Critical Notice: Jose Zalabardo’s Scepticism and Reliable Belief

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In Jose Zalabardo’s excellent book, Scepticism and Reliable Belief, we are treated to some outstanding philosophical analysis as he defends a kind of probabilistic reliabilism against many alternatives. I found that there was much of great interest in the book but I shall focus, as is typical, on some problems for his analysis. In Chapter Two, “Reliabilism and the Evidential Constraint,” Zalabardo argues that Laurence Bonjour’s attack on reliabilism fails. I agree with his conclusion but will argue that his argument attacks a misrepresentation of Bonjour’s argument and violates the Principle of Charity. The result is that Zalabardo attacks a straw man. Finally, I shall make a few comments about philosophical methodology and the appeal to epistemic intuition that Zalabardo engages in.

Zalabardo correctly notes that Bonjour accepts the evidential constraint: “It is the principle that knowing p requires having adequate evidence in support of p” (Zalabardo, (2012), p. 5). In contrast, those who champion reliabilist accounts of knowledge typically reject the evidential constraint. Zalabardo accepts a form of reliabilism and so rejects the evidential constraint too. Bonjour, of course, argues that one cannot know that p if one has no evidence or good reasons for believing p. After some preliminary points are made, Zalabardo correctly notes that it is Bonjour’s commitment to the evidential constraint via epistemic responsibilism that produces the famous clairvoyance counterexamples to reliabilism. That is, Bonjour says that the problem is that: “according to the externalist view, a person may be highly irrational and irresponsible in accepting a belief, when judged in light of his own subjective conception of the situation, and may still turn out to be epistemically justified […]” (Bonjour (1985), p. 38). Zalabardo plays up the idea that Bonjour is committed to a conception of epistemic rationality such that: [Bonjour thinks] “of such rationality as essentially dependent on the believer’s own subjective conception of his epistemic situation.” (Bonjour (1985), pp. 49-50) The argument that Zalabardo constructs for Bonjour against reliabilism has it that:
[Premise] 1. Reliabilism entails that a belief can be knowledge even if the subject is epistemically irrational and irresponsible in holding it (relative to his own subjective conception of the situation).

[Premise] 2. A belief can’t be knowledge if the subject is epistemically irrational and irresponsible in holding it (relative to his own subjective conception of the situation) [Zalabardo (2012), p. 26]

Zalabardo’s claim is that the clairvoyance examples are intended to provide support for these two premises and that they result in Bonjour’s main argument against reliabilism. Subsequently, Zalabardo argues that the clairvoyance examples fail to prove that reliabilism is flawed since the examples fail to demonstrate any irrationality or irresponsibility on the part of the subjects since ‘by their own lights’ they are, pace Bonjour, being rational. Since Norman, Casper, Maud and the gang are being rational by ‘their lights’, it follows that there is no irrationality involved and they know what they purport to know. All is well with reliabilism.

But what notion of rationality and responsibility figures in Bonjour’s claims? Zalabardo correctly cites Bonjour’s epistemic responsibility to answer this question. As Zalabardo says: “What distinguishes epistemic rationality or responsibility from other forms of rationality or responsibility is ‘its essential or internal relation to the cognitive goal of truth’ [Bonjour (1985), p.8]. ‘Our cognitive endeavors’, he adds, ‘are epistemically justified only if and to the extent that they are aimed at this goal’ [Bonjour (1985), p. 8], [Zalabardo (2012), p. 27]. Zalabardo correctly notes that this is an instrumental, or means-ends, notion of rationality. But Zalabardo stops there. He does not quote the full statement that Bonjour provides concerning epistemic responsibility. In other words, and as, crucially, Zalabardo does not say about Bonjour at this point in the text, to be epistemically justified in believing that p is to have adequate reasons to believe that p is true. The full statement by Bonjour is: “A cognitive act is epistemically justified, on this conception, only if and to the extent that it is aimed at this goal—which means at a minimum that one accepts only beliefs that there is adequate reason to think are true” [Bonjour (2008a), p. 364]. The way that Bonjour put this point in “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” was to say that:

Cognitive doings are epistemically justified, on this conception, only if and to the extent that they are aimed at this goal—which means roughly that one accepts all and only beliefs which one has good reason to think are true. To accept a belief in the absence of such a reason, however appealing or even mandatory such acceptance might be from other standpoints, is to neglect the pursuit of truth;
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such acceptance is, one might say, epistemically irresponsible. My idea is that the idea of being epistemically responsible is the core of the concept of epistemic justification [Bonjour (2008b), p. 113].

For Bonjour, one must have adequate reasons or good reasons to believe that \( p \). Only in this way, will the analytic connection between the justification condition on knowledge and the truth condition be satisfied. This does not mean that justified beliefs must be true, but it does mean that justified beliefs must be supported by good reasons for them to have a chance to be true and that is the point of epistemic as opposed to moral or prudential justification. Epistemic justification is that species of justification that is supposed to ensure a connection to truth. Now Bonjour does not tell us what adequate reasons or good reasons would be precisely. But it is clear that he intends good reasons in a normative sense or objectivist sense such that such reasons would be of the sort that anyone might accept given the available evidence and a significant amount of diligence in the pursuit of truth. It is on this basis that Bonjour argues that such good reasons are not in evidence in the clairvoyance examples. But Bonjour does say the following about the nature of the ‘adequate justification’ condition on knowledge:

[A belief must be] “Adequately justified’ because a belief could be justified to some degree without being sufficiently justified to qualify as knowledge (if true). But it is far from clear just how much justification is needed for adequacy. Virtually all recent epistemologists agree that certainty is not required. But the lottery paradox shows that adequacy cannot be understood merely in terms of some specified level of probability. … Ultimately, it may be that the concept of knowledge is simply too crude for refined epistemological discussion, so that it may be necessary to speak instead of degrees of belief and corresponding degrees of justification. I shall assume (perhaps controversially) that the proper solution to this problem will not affect the issues to be discussed here, and speak merely of the reasons or justification making the belief highly likely to be true without trying to say exact what this means” [Bonjour (2008b), p. 120].

It is clear in this passage that Bonjour intends ‘highly likely’ to impose an objectivist probabilistic requirement on justified belief. I will return to these matters after reviewing what Zalabardo has to say about the clairvoyance examples. It should also be noted that Bonjour is following Chisholm in accepting epistemic responsibilism. Bonjour notes in “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”: “As Chisholm suggests, one’s purely intellectual duty is to accept beliefs that are true or likely to be true, and reject beliefs that are false, or likely to be false” [Bonjour (2008a), p. 364] It was in Theory of Knowledge, 2nd Edition (Prentice-Hall, 1966) where Chisholm defended this view when he said, quoting William James, that: “We must know the truth: and we must avoid error-these are our first and great commandments as
would-be knowers; but they are not two ways of stating an identical commandment, they are two separable laws” [Chisholm (1966), p. 14].

Note also that epistemic responsibilism makes it tautological, or a matter of definition, that one must be an internalist about epistemic justification in order to have a justified belief. In effect, Bonjour makes it the case that since one cannot know that p unless one has an epistemically justified, true belief and since epistemically justified belief necessitates the provision of providing good reasons for one’s beliefs, one cannot know that p on anything but an internalist account of knowledge. Certainly, this is a strange result. The evidential constraint becomes, for Bonjour, his notion of epistemic responsibilism. Epistemic responsibilism then simply picks out epistemic justification as something that must, by definition, be internalist in nature.

At any rate, Zalabardo takes Bonjour’s Norman Case to illustrate Premise 1 but he wants to focus on Premise 2 to bring out the problems with Bonjour’s objections to reliabilism. Here is the example:

Case IV. Norman, under certain conditions that usually obtain, is a completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power, or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power, under circumstances in which it is completely reliable [Bonjour (2008a), p. 369].

