principals interviewed, *Las Parcelas* is attractive to students due to several factors. First, local public schools have a respected tradition and have built prestige based on the previous generations having studied there. Second, in the last decade they obtained excellent student achievement and academic results—above public and private-voucher schools in general and comparable to private-paid schools in the area. Third, most local public schools have an excellent infrastructure and have recently made large investments in classroom technology. Finally, the district is located in the northeastern section of Santiago, the wealthiest section of the city, and is near the city center.

Considering these general trends and characteristics, most public schools at *Las Parcelas* have more applicants than spaces available. As a result, most schools in *Las Parcelas* are able to select their students by applying admission tests, requesting students' academic records and interviewing their parents. Following these procedures, they choose their desired candidates from the pool of applicants.<sup>6</sup> This overall mechanism strengthens the local public schools reputation in that, by ensuring that only certain students with specific socioeconomic and/or ability backgrounds enter and/or remain studying in the district, the district reputation is ensured. Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe (1995) came across similar findings when analyzing the effects of school choice policies in England. In that case, district reputation is also linked with student intake and/or the ability to attract better able students.

The student application process is highly selective at the secondary level. Here, admission tests, reviews of students' academic records and parent interviews openly occur every year. Some secondary public schools in the area not only select students from a pool of applicants, but also demand students to academically perform above a certain level to remain in the school. If students do not perform above certain benchmarks, they are either not promoted from one level to the next, or they are removed from the school. Of note, these additional requirements are not implemented in all

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secondary schools within the district, as some of them do not require a level of performance as a condition to stay enrolled.

The above description illustrates the heterogeneity that exists between public schools at *Las Parcelas*. Some schools are more demanding and selective than others, and consequently, some schools tend to obtain better academic results than others. As some respondents point out, these differences occasionally produce rivalries between schools, particularly at the secondary level. *Las Parcelas District Corporation* demands that all schools meet similar benchmarks, but not all schools use the same selection and promotion criteria. A *Las Parcelas* public secondary principal stated,

There are secondary schools at *Las Parcelas* where students are expelled if they do not academically perform above a certain level. We do not discriminate that way, but others do. That is unfair competition within the district.

Despite the differential admission policies implemented by school leaders across the district, the stellar academic performance of public schools in the area, combined with their historical prestige, benefits all schools belonging to the district.

If you see the trajectory of average student achievement results for local public schools at *Las Parcelas* you will see an ascending annual trajectory of performance, and I think that ascending trajectory helps attracting students to the district. (Public school principal, *Las Parcelas*)

This tradition and stamp of approval for good results are sources of ‘capital’ for such schools that have accumulated over time. It is precisely that ‘accumulated capital,’ in the education market of the city, coupled with the higher level of wealth within the district, which favors public schools in the area. The selectivity of *Las Parcelas* schools based on test scores and other factors also helps to explain their high-levels of student retention and attraction capacity despite private-voucher penetration and competition. A *Las Parcelas* central district official stated,



We are a valuable educational option for many families living both within and outside the district. We provide good education as a district, and that gives us power of attraction.

Is important to note that the market structure may change in incoming years, since various law and education policy changes have occurred in the country since 2014. One of these changes refer to the fact that all public and private-voucher schools (including all secondary level schools) will no longer be allowed to choose student applicants based on socioeconomic backgrounds and/or academic records beginning in 2016. How these modifications will change Las Parcelas' retention and attraction capacity and its student's intake is an important open question for future research.

#### ***Las Parcelas' strategies for attracting and retaining students.***

According to respondents, the main strategies *Las Parcelas District Corporation* has implemented for attracting and retaining students to local public schools are related to the student achievement results they have obtained during the past decade, and the decentralization changes that were implemented which has given greater decision-making power to school level actors— such as selective admissions. A *Las Parcelas* principal stated, “Due to good academic results and good school management parents feel that *Las Parcelas* public schools have a plus as compared to other districts.”

Via selectivity and its neighborhood composition, *La Parcelas* is ensured an adequate level of student applications and retention each year without the need to focus on aggressive advertisement. However, school leaders in the district still undertake a variety of recruiting efforts. Respondents identified various marketing mechanisms. First, each year public school principals visit other public schools in the district for promotional purposes. For secondary school principals this promotion consists of visiting primary schools in the area and talking directly to parents. In comparison, primary school principals visit public day care centers in the area and deliver promotional flyers.

Another recruiting mechanism that is utilized by *Las Parcelas* is public school alliances. Many of the secondary public schools have created networks of collaboration with primary public schools in the area for sharing teaching and learning initiatives and supporting each other. Such alliances also have the stated purpose to attract student applications. Other recruiting

efforts utilized by *Las Parcelas* for the promotion of its schools are the door-to-door placement of flyers and the display of promotional canvas on local avenues and streets. The *Las Parcelas* District Corporation Education Director related that this marketing effort tries to reinforce the interest in the district by “advertising the good academic results obtained by our local public schools.”

### ***San Antonio’s* Administrative Responses to Vouchers**

How have school leaders in the *San Antonio District* responded to competition for students under vouchers? We first consider the specific economic and educational contexts the area confronts, the specific factors that influence its public school enrollment changes over time and the position it occupies within the city. We then discuss how school leaders in *San Antonio* have responded to the task of attracting and retaining students to local public schools.

