

“Emerging Powers” as obstacles to “Effective Multilateralism”: The negative impact of Brazil’s Foreign Policy on the Rhetoric of “Civilian Power Europe”¹

Stelios Stavridis*

Abstract: *The emergence of Brazil as an important international actor is an accepted fact. In an emerging world order that is trying to produce effective multilateralism, the collaboration between “like-minded” democratic states and other political entities is a necessary though not sufficient pre-condition. This article offers a critical analysis of the impact of Brazil’s foreign policy during the Lula and Rousseff presidencies. It argues that especially during Lula’s two terms in office, Brazil’s foreign policy has had a particularly negative impact on the rhetoric of “civilian power Europe”. The article concentrates on a number of case studies. The wider interest of this article is that it offers an illustration of how difficult the task of creating a new multilateral world order will be.*

Resumen: Las potencias emergentes como obstáculos para el multilateralismo efectivo: El impacto negativo de la política externa brasileña sobre el discurso la UE como potencia civil

La emergencia de Brasil como actor internacional importante ya no está en duda. La colaboración entre estados y otros entes democráticos de “ideas afines” es una condición necesaria, aunque no suficiente, para construir un nuevo orden mundial basado en el multilateralismo efectivo. Este artículo analiza críticamente el impacto de la política exterior brasileña bajo las presidencias de Lula y Rousseff sobre la retórica de “potencia civil europea”, para ilustrar lo complicado que resulta crear un orden internacional multilateralista.

Keywords: Brazilian foreign policy, civilian power Europe, EU foreign policy, democracy, emerging powers, effective multilateralism, Lula, Rousseff

Palabras clave: política externa brasileña, política externa de la Unión Europea, potencia civil, potencias emergentes, multilateralismo, Lula, Dilma Rousseff

* ARAID Senior Research Fellow, Research Unit on Global Governance and the European Union, Universidad de Zaragoza, Spain, dr.stelios.stavridis@gmail.com

¹ This article is an expanded and updated version of Stavridis and Hoffmann (2011). An earlier version was presented during the 22nd IPSA World Congress of Political Science (Madrid, 8-12 July 2012) to the Panel on *Speaking Truth to Power? The European Union, Global Institutions and the Changing International Power Structure*. The author would like to thank Aline Hoffmann (Univali/Universidade do Vale do Itajaí, Brazil) for co-authoring the paper mentioned above. He extends his thanks to the IPSA Panel organizers and participants, in particular to Adrian Hyde-Price as the Discussant. Finally, the author would like to thank the editors of *Anuario Americanista Europeo* as well as an anonymous referee for useful comments. All translations from Spanish are by the author. The usual proviso about final responsibility for this article applies here too.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of Brazil as an important international actor is an accepted fact and has opened a new range of interest and study in International Relations. In an emerging world order that is trying to produce effective multilateralism following the end of bipolarity, the collaboration between “like-minded” democratic states and other political entities is a necessary though not sufficient pre-condition. This article offers a critical analysis of the impact of Brazil’s foreign policy during the Lula and Rousseff presidencies. It argues that especially during Lula’s two terms in office, Brazil’s foreign policy has had a particularly negative impact on the *rhetoric* of “civilian power Europe”. This concept - that has been present since the inception of foreign policy cooperation at the European level in the early 1970s - is extremely useful in assessing if there is a semblance of European Union foreign policy. The article concentrates on several case studies, namely, Cuba, Honduras and Paraguay/Venezuela (in Latin America) and Iran/Middle East, Libya and Syria (in the wider Mediterranean). The four topics under study cover the following very important International Relations issues: long-term relations with dictatorial regimes; reactions to non-democratic takeovers in third countries through military coups or political overthrows; questions related to how to deal with nuclear proliferation and developments of weapons of mass destruction, as well as questions related to terrorist groups; and, finally, international military interventions (especially within the ambit of the new – still emerging and still controversial - international principle of Responsibility to Protect/R2P). The wider interest of this article is that it offers an illustration of how difficult a task it will be to create a new multilateral world order.

A NEW WORLD ORDER?

The jury is still out about what kind of new world order has succeeded the bipolar era. Over two decades after the seminal events of 1989-1991 it is still impossible to agree on a single concept. But there are those who argue that the current interim period should be used in order to produce a more just and effective world order based on multilateral institutions, the rule of (international) law, human rights and other basic democratic principles. That is to say an international system that stresses the need for at least a “better” and “safer” world than the one it has replaced following the collapse of Communism and the Soviet bloc. For a time, it was defined as “the unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 1990) with a sole *hyperpuissance* (to use French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine’s characterization in 1999) being the only superpower in charge. But soon it appeared that this was not going to be the case, and not only because as Realists claim power preponderance or power vacuum eventually lead to new balances of power. In 2001, Jim O’Neill, chairman of *Goldman Sachs Asset Management* coined the term “BRICs” to reflect the emerging - initially

only economic – power of Brazil, Russia, India and China². In the early 2010s, it is clear that one now refers to them not only for economic but also for financial, political, and military reasons. Moreover since late 2010, South Africa has become the “S” in BRICS who are now 5 members.