Zalabardo offers two construals of the instrumental epistemic rationality notion and argues that both construals fail to show that Norman is irrational, contra Bonjour.

On the first construal of epistemic rationality:

ER1 From the point of view of a subject’s conception of her epistemic situation, it is epistemically rational and responsible to believe that p just in case she believes that p is likely to be true [Zalabardo (2012), p. 28].

Zalabardo notes that Norman does believe that the President is in New York City and so satisfies this requirement as is made clear by a slightly different version of the example where Bonjour says: ‘Norman believes himself to have clairvoyant power even though he has no justification for such a belief’ and this belief ‘contributes to his acceptance of the belief about the President’s whereabouts’’ [Bonjour (1985), pp. 41-42]. Since Norman does believe that the President is likely to be in New York City, and Norman does believe that he has clairvoyant powers that he has just used to determine this, he satisfies ER1. Zalabardo concludes that Norman is being epistemically re-
sponsible such that this example fails to show what Bonjour had hoped that it would show. Namely, that Norman is not being epistemically responsible and so does not have an epistemically justified belief nor knowledge.

But Zalabardo amends ER1 since it allows subjects to be epistemically responsible by ‘simply refusing to face the facts.’ He suggests that one must at least ‘do the best one can’ in order to be epistemically responsible. This results in a revised principle:

\[ \text{ER2* If a subject has done her best by her lights to determine the truth value of a proposition } p, \text{ then from the point of view of her conception of her epistemic situation, it is epistemically rational and responsible to believe that } p \text{ just in case she believes that } p. \] [Zalabardo (2012), p. 30]

Zalabardo thinks this principle provides a very accurate constraint on being epistemically responsible from the standpoint of the subject’s point of view. On this view, the subject will only be irrational if she fails to do her best, i.e., if she fails to do something that she knows that she could and should do such that it would make a difference to her final verdict in a case. Applied to Norman’s case concerning the President, Norman would have to fail to do something that he could and should have done to determine if the President was in New York City. Norman must have failed to do his best given his lights. But Norman did do his best given his lights, hence Norman is not being irrational and so he has an epistemically justified belief and Bonjour is simply mistaken, says Zalabardo, to think that Norman is being irrational in this case.

What it is important to notice in Zalabardo’s handling of these cases is the emphasis that he puts on the subjective perspective of the cognizer. By emphasizing how Bonjour makes rationality a function of the standpoint of the cognizer, i.e., the cognizer’s subjective conception of the situation, it turns out that one can be rational as long as one is doing one’s best. But, since Bonjour thinks that these examples do demonstrate irrationality it follows that Zalabardo does not understand what epistemic responsibilism requires of cognizers in the way that Bonjour does. How should we understand this disconnect? The answer is that Zalabardo has ignored Bonjour’s claim that one must have good reasons or adequate reasons to believe that \( p \) in order to be epistemically justified in believing that \( p \). In this context, for Norman to believe that the President in in New York City on the basis of a clairvoyant ability that Norman has no reason to believe that he possesses is simply irrational from Norman’s standpoint. It will not do to say, as Zalabardo does, that from Norman’s standpoint that he might ‘fill in the details’ in a way such that he has good reasons to believe that he has this ability. It is stipulated in the example that Norman has no reason to believe that he has this ability. If Norman has no reason to believe that he has this ability then he will be epistemically irresponsible if he believes that the President is in New
York City! In other words, Bonjour does intend to offer an account of good reasons that is objective in the sense that Zalabardo discusses but denies that Bonjour advocates.

What this means is that Bonjour does not intend to offer anything like ER2* as the principle that Norman and his cast of characters must satisfy in order to be epistemically responsible. Instead, I think Bonjour has something like the following principle in mind when he says that Norman is not justified in believing that the President in New York City:

ER3 If a subject has done what any reasonable person would do to determine the truth value of a proposition \( p \) and from the point of view of her conception of her epistemic situation, i.e., this only includes what she takes the facts to be prior to evaluating the basis of her beliefs, then it is epistemically rational and responsible to believe that \( p \) just in case she believes that \( p \).