**Main characteristics of *San Antonio’s* public school district.** One of the main characteristics of the *San Antonio* community is the presence of the district’s action for public schools through multiple means, including support systems for teaching and learning. These district level actions and interventions in local public schools are part of a deep organizational change that began occurring at the district office in 2007-2008. First, the transformation focused on the elaboration of a school curriculum that identified the main cognitive and attitudinal characteristics that the district wanted to develop in their public school students. This process resulted in the creation of two new departments: Academics and Pedagogy and Human Development.

The purpose of the Academics and Pedagogy department was to give educational planning and pedagogical support to public school teachers through regular supervision, classroom observations and by implementing meetings for the sharing of knowledge and experiences. These instances, which are coordinated by the District Corporation and implemented with the help of outside contractors, allow schools to plan, implement and jointly evaluate their teaching and learning initiatives.

The purpose of the Human Development department was to promote citizenship values among school level actors and to encourage and strengthen parents and students participation and organization. These purposes involve systematic and permanent work with parents and student organizations, promoting their involvement in school issues and decision-making.

According to respondents, these organizational changes strengthened the district's capacity to coordinate and support schools and to increase parents and students commitment with schooling. In addition, the new school curriculum provided school level actors a common language for sharing experiences, and a common core of abilities and values to focus on when educating students. As one *San Antonio* public school principal proffered,

The new district school curriculum has allowed local public education at *San Antonio* to have certain common characteristics, and to develop a common stamp and character on local public school students.

Despite the changes, several problems persist in *San Antonio* such as a chronic budgetary deficit, teacher absenteeism and bullying between students. These difficulties relate to district, school, family and/or neighborhood characteristics that promoted public school enrollment losses (-43.7%) over the past decade.

**Factors associated with *San Antonio*'s public school enrollment losses.** In *San Antonio*, the relatively high percentage of low-income population for the city (11.6%), the necessity of funds and resources for paying education personnel wages and related fixed costs that surpasses the total voucher received from the central government (representing 118.2% of the voucher), and the average student achievement results for local public schools that are below the 25<sup>th</sup> quartile of the city's public school achievement distribution, constitute relevant factors that are associated with public school enrollment losses in the area. As demonstrated by Portales and Vasquez Heilig (2014), these local/district factors intermingle together to raise public school enrollment losses to a high percentage (-43.7%) despite the fact that only a moderate private-voucher penetration (20%) occurred in the area between 2000 and 2009.

Various public school officials and public school principals interviewed at *San Antonio* say that the expansion of the private-voucher sector in the area has been “brutal” and that public schools were crippled as a result. What is also clear is that some advantaged students (i.e. those with high test scores, ability to pay beyond voucher) had access to other private and public districts in Santiago. Respondents suggested that parents and students think private-voucher and wealthier public districts tend to be better because they have newer infrastructure and better outward appearance, students seem to have better behavior, and because they can choose the students who enroll or remain at the school. In comparison, local public schools at *San Antonio* have few resources to model an image, have not been able to invest in their building appearance and have been unable to re-craft the negative perception of their image across the city.

Additionally, public schools in *San Antonio* have the obligation to receive *all students that apply*, and only can select them if applicants surpass the number of spaces available. A *San Antonio* public school principal proffered,

Private-voucher schools can always choose the students that get enrolled, and easily expel those students that cause them problems. We cannot do that. We cannot refuse the enrollment of a student or expel him/her. That occurs only under very specific conditions... As public schools, we have the obligation to receive all students.

According to respondents, there are additional factors that contribute to increasing the probability of public school enrollment losses at *San Antonio*. First, the perception of many families that public education in the area suffers from student behavioral problems has contributed to the flight of enrollment. As some respondents indicated, one of the greater problems of public schools at *San Antonio* relates to student discipline issues such as absenteeism and bullying.

Second, a perception of teachers’ lack of commitment to teaching and relatively high levels of teacher absenteeism has contributed to student flight. This absenteeism is facilitated by a teacher statute that protects public school teachers from being removed or dismissed from their positions without cause. Such regulations are not applicable to private-voucher schools.

The teacher statute protects public school teachers and pays them full wage under sickness or administrative leave. In comparison, private-voucher teachers do not have those same benefits; they get pay if they have sickness leave but only up to a certain limit. (Public school principal, *San Antonio*)

Adding to this unfortunate context for public education, structural financing problems are in play in *San Antonio*. A public school official indicated,

Since we receive the voucher from the central government according to the total public school enrollment and student attendance we have, year by year we end up receiving less and less contributions and resources. The problem is that each year we have to cover similar operational and fixed costs, and we increasingly have to attend a more vulnerable population of students. (District Corporation General Director, *San Antonio*)

Despite this situation, the *San Antonio* district adjusted its personnel and promoted the voluntary retirement of teachers; however, these measures were insufficient for solving the budgetary problem.

Considering these general trends and characteristics, most local public schools in *San Antonio* operated in a disadvantaged position in the market that was hard to overcome; different district, school, family and/or neighborhood characteristics have intermingled to configure a ‘big loser’ scenario. The final result was public school enrollment losses, private-voucher enrollment gains and student flight to wealthier public districts.