This article is not however about the BRICS – nor is it about EU-Brazil relations in general³ - but it is important to begin with them as they are impacting on this new emerging world order. The G-8 is now also *de facto* a G-20 and there is huge debate about what kind of system is emerging: will it be a traditional G-2 (USA and China), or a new multilateral world which requires urgent reforms in most, if not all, existing universal and regional international organizations and institutions (starting with the UN Security Council).

What matters with multilateralism is that it must be created, that is to say, i.e. set up. The article do not use the word “constructed” because it could be misinterpreted as if the only way to explain and analyze the international system is through the constructivist approach – which in my view does not represent overall a convincing approach to International Relations because it claims (rather simplistically) that what really matter are ideas and that all institutions are social constructs, as if ideas did not matter in the past⁴. Its other problem (among many others) is the emphasis on dealing with the “hows” of things and not with the “whys”: again, as if the two were not related. But this article is not about constructivism.

The need to create this new international order also fundamentally means that there will be actors working in one specific direction and others in different directions. Therefore it is important for those actors that have the same normative “mindsets” to collaborate together in order to try and produce a normative – and eventually empirical - world that fits their norms. Therefore, democracies should cooperate as often as possible and try to avoid the emergence or the strengthening of a system based on non-democratic norms and practices because of the presence of so many non-democratic states in the world⁵.

² But in late 2011 he seemed to distance himself from this concept: see “Goldman Sachs: Brics in 2050”, in *Beyondbrics*. Accessed December 7, 2011. <http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/12/07/goldman-sachs-brics-in-2050/#axzz2DbXwKfyy>

³ For details see Gratius (2012a, 2012b) and de Souza Silva (2012). On the EU and the BRICS see Keukeleire and Bruyninckx (2011). On the BRICs and their impact for the EU at the UN General Assembly see Hooijmaaijers (2011).

⁴ Thought is the first action.

⁵ For the difference between “authoritarian” and “totalitarian” regimes, there is again a huge literature. A ‘must read’ is Popper (1945). On the foreign policy dimension see Jones (1979). See also Szmolka (2011).

“Results for 2011: The number of countries designated by Freedom in the World as Free in 2011 stood at 87, representing 45 percent of the world’s 195 polities and 3,016,566,100 people—43 percent of the global population. The number of Free countries did not change from the previous year’s survey. The number of countries qualifying as Partly Free stood at 60, or 31 percent of all countries assessed by the survey, and they were home to 1,497,442,500 people, or 22 percent of the world’s total. The number of Partly Free countries did not change from the previous year. A total of 48 countries were deemed Not Free, representing 24 percent of the world’s polities. The number of people living under Not Free conditions stood at 2,453,231,500, or 35 percent of the global population, though it is

This is not to call necessarily for a formal “Alliance of Democracies”⁶. Simply to argue that one should expect some form of solidarity and cooperation among like-minded states and entities because (1) they share the same fundamental democratic principles and values, (2) and, they call for the emergence of a more just and fair international system (based on those principles) through effective multilateralism.

As this article is a normative piece, it builds on the huge academic literature that has taken such an approach over a long period of time. Moreover, it takes as objective assessment criteria both EU and Brazil official documents that refer systematically, diachronically and comprehensively to democracy and human rights as their objectives, policies and fundamentals. The EU’s rhetoric can be found in any official document issued ever since the early 1950’s, and for Brazil it suffices to refer to the Preamble and Title I of its Federal Constitution (see also de Souza 2012: 298).

THE “CIVILIAN POWER” (EUROPE) RHETORIC

The key concept used in this article is that of civilian power and in particular its application to the EEC/EU as civilian power Europe (CPE). The aim of this article is not to contribute to the debate of the application of this concept (or other concepts such as normative power, transformative power, soft power, etc.). It is about the fact that CPE produces a series of common positions on a huge range of international issues. It is also important to note that unlike studies like that by Volgy, Sabic, Roter and Gerlak (2009), this article does not address the general theoretical and conceptual debates but rather focuses on a specific concept that has been applied to the European Union for some time now. It also does so by illustrating it with a series of empirical cases.

Usually there is criticism for the gap that often exists between EU declarations and the reality of EU external actions and policies. It has led to a plethora of work on “double standards”. The significance of this literature is extremely important for those who want to make sure that norms and actions do not diverge too often, and/or for far too long.

But this study does not adopt such an approach: instead of criticizing – rightly – the discrepancy between the EU’s rhetoric and reality⁷, it focuses on the negative impact of the *reality* of Brazil’s foreign policy on the EU’s *rhetoric* during the two Lula Presidencies and the current Rousseff Presidency. In order to do so this section

important to note that more than half of this number lives in just one country: China. The number of Not Free countries increased by one from 2010 due to the inclusion for the first time of South Sudan, a new state that was given a Not Free designation”.