My claim is that Zalabardo ignores the first clause of ER3 in his handling of the clairvoyance examples and so misreads Bonjour’s understanding of epistemic responsibilism. Bonjour would unpack the term ‘reasonable person’ as meaning a person who was sufficiently objective to carefully look for possible evidence against what one believes and only believe that \( p \) once one had objectively good reasons in hand. In this case, that would involve searching for scientific evidence concerning the status of clairvoyance. If one did that, one would not believe that \( p \). It is only by inflicting an extremely low standard for justified belief on Bonjour that Zalabardo can begin to argue that these cases demonstrate rationality. But given the textual evidence that I provided earlier for the claim that Bonjour demands higher standards for one being epistemically responsible, it follows that Zalabardo has simply misread Bonjour. The key point here is that Bonjour understands the ‘subjective conception of the cognizer’ to mean ‘the set of facts that the cognizer has access to, together with other facts that she could gather were she sufficiently diligent in her pursuit of the truth.’ It is only by misreading Bonjour that Zalabardo can seem to make his case against him in this way. At the end of the day, Zalabardo here violates the Principle of Charity [a principle that he, elsewhere and ironically, upholds]. That principle says that one must read texts such that one adopts that reading which is the most favourable to the author consistent with the text. This Zalabardo fails to do. There is an alternative reading of Bonjour ready to hand which produces a straightforwardly more plausible rendering of his intention with respect to the clairvoyance examples. This alternative reading also accounts for Bonjour’s fame as having provided some of the most searching criticism ever leveled against reliabilism. I say all of this with some regret since I have also defended a version of reliabilism in my book, *Reconstructing Reason and Representation* [Clarke
Interestingly, near the end of Chapter Two, Zalabardo does finally mention that Bonjour “…informs us that aiming at the cognitive goal of truth ‘means very roughly that one accepts all and only those beliefs that one has good reason to think are true’. And, as Zalabardo points out: “Needless to say, on this reading of ‘aiming at truth’, Bonjour’s principle would support the evidential constraint. The problem for Bonjour is that this reading stands itself in need of support, and I suspect that it is at least as vulnerable as the evidential constraint itself” [Zalabardo (2012), p. 39]. At this stage in the chapter, Zalabardo thinks he has established that the evidential constraint can be rejected. But, for my purposes, I will simply note that whatever one thinks about the evidential constraint, it is clear that Bonjour intends his epistemic responsibilism to impose objectivist constraints on the cognizer that Zalabardo refuses to acknowledge. It should also be noted that because epistemic responsibilism is, by definition, an internalist requirement on knowledge, Bonjour’s adoption of the evidential constraint entails that externalism must be false.

But, as I noted earlier, one cannot establish that externalism must be false because it is incompatible with the evidential constraint, a constraint that one simply imposes on all adequate accounts of knowledge. In this sense, Zalabardo is correct to suggest that one must defend the evidential constraint. The question is how to do this in a nonquestion-begging fashion. This debate between internalists and externalists often strikes me as having the flavor of a Kuhnian debate over competing paradigms. In *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* [Kuhn (1962)], Kuhn infamously argued that, for instance, defenders of the Newtonian paradigm and the Einsteinian paradigm simply ‘talk past one another’ or see the world in different ways or offer reasons for their views that presuppose their own paradigm and so can only offer ‘circular arguments’ for their position. Something exactly like this goes on when epistemologists disagree about internalism and externalism about justification and knowledge. In such cases, it may be that there are no shared rules that can be offered which would result in a satisfactory resolution of the debate. For instance, if one simply stipulates that there is a necessary connection between the justification condition and the truth condition such that one must provide good reasons for one’s belief that \( p \) if one is to be epistemically justified then it will be axiomatic that reliabilism is mistaken. If the reliabilist objects on the grounds that she has different intuitions than the internalist about such matters, how is this debate to be adjudicated? One person accepts the evidential constraint as a matter of stipulation, while the other one rejects it. If we apply Kuhn’s analysis to the situation, then there would be no rational resolution procedure to apply. It is entirely possible that such debates cannot be rationally resolved.

