'ARABY' AND MEANING PRODUCTION IN THE SOURCE AND TRANSLATED TEXTS: A SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONAL VIEW OF TRANSLATION QUALITY ASSESSMENT[1]

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1. Introduction

All use of language encodes representations of the world. On the basis of this assumption, this article focuses on the view of language as a modeling system, which 'enables human beings to build a mental picture of reality, to make sense of what goes on around them and inside them' (Halliday, 1994:106).

The notion of language as a modeling system is particularly relevant to translation quality assessment as dealt with in this paper. This relevance can be seen in two different but interrelated senses: i) when dealing with translated texts, one is necessarily dealing with a different kind of representation as the translator is encoding, in another language, a representation of reality already coded, or *textualized*, in a previous language for a specific audience; this fact has implications for the selection of meanings (s)he will make for her/his *retextualization*, not only with regard to the ways (s)he (re)models the textual reality - the source text - but also with regard to the new audience for her/his translated text; ii) within the

universe of *Araby* itself, Joyce chose to present the reality he is portraying through the eye and voice of a specific character, who models his experience of the world in very specific ways. The linguistic resources used to code these special perspectives on reality seem to be motivated and thus sensitivity to the ways realities are constructed through language in the source text (ST) can be of help in the assessment of the meanings selected and realized in the translated texts (TTs).

From the perspective of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), the grammatical system which embodies the general principle for modeling experience is the *system of transitivity*, which 'construes the world into a manageable set of process types' (Halliday, 1994:106). By expressing *processes* (to be discussed in 2 below), transitivity realizes the experiential component of the *ideational* function of language, which gives structure to experience and helps to determine our way of looking at things' (Halliday, 1970:143) as well as the shifts in our perception of reality.

Transitivity 'has proved a useful analytic tool in both stylistics and critical linguistics ever since Halliday's influential analysis of William Golding's *The Inheritors*' (Simpson, 1993: 95), published in 1971 and reprinted in 1973. Halliday's account of transitivity has been adopted many times for the stylistic analysis of literary texts, 'since it places agents, actions, processes and patients in various relations to each other' (Stubbs, 1994: 204).

Four recent studies carried out along these lines can be cited: i) Lee's (1992:49-64) comparison of the connection between language and world-view in Golding's *The Inheritors* and in Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury;* ii) Montgomery's (1993:127-142) analysis of character in Hemingway's 'The Revolutionist'; iii) Simpson's (1993: 86-118) re-examination of the issue of encoding experience in language, in which he develops some illustrations of his own; and, finally, iv) Dourado, Gil and Vasconcellos (1997: 200-242), in which a preliminary evaluation of the potential of SFL as an analytical tool for translation quality assessment is made. In this com-

posite paper, the study of a translation of Hemingway's 'A Very Short Story' into Brazilian Portuguese, one section is devoted to the examination of the transitivity choices in the TT's as seen against those meaning selections made in the ST (Gil: 210-212). In this section, the 'who does what to whom' axiom of transitivity analysis is used and proves fruitful to reveal the foregrounded ideational meanings forming the dominant paradigm in the passage.

This paper further explores the possibilities of SFL in the analysis of two translations of Joyce's *Araby* into Brazilian Portuguese by examining the lexicogrammatical features used to encode the protagonist's initial representation of the world and the change of his conceptualization of outer and inner reality. Two particular configurations of transitivity are analyzed: i) the processes of the external world (whose grammatical categories are those of *material* processes), and ii) the processes of consciousness (whose grammatical categories are those of *mental* processes). Salient choices of special material processes, non-goal-directed clauses, allow for an *ergative* interpretation complementing the standard transitive analysis: the ergative patterns - yielded by the interpretation of the processes in terms of *causation*, as opposed to *extension,* as is the case with the standard transitive interpretation - are examined in terms of the *instigation* of the process and in terms of the representation of *agency*.

On the basis of the description of the linguistic structure, the motivation for the use of particular transitivity patternings is discussed and the significance of particular choices is assessed. After the analysis of the ST, the meaning selections made in the two translations are examined, against the background of those selections made in the ST and against the options available in the linguistic repertoire of Brazilian Portuguese. For a better appreciation of the arguments put forward here, the system of transitivity is briefly explained in the next section.

2. Transitivity: the grammar of Processes and Participants

Through the system of transitivity, speakers/writers organize the cognitive realities of experience and encode in language their mental picture of these realities. The way in which transitivity expresses the ideational function is by means of processes. Halliday (1994a:106) defines processes as the 'goings-on' reality consists of. As Halliday (1994:108) explains, 'perceptually the phenomenon is all of a piece; but when we talk about it we analyze it as a semantic configuration.' 'In this interpretation of what is going on,' he continues, 'there is a doing, a doer, and a location where the doing takes place' (ibid). These three aspects constitute the three components of the semantic configuration, which he defines as: (i) the Process itself; (ii) the Participants in the Process; and (iii) the Circumstances associated with the Process. 'These,' Halliday sums up, 'provide the frame of reference for interpreting our experience of what goes on' and constitute 'a pattern that in some form or other is probably universal among human languages' (ibid).

Halliday distinguishes different kinds of processes capable of modeling experience in different ways. They are Processes of *doing, happening, feeling, being, saying, existing,* and *behaving.* The classification of processes is in accordance with what they represent. From this follows the distinction in terms of Process types, each Process having a grammar of its own: Material Processes, Mental Processes, Relational Processes, Verbal Processes, Existential Processes and Behavioral Processes. Such Processes constitute the 'grammar of experience', being available for the speaker's use in the organization of his/her perception of reality, his/her experience of inner or outer worlds.

For the purposes of my analysis, material and mental processes are the main focus: particular situations are encoded through material processes having inanimate entities at Subject (a function in the Mood structure) or through mental processes with the phenomenon being sensed at Subject, while others, depicting a second moment

in the protagonist's view of reality, are encoded by means of men-
tal processes into which the protagonist is inscribed in the role of
Senser. Table 1 below presents a summary of the process types
particularly relevant to my work and the participant functions asso-
ciated with them (Halliday, 1994: 143):

Process Type	Category meaning	Participants
Material: action event	'doing' 'doing' 'happening'	Actor, Goal
Mental: perception affection cognition	'sensing' 'seeing' 'feeling' 'thinking'	Senser, Phenomenon

Table 1 Material and mental processes: meanings and key participants

As the Table shows, within the category of Mental processes, three
subtypes are distinguished, namely, *perception* (seeing, hearing),
affection (liking, fearing) and *cognition* (thinking, knowing, under-
standing). This distinction is crucial to my analysis**:** the distribution
of mental processes throughout the narrative in *Araby* is significant
to the construction of the protagonist as a more conscious and less
self-deluded being. While *perception* and *affection* are involuntary
and feeling-oriented, mental processes of *cognition* have the prop-
erty of crediting the entity functioning in them with the power to
understand or to *cognize* the phenomena of experience. In *Araby*,
the investigation of the protagonist's trajectory towards knowledge
as depicted in the narrative reveals a special distribution of mental
processes, into which the boy is gradually inscribed.