Freedom House: *Freedom in the World 2012*, pp. 4-5, accessed July 2, 2012. http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf

⁶ “The solution must lie in creating a formal Alliance of Democracies”, in the words of Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, “An Alliance of Democracies: Our Way or the Highway”, *Financial Times*, accessed November 6, 2004.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2004/11/06globalgovernance-daalder>

⁷ The literature is legion. To use just one example by the current author (applied to a specific case study: the Cyprus Problem), see Stavridis (2008).

begins by showing that both are important international actors. There follows why the two actors can be seen (indeed are seen by external observers but most importantly by the actors themselves) as like-minded. That is to say that the EU and Brazil are real or potential allies.

Important international actors

The case for the EU as an international actor is very well documented⁸ even if the current economic crisis has brought about an important question mark about its future as a whole. However, even if post-2008 figures show a lesser weight in the world economy, it is premature to assume that its overall weight will definitely and surely decline in absolute terms. The EU will welcome its 28th member next year, and enlargement always represents a sign of continued “attraction”⁹. The Union and its member states remain the largest economic bloc and the biggest international aid donor. Before the current crisis, 4 EU states (Germany, France, Britain and Italy) ranked among the 7 richest economies¹⁰.

As for Brazil, most academic observers and official organizations coincide: it is now a regional *and* a global leader, according not only to Brazilian rhetoric or EU declaratory diplomacy, but also based on statistical data¹¹. For instance, there follows evidence of both:

Over the last years, Brazil has become an increasingly significant global player and emerged as a key interlocutor for the EU. (...) The time has come to look at Brazil as a strategic partner as well as a major Latin American economic actor and regional leader.¹²

In terms of economic clout, Brazil was the 7th world economy in 2011¹³. It represents 40% of Latin America and 55% of South America in economic terms. Further similar data abound: between 2001 and 2010, Brazilian exports grew 231%, from just over 58 million US dollars to nearly 193 million¹⁴. Celso Amorim referred to the fact that Brazil’s trade with Arab countries quadrupled in seven years; with

⁸ On that question see *inter alia* Stavridis and Fernández Sola (2011).

⁹ And the queue is even longer: there are 5 candidate countries (Iceland, the FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey) and 3 potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo), let alone Norway, Switzerland and others.

¹⁰ *El País – Domingo*, October 24, 2010.

¹¹ For a different view, see Malamud (2011).

¹² See for instance: *Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership*, communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2007) 281 final): <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0281:FIN:EN:PDF>. Also quoted in Malamud (2012, 222). The same reference was also used previously in Stavridis and Hoffmann (2011, 13).

¹³ According to IMF/International Monetary Fund figures reproduced in *El País*, April 17, 2011.

¹⁴ Carlos Manzoni, “Los secretos de Brasil: la receta de una potencia”, *La Nación*, 26.09.10. <http://www.lanacion.com.ar>

Africa, it grew five times and reached 26 billion US dollars, a figure above that of trade with traditional partners like Germany or Japan.¹⁵

Malamud (2012, 225-226) argues that Brazil has become a global multi-dimensional actor under foreign minister Amorim's management of Brazilian foreign policy carried out "at the service of a president with a worldwide projection". In terms of presidential diplomacy, the most significant changes occurred under Lula's two mandates (2003-2010), with an activism in international affairs next to none in the history of Brazilian foreign policy (Maihold 2010, 2). Thus, in over 200 foreign visits in eight years, Lula spent 385 days abroad, inaugurated 36 new embassies and consulates – which means that now Brazil has 1,400 diplomats in over 100 capitals, and contrary to his predecessors, two thirds of his trips were to Asia, Africa and Latin America, and not as in the past to the USA or Europe¹⁶.

Drawing on Brazil foreign ministry data, Carlos Cano has calculated that Lula visited Algeria (1 trip), Libya (1), Egypt (1), Senegal (1), *Cape Verde* (2), *Guinea Bissau* (1), Ghana (2), Benin (1), Burkina Faso (1), Nigeria (2), Cameroon (1), *Santo Tomé y Príncipe* (2), Gabon (1), Equatorial Guinea (1), DR Congo (1), Kenya (1), Tanzania (1), *Angola* (2), Zambia (1), Botswana (1), Namibia (1), *Mozambique* (2) and South Africa (4) – in italics the countries that belong to the Community of Portuguese Language Countries.

No doubt Brazil is now a global player and the impact of Lula on Brazil's foreign policy has been seen as a "radical departure" or "rupture" with past practice (Gratius 2012b, 242 and 237)¹⁷, especially by the more traditional Ministry of External Relations "Itamaraty". This may lead to internal changes now that Lula is no longer President and that Rousseff is seen less of a "visionary". But the fact that Brazil has now overcome Britain as the 6th world economy confirms that it will remain a global actor in the future.