If that is true then Zalabardo’s attempt to reject the evidential constraint might simply be a nonstarter as would Bonjour’s question-begging appeal to
epistemic responsibilism in favour of the evidential constraint. Debates of this sort about fundamental principles ultimately lead to an appeal to ‘intuition’ and such appeals themselves result in an impasse. Zalabardo, of course, hopes to overcome this sort of problem. For, consider what Zalabardo says about the sort of analysis that he offers:

In defending this account, I will not be assuming that knowledge has some kind of hidden essence that philosophical analysis can reveal. I take the analysis of knowledge to aim at the formulation of enlightening systematizations of our intuitions regarding the concept. According to this approach, an account of knowledge will be correct if it provides the most charitable and illuminating systematization of our intuitions concerning the circumstances under which people know things…. The resulting analysis of knowledge will license violations of the evidential constraint [Zalabardo (2012), p. 40].

The claim then is that there need be no impasse between the internalist and the externalist because the correct account of knowledge will be the one that provides the ‘most charitable and illuminating systematization of our intuitions’. The question that needs asking at this point is: “Who are the ‘we’ that Zalabardo is referring to here?” When Zalabardo refers to ‘our intuitions’, who is he referring to? He never tells us. I find it deeply problematic that Zalabardo devotes exactly three sentences to the discussion of his methodology in light of the intense debate over the last twenty-five years in epistemology and cognitive science concerning the status of epistemic methodology and epistemic intuition. This would have been an excusable oversight in 1973, but it is just irresponsible in 2013 to ignore this particular elephant in the epistemic boardroom! One cannot just assume that we can do business as usual in epistemology given the very serious issues at stake in these debates. Another issue here is: what counts as a successful systematization of our intuitions? Can we assume that our intuitions can be made coherent? How would one tell if one had succeeded?

Three positions emerge in response to the question about whose intuitions are being systematized in the discussion about epistemic justification and knowledge: intuition solipsism, intuition elitism, and intuition populism. Intuition solipsism has it that when a philosopher relies upon intuitions as evidence, she is relying on her own personal intuitions. Alternatively, she might be relying upon her own intuitions because they are representative of the class of professional philosophers. This is intuition elitism. Finally, she might be relying on her intuitions because they are representative of a broader class of people that includes non-philosophers. This is intuition populism. Intuition solipsism has it that one’s personal intuitions, whether shared by anyone else or not, are evidential and decisive with respect to making correct epistemic judgments. The idea is that one’s concepts give rise to one’s intuitions such
that one’s intuitions are evidence concerning the nature of one’s concepts. Alvin Goldman and Joel Pust, and George Bealer, have defended this view. Alexander and Weinberg have attacked this view on the grounds that if one is in a class of one who has a particular intuition then one should reconsider their intuitions on pain of extreme dogmatism and irrationality. Typically, one appeals to one’s intuitions because one believes that these intuitions will be shared by others, otherwise, it would be hard to understand how the argumentative practice of offering such appeals could possibly proceed [Alexander and Weinberg (2007), pp. 57-58]. They think this view has little to recommend it. However, they overlook the fact that Goldman can argue that the source of our intuitions is our epistemic concepts. My intuitions and your intuitions might both have the same source in our shared concepts. Hence, my intuitions can be legislative for you too.