The participant functions are part of the basic components of the
standard analytic model of Transitivity, based on the variable of
extension. Some examples of these functions are *Actor, Goal,*

Senser, Phenomenon, as displayed in Table 1. However, another component can be added, which concerns the ways in which *agency* and *causation* relate to the process expressed by the clause. This extra dimension in the framework reflects *ergative* forms of clause organization. In ergative terms, clauses are 'describable not primarily in terms of action and goal but rather in terms of *cause* and *effect',* not in terms of types of process, but in terms of a single type of process-participant relation based on one variable, the variable of causation.

What is at issue in the ergative form of organization of the clause is the *source* of the process, whether it is represented as being caused from outside or from within, as self-caused. The basic question in the ergative analysis is: *'Some participant is engaged in a process; is the process brought about by that participant, or by some other entity?'* (Halliday, 1994: 163) When put to *Araby,* this question yields significant configurations in the *causation* and *direction* of the processes, correlating with crucial moments in the protagonist's journey towards maturity.

'Within the ergative paradigm, a special configuration expressing only the process and its central participant (the so-called Medium), has an extra meaning dimension: its experiential structure neutralizes the features *self-instigated* or *externally instigated*' (Davidse,1992:109). Consequently, it is characterized by an essential vagueness leaving open the question whether or not the process is self-instigated or externally instigated. This feature constitutes a useful tool in the hands of speakers or writers who choose to play with the possibilities inherent in this ambiguity. An example can be found in *Araby,* where a passage involving the protagonist and the girl he loves explores the communicative function of ergativity (Paragraph 3). This passage depicts a scene in which an alternative representation of reality is offered, exorcising the 'doer' from the process**:**

> *Her dress swung* as she moved her body and *the soft rope of her hair tossed from side to side.*

In these two non-goal-directed clauses, the processes appear *endogenous,* in Simpson's term (1993: 100). That is to say, they seem to be brought about by the single participant associated with them, the Medium (*her dress* and *the soft rope of her hair*), uninduced by an external cause or *Agent.* The effect of this alternative representation is to bring to the fore the power of the external world bearing on the narrator's modeling of reality: the boy models the outside reality in a way that is suggestive of the strength of his impressions, which he is at the time not only unable to cognize but under which he is spellbound. This form of representation creates the illusion that the process is self-engendered, contributing to the magical effect of the scene. Other passages in *Araby* exhibit similar patterns, which are gradually replaced by a different configuration as the main protagonist gradually constructs a sense of personal agency in the way from self-delusion to 'epiphany'[2] .

In the analysis of a text, the cause-&-effect aspect of processes proves to be relevant in the sense that it allows for the emergence of special patterns centrally contributing to the understanding of how the text comes to mean what it does. This is what is examined in *Araby,* in the section below.

3. Encoding experience in language: the ST

The following account of the events in *Araby* is suggested by Stone (1969:349):

> A young boy becomes fascinated with his boyfriend's sister, begins to dwell on her soft presence, and eventually adores her with an ecstasy of secret love. One day the girl speaks to

> him - it is one of the few times they have ever exchanged a
> word - and asks him if he is going to Araby. She herself cannot
> go, she tells him, for she must participate in a retreat. The
> boy says if he goes he will bring her a gift. The boy arranges
> with his aunt and uncle that he will go to the bazaar on Satur-
> day evening. Saturday evening arrives but the boy's uncle is
> late from work and the boy wanders at loose ends through the
> empty upper reaches of his house. Then at nine o'clock the
> uncle finally returns. He has forgotten the bazaar and tries to
> put the boy off, but the aunt insists that he give the boy money
> and he finally agrees. The word 'Araby' sets the uncle's mind
> working and he remembers a poem which is not present on the
> surface of the short story. Still it is there, in absence. When
> the boy finally visits the bazaar he is disillusioned by its
> tawdriness and by a banal conversation he overhears, and he
> buys no gift. Instead he feels 'driven and derided by vanity'
> and his eyes burn with 'anguish and anger'. The boy's reac-
> tions seem exaggerated but he is reacting not to the immedi-
> ate external events but to sudden and deeply disturbing in-
> sights: his worshipped Madonna is only a girl, like the ordi-
> nary girl who stands before him at the fair and he is just a
> common boy.

The narrator, the highly sensitive boy in the story, models his
experience of inner and outer reality as if *re-experiencing* rather
than *recollecting* those moments of his life, a re-experience which
coincides with the narrational moment. The effect of this mode of
presentation, in which the reporting-self is the experiencing-self,
is that the narrator does not start with a clear-cut view of the envi-
ronment. In fact, in a fashion similar to the narrator in the three
first short stories in *Dubliners*, although there are many indications
that the boy in all three cases is intelligent and perhaps even preco-
cious, he is hampered by a pronounced lack of preparation - to
encounter reality (usually for the first time) and to immediately
turn reality into fiction without the self-conscious awareness of an

intentional storyteller (Benstock, 1994:13).

The boy's difficulty in turning reality into fiction does not allow for an orderly narrative. Rather, what he produces is an immediate transfer of the impressions of the outside world into the linearity of the narrative without the mediation of a cognizing mind. This is the crucial feature of the mode of narration occurring in a large portion of *Araby*. As there is no a priori reason why his experiences of the world should have been structured the way they are in the text, the patterns are significant, reflecting the limits of the narrator's view of inner and outer reality at the beginning of the story. However, another distinct moment occurs later on in the narrative, corresponding to a different perception of inner and outer reality: instead of immediate impressions of internal and external worlds, a shift in the lexicogrammatical pattern points to a state of interpretation and cognition of events on the part of the narrator. Such moments in the narrative are characterized by particular configurations in which different perspectives are realized. These two different ways of meaning are seen here as special textualizations, which I call, respectively, '*The Enchantment Language'* (from now on referred to as *Textualization A*) and *'The Interpretation Language'* (from now on referred to as *Textualization B*).[3] My argument is that Textualization A encodes a representation of reality which highlights the state of bewilderment experienced by the narrator and does not display in the linguistic realizations any form of control over internal and external events. As for Textualization B, the shift in the lexicogrammatical patterns points to the construction of personal agency through an interpretation of reality as perceived by a now disillusioned but conscious human being. The distinction can be seen at the lexicogrammatical level, as demonstrated below.

Thus the notion of *Agency* plays a crucial role in the understanding of Textualization A and Textualization B. Agency can be either made explicit of avoided in textualizations. English has special resources to avoid mention of Agency, a procedure which has direct

implications for the issue of maturity and responsibility for one's action in the world. Among these resources, the following are found in Textualization A**:** the passive, the use of non-specific subjects, impersonal constructions, ergatives and inanimate subjects. Such features can be found in i) a number of material processes with inanimate Agents at Subject; ii) a number of ergative constructions, and ii) some mental processes of Affection or Perception. These lexicogrammatical aspects realize meaning selections portraying the representation of an idealized reality, which the protagonist can neither understand nor act upon. As a result, the sense of personal Agency is dissolved.