### ***San Antonio’s strategies for attracting and retaining students.***

Despite these weaknesses, *San Antonio’s* school leaders believe that they have some comparative advantages over private-voucher schools in the area. They have sought to develop, strengthen and promote competitive advantages such as the development of a local curriculum created through participatory means and the delivery of systematic support services to students in need within the district.

Additionally, beginning in 2007-2008, *San Antonio* implemented a set of strategies with the purpose of developing and strengthening the district's capacity to better communicate its benefits to the public. The schools leaders sought to attract and retain students for local public schools and to increase student attendance and performance. The district also sought to hire innovative public school principals at various school sites. The arrival of these new principals triggered more organizational changes at the school level such as the improvement of school climate and the relationships between students between teachers and students. By improving principal and assistant principals' leadership positions, empowering teachers and auxiliary personnel on disciplinary issues, and developing an agreed manual for "good relationships" at each school site, the hope is that student attraction and retention problem will be ameliorated.

Finally, district capacity was strengthened by developing and implementing multiple extracurricular activities for public school students in the area, including sports and cultural activities, and through the establishment of an agreement with a public university in Santiago that provides access to high-achieving secondary school students studying in the district to concurrently attend university preparatory courses. The agreement allows for students in good standing to later enroll in the partner university when graduating from high school. According to various respondents, private-voucher competitors in the area do not currently offer these opportunities. A *San Antonio* academic coordinator stated,

Our students have various opportunities private-vouchers students do not have. For example, we have an agreement with a public university in Santiago and currently 20 students are attending university preparatory courses in there.

All these measures were advertised through multiple promotional activities at different public sites across the locality. They reveal the existence of a common district strategy and a concerted effort by *San Antonio* to confront the loss of public school enrollment in order to actively compete with private-voucher and wealthy public schools in Santiago. According to local and national media, marketing and promotional efforts have apparently produced a positive effect on *San Antonio's* public school

enrollment— which increased for 2013-14 and approximately matched 2009-10 numbers (Muñoz, 2015).

### **Discussion: Winners and Losers in Santiago’s Stratified Educational Market**

Responses from district and schools leaders from *Las Parcelas and San Antonio* suggest that the success of public schools in an educational market like Santiago is the result of the prestige of the district, economic conditions of the community, management decisions and student outcomes. Each of these factors represents capital in a voucherized education market. These local/district characteristics create different educational positions and status for each of the public districts in this study. On the one hand, the historical prestige, school management style and good academic results of *Las Parcelas* public schools contribute to create an advantaged, recognized and valuable status for the area. On the other hand, the relatively low student achievement results and various economic and organizational problems of *San Antonio* public schools contribute to create a perpetually disadvantaged competitive status for the area.

### **Conclusions**

Based on the interviews performed in this study, local public school enrollment losses and private school enrollment gains occurred due to a combination of circumstances. Important factors influencing public school enrollment losses and private school gains include the different public images and perceptions each sector has within the country and within the city of Santiago. According to respondents, private schools and wealthy public schools are now perceived as higher in quality and as more desirable than the poorer public schools and districts. This occurs because private schools are able to select which students they enroll, charge additional fees to parents, have newer infrastructure and because they are able to select students based on achievement and behavior. Oversubscribed wealthy public schools are able to mimic many of the student selection practices and investments available to private schools. Further, respondents suggested that

wealthy public schools and districts are able to compete for students with private schools in general when school leaders are able to use similar competitive procedures or mechanisms. Las Parcelas represents this behavioral response. In comparison, the poorer public districts, such as San Antonio, are not able to select their students based on achievement or other characteristics, do not charge additional fees to parents, are less able to invest in outward building appearances and cannot reject students with behavioral problems.

In sum, the respondents in this study conveyed that unequal competition between and within public and private schools helps explain public school enrollment losses and private school enrollment gains. School choice supporters posit that the introduction of vouchers will improve the educational opportunities of disadvantaged students (Sugarman, 1999), as well as contribute to their social integration with middle and upper class students. However, under a universal voucher system like the one developed in Chile, a social justice argument appears to fail. In fact, in practice, a universal market system appears to enhance stratification relative to economic conditions in a community, student test scores and behavior. In essence, test scores and good behavior become non-pecuniary capital in the market.

The public Chilean districts studied in this research underscore what previous studies have already underscored quantitatively— that urban stratification and segregation in Chile continues to operate and is escalated by the universal voucher system (Bellei, 2009; Carnoy, 1998; Gauri, 1998; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000; Parry, 1996; Portales & Vasquez Heilig, 2014; Valenzuela, Bellei & De los Rios, 2006). As demonstrated in this study, the Chilean voucher system generates cream-skimming responses within the public school system benefiting select families and students. In particular, parental choice coupled with specific policy arrangements— student selection procedures and/or the charging of additional fees to parents— tend to benefit better-off students or families (only those that demonstrate greater abilities or are able to pay), while disadvantaging students of lower-abilities or lower SES students with low-test scores.

How does this occur within Santiago and its Metro Region? In general, it can be said that the voucher system in the city introduces new educational



opportunities for students who have the capital (pecuniary and non-pecuniary) to enable a move from one public school to another within an area, from a public school to private-voucher school within an area, from one district to another, or from a public school within an area to a private-voucher school within another district. The respondents in our study further elucidated that parent and student choice is limited because specific family and students characteristics (i.e. SES background, test scores), as well as the family/student residence within the city (in a relatively wealthy or in a relatively poor section of the city) influence the spectrum of opportunities a student will have and the school he/she will finally enter.