Both intuition elitism and intuition populism see the appeal to intuition as part of an argumentative practice that has intuitions playing a crucial role in the argument for a specified philosophical position. This seems appropriate since, presumably, the goal is to convince one’s interlocutor of one’s position in a debate. An argument sometimes made by the intuition elitist is that ‘knowledge’ is a technical notion and so the intuitions required to explicate the concept of ‘knowledge’ must be formed on the basis of a technical understanding of the notion at hand. Now Alexander and Weinberg’s response to this technical conception of knowledge is to say:

But this can’t be the correct way to interpret philosophical practice. Philosophical practice is not concerned with understanding the nature of knowledge (or belief, freedom, moral responsibility, etc.) in some technical sense, but of knowledge as the concept is ordinarily understood outside of strictly philosophical discourse and practice [Alexander and Weinberg (2007), p. 58].

If they are correct and epistemic analysis has focused on the ordinary notion of knowledge embedded in everyday usage, as, for instance, Goldman suggests in various places then one could not appeal to technical elitist intuitions to arbitrate disputes. Despite Goldman and Alexander and Weinberg’s claims, however, it is anything but clear that professional philosophers have proceeded by taking the intuitions of the non-philosophical public as evidential as would be required if the goal is to clarify the ordinary or lay notion of justification and knowledge, if indeed, such notions have an extension. When push comes to shove, professional philosophers regularly rule the intuitions of the novice out of court because those intuitions fail to be informed by a sophisticated body of theory. Anyone with even a single course in epistemology, at the undergraduate level, knows this to be a fact. It seems obvious that philosophical practice is here in conflict with the rhetoric of philosophers. More importantly, it is surely right that professional philosophers ought not
to take the intuitions of the novice as sacrosanct. To do so would be to admit that the professional philosopher has no more insight than a novice about matters epistemic. It would be analogous to a medical doctor asking his patient what disease he thought he had because, after all, all medical judgments are born equal and it is the patient that has the disease. But that would be absurd! It is no less absurd in the case of epistemology. Having made the assumption that one is studying the ordinary notion of justification and knowledge embedded in social practices, the mistake is to think that everyone has equal insight into the nature of those practices. Being a participant in those practices does not make one an expert on the nature of those practices any more than exhibiting a disease makes one an expert on disease detection. Hence, intuition populism must be a false doctrine. At the end of the day, it is plausible that the correct view of the object of traditional analysis is that epistemology begins with the ordinary notion of knowledge but that it arrives at a technical version of that notion. The technical version is connected with the ordinary version, it is derived from that version, but it is different. In fact, Goldman’s move from traditional epistemology to a scientific epistemology in *Epistemology and Cognition* [Goldman (1986)] provides an example of just such an account.