As regards Textualization B, a change of pattern occurs, which brings to the fore a sense of personal involvement and control over inner and outer reality **:** i) a number of material processes of the *volitional* kind occur, with 'I' as Actor at Subject, ii) mental processes of *cognition* are textualized, with 'I' as Senser at Subject. This configuration realizes meaning selections portraying a representation of inner and outer reality which now the boy can both understand and act upon.

In addition to these two types of textualization, a third type occurs at the very end of the short story, establishing the presence of the narrator's emerging self. The lexicogrammatical configuration is significant in that it encodes linguistically the finally achieved epiphany**:** the narrator is at one with himself and the world. This textualization, here called the *'Fusion Language'*, is referred to as *Textualization C*.

The next section develops this discussion illustrating the arguments by reference to the numbered paragraphs in the ST.

3.1 Textualization A: From phenomenon to consciousness

Textualization A can be symbolized by the narrator's state of bewilderment and enchantment, as textualized in Paragraph 9:

> *The syllables of the word Araby (…) cast an Eastern enchant-*
> *ment over me.*

In terms of the ergative interpretation, that is, in terms of the variable *causation*, this clause has an inanimate Agent as Initiator at Subject (in a Material process) and the nodal participant - the Medium - at Goal. This configuration depicts a modeling of reality in the direction from phenomenon to consciousness, the impressions of the world bearing strongly upon the perceiving entity, in this case not connected with the notion of Agency.

In fact, the high proportion of non-human Subjects, realizing the role of inanimate Agents is the first striking feature of Textualization A. From the initial paragraph, which sets the geographical scene for the story, inanimate Agents are realized as Subject in clauses which have a *presentative textual function.* Thus the following sequence of inanimate Agents occurs:

> *North Richmond Street*, being blind, was a quiet street except
> when *The Christian Brothers' School* set the boys free. *An*
> *uninhabited house of two storeys* stood at the blind end, de-
> tached from its neighbours in a square ground. *The other houses*
> *of the street*, conscious of the decent lives within then, gazed
> at one another with brown imperturbable faces.

With regard to *presentative constructions* as the ones occurring in this paragraph, a distinction is made in Bolinger (1977), where a discussion is carried out on the meaning of the presence or absence of the item *there* in existential clauses. Bolinger establishes a contrast between (i) instances in which *there* is deleted and (ii) instances in which it is inserted (ibid:93-94):

the first presents something on the immediate stage (brings

something literally or figuratively BEFORE OUR PRES-
ENCE) whereas the second presents something to our minds
(brings a piece of knowledge into consciousness) (his empha-
sis).

The key distinction here is that between presentation *to the eyes*
vs. presentation *to the mind*. While the latter involves mental op-
erations, the former involves presenting the impressions of the
moment directly in such a way that the impact caused on the reader
is that of a vivid, or 'staged' description of the scene. In fact,
Bolinger (ibid:95) observes, ' the more vividly on the stage an ac-
tion is, the less appropriate *there* becomes.'

This observation is particularly suited to the situation in Para-
graph 1**,** in which the non-use of *there* and the use of presentative
constructions such as *was* and *stood* brings to the fore the nature of
the narrative in 'Araby': the boy is *not recollecting* experiences,
presenting an orderly narrative in which appreciation of what is
mentioned is emphasized; on the contrary, he is *re-experiencing*
the phenomenon itself, receiving directly the impressions of the
world around him. This special configuration of presentative con-
structions reinforces the effect of the inanimate Agent-at-Subject
pattern, with which it enters in combination.

The inanimate Agent-at-Subject pattern continues in the ST in
Paragraph 2:

> *Air,* musty from having been long enclosed, hung in all rooms
> *The waste room* was littered with old useless paper
> *The wild garden* contained a central apple tree

In Paragraph 3, inanimate Agents also appear:

> *dusk* fell

> *the houses* had grown sombre
> *the lamps of the street* lifted their feeble lanterns
> *the cold air* stung us
> *our bodies* glowed
> *our shouts* echoed in the silent street
> *the career of our play* brought us through the dark muddy lanes
> *odours* arose from the ashpits
> *light from the kitchen windows* had filled the area

All these realizations have the effect of attributing power to in-animate entities. Take, for example, the case of *the lamps of the street, the cold air* and *odours,* inscribed in processes of 'doing', namely, *lifting, stinging* and *arising*. Such inanimate Agents textualized in the ST occur in Textualization A, describing the effects of the world upon the boy. At moments like these, he is not the Agent, but is at the mercy of his impressions. The world is the powerful entity capable of operating on him, capable of bringing about changes in his states. External reality reaches the narrator in the direction *from phenomenon to consciousness,* the lexical realization thus grammaticalizing the absence of a sense of personal Agency.

Still in Paragraph 3, the inanimate-Agent-pattern is repeated in the picture which depicts the scene of Mangan's sister, his adored girl, standing on the doorstep of her house:

> *Her dress* swung
> *the soft rope of her hair* tossed from side to side

The entities *dress* and *rope* appear to take on a life of their own, being able to carry out actions. In clauses like these, called middle clauses, the external causer is not realized. Of course, they are initiated by the entity *she*, being caused by her movements. This is not grammaticalized, though. The effect is to portray the boy as enchanted by the scene, at the mercy of the spell cast by *her dress*

and *the soft rope of her hair*. This choice is significant in that, as Lee (1992: 185) points out, 'whether a particular situation is encoded as agentive or a non-agentive event is often a matter of perspective rather than an objective property of the situation.' In this specific case, the significance lies in the fact that the selection points to the boy's perspective and to his impression of reality at that point in his life.

Inanimate-Agent structures also occur in Paragraph 9, whose final lines portray a picture of the girl in clauses encoding a representation of the world bringing to the fore the passive role of the boy as an experiencer of the visual sensations:

> The light from the lamp opposite our door caught the white curve of her neck, lit up her hair that rested there and, falling, lit up the hand upon the railing. It fell over one side of her dress and caught the white border of a petticoat, just visible as she stood at ease.

Once again the language form chosen is suggestive of the state of enchantment to which the boy is bound. This interpretation is confirmed by the next sequence of clauses in Paragraph 4, in which, contrary to the pattern discussed so far, the boy is inscribed into the semantic role of Agent; this, however, happens only as an irresistible response to the appeal she exerts on him. He is, so to speak, driven by some force he can neither resist nor understand:

> When *she* came out on the doorstep, *my heart* leaped. *I* ran to the hall, (*I*) seized my books and (*I*) followed her. *I* kept her brown figure always in my eye and, when *she* came near the point where *our ways* diverged, *I* quickened my pace and (*I*) passed her.