Concerning the public school districts considered in this study, the students that enroll at Las Parcelas, if selected, enter a district that offers them not only the credit of previous good mean student achievement results, but also a solid educational system based on rigorous admissions processes and a management style where each public school takes direct responsibility for educating students. In comparison, students attending San Antonio enter a district that not only has a history of exiguous academic results, but also where no rigorous admissions policies exist and where structural and organizational difficulties are magnified in the midst of reforms.

These characteristics coupled with the fact that each district is located in a specific section of the city (Northeastern vs. Northwestern Santiago) determine quite different educational opportunities for public school students enrolled in each area. In addition, these attributes determine quite different student access. Where Las Parcelas District mainly provides access to more academically qualified students (students with high test scores who are typically from the middle and upper classes), San Antonio provides access to all students, regardless of their ability levels.

Notably, Chile has recognized the inequity for low-SES students as a problem in their market-based approach system and, in 2008, passed the Preferential Subvention Law (PSL), changing the apportionment of the voucher. Prior to the PSL, the voucher amount was the same for all students. The new law created a larger voucher for high-poverty students. The data in this study are focused on the period prior to the passage of the PSL; therefore, future research is necessary to understand if the newly allotted voucher amounts are enough for the schools (suppliers) to take an interest in

the low-SES students (disadvantaged consumers in the market). Thus, a question for future research is whether the newly allotted voucher apportionment is enough to balance the market in favor of low-SES students, particularly for those living in mid- high and high poverty areas and with low standardized test scores, determining whether the PSL has changed the existing pattern of attraction and retention. Finally, the effects of the most recent changes to the law (passed in the 2014 legislation period) and their impacts on parental school choice, student enrollment trends and the capacity of public school districts to retain and attract students to their campuses will need to be considered in future research.

Should a nation focus on competition or equity? Does it matter that a universal voucher system privileges some students over others based on the capital that they bring to the school? Considering the responses of district and school leaders in Chile, policymakers should weigh whether educational reform that has winners and losers tied to financial advantage in a market is the best approach for addressing inequities in education. Notably, Finland has had larger gains over the past two decades and ranks higher in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) than both Chile and the United States. The Finnish attribute this rise to a focus on equity and have pointed out that their international standing on a variety of metrics has, over the past two decades, improved more than neighboring and comparable Sweden, using an education reform approach grounded in market-based choice (Sahlberg, 2011). Thus, an important question for the field and for U.S. educational policymakers is whether the Chilean market-based approach or a Finnish equity-based approach is more appropriate to foment equity and excellence in schools. Additionally, U.S. policymakers should consider that unregulated vouchers have been deemed problematic in the Chilean context by the public and policymakers alike. Current educational reform approaches are requiring stronger regulations over public and private-voucher schools to limit further stratification and limits on equity and access that had been further entrenched after decades of privatization.

## Notes

1. In 2014, about 7% of Chilean students attended private-paid independent schools that do not receive vouchers.
2. These names correspond to pseudonyms of real municipal districts analyzed. Denominations have been changed for confidentiality purposes.
3. Portales and Vasquez Heilig (2014) focused on the factors associated with public school enrollment changes between 2000 and 2009 in Chile. Findings from this paper show, for example, that the reduction of birth rate and the decline in children's population are not associated with changes in student enrollment for the 2000-2009 period.
4. We considered the fact that Las Parcelas and San Antonio both experienced general population decreases as a control (See Tables 9 and 10). If Las Parcelas had a population increase and San Antonio a decrease, then the likely critique would be that that our data could be attributed to changing demographics. By choosing two areas with overall population decreases, the oversubscribed schools in Las Parcelas and student population loss in San Antonio likely cannot be attributed solely to population fluctuations.
5. Chile has two types of municipal or district education offices: Municipal Education Departments and Municipal or District Corporations. The first ones directly depend on the mayor of the municipality, the latter is administered in a more independent and flexible manner.
6. Some respondents indicated that selection even unofficially occurs at the primary level where it has been legally prohibited since 2009.

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
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
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Appendix A




Graph 1. Student enrollment per school type- National level 2000- 2009




Graph 2. Student enrollment per school type- Santiago Metropolitan Area 2000- 2009





Graph 3. Student enrollment per school type (%) - Las Parcelas District 2000- 2009



Graph 4. Student enrollment per school type (%) - San Antonio District 2000- 2009

Table 1  
*School Enrollment Losses- National Level: Municipal Public versus Private-Voucher*

LOSSES: Percent Change	Municipal Public Sector	Private-Voucher Sector
More than -40% (N)	29	8
Between -20% and -40% (N)	175	17
Between -0.1% and -20% (N)	123	40
Subtotal	327	65
Total	345	256

Table 2  
*School Enrollment Gains- National Level: Municipal Public versus Private-Voucher*

<b>GAINS: Percent Change</b>	<b>Municipal Public Sector</b>	<b>Private-Voucher Sector</b>
More than +40% (N)	2	91
Between +20% and +40% (N)	2	50
Between +0.1% and +20% (N)	14	50
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>191</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>256</b>

Table 3  
*Quartile Distributions of Dependent and Significant Independent Variables of Interest- National level*