Like-minded and potential allies

There is a proliferation of statements to that effect, be it among academic observers and analysts or officials from both sides of the Atlantic, for instance:

From a European perspective, Brazil is increasingly perceived as a global player whose aspiration to turn its new international status into regional and global clout needs to be fully supported (Poletti 2007, 271 and 284).

The already mentioned 2007 European Commission document *Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership* falls in the same line:

¹⁵ Celso Amorim, "Un nuevo mapa del mundo", *El País*, September 13, 2010. See also Schoeman (2011, 47).

¹⁶ M. Á. Bastenier, "De güelfos y gibelinos", *El País*, October 6, 2010. See also Carlos G. Cano, "Lula reivindica su legado africano", *El País*, 15.08.10; and, Maihold (2010, 2).

¹⁷ This aspect of the domestic sources of Brazilian foreign policy decision-making deserves more attention than I give it to here. My thanks to Elena Lazarou (Fundação Getulio Vargas – CPDOC, Rio de Janeiro) for bringing this aspect of the question to my attention.

Based on powerful historical and cultural links, the EU enjoys broad relations with Brazil. Over the last few years Brazil has emerged as a champion of the developing world in the UN and at the WTO. The EU and Brazil share core values and interests, including respect for the rule of law and human rights, concern about climate change and the pursuit of economic growth and social justice at home and abroad. Brazil is a vital ally for the EU in addressing these and other challenges in international fora.

Poletti (2007, 281) reproduces Carlos Amorim’s following words:

The definitions of Europe as a partner ‘with which we share the will to defend an international order based upon the strengthening of multilateralism as a way to oppose tendencies towards unilateralism’ (... and that) ‘can contribute to make the international system more solidaristic, more representative and, thus, more legitimate and efficient.

Poletti (2007, 284) even goes as far as to wonder whether, as both the EU and Brazil share a common Grotian view of the international system, they should develop an alliance between “civilian powers”.

No doubt there are competitive areas, especially in economic terms:

It is somehow natural to see the interests of an internationally recognized emergent economic power like Brazil and those of an economic giant such as the EU – accounting for more than a fifth of global trade – often clashing. (Poletti 2007, 273-274; see also Gomes Saraiva 2010, 2 and 4).

As Karine de Souza Silva notes, there are plenty of differences between the two sides at the World Trade Organization level, with many a decision taken in favour of Brazil be it over foodstuffs like chicken, sugar or bananas (de Souza Silva 2012).

Furthermore, some observers argue that Brazil is a revisionist power (Gratius 2012a, 232), thus challenging Europe’s international clout. But such an approach does not take into consideration the regime of all revisionist powers in the early 2010s. There is a difference between on the one hand, China and Russia as totalitarian or autocratic regimes (and by implication their foreign policies) and on the other Brazil (or India) (Jones 1979); and there is difference between wanting more representative power in existing or new international organizations/institutions and challenging the promotion and respect of human rights and other democratic principles worldwide.

Where there *is* clear convergence - and that is quite mind boggling - is the traditional slant that both democracies in BRICs (India and Brazil) take in coinciding with the non-democratic regimes (Russia and China) on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of a state. This concurrence of views is what has in part led to writing this study as it appears rather old-minded, restrictive, and dangerous as in practice it means that it perpetuates dictatorships and autocracies of all kinds throughout the world.

THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (CASE STUDIES)

What follows consists of a number of empirical examples of the way Brazilian foreign policy has negatively affected the rhetoric of EU foreign policy. It does so by taking a thematic approach together with a diachronic element in order to find out if there are at least some signs of an improvement in that respect.

The four topics under study include the following very important International Relations issues: long-term relations with dictatorial regimes; reactions to non-democratic takeovers in third countries through military coups or political overthrows; questions related to how to deal with nuclear proliferation and developments of weapons of mass destruction, as well as questions related to terrorist groups; and, finally, international military interventions (especially within the ambit of the new – still emerging and still controversial - international principle of Responsibility to Protect/R2P). The specific cases deal respectively with Cuba; Honduras and Paraguay (Venezuela); and Iran/Middle East; and Libya and Syria. The time-period ranges from the beginning of the first Lula Presidency in 2003 to the time of writing, in July 2012.

Cuba

The EU adopted in 1996 a Common Position on Cuba which links any progress in EU-Cuba relations to an improvement of the political situation on the Island. Promoted by the Aznar Government at the time, it gained strength once old communist countries joined the EU in the two enlargements of 2004 and 2007. In Spain, during the Zapatero governments (and in particular during the Moratinos era as foreign minister) there were several attempts at reforming the Common Position on the grounds that a reform was long overdue. It is not the objective of this piece to assess the internal EU divisions (see Buck 2010, Bermúdez 2011, Contreras 2010, Roy 2003; 2011), but to focus on the problems that the Brazil stance has created for its existing policy towards the Island.