All these instances of *I* realizing the role of Agent do not constitute a real case of personal Agency, but they show the boy *reacting to or yielding to the enchantment,* since *her name was like a summons to all* [his] *foolish blood* (last line in Paragraph 4)*.*

The fact that the realization of I as Agent does not constitute a real case of personal agency raises the very important issue of automatic interpretation of linguistic forms: The choices in language form *per se* do not lead automatically to fixed interpretations, but have to be seen against the meanings of the total work.

Evidence for the interpretation of her figure as an irresistible summons can be found in other clauses in Paragraph 5, in which inanimate Agents, connected with images of Mangan's sister, are at Subject in material clauses, projecting the angle of telling adopted in Textualization A:

> *Her image* accompanied me
> *Her name* sprung to my lips

These occurrences point to the non-volitional feature of the boy's encoding of reality.

Still In Paragraph 5, a noteworthy fact happens**:** some mental processes of *cognition* are textualized:

> (…) I myself did not understand
> I did not know

At first sight, these occurrences might be automatically read as instances of Textualization B. This is not the case, though. These mental processes appear in association with *negative* polarity**:** *not* understand, *not* know (the latter being repeated in Paragraph 7). This is suggestive of a cognizing process on the making, that is, an attempt at understanding which does *not* occur at this point but which might be likely at a later stage. In fact, still in Paragraph 6, the protagonist *could see so little*, although he *heard* (6), *wished* (9, 10), *hoped* (9) and *saw* (12), mental processes of perception and affection in which awareness is marginal and not fully conscious**:** what is happening at several points in the visual/auditory field reaches the boy without being fully attended to.

The inanimate-Agent-at-Subject pattern, however, appears as far as Paragraph 12, where, in his second vigil, the boy hears the children's cries at a distance and models his impression linguistically as *Their cries reached me.*

In Paragraph 14**,** however, there are lexicogrammatical indications that the situation is changing**:** *I could interpret these signs* is the herald to Textualization B in that it explicitly realizes the beginning of the boy's process of cognition.

3.2 Textualization B: From consciousness to phenomenon

Up to this moment, the lexicogrammatical features of the short story point to the existence of signs in the world which the boy cannot interpret, that is, *uncognized* facts under whose spell he is bound. From now on, evidence exists of signs he can interpret, that is, *cognized* facts on which he operates to bring about changes in his perception of himself and of the world. There is a change in the directionality of his perception, which is now from phenomena in the world to his consciousness, awareness gradually becoming central.

The effect of this textualization is to suggest *a growing* sense of Agency: Appreciation and consciousness are built into the boy's analysis of events in the outside world, which is realized through the lexicogrammatical features of the text.

This interpretation which can be confirmed by realizations in Paragraph 17, where a set of material processes occur, in which the boy is inscribed into the role of Actor (in transitive terms), or of Agent (in ergative terms), as the *animate* I at Subject:

> I held a florin tightly in my hand
> I strode down Buckingham Street
> I took my seat in a third-class carriage
> I remained alone
> I passed out on to the road

This different assignment of semantic role is suggestive of the expression of growing responsibility for the processes: while the material processes in Paragraph 4 (discussed above) are but a yielding to the enchantment to which he falls victim, the textualizations here show an orientation towards explicit expression of a process that is represented as being caused from within.

At this point, these are, however, still intermingled with instances of Textualization A (Paragraph 17):

> The sight of the streets (…) recalled to me the purpose of my journey
> a large building which displayed the magical name

Effects of enchantment still intrude into these clauses, which display the from-phenomena-to-consciousness pattern.

The pattern of Textualization B is to gain momentum in Paragraph 18 , where the boy *finds himself* in a big hall where sights and noises, instead of *reaching* him, as encoded in previous clauses, are *perceived by him*, who *recognizes* things and *listens to* very material things, such as the falling of coins on a salver:

> I found myself in a big hall
> I recognised a silence
> I listened to the fall of coins

The last two clauses depict auditory impressions, which in Textualization A had been represented in the direction from-phenomena-to-consciousness, as in *Their cries reached me* or in existential clauses as in *There was no sound in the house.*

At the beginning of Paragraph 19, *Remembering with difficulty* (a non-finite clause in which the Subject I can be retrievable) places the boy in a central position in the cognizing process as the cognizing Agent, though he occupies this position *with difficulty*. This role is

confirmed by the next clause of cognition, *I remarked their English accents.*

Paragraph 22 provides the final confirmation of the Textualization B pattern:

> I knew my stay was useless
> *I allowed the two pennies to fall against the sixpence*

A mental process of cognition - *know* - establishes the boy's new state of disillusionment, of maturity and understanding of the facts of life: the thing apprehended - that his stay is useless - is at the semantic role Phenomenon, thus confirming the directionality of the encoding. As regards the second clause- *allowed* - establishes the boy's new state of external causation of events, upon which he can exert his influence.

This pattern develops into a full-fledged state of affairs in which true perception and interpretation are built into the boy's analysis of inner and outer reality, into his analysis of the events in the outside and inside worlds.

3.3 Textualization C: The fusion

A third kind of textualization is found at the end of the short story, Textualization C (the 'The Fusion Language'). This textualization establishes the presence of the narrator's newly emerged self and can be represented by the protagonist's remarks in the last Paragraph:

> I saw myself as a creature driven and derided by vanity

The lexicogrammatical features chosen to encode the meaning selections in this clause epitomize the boy's 'epiphany', marking the definite boundaries between illusion and reality as perceived by

the boy. The reflexive structure in the clause above deserves some discussion.

In structures like this the Subject relates to the process as a participant that fulfills both the role of the entity *that causes* and of the entity *that is affected* by that process. In *saw* myself, *see* describes a mental process that is centered on the same entity, the Medium, which, in this clause combines the two ergative functions of Medium and Agent, or affected and causer.

I saw myself might be thought of as a two-participant form, since a reflexive expression is transitive syntactically. But, as Halliday (1968:189) points out, since no receptive form (*He was seen by himself)* exists, there is evidence that this is a *middle* form, with affected participant (the Medium) only, the reflexive pronoun having no separate function. Which has the effect of returning the very act of *seeing* onto the only and nodal participant in this process.

Close examination of the *whole* clause in which the reflexive form occurs reveals that the entity *vanity* appears as a participant functioning as external cause (*Vanity* as the entity doing *the driving* and *the deriding*). This situation, however, is not represented with an explicit passive construction as it is realized with elliptical Subject and Predicator [*I was*]. An interpretation for this elliptical grammaticalization might be that, in this clause (the 'epiphany' clause), the mention of the external Agent (*Vanity*) is subordinated to the perception of the Medium/Agent *I,* thus being subsumed under the independent clause *I saw myself.* Although the *by Adjunct* inscribes *vanity* as Agent, it is part of the function Phenomenon in the mental process *see*:

I	*saw*	*myself as a creature driven and derided by vanity*
(Senser)	(mental process)	(Phenomenon)

This is an indication of the change of perception of things on the part of the boy, who now *consciously visualizes* his former, self-

deluded being as a prisoner of an enchantment. *Vanity* is now an element of the boy's perception, *I saw*, realizing the participant *I as* the *Senser*, now in full control of the situation. The boy is able to shape reality in the direction *from-consciousness-to-phenomenon.* He is now in a position to understand the ordinary character of his own being and existence as well as of the girl he once worshipped.