Quartiles National level	Public School Enrollment Change 2000- 2009 (DV)	Poverty Index CASEN Survey 2009 (IV)	Total District Expenditures on Education Personnel Expenses over Total Voucher received 2009 (IV)	SIMCE Language Math Public 2006- 2008 (IV)	Percent Change of Private-voucher Schools 2000- 2009 (IV)
25 <sup>th</sup>	-30.55	9.5	100.27	225.26	.01
50 <sup>th</sup>	-22.75	15.1	114.10	234.10	20.71
75 <sup>th</sup>	-13.51	21.3	131.41	243.15	66.66
N	345	335	335	339	256

Table 4  
*Quartile Distributions of Dependent and Significant Independent Variables of Interest- Santiago Metropolitan Area*

Quartiles Santiago Metropolitan Area	Public School Enrollment Change 2000- 2009 (DV)	Poverty Index CASEN Survey 2009 (IV)	Total District Expenditures on Education Personnel Expenses over Total Voucher received 2009 (IV)	SIMCE Language Math Public 2006- 2008 (IV)	Percent Change of Private-voucher Schools 2000- 2009 (IV)
25 <sup>th</sup>	-35.97	7.4	118.23	220.33	6.25
50 <sup>th</sup>	-25.29	9.4	133.09	226.46	33.33
75 <sup>th</sup>	-16.72	13.3	155.40	237.41	88.47
N	52	52	51	52	48

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Table 5  
*Typology of four “pure” “extreme to moderate” district cases - National level*

Typology Categories National level	Public School Enrollment Change 2000-2009 (DV)	Poverty Index CASEN Survey 2009 (IV)	Total District Expenditures on Education Personnel Expenses over Total Voucher received 2009 (IV)	SIMCE Language Math Public 2006- 2008 (IV)	Percent Change of Private-voucher Schools 2000- 2009 (IV)
Low-bound – “Big looser”	Below -30.55	Above 21.3%	Above 131.41%	Below 225.26 points	Above 66.66%
Moderate low – “Moderate looser”	Between - 22.75 and - 30.55	Between 15.1% and 21.3%	Between 114.10% and 131.41%	Between 225.26 and 234.10 points	Between 20.71% and 66.66%
Moderate high – “Slight looser”	Between - 13.51 and - 22.75	Between 9.5% and 15.1%	Between 100.27% and 114.10%	Between 234.10 and 243.15 points	Between .01% and 20.71%
High bound – “Retainer”	Above -13.51	Below 9.5%	Below 100.27%	Above 243.15 points	Below .01%

Table 6  
*Typology of four “pure” “extreme to moderate” district cases - Santiago Metropolitan Area*

Typology Categories Santiago Metropolitan Region	Public School Enrollment Change 2000-2009 (DV)	Poverty Index CASEN Survey 2009 (IV)	Total District Expenditures on Education Personnel Expenses over Total Voucher received 2009 (IV)	SIMCE Language Math Public 2006- 2008 (IV)	Percent Change of Private-voucher Schools 2000- 2009 (IV)
Low-bound – “Big looser”	Below -35.97	Above 13.3%	Above 155.40%	Below 220.33 points	Above 88.47%
Moderate low – “Moderate looser”	Between - 25.29 and - 35.97	Between 9.4% and 13.3%	Between 133.09% and 155.40%	Between 220.33 and 226.46 points	Between 33.33% and 88.47%
Moderate high – “Slight looser”	Between - 16.72 and - 25.29	Between 7.4% and 9.4%	Between 118.23% and 133.09%	Between 226.46 and 237.41 points	Between 6.25 and 33.33%
High bound – “Retainer”	Above -16.72	Below 7.4%	Below 118.23%	Above 237.41 points	Below 6.25%

Table 7

*Main topics & questions for the qualitative section of the study*

<b>Main Topics for Interviews</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Perception and judgment of the public school enrollment issue within the district.</li> <li>- Consideration of potential factors affecting public school enrollment in the area.</li> <li>- Strategies used for attracting/retaining students to public schools, and reasons for using them.</li> <li>- Analysis of strengths and weaknesses of strategies employed.</li> <li>- Challenges at the district and school levels for increasing/maintaining enrollment.</li> <li>- Supports needed from central government/the Ministry of Education/the mayor of the district to ensure adequate levels of enrollment</li> </ul>
<b>Questions for interviews with public school officials</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What is your perception about the student enrollment of public schools within the district? Has it increase, decrease or maintained during the last decade? Why has this occurred?</li> <li>- What factors/issues you think explain this decrease, increase or maintenance over time? What are the most important factors that explain this situation? Why?</li> <li>- Have the district education office in the district designed and implemented any strategies for attracting/retaining students in the last years? Which have been these strategies?</li> <li>- What have been the purposes of designing and implementing these strategies? Which have been the pursued outcomes?</li> <li>- Have strategies implemented been successful? Have pursued outcomes been reached? Why or why not? What can be done better for aiming desired results?</li> <li>- What are the main challenges of the district education office you work in? Is student enrollment a challenge? Why? How would you deal with these challenges?</li> <li>- Would the district education office need some external supports for pursuing its goals, particularly its enrollment ones? What kinds of supports? From whom?</li> <li>- What could the central government do to help districts operate local public schools, and to attract/retain students? What could the Ministry of Education and the mayor of the district do to help districts operate local public schools and to attract/retain students?</li> </ul>