Thus Iglesias Rodríguez (2010) is one among many analysts who have criticized Brazil for its policies towards Cuba, a state with which Brazil re-established diplomatic relations in 1986. Since then there have been many high-level bilateral visits. In 1988, the *Mecanismo Permanente de Información y Consultas Políticas Brasil-Cuba* was established. This mechanism acts as an institutional framework to develop bilateral relations in a number of economic and political matters (Rezende 2010). Relations between the two countries developed most after 2003 when Lula became President. There were indeed strong political and emotional/affective links between several members of the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT) and Fidel Castro dating back to the dictatorship years in Brazil. This bilateral relationship became stronger and now Brazil is the third investor in Cuba, a trend that will gain pace in the future as there is also now a MERCOSUR-Cuba agreement which facilitates further investment by Brazilian firms.

There is also the “anti-imperialist” approach with relation to the US so-called “economic embargo”. Lula has included Cuba in CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños/Community of Latin American and Caribbean States),

a new Latin America organization that is geared to promoting integration¹⁸. The official line is, in the words of Carlos Amorim, to promote “constructive engagement” in an attempt to influence change on the Island, rather than just condemning and isolating Cuba (Ayllón Pino 2012, 192). Such a policy explains for instance the numerous visits to Fidel Castro, Brazil’s abstention on UN Human Rights Committee condemnation of human rights abuses in Cuba, and of course, the already mentioned development in economic and trade relations.

In 2010, Lula *hugged* Fidel Castro as well as his brother Raul, the current President following Fidel’s health problems. He did not initially mention the death of dissident Orlando Zapata Tamayo nor did he refer to the problems that his friends and relatives encountered during his funeral. Lula refused to meet dissident groups and he defined his visit as a “reunion among old friends” according to Brazilian sources quoted in various media. The same sources also added that later Lula had said he regretted Zapata’s death¹⁹, but he also compared Cuban political prisoners to common criminals²⁰. This led many observers to use very severe words in condemning Lula’s attitude²¹, including within Brazil: “Lula makes business over corpses” was the title of an opinion article in *O Estado de Sao Paulo*.²² Lula’s support for the Cuban regime continued after he had left power as reported in the international press in June 2011.²³

Such a policy clashes directly with the EU Common Position and its constant condemnation of human rights violations by the Castro regime. Rodríguez Iglesias (2010) argues that this reflects the existence of different criteria for the EU and Brazil. The fundamental difference (something that will be showing to be present in more than just one case – see below) rests on the fact that Brazil still bases its foreign policy on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs (“national sovereignty” à la Westphalian model).

In spite of the fact that the 2003 “75” prisoners were finally released in 2010-2011 thanks to the intervention among others of the Cuban Catholic Church and Spain²⁴ but also because of the change of Administration in Washington, the

¹⁸ El presidente de Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula Da Silva, consideró este martes un hecho histórico la decisión de los países de América Latina y el Caribe de constituir una Comunidad de Estados. “Hoy no es un hecho histórico menor, es un hecho histórico, diría, de dimensión más grande en la medida en que estamos conquistando hoy nuestra personalidad como región”. Leído en “Una nueva institución regional sin Estados Unidos”, *El Mundo*, February 23, 2010. <http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/02/23/mexico/1266944223.html>

¹⁹ “Lula lamenta la muerte de Zapata tras su reunión con los hermanos Castro”, *El Mundo*, February 24, 10. <http://www.elmundo.es/america/2010/02/24/brasil/1267050394.html>

²⁰ “Lula da Silva compara a los presos políticos cubanos con delincuentes comunes”, March 10, 2010. <http://www.20minutos.es/noticia/648621/12/>

²¹ Mario Vargas Llosa, “Lula y los Castro”- Cuando se trata del exterior, el presidente brasileño se desviste de los atuendos democráticos y se abraza con la hez de América Latina. Su foto con Raúl y Fidel me retorció las tripas”, *El País*, March 7, 2010.

²² Fernando Gualdoni, “Las contradicciones de Lula”, *El País*, February 26, 2010.

²³ Mauricio Vincent, ‘Lula expresa su interés de que Brasil siga apoyando a Cuba’, *El País*, June 2, 2011.

²⁴ See Bermúdez (2011). Miguel Ángel Moratinos’s activism is difficult to understand considering the lack of agreement among the other EU states to change the existing 1996

difference of views between the EU and Brazil remains clear. Some would argue this reflects a lack of responsibility for an emerging world power (Rodríguez Iglesias 2010) and others would say that it reflects its growing autonomy in international affairs (Gratius 2012a). No doubt, this discrepancy of views and actions among democratic entities plays in the hands of the dictatorial regime that has been in power in Havana since 1959, but more importantly for this study, it makes Civilian Power Europe less effective because it undermines even its rhetorical stance alone.