Following this discussion of the ST in terms of the transitive and ergative interpretation of the ideational configuration, the next section will analyze the response to these foregrounded meanings in terms of the selections made in TT1 (O'Shea's 1993 edition) and TT2 (Trevisan's 1984 revised edition).

4. Encoding experience in language: the TTs

In the analysis of the translated texts, my concern is with the linguistic options selected by the translators, their relation to the total meaning of the work as well as their relation to the meanings selected in the ST. In other words, I focus on the translated texts as *two possible retextualizations in Portuguese of ideational content already textualized in English.* It is argued that sensitization to the meanings selected in the ST is crucial because, other things being equal, this is the basic material translators work from.

4.1 (Re)Textualization A in TT1 and TT2

In (Re)textualization A, the first aspect to call attention is the translations of the title of the short story**:**

> ST Araby
> TT1 Araby
> TT2 Arabia

In accordance with the interpretation in *ergative* terms, *Araby* turns out to be the most important *external causer,* a power operating on and controlling the boy. It is worthwhile to notice that the

semantic role in which the word is inscribed throughout the short story is in accordance with its use as the title, in that it is the causative entity affecting the whole story.

As pointed out in the annotated edition of *Dubliners (1992:250)*, this item bears connotations such as:

> *Araby.* Poetic name for *Arabia.* Throughout the 19th century, the orient was a principal object of European romance and fantasy, in which images of exoticism, sensuality (…) and prodigious wealth were all involved.

The association of romance, fantasy and sensuality suggested by the word *Araby* suits well the boy's idealized view of his beloved girl and explains his assertion that *the syllables of the word Araby cast an Eastern enchantment over him.* To maintain this association seems to have been O'Shea's decision in his choice of *Araby* for the title of TT1. Trevisan's choice, however, reflects another decision**:** the choice of *Arabia* leaves out the poetic use suggested above.

In (Re)Textualization A, the boy's cognitive orientation causes him to construct an interpretation of experience in terms of an external agent engendering the processes. The first striking feature in the ST is the high proportion of non-human subjects, realizing the role of inanimate agent. This aspect is examined in the translated texts, where the situation is not exactly the same as in the ST. As *ways of saying are ways of meaning* (Hasan, 1984:105, 1996), the linguistic devices used by the translators sometimes produce and foreground different meanings, as I go on to show now.

TT1 displays a clear tendency towards the use of clauses in which the insertion of *havia* fulfills the textual presentative function. This is not found in TT2, which, however, also alters the configuration of the pattern, as discussed below. With regard to *presentative constructions*, it is worthwhile to remember the comments above on Bolinger's distinction (1977) between instances of the non-use and the use of *there* in existential clauses (ibid:93-94): presentation *to*

the eyes vs. presentation *to the mind*. While the ST displays a clear preference for the non-use of *there*, emphasizing the *re-experiencing* nature of the boy's narrative and the impact of the vivid impressions of the world bearing upon him, the retextualizations realize different meanings. Thus in paragraph 1:

> ST An uninhabited house of two storeys stood at the blind end, detached from its neighbours in a square ground
>
> TT1 Havia no fundo do beco uma casa de dois andares desabitada construida no meio de um terreiro quadrado (…)
>
> TT2 Uma casa de dois andares, desabitada e isolada de ambos os lados, bloqueava-lhe uma das extremidades.

Here, the retextualizations display different ways of conceptualizing reality. TT1 realizes explicitly the existential *havia*, thus suggesting, according to Bolinger's distinction, a mental operation as opposed to a description of vivid sensory phenomena. TT2 favors the realization of inanimate Agents by the Subject but, in terms of the transitive form of organization of this specific clause, a different process was chosen: *bloqueava-lhe*. The material process *bloquear* depicts a certain kind of activity since it features a non-human Actor (or an inanimate Agent in ergative terms) *acting* upon the environment.

The lexical realizations of the meanings in Paragraph 2 in the TTs display the following picture: in general the pattern of Subjects realizing inanimate Agents is found but, some differences occur. These can be seen in the sets below:

> ST *Air,* musty from having been long enclosed, hung in all rooms.
> TT1 *O ar* que pairava em todos os cômodos era pesado
> TT2 Nos cômodos longamente fechados flutuava *um odor de mofo*
>
> ST *The waste room* behind the kitchen was littered with old useless paper

TT1 *O depósito que havia atrás da cozinha estava entulhado*
de papel velho
TT2 *O quarto de despejo,* atrás da cozinha, estava abarrotado
de papéis velhos

ST *The wild garden* behind the house contained a central apple
tree
TT1 No centro do quintal abandonado que havia atrás da casa,
via-se uma macieira
TT2 *O quintal abandonado atrás da casa* tinha no centro uma
macieira

TT1 realizes inanimate Agents in *O ar (que pairava em todos os
cantos)*, and *o depósito (que havia atrás da cozinha)*. As for *the wild
garden*, the Agent of the relational process in the ST, it becomes an
Adjunct in *no centro do quintal abandonado que havia atrás da casa.*
However, TT1 still constructs an agentless clause since *via-se* is a
possibility for encoding impersonal agentless constructions in Por-
tuguese. TT2 keeps the same pattern of inanimate Agents in:
(flutuava) *um odor de mofo*; *o quarto de despejo; o quintal
abandonado*.

In Paragraph 3, inanimate Agents also appear in the TTs, attrib-
uting power to inanimate entities in material processes, some dif-
ferences occurring, as can be seen below:

SET 1
ST When *the short days of winter* came, *dusk* fell
TT1 Ao chegarem os curtos dias de inverno, anoitecia
TT2 Ao chegarem os dias curtos de inverno, *o crepúsculo* caía

SET 2
ST *the houses* had grown sombre
TT1 *as casas* estavam sombrias
TT2 *as casas* se encontravam mergulhadas na sombra

SET 3
ST *the lamps of the street* lifted their feeble lanterns

TT1 *os lampiões da rua* erguiam suas luzes fracas
TT2 *os postes* erguiam a luz pálida de suas lanternas

SET 4
ST *the cold air* stung us
TT1 *o ar frio* ardia na pele
TT2 Aguilhoados pelo vento gélido

SET 5
ST we played until *our bodies* glowed
TT1 brincávamos até brilhar de suor
TT2 brincávamos até nos esbrasearmos

SET 6
ST *our shouts* echoed in the silent street
TT1 *nossos gritos* ecoavam nas ruas desertas
TT2 *nossos gritos* ecoavam na rua silenciosa

SET 7
ST *the career of our play* brought us through the dark muddy lanes
TT1 *nossas brincadeiras* levavam-nos às ruelas escuras e lamacentas
TT2 *o curso de nossos brinquedos* conduziam-nos às vielas escuras

SET 8
ST *odours* arose from the ashpits
TT1 rescendia *o cheiro dos buracos usados para despejar cinzas*
TT2 quintais, impregnados do cheiro fétido das fossas

    From the comparison, we see points of convergence and points of divergence. In set 1, TT1 keeps the pattern of the inanimate Agent in the first clause, but favors the realization by a structure in which no Medium exists, or, in a second interpretation, it might be said to be conflated with the process itself, in the metereological process *anoitecia*. TT2 maintains the pattern in *o crepúsculo* caía.