Table 7 (cont.’d)

*Main topics & questions for the qualitative section of the study*

<b>Questions for interviews with public school principals</b>	-	What are your perceptions about the student enrollment of public schools within this district? Has it increase, decrease or maintained during the last decade? Why has this occurred?
	-	What has happened with student enrollment at your public school during the last decade? Why has this occurred?
	-	What factors/issues you think explain these decreases, increases or maintenance over time? What are the most important factors that explain this situation at your school, and at the district level? Are there any differences on enrollment trends between schools in the district? Why this is the case?
	-	Have your school designed and/or implemented any strategies for attracting/retaining students in the last years? Have these strategies been designed by the district education office in your district, by your school or by both together? Which have been these strategies?
	-	What have been the purposes of implementing these strategies? Which have been the pursued outcomes?
	-	Have strategies implemented been successful? Have pursued outcomes been reached? Why or why not? What can be done better for aiming desired results?
	-	What are the main challenges of the school you manage? Is student enrollment a challenge? Why? How are you dealing or would you deal with these challenges?
	-	Would your school need some external supports for pursuing its goals, particularly the enrollment ones? What kinds of supports? From whom?
	-	What could the mayor of the district or the district education office do to help your school attract/retain students? What can the Ministry of Education/central government do to help you pursuing that goal?

Table 8.

*Type & number of interviewees per district*

District	Type of Interviewee			Total
	Public district and school officials	Public school principals		
		Primary level	Secondary level	
Las Parcelas	2	3	2	7
San Antonio	3	2	2	7
Total	5	5	4	14

Table 9  
Las Parcelas District profile

<b>Geographic and Demographic Information</b>					
			2009		2001
	Total District Population		149205		175393
	Total District Population % Change 2000/2009		-14.93		
	District Surface kms2 (2011)		16.9		
	Population Density per km2 (2011)		8720.71		
	Percent of Urban Population (2009)		100		
	Percent of Rural Population (2009)		0		
	Poverty Index % (CASEN Survey 2009)		4.3		
	Poor Percent (CASEN Survey 2009)		3.93		
	Indigent Percent (CASEN Survey 2009)		.89		
	Student Vulnerability Index % (IVE SINAE 2009)		63.6		
<b>Educational Information</b>					
<b>School Enrollment</b>	Total Percent	2000 (N)	2009 (N)	% Change 2000/2009	
	2009				
Public	33.47	12042	10826		-10.10
Private-voucher	37.93	11473	12270		+ 6.95
Private-paid	28.60	12969	9252		-28.66
Total Student Population	100.00	36484	32384		-11.34
<b>Average Student Achievement Results 4<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Grades (SIMCE 2006- 2008)</b>	<b>Number of Schools</b>		2000	2009	% Change 2000/2009
Public	277.38	Public	15	17	+ 13.33
Private-voucher	256.67	Private-voucher	15	20	+ 33.33
Private-paid	287.93	Private-paid	33	24	- 27.27
<b>Student Achievement Results (SIMCE)</b>	<b>Grade Level</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>Average 2006/2008</b>
Public	4 <sup>th</sup> Grade	259.45	244.00	264.45	255.97
	10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	297.64	-	299.93	298.79
Private-voucher	4 <sup>th</sup> Grade	252.81	262.67	265.82	260.43
	10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	247.69	-	258.14	252.92
Private-paid	4 <sup>th</sup> Grade	281.52	287.63	289.70	286.29
	10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	293.97	-	285.20	289.58

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Table 9 (cont.'d)  
*Las Parcelas District profile*

<b>Total District Revenue and Expenditures (2009)</b>	
Total District Revenue	19405148
Total District Revenue Per Capita	130.1
Total District Expenditures	20444388
<b>District Education Revenue and Expenditures (2009)</b>	
Total District Education Revenue	10099216
Revenue Contributions from MINEDUC (Voucher)	7794407
Revenue Contributions MINEDUC % from Total District Education Revenue	77.18
Revenue Contributions from District	560941
District Contributions % to Education from Total District Revenue	2.89
Revenue Contributions District % from Total District Education Revenue	5.55
Total District Expenditures on Public Education	10311065
Total District Expenditures on Public Education Per Student	952.44
Total District Expenditures on District Education Personnel	7460863
Total Expenditures on District Education Personnel Wages and related fixed costs over Total Voucher received	95.72
Total District Expenditures on Teachers	4918200
Teachers Expenditures Percent from Total District Education Personnel Expenditures	65.92
Teacher Expenditures Percent from Total District Education Expenditures	47.70
Operations Expenditures on Public Education	1478015
Operations Expenditures Percent from Total District Education Expenditures	15.55
Investments on Public Education	-
Investments Percent from Total District Education Expenditures	-

Table 10  
*San Antonio District profile*

<b>Geographic and Demographic Information</b>		
Total District Population	2009	2001
Total District Population	94744	117395
Total District Population % Change 2000/2009	- 19.29	
District Surface kms2 (2011)	6.7	
Population Density per km2 (2011)	13.934.93	
Percent of Urban Population (2009)	100	
Percent of Rural Population (2009)	0	
Poverty Index % (CASEN Survey 2009)	11.6	
Poor Percent (CASEN Survey 2009)	7.77	
Indigent Percent (CASEN Survey 2009)	3.80	
Student Vulnerability Index % (IVE SINAE 2009)	73	