I expect that Zalabardo implicitly presupposes intuition elitism in his book. Suppose that this is true. Is there any reason to think that the systematization of the intuitions of professional philosophers is possible? The history of epistemology would suggest that no account of knowledge has ever passed the test that Zalabardo imposes on correct accounts of knowledge. That is, there has never been a professional consensus about any account of knowledge such that any particular account has provided a charitable and illuminating systematization of ‘our intuitions’ and so is correct. This has lead philosophers like Bishop and Trout to ask: What exactly is an epistemologist an expert about?“ [Bishop and Trout (2005), p. 106.] They doubt that there is any evidence to support the claim that epistemologists are experts in any meaningful sense. This might make one doubtful that the question that Zalabardo seeks to provide an answer to can, if epistemological history means anything, be successfully answered. To be sure, this is a pessimistic inductive inference from the history of epistemology. But no other inference is possible. Moreover, if empirical psychologists are correct, this is no surprise. The traditional theory of concepts or ‘Definitionism’, i.e., the idea that there are necessary and sufficient conditions that would uniquely pick out each primitive lexical concept, has not been taken seriously in psychology for at least thirty-five years! A standard example of the failure of definitionism in cognitive science is, somewhat ironically, the concept of ‘knowledge.’ According to psychologists, ‘knowledge’ is a concept that lacks any useful specification in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions [cf. Laurence and Margolis (1999), p. 15]. Cognizers regularly fail to agree on such definitions, whether
they be professional philosophers or non-philosophers, and yet competent
speakers of natural languages use terms like ‘knowledge’ and ‘justification’
regularly. The reality is that, for most concepts, there simply are no defini-
tions to be had. This, in the cognitive science literature, is called ‘Plato’s
Problem’ [Ibid (1999), p. 15]. How can cognizers possess concepts without
knowing their definitions? The answer is that one does not need to possess a
definition before one can use such terms. Concept acquisition does not de-
pend on the possession of definitions. There are numerous alternative ac-
counts of concept acquisition on offer in the current cognitive science
literature. These include: Gopnik’s theory-theory, Rosch’s prototype theory,
Prinz’s proxy-type theory, Fodor’s conceptual atomism, Smith and Medin’s
exemplar theory, and so on (See Margolis and Laurence’s excellent antholo-
gy, Concepts (1999), for more information). But no one thinks that definition-
ism might be the correct account of concepts or that it is even a serious
contender for that title. Of course, Zalabardo might acknowledge this liter-
ture but deny that he is offering an account of how cognizers acquire the con-
cept of knowledge. Instead, he might say, I am only offering a theoretical
account of what the concept of knowledge is from the standpoint of a sys-
tematization of ‘our’ intuitions. But notice that even this last claim presup-
poses that such a systematization can, in principle, be discovered in some
sense of ‘our’ intuitions. But if most people simply lack the requisite defini-
tions despite possessing the necessary concepts then the attempt to illicit such
definitions by appeal to intuition must fail.

To conclude, I have made two main points. One point is that Zalabardo
has some serious work to do in defending his methodology, one cannot just
proceed as though there are no serious issues to be resolved, and that he
ought to have devoted at least a chapter to such issues. The other point is that
Zalabardo has simply misread Bonjour in Chapter Two and then proceeded to
attack this misrepresentation of Bonjour’s attack on externalist accounts of
knowledge.

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RESUMEN

En el capítulo dos del libro de José Zalabardo, *Scepticism and Reliable Belief*, el autor argumenta que el ataque clásico de Laurence Bonjour contra las explicaciones externistas del conocimiento no logra su objetivo. Zalabardo alcanza este resultado intentando mostrar que los famosos ejemplos de clarividencia de Bonjour no muestran lo que él cree que muestran, a saber: la irracionalidad epistémica a pesar de las constricciones externistas sobre el conocimiento. Estoy de acuerdo con Zalabardo en el ataque de Bonjour en contra del externismo no alcanza su objetivo, pero argumento que Zalabardo malinterpreta el argumento de Bonjour y viola el Principio de Caridad. En particular, argumento que Zalabardo malinterpreta lo que Bonjour entiende por responsabilidad epistémica. El resultado es que Zalabardo ataca a un “hombre de paja”. Argumento también que Zalabardo necesita defender la apelación que hace a la intuición epistémica a lo largo del libro.

PALABRAS CLAVE: ejemplos de clarividencia, responsabilidad epistémica, intuición epistémica, conocimiento externista.

ABSTRACT

In Chapter Two of Jose Zalabardo’s book, *Scepticism and Reliable Belief*, the author argues that Laurence Bonjour’s classic attack on externalist accounts of knowledge fails. He achieves this result by attempting to show that Bonjour’s famous clairvoyance examples do not demonstrate what Bonjour thinks that they demonstrate,
namely, epistemic irrationality despite the satisfaction of externalist constraints on knowledge. I agree with Zalabardo that Bonjour’s attack on externalism fails but argue that Zalabardo misrepresents Bonjour’s argument and violates the Principle of Charity. In particular, I argue that Zalabardo misrepresents Bonjour’s understanding of epistemic responsibilism. The result is that he attacks a straw man. I also argue that Zalabardo needs to defend the appeal to epistemic intuition that informs the book.

KEY WORDS: Clairvoyance Examples, Epistemic Responsibilism, Epistemic Intuition, Externalist Knowledge.