Set 2 offers no significant change. The same occurs in set 3, with effective clauses and inanimate Agents in the three texts, namely *the lamps, os lampiões e os postes.*

As for set 4, TT2 favors a realization by a *passive* effective clause, having the inanimate Agent realized with a by-Adjunct, *pelo vento gélido,* with the Medium (nós) ellipted. TT1 replaces the Medium *us* by the Complement *na pele*, which can be taken as a metonym.

Set 5 presents three different lexical realizations. ST has the middle, one-participant structure *our bodies glowed*, which leaves the causative agent of the process *sweat* unrealized. TT1, once again, made the external cause explicit, in the non-finite clause *brilhar de suor,* the Agent realized by the Complement of the Predicator, producing a more transparent kind of language. TT2 also chooses a non-agentive structure though having the elliptic Subject (nós) realizing the Medium.

Set 7 presents no significant change in that the three texts keep the pattern of inanimate Agents, *the career of our play, nossas brincadeiras* and *o curso de nossos brinquedos.*

Set 8 is noteworthy in that both translators seem to have felt the urge to make the meaning explicit for Brazilian audiences. Thus item *ashpits*, an Adjunct in the ST participating as an inessential element in the Middle clause *odours arose,* is unpacked into complex nominal groups, TT1 presenting the longer one, which, however, keeps the pattern of inanimate Subjects. TT2 realizes a different meaning which foregrounds *os quintais,* receiving the attribute *impregnados do cheiro fétido das fossas*, expressed in the non-finite clause.

The (re) textualization select the same meanings and realize them in a similar way, using ergative constructions**:**

> ST *her dress swung*
> TT1 *o vestido balançava*
> TT2 *o vestido rodava*

ST *the soft rope of her hair tossed from side to side*
TT1 *seus cabelos macios balançavam acompanhando o movimento do corpo*
TT2 *a macia trança de seus cabelos saltava de um ombro para o outro*

These retextualizations have the Medium at Subject and, being middle clauses, suppress the feature agency, with the effect that the process seems to be self-caused. The encodings in Portuguese also project the meaning of enchantment selected and realized in the ST.

Evidence for the interpretation of Mangan's sister as an irresistible summons can be found in several clauses in which the Subject realizes the role of inanimate Agent in material clauses, projecting the angle of telling adopted in Textualization A, both in the ST and in the TTs:

ST *Her image* accompanied me even in places most hostile to romance
TT1 *Sua imagem* acompanhava-me até em locais menos propícios ao romance
TT2 *Sua imagem* acompanhava-me mesmo em lugares menos românticos

ST *Her name* sprung to my lips
TT1 *O nome dela* vinha-me aos lábios
TT2 *Seu nome* brotava-me dos lábios

All these impressions converge in a sensation of *confused adoration*, an expression which appears in the clause *… how I could tell her of my confused adoration,* standing in a hypotactic relation to the clause *I did not know* (Paragraph 5). This clause has the following translations:

ST how I could tell her of my confused adoration
TT1 de que modo poderia expressar minha *confusa adoração*
TT2 de que modo revelaria minha *tímida adoração*

In this specific instance the selection of meaning made in TT1 and its lexical realization *confusa* is in accordance with the whole meaning of the text, while the realization in TT2 is not. The item *tímida* is presented in the dictionary by Aurélio Buarque de Holanda (1975:1378) as synonymous with *acanhada, receosa*, which realize meanings unrelated to *confusion*, the basic property of the boy's state in (Re)textualization A.

It is worthwhile observing that there are some mental processes in Paragraph 5 which have the boy inscribed into the role of Agent/ Senser. The reader's expectation might be then that the process is encoded in the direction *from consciousness to phenomenon in the world.* However, where cognition should take place, the process is *negated* or *downgraded*, denying the expected conscious structure imposing upon the perception of phenomena. Examples are the clauses:

ST strange prayers and praises which I myself *did not understand*
TT1 preces e louvores estranhos que *nem eu mesmo era capaz de compreender*
TT2 em estranhas preces e rogos *que eu mesmo não compreendia*

ST I thought *little* of the future
TT1 *Pouco* me preocupava o futuro
TT2 *Pouco* me preocupava o futuro

ST I *did not know* whether I would speak to her or not
TT1 *Não sabia* sequer se um dia conversaria com ela
TT2 *Não sabia* se falaria ou não com ela

This is repeated in Paragraphs 6 and 7 in the three texts, as illustrated below. It is interesting to notice that, for example, in the

first set, while TT1 negates the perception process, ST and TT2
equally downgrade it. Such differences are significant in the sense
that by 'saying' differently, they 'mean' differently:

> ST I was thankful that I could see *so little*
> TT1 Felizmente eu *não* enxergava *muito bem*
> TT2 Agradava-me *enxergar tão pouco*

> ST I was so confused that *I did not know* what to answer
> TT1 fiquei tão confuso que *não soube o que responder*
> TT2 fiquei tão encabulado *que não soube o que responder*

Still in Paragraph 6, there is a single instance of a non-negated
mental process:

> ST I *heard* the rain impinge upon the earth
> TT1 *Eu ouvia* a chuva violando a terra
> TT2 *Eu ouvia* a chuva bater contra a terra

This might be taken as a herald for Textualization B. However,
it turns out to be a *perception* process, 'an involuntary state, which
does not depend on the agency of the perceiver. In fact, the per-
ceiver receives the *auditory sensation non-volitionally'* (Downing
& Locke, 1992:126). In Paragraph 12, the former pattern reap-
pears in the clauses:

> ST T*heir cries reached me* weakened and indistinct
> TT1 *Seus gritos chegavam-me* abafados e irreconhecíveis
> TT2 *Seus gritos chegavam-me* amortecidos

These are alternative realizations for the forms *I heard their
cries/Eu ouvi seus gritos.* The choice in Paragraph 12 has the ef-
fect of foregounding the boy's hesitation towards his painful self-

knowledge and of still marking the non-volitional feature of his en-coding of reality. In Paragraph 14, repeating the recurrent oscilla-tion, perception processes are realized by the verb *to hear*:

> ST
> At nine o'clock *I heard* my uncle's latchkey in the halldoor. *I heard* him talking to himself and *heard* the hallstand rocking when it received the weight of his overcoat. I could   inter-pret these signs.
>
> TT1
> Às nove horas *ouvi* o ruído da chave de meu tio na porta da rua. *Ouvi-o* resmungar algumas palavras e [ ] o cabideiro balançar sob o peso de seu sobretudo. *Sabia muito bem como interpretar esses sinais.*
>
> TT2
> Às nove horas, *ouvi* o ruído da chave de meu tio na porta de entrada. *Escutei-o* resmungar e o [ ] porta-chapéus balançar ao peso de seu casaco. *Sabia interpretar esses sinais.*

Bolinger's (1977:7) comment on the function of repetition is relevant to this discussion: when the item is not ellipted (in this case, the process *heard*), the effect is that of *separation*, the ac-tions are perceived as discrete parts of a sequence, that is, they are perceived as conceptually separated. Thus, in 'Araby', repetition is motivated. However, neither TT1 nor TT2 follow the repetition pattern of ST: the occurrence of *heard* before *hallstand* was omit-ted in both retextualisations. This procedure points to the transla-tors' tendency to make implicit connections more evident or, on the contrary, to delete parts which, from an informative point of view, while not conveying new *factual* information, do play a central role in the text by adding nuances otherwise unnoticed.

The clause *I could interpret these signs* is retextualized in both TT1 and TT2 in a manner which confirms the pattern in the ST, taken as the boundary between Textualization A and Textualization B.

4.2 (Re)Textualization B in TT1 and TT2

The clause *I could interpret these signs* changes the directionality of the perception: from consciousness to phenomenon. In fact, when material processes reappear in Paragraph 17, the boy is inscribed in the role of Actor, in transitive terms, or of Agent, in ergative terms, appearing in the *animate* Subject *I*. The realizations in the TTs, though in different formal configurations including finite and non-finite clauses, select the same semantic role for the boy, as can be seen in the comparison below:

> *ST I* held a florin tightly in my hand as *I* strode down Buckingham Street
> TT1 [Eu] Segurei firme o florim que ganhara, enquanto descia Buckingham Street
> TT2 [Eu] Apertando na mão o florim que recebera, desci a rua Buckingham
>
> ST *I* took my seat in a third-class carriage…
> TT1 [Eu] Tomei assento num vagão de terceira classe
> TT2 [Eu] Acomodei-me num vagão de terceira classe
>
> ST I passed out on to the road …
> TT1 [Eu] Desembarquei e caminhei rua abaixo
> TT2 Ao descer [the non-finite clause implying the Subject I]

As the story unfolds, the state of enchantment gradually disappears from the lexicogrammatical features of the ST. This disappearance is made evident in the comparison between two instances of cognition of reality encoded differently in Paragraphs 17 and 19, the latter being closer to the end of the short story and to the boy's 'epiphany':

> ST *The sight of the streets (…) recalled to me* the purpose of my journey
> ST *Remembering* with difficulty why *had come*

Effects of enchantment still intrude into the first clause above*,* whicattributes the source of the cognition - *recalling* - to external causes, *the sight of the streets*. The latter, though encoded in an non-finite clause, places the boy in a central position in the cognizing process: the cognizing agent can be clearly retrieved in the clause *why I had come*. He does, however, occupy this position *with difficulty*. The translations display the following picture:

> TT1 A visão das ruas (…) trouxe de volta à minha mente o propósito de minhas escapadas
> TT1 Com dificuldade de lembrar a razão de minha presença na feira
> TT2 As calçadas (…) deram um novo alento ao propósito de minha viagem
> TT2 Recordando com dificuldade o motivo que me trouxera

TT1, in a manner similar to the ST, selects the idea of *recalling* encoded in the causative structure *trouxe de volta à minha mente,* that is, *made me remember*. Unlike TT1, TT2 though keeping the source of the process outside the boy, omits the aspect of the *from-phenomenon-to-consciousness* cognition, replacing it by the process *dar alento*, a lexical item whose referential domains point to *motivating forces* rather than *cognizing activities.* In the second set, however, the *I-Agent* is implicit in the encodings in both TTs.

Textualization A favors the representation of auditory impressions in the direction *from phenomenon to consciousness,* as in t*heir cries reached me*, or with the perceiver omitted, as in the existential clause *There was no sound in the house*. In this respect, the retextualizations behave differently. TT1 does not use this pattern, since its final stage in the realization process yields the following lexical configuration: *Reinava ali o silêncio de uma igreja após uma missa,* which also occurs in TT2: *Reinava ali o silêncio de um templo vazio.*

The new pattern of realizations in Textualization B, describing moments of agency, inscribes the boy into the role of *perceiver* and *interpreter* of the world. The TTs are as follows:

In Paragraph 18:

ST I listened to the fall of the coins
TT1 Ouvi o ruído das moedas
TT2 Eu ouvia o tilintar das moedas caindo

In Paragraph 19:

ST I examined the porcelain vases
TT1 [eu] examinei uns vasos de porcelana
TT2 [eu] examinei alguns vasos de porcelana

ST I remarked their English Accents
TT1 [eu] notei que tinham sotaque inglês
TT2 notei-lhes o sotaque britânico

ST [I] listened vaguely to their conversation
TT1 pus-me a escutar vagamente a conversa
TT2 e [eu] ouvi imprecisamente o que diziam

In Paragraph 22:

ST Though I knew my stay was useless
TT1 Embora soubessse que era inútil ficar ali
TT2 Embora [eu] soubesse que era uma atitude inútil

As the comparison shows, the general tendency in the TTs is towards the selection of the same pattern as that in ST. Verbs like *examinei, notei, soubesse* are mental processes implying a human cognizing Agent, encoding the process in the direction *from consciousness to phenomenon.* A special clause deserves attention: *I listened vaguely to their conversation.* The process in the clause, *to listen,* in this context in clear opposition to the involuntary process *hear*, has an implicit element of choice and responsibility in its referential domain. It is the volitional act of listening introducing

the conversation whose banality contributes to the boy's disturbing insight concerning his worshipped girl and his own nature. In this clause, I see the Adjunct *vaguely* as performing the task of presenting the volitional act in a seeming ordinary and casual way, in a last attempt to resist confrontation with reality.

Portuguese has the option of two verbs available in the system for auditory impressions: *ouvir* and *escutar*. *Escutar* refers to the state of attentiveness and readiness to hear: 'tornar-se ou estar atento para ouvir, exercer o sentido da audição' (*Novo Dicionario Aurélio*:558). *Ouvir* refers to the very sense of hearing: 'perceber pelo sentido da audição' (ibid:1012). Thus the selections made by the translators constitute their choices and have implications for the meanings they want to convey. Where Joyce chooses to encode the situation by a volitional process (*I listened to the fall of the coins)*, both translators choose *ouvia*. This choice leaves out the volitional aspect of the process. This is repeated in TT2 in the clause introducing the conversation at the bazaar: *ouvi imprecisamente o que diziam*. If you consider the act of perception on a cline having the two poles *phenomenon and consciousness, ouvir* could be said to occupy an intermediate position in the direction of consciousness.