The Lula standpoint is even more problematic if one also takes into consideration the views of the European Parliament over that issue. The parliamentary dimension of a truly civilian power does not only rest only on its importance for democratic control and legitimacy. It reflects a comprehensive view of what a democratic foreign policy should look like both in terms of process and output (for more on this issue see Stavridis 2006). In that respect, but this is not discussed here, it is important to note that there was opposition to the Lula stance within the Brazilian Congress itself. But at the end of the day it did not materialize in the official position of the Brazilian executive. The European Parliament has been very active in its role as a “moral tribunal” on international affairs, awarding three times its prestigious Sakharov Prize for the Defence of Human Rights to Cuban dissidents: to the founder of Proyecto Varela, Oswaldo Payá in 2002, to the Damas de Blanco in 2005 (joint prize), and to Guillermo Fariñas in 2010.

All of the above renders Dilma Rousseff’s decision not to meet with dissidents during her early 2012 visit to Cuba even more problematic. Indeed, trade and other economic issues visibly took precedence over human rights. In the words of Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota, “there are other more alarming situations to deal with, for instance Guantanamo”. It was not forgotten that Dilma’s past 40 years ago as a guerrilla had led her to call at that time for a similar revolution in her own country to the one that Castro had carried out in Cuba.²⁵

Honduras and Paraguay (Venezuela)

This set of examples includes Venezuela because there were similar disagreements during the failed 2002 coup in Caracas with Brazil clearly positioning itself on the Hugo Chavez side and many European countries showing clear reluctance to do so (with Spain for instance showing even some support). But those events occurred before the Lula Presidency and are not included here. However, the Paraguay situation in 2012 (a non-democratic development according to MERCOSUR

Common Position. It might have just been a case of domestic politics (“playing” to the leftist political arena in Spain), although during the brief tenure of his successor, Trinidad Jiménez (October 2010 to November of the following year, due to early elections), Spain reintegrated the consensus view that there had been no real progress on the Island to justify modifying the Common Position after all. One *El País* editorial insisted on the risk of failure for Moratinos as there was clearly no consensus among other EU partners – especially after Zapata’s death - about revising the Common Position, *El País*, March 13, 2010.

²⁵ “Dilma Rousseff descarta reunirse con la disidencia en La Habana – La visita de la presidenta brasileña se limita a una agenda comercial” and “La libertad no es un tema ‘prioritario’”, *El País*, February 1, 2012.

and UNASUR countries, including Brazil) has led to the incorporation of Venezuela to MERCOSUR following the expulsion of Paraguay as that country’s Senate was the last parliamentary obstacle to Venezuela’s adhesion. This is why Venezuela will also be mentioned in this section which focuses on Brazilian and EU reactions to the 2009 coup against President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras and the 2012 impeachment of President Fernando Lugo in Paraguay.

The role of Brazil in 2009 was very important as it “hosted” the deposed leader in its embassy in Tegucigalpa once he had managed to return clandestinely to his country (he had been expelled *manu militari* during the coup). This created an important political crisis within Brazil as Article 4 of the 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution refers to human rights, cooperation with other peoples, non intervention in internal affairs and political asylum principles. Brazil’s accepting the overthrown President to stay on “Brazilian territory” (embassy) also helped lengthen the tense drama.

Most countries also condemned the military takeover. Initially, the EU strongly condemned the arrest of the constitutional president of the Republic of Honduras, Manuel Zelaya, by the armed forces and called for his urgent release and a swift return to constitutional normality.

But with the justification of the holding of elections in late 2009, the EU states recognized the new regime. It was also helped by the developing situation on the ground: the *Comisión de la Verdad y de la Reconciliación* announced in the summer of 2011 a sort of a compromise as it stated that there had indeed been a coup but that the ousted President had been as responsible as the military who had expelled him from the country²⁶. Previously, during the May 2010 EU-LAC summit in Madrid, the Europeans even had to refuse to invite the new Honduran President (Roberto Micheletti) as a result of Latin American states opposition; but a few days later, Micheletti did attend the EU-Central American states summit. Yet another of those strange diplomatic *tour de force*. There was also a big row over that particular issue during the Plenary Session of the EUROLAT Parliamentary Assembly²⁷ in Seville that took place a few days before the Summits in Madrid.²⁸

Internationally speaking, Brazil was criticized for its stance. But some have argued that it only amounted to a political asylum question, which represents common practice in Latin America (Magide 2010). Thus, there was no “special” Brazilian policy in this particular case. Others even argued that on the contrary Brazil acted as a “giant” and incremented its role in international politics (Gratius 2011, 16).

However, others still consider that the Honduras incident weakened both Venezuela’s leadership and that of Brazil as well “whose regional influence seems not to reach beyond the Darien forests, in the southern Central American isthmus, and that, in any case, weakens as soon as the USA enters in the stage” (Sanahuja 2010, 126). As for Rodríguez Iglesias, she argues that Brazil lost an opportunity to

²⁶ “Honduras cierra en falso la investigación del golpe militar contra el presidente Zelaya”, *El País*, July 8, 2011.