Table 10 (cont.'d)  
San Antonio District profile

<b>Educational Information</b>					
<b>School Enrollment</b>	Total Percent 2009	2000 (N)	2009 (N)	% Change 2000/2009	
Public	52.03	9684	5454	- 43.68	
Private-voucher	47.00	4627	4927	+ 6.48	
Private-paid	.07	119	101	- 15.13	
Total Student Population	100.00	14430	10482	-27.36	
<b>Average Student Achievement Results 4<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Grades (2006- 2008)</b>	<b>Number of Schools</b>		2000	2009	% Change 2000/2009
Public	216.04	Public	12	11	-8.33
Private-voucher	261.11	Private- voucher	10	12	+ 20.00
Private-paid	247.50	Private-paid	1	1	0
<b>Student Achievement Results (SIMCE)</b>	<b>Grade Level</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>Average 2006/2008</b>
Public	4 <sup>th</sup> Grade	227.13	221.00	227.13	225.08
	10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	206.50	-	207.50	207.00
Private-voucher	4 <sup>th</sup> Grade	250.40	257.25	267.38	258.34
	10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	265.00	-	262.75	263.88
Private-paid	4 <sup>th</sup> Grade	215.50	255.00	272.00	247.50
	10 <sup>th</sup> Grade	-	-	-	-
<b>District Revenue and Expenditures (2009)</b>					
Total District Revenue					9027927
Total District Revenue Per Capita					95.3
Total District Expenditures					9224471
<b>District Education Revenue and Expenditures (2009)</b>					
Total District Education Revenue					6197279
Revenue Contributions from MINEDUC (Voucher)					4378347
Revenue Contributions MINEDUC % from Total District Education Revenue					70.65
Revenue Contributions from District					267727
District Contributions % to Education from Total District Revenue					2.97
Revenue Contributions District % from Total District Education Revenue					4.32
Total District Expenditures on Public Education					6215451
Total District Expenditures on Public Education Per Student					1139.61
Total District Expenditures on District Education Personnel					5176554
Total Expenditures on District Education Personnel % over Total Voucher received					118.23
Total District Expenditures on Teachers					3482785
Teachers Expenditures Percent from Total District Education Personnel Expenditures					67.28
Teacher Expenditures Percent from Total District Education Expenditures					56.03
Operations Expenditures on Public Education					760423
Operations Expenditures Percent from Total District Education Expenditures					12.30
Investments on Public Education					55
Investments Percent from Total District Education Expenditures					.09

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Table 11  
*Matrix of mayor themes and issues emerged from interviews*

Main Themes	Main Issues on each theme
<i>District and District Corporation main characteristics</i>	<p data-bbox="273 288 353 331"><i>Las Parcelas</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="404 288 1014 331">- Has only slightly lose public school enrollment (-10.10%) between 2000 and 2009.</li> <li data-bbox="404 336 1014 408">- Located in Northeastern Santiago –the most affluent section of the city.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="557 384 846 408">- Has low poverty level (4.3%).</li> </ul> </li> <li data-bbox="404 413 1014 485">- Good student achievement results for public schools (277 points on average) that surpass private-voucher average results in the area (256 points).</li> <li data-bbox="404 489 1001 513">- Has experienced an expansion of 33% of private-voucher schools.</li> <li data-bbox="404 518 1014 580">- Has a decentralized system for administrating schools since 2000. Many decisions are a school level responsibility rather than a district level one.</li> <li data-bbox="404 585 1014 628">- Decentralization did not imply a complete reduction of the district office power over schools, but its redefinition.</li> <li data-bbox="404 633 1014 705">- Local public schools tend to select their students by applying admission tests, requesting students' academic records, and interviewing their parents.</li> <li data-bbox="404 710 1014 804">- Currently (2011), the district is under a big crisis –of schools shutdown and students on strike- following a national student movement that spread throughout the country claiming for a better public education.</li> </ul>

Table 11 (cont.'d)

*Matrix of mayor themes and issues emerged from interviews*

<i>San Antonio</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Has lost a large percentage of public school enrollment (-43.68%) between 2000 and 2009.</li> <li>- Located in Northwestern Santiago –one of the lowest income sections of the city.</li> <li>- Has a relatively high-poverty level for the capital city (11.6%).</li> <li>- Relatively poor student achievement results for public schools (216 points on average) that are below private-voucher average results in the area (261 points).</li> <li>- Has experienced an expansion of 20% of private-voucher schools during the period analyzed.</li> <li>- Strong presence of its district corporation on public schools through multiple means such as support systems for teaching and learning and for the development of parents’ and students’ organizations.</li> <li>- District level actions and interventions on local public schools are part of a deep organizational change that began occurring at the district office in 2007-2008.</li> <li>- The transformation mainly consisted on the elaboration of a district school curriculum and on the creation of two new coordinating areas at the district level: an academic/pedagogical and a human development one.</li> <li>- Overall, changes implemented may potentially contribute to student retention and attraction to the district. However, several problems persist in the area such as a chronic budgetary deficit in education, teacher absenteeism, and bullying between students.</li> </ul>
<p><i>Factors associated with public school enrollment change in the area</i></p>	<p>Retention and stability at <i>Las Parcelas</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Has low poverty level (4.3%).</li> <li>- Good student achievement results for public schools (277 points on average) that surpass private-voucher average results in the area (256 points).</li> <li>- The large tradition and historical prestige of local public schools that help to build a district reputation.</li> <li>- Reputation is built on current good academic and student achievement results.</li> <li>- Reputation also emerges from the fact that many parents of current students have previously studied in the district and have an emotional liaison with public schools in the area.</li> <li>- Reputation is also linked to ‘a way of doing things, and educating students’ where each school actor takes responsibility for the teaching and learning of students.</li> <li>- The good infrastructure and the technological investments made by local public schools.</li> <li>- The high expectations of school staff and their commitment with students</li> <li>- The school environment and good teacher-student relationships.</li> </ul>