Except for the occurrences discussed above, all these instances point towards the boy's epiphany, which can be symbolized by the clause *I saw myself as a creature driven and derided by vanity.* This clause marks the boundary of what I call (Re)Textualization C, the language of fusion, to which I turn now.

4.3 (Re)Textualization C in TT1 and TT2

The (re)textualizations are transcribed below:

> ST I saw myself as a creature driven and derided by vanity
> TT1 vi a mim mesmo como uma criatura comandada e ludibriada pela vaidade
> TT2 eu me vi como uma criatura tangida e ludibriada por quimeras

The TTs realize the same meaning as that in the ST. In a manner similar to the ST, the retextualizations indicate the change of perception of things on the part of the boy, who now *consciously visualizes* his former, self-deluded being as a prisoner of an enchantment.

The reflexive character of the process in the clauses confirms my interpretation of the Subject, elliptical or not, realizing the conflation of the Agent/Medium function in *eu me vi* and [eu] *vi a mim mesmo.*

5. Final Remarks

I would like to close this paper by making it explicit that, in a manner similar to Lefevère's (1992: 6), my analysis 'tries to deal with translation in a way that goes beyond right or wrong'. Although I use analytical tools different from those suggested by Lefevère, I subscribe to his view of the translation as taking place not in a vacuum in which two languages meet but, rather in the context of all the traditions of the two literatures. Translators mediate between literary traditions, and they do so with some goal in mind, other than that of making the original available in a neutral, objective way. Originals are indeed made available, but on the translators' terms, even if these terms happen to produce the closest literal translation. Translators' terms, says Lefevère, are not necessarily their own in the sense that they 'are constrained by the times in which they live, the literary traditions they try to reconcile, and the features of the languages they work with' (ibid: 6).

Though constrained by cultural, literary or linguistic considerations, the translator always *chooses from among the possibilities available to him.* Whether this choice is conscious or unconscious, motivated or not, it is present. Though not committing himself to a functional approach to translation, Lefevère acknowledges the element of *choice* in the process: what he calls the translator's 'power

to construct the image of one literature for consumption by the readers of another'(ibid: 6) is but a manifestation of choice made by the translator in his rewriting of the source text.

However, the view informing this paper assumes, along the lines suggested by Ivir (1996), that 'the translator would not have departed from literalness without a valid reason**:** literal meaning is the starting point from which the translator begins and to which he constantly returns for the verification of his decision' (ibid: 156). In other words and within the theoretical perspective adopted here, this would be equivalent to saying that sensitivity to the meanings selected and realized in the ST is crucial for the translator's work, whatever his decisions as to the objectives of the translation and the function of the translated text in the target situation.

It is from this perspective that I have explored the lexicogrammatical features of *Araby* and the translations. I have examined the choices made by Joyce to encode *the construction of agency in the grammar* and those choices made by O'Shea and Trevisan, which sometimes realized similar and sometimes different meaning selections.

An illustration of the potential of the transitivity model as a fruitful analytical tool in translational stylistics was provided. To this effect, section 2 introduced the basic concepts informing the analysis, drawing mainly on Halliday' s transitiviy system (1985, 1994) realizing the ideational function of the language. The mechanisms through which reality is modeled were discussed with a view to emphasizing the notion that ways of saying are ways of meaning (Hasan, 1984**:**105), central to the understanding and assessment of any text, translated texts included.

The experiential component of the ideational function was dealt with separately. An attempt was made, however, not to lose sight of the ways the three metafunctions interact in the shaping of the text's special character. The isolation of the ideational component was due to the fact that stylistic significance proved to lie in the narrator's representation of reality. The patterns which emerged

from the analysis pointed to a basic separation of processes into two types: 'those regarded as due to an external cause, an Agency other than the person or object involved, and those that are not' (Halliday, 1973:134).

A comparison was then carried out between Joyce' s *Araby*, O'Shea's *Araby* and Trevisan's *Arabia*. This comparison had a descriptive basis in terms of *systemic choices* and attempted to show, through an investigation of regular foregrounded patterns: i) how reality was represented in the ST through meaning selections made from within the ideational function of language, and ii) how the translators' responses to such meaning selections were reflected in their (re)textualizations.

The description of the ST attempted to show how the resources for the expression of Agency were manipulated so as to portray the boy's movement towards self knowledge. Patterns emerged confirming the gradual construction of the narrator's sense of personal agency, culminating with his epiphany.

In the analysis of the TTs, the basic concern was with the linguistic options selected, their relation to the total meaning of the work as well as their relation to the meanings selected in the ST, the translated texts being analized as *two possible (r)etextualizations in Portuguese of ideational content already textualized in English.*

From the descriptive statements, the effects produced by the selections in the TTs were then evaluated. The points of convergence between the three texts led to the assertion that, given the ideational content first textualized in English and then retextualized in Portuguese, the TTs constitute what seems to be appropriate translations of Joyce's *Araby* in the sense that similarities in the meanings selected can be recognized. Differences in the encodings can be explained by a number of reasons, including the translator's reading and interpretation of Joyce's text, the selection of the meanings to be encoded in the TT, the cultural and linguistic constraints, and, finally, the general objective of the translation which informs the translational decisions.

In describing   the stylistic effects produced by the selections made in the ST and comparing them to those made in the TTs through the transitivity system, it is not suggested that translators *should* necessarily follow the configuration found in the ST. Nor is it suggested that a TT can be assessed as 'good' or 'bad' solely in those terms. What is argued is that, whatever the constraints bearing upon the work and whatever the objective and function of the translation in the target context, translation quality assessment can benefit from an analysis of the translator's sensitivity to those meanings foregrounded in the ST and also from an awareness of the potential ways available is a given target language for grammaticizing similar meanings. An analysis along the lines suggested here can be of help in the understanding of the ways all sorts of realities are constructed through language in both the source and the target contexts.

Notes

1. This article is adapted from the fourth chapter of my doctoral dissertation (Vasconcellos, 1997). A slightly different version was presented ar the VII ENCONTRO NACIONAL DE TRADUTORES / I ENCONTRO INTERNACIONAL DE TRADUTORES, USP/SP, September 7th to 9th, 1997.

2. The word 'epiphany' is used here in Joyce's special literary sense of a '*sudden spiritual manifestation, whether in the vulgarity of speech or of gesture or in a memorable phase of the mind itself*' (Stone, 1969:362). Basing their use of the term on this view, critics have applied the notion of epiphany to those moments in a *Dubliners* story when some sort of revelation takes place. In 'Araby', the trivial dialogue overheard by the boy at the bazaar, for example, precipitates his insight into the vanity of his romantic quest and into his own situation.

3. This analysis was inspired by Halliday's (1973) seminal study of the transitivity structures in Golding's *The Inheritors*, in which he identifies three languages, A,B, and C, realizing different representations of experience: these languages express 'not only the content of the narrative but also the abstract structure of the reality through which that content is interpreted'(ibid:121).

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