²⁷ On EUROLAT, see Fernández Fernández (2011); Stavridis and Ajenjo (2010); Ajenjo Fresno and Stavridis (2011).

²⁸ On the proliferation of summits on the international agenda and in particular in Latin America and Iberoamerica, see Salvador Ortiz (2010).

mediate in a regional conflict and subsequently help positively in returning democracy to Honduras. Instead, Brazil preferred to align with the ALBA/Alianza Bolivariana Para los Pueblos de Nuestra America alliance, a grouping highly criticized for its populist and authoritarian traits by many a state, including the EU (Iglesias Rodríguez 2010)²⁹.

As for the case of Paraguay in 2012, it is interesting to see that there is equally much controversy, with Brazil and Latin American states squarely condemning the “coup”, and the Europeans taking a more reserved stance. What is equally important is that as noted above, one result of the Paraguay *mélee*, and also to a certain extent as a further criticism of what had happened in Asunción, Venezuela was finally allowed to join MERCOSUR.³⁰

The European Parliament is taking a wait-and-see position as a whole. At the time of writing the EP was sending a fact-finding mission to Paraguay. But once again, as over Cuba, Honduras and so many other issues, the non *mainstream* political parties³¹ take a different stance: thus, Willy Meyer of the Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left (Izquierda Unida/Plural in Spain) has publicly demonstrated their support for deposed President Lugo by travelling to Paraguay³². Whereas even Spain’s government initially accepted the impeachment result, before it raised some objections about the validity of the procedure and called in the Paraguay ambassador for more information.³³ As for the EU as a whole, it has sat on the fence, calling for the respect of the will of the Paraguay people³⁴.

Finally, it is worth adding that as with the case of Cuba, Lula has continued with his supportive support of yet another autocratic regime: as late as July 2012 he called for a Chavez win in the autumn elections (ADD) in Venezuela, claiming that “your victory will be our victory”³⁵.

²⁹ As an *El País* editorial put it when Zelaya finally returned to Honduras in May 2011, “in 2009, only the Chavist axis, Venezuela, Bolivia y Ecuador, plus President Lula’s Brazil, worked hard to make sure that Zelaya would return to power” (*El País*, 30.05.11, emphasis added).

³⁰ It is said that the expulsion of Paraguay from MERCOSUR was justified on similar grounds to the ones that Paraguay had used in the past to prevent Venezuela’s membership. I thank Silvia Mergulhão for this point.

³¹ The bulk of MEPs come from three political groups: the (right) European People’s Party, the (left) Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, and the (centre) Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.

³² “Spanish MEP Willy Meyer leads in Paraguay an act of support to Lugo”, *The Delta World*, July 3, 2012. <http://www.deltaworld.org>

³³ “Margallo cita al embajador de Paraguay para conocer la situación del país - El PSOE critica la “tibia” reacción del Gobierno español ante la destitución de Fernando Lugo”, *El País*, June 27, 2012.

³⁴ “EU tells Paraguay to respect ‘democratic will’ of people”, July 3, 2012. <http://www.eubusiness.com>

³⁵ “Lula a Chávez: “Tu victoria será nuestra victoria”, *El País*: www.elpais.com, July 7, 2012. See also Moisés Naím, “¿Para qué sirve un expresidente?”, *El País*, July 15, 2012.

Iran/Middle East

The wider Middle East also became an important area for Lula’s diplomacy. His March 2010 visit to the region was the first carried out by a Brazilian leader since Emperor Pedro II in 1876. It followed in line with the South American-Arab states summits that Lula himself promoted during 2005-2009 (Maihold 2010, 1)³⁶.

Through MERCOSUR, Brazil also signed a Free-Trade agreement with Israel and is considering a similar one with the Palestinian Authority. But the difficult question of the Middle East Process depends on so many international and internal issues (internal conflict and reconciliation in the Palestinian territories, Israel’s domestic politics, and neighbouring developments be they in Lebanon or now Syria) (Maihold 2010, 5-6). There is a clear risk “overstretch” (Maihold 2010, 6) that could show the limits of Brazilian power outside its regional ambit. What the EU criticized Lula’s foreign policy for referred to its lack of sensitivity about terrorism issues and the fact that Hamas is on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations. A situation further complicated by the fact that several Latin American states, including Brazil, have recognized the Palestinian Authority as an independent state, even if it has yet to join the UN.³⁷

Moreover, Lula saw the Iranian nuclear enrichment process dispute as an opportunity for Brazilian mediation between Iran and the countries involved at the UN level (especially the 5+1 Contact Group that consists of the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany). The imposition of economic sanctions and the supervisory role of the International Atomic Energy Agency have now been dragging on for years without any success (Mota 2010) with numerous examples of Iran fooling the inspectors and developing its nuclear programme even when it had publicly promised it would not do so. Brazil pretended to try to find a compromise solution and – with the support of Turkey – tried a different track. Lula’s government claimed that there was a lack of understanding between the two sides involved, i.e. implying that it was not only Teheran’s fault.