Table 11 (cont.'d)

*Matrix of mayor themes and issues emerged from interviews*

<i>Public school enrollment losses at San Antonio</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Has a relatively high-poverty level for the capital city (11.6%).</li> <li>- Relatively poor student achievement results for public schools (216 points on average) that are below private-voucher average results in the area (261 points).</li> <li>- Local public schools have not care enough about the image they project to the outside, have not invested enough on their building appearance, and have not been concerned enough with their students' image.</li> <li>- The perception of many families that public education in the area suffers from student behavioral problems.</li> <li>- Teachers' lack of commitment with their work and relatively high levels of teacher absenteeism.</li> <li>- Public schools and private-voucher ones are not governed by the same rules, which end benefiting the private sector.             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Structural financing problems of the district.</li> <li>- The emigration of young families to other districts.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- The arrival of the subway to the area has open opportunities for families and students to easily attend public or private-voucher schools in other districts.</li> </ul>	
Reasons for preferring public or private-voucher schools in the area	Reasons for preferring public schools at <i>Las Parcelas</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local public schools have a large tradition and a recognized prestige built over time.</li> <li>- In the last decade, they have obtained excellent student achievement and academic results, above public and private-voucher schools in general and comparable to private-paid schools in the area.</li> <li>- Public school principals and school staff take direct responsibility for educating each student, developing high expectations for teaching and learning and establishing good relationships with students.</li> <li>- The excellent infrastructure of most local public schools and the recent investments made on new technologies placed them on an advantaged position.</li> <li>- The district is located in the northeastern section of Santiago and near the city centre.</li> </ul>
	Reasons for preferring private voucher schools at <i>San Antonio</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Private-voucher schools in the area are more concerned with the public image they project and take more care about their infrastructure appearance, and their students look and behavior.</li> <li>- Private-voucher schools select the students that enroll, thereby ensuring that students with higher behavioral and/or academic problems do not enter their classrooms.</li> <li>- Parents perceive that private-voucher schools are more secure and provide a better educational service to their children.</li> <li>- Private-voucher schools have more managerial flexibility than local public schools.</li> <li>- Private-voucher schools in the area –or elsewhere- operate with less financial problems and restrictions than public schools.</li> </ul>

Table 11 (cont.'d)

Matrix of mayor themes and issues emerged from interviews

Strategies for retaining/attracting students to local public schools	Strategies used at <i>Las Parcelas</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The good student achievement and academic results they have obtained during the whole decade (2000-2009)</li> <li>- The decentralization change they have implemented which has given greater decision-making power to school level actors.                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- They tend to choose the best candidates from the pool of students/applicants.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Public school principals visit other public schools in the district for promotional purposes.</li> <li>- The creation of public school alliances. Some secondary public schools have created networks of collaboration with primary public schools in the area for sharing teaching and learning initiatives and supporting each other.</li> <li>- Promotion of local public schools throughout the district by delivering flyers and placing promotional canvas on local avenues and streets.</li> </ul>
	Strategies used at <i>San Antonio</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The creation of two new coordinating areas within the district: an academic/pedagogical and a human development one.</li> <li>- The elaboration of a new district school curriculum that specifies a common core of abilities and values to focus on when educating students</li> <li>- The contracting of new public school principals at various school sites. Their arrival has triggered relevant organizational changes at the school level.</li> <li>- Developing and implementing multiple extracurricular activities for public school students in the area, including sports and cultural activities,</li> <li>- The establishment of an agreement with a public university in Santiago that gives access to good secondary school students studying in the district for attending university preparatory courses and eventually enrolling in such university when graduating from high school.</li> <li>- Multiple promotional activities at different public sites across the locality.</li> </ul>
District position and status within the city	<i>Las Parcelas</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Advantaged, recognized and valuable status.</li> <li>- <i>Las Parcelas Public Schools</i> inhabit a ‘winner’ position under the choice system.</li> <li>- If the current crisis –of schools shutdown and students on strike- continues to occur in incoming years its privileged position could be downgraded.</li> </ul>
	<i>San Antonio</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Disadvantaged and deprived status.</li> <li>- <i>San Antonio Public Schools</i> occupy a ‘looser’ position within Santiago’s big education market.</li> <li>- Despite this disadvantaged position, the <i>San Antonio District Corporation</i> has been developing a set of strategies that can counteract its weaknesses and the loss of public school students experimented.</li> </ul>