Again, what upset the Europeans (and other Westerners, including the Americans³⁸) and goes against its civilian power policy was Lula’s “hug” with President Mahmud Ahmadineyad in November 2009, a few months after the “frustrated spring” in the Iranian elections of June 2009. In addition, the various public announcements made by Ahmadineyad about the need “to wipe out Israel from the map” are seen as serious obstacles for “normal” diplomatic relations although there is an EU attempt to engage with Iran if and when Teheran shows signs of flexibility on its nuclear programme (*constructive engagement*). But this policy has also shown its limits, especially after the election of Ahmadineyad to the Presidency in 2005 (following the 2004 elections that had brought to power a more conservative Parliament), replacing a more flexible ruler (Mohammad Khatami)³⁹. It

³⁶ See also Brun (2011).

³⁷ See Andrés Oppenheimer, “El apoyo sudamericano a Palestina”, *El País*, January 17, 2011.

³⁸ “Washington Post critica a Lula da Silva”, Agencia *Efe*, November 29, 2009. <http://www.pontealdia.com/estados-unidos/washington-post-critica-a-lula.html>

³⁹ Bernd Kaussler, “How the EU could resolve the US-Iran crisis”, *Europe’s World*, Spring 2008. http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articlev

is important to note that Iran possesses missiles that can not only reach Israel, but also Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and even Southern Italy⁴⁰.

There seems to be positive developments since the coming into power of Dilma Rousseff all the same: «En diplomatie, le virage le plus spectaculaire concerne l' Iran, avec lequel Dilma a pris nettement ses distances, au nom de la défense des droits humains. Pour la première fois, Brasilia vient de voter à l' ONU contre Téhéran»⁴¹.

This change was announced by the new President herself at a meeting of the “influential” Jewish Confederation of Brazil/CONIB⁴². Some observers even claim success in her efforts to stop the stoning of Sakineh Ashtani⁴³. It is significant that whereas the Iranian President had visited Brasilia and hugged Lula in November 2009, this was not to be repeated during his 2012 Latin America tour. After visiting the usual “anti-imperialist” forces in Venezuela and other ALBA countries, Ahmadinejad did not travel to Brazil to meet President Rousseff. Even though it is correct to point out that even his 2009 visit had raised strong objections from some political circles and civilian society actors, the fact that he did not include Brazil in January 2012 also stems from strong criticisms that Rousseff has proffered about Iran and from a 73% decrease in trade between the two countries in the past years.⁴⁴ Moreover, when the Iranian President attended the Rio+20 Earth Summit in June of that same year, Rousseff refused to see him⁴⁵.

Libya/Syria

As all members of the UN Security Council at the time (both permanent and non-permanent), Brazil voted in favour of Resolution 1970 (26 February 2011) which

<http://www.cnn.com/2010/05/20/iran.missile.test/index.html>. On US-Iran relations, see *inter alia*, Sadjadpour (2010).

⁴⁰ “Iran says the missiles have a range of almost 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles). If that is true, the missile brings Moscow, Russia, Athens, Greece, and southern Italy within striking distance from Iran, according to Jane's, which provides information on defense issues”, “Iran tests new surface-to-surface missile”. *CCNN.com*, May 20, 2009.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/05/20/iran.missile.test/index.html>

⁴¹ Jean-Pierre Langellier, “Lui, c' est lui, moi, c' est moi”, *Le Monde*, 31.03.11. See also Soledad Gallego-Díaz, “Dilma Rousseff se distancia de Lula-La presidenta de Brasil favorece la compra de cazas a EE UU frente a Francia”, *El País*, 10.02.11. See also Andrés Oppenheimer, “Brasil y EE UU se acercan”, *El País*, January 31, 2011.

⁴² Juan Arias, “Rousseff rompe los lazos de Brasil con el régimen de Irán-La presidenta defiende los derechos humanos ante una asociación judía”, *El País*, 29.01.11. Editorial du Monde, ‘La présidente «Dilma», son héritage et ses défis’, *Le Monde*, 31.12.10: la nueva presidenta “a commencé à faire entendre sa différence en exprimant avec force son souci des droits humains, en particulier ceux des femmes, en Iran et ailleurs”.

⁴³ Vicente Palacio (Director adjunto de OPEX de la Fundación Alternativas), “El segundo discurso de El Cairo”, *El País*, February 12, 2011.

⁴⁴ Rousseff had declared over the Sakineh Ashtiani case that “as a woman I cannot accept a practice of medieval characteristic. There are no excuses. I will not make any concession on that issue”. Juan Arias, “Por qué Ahmadinejad no visitará Brasil – Irán busca oxígeno entre sus aliados de América Latina”, *El País*, January 9, 2012.

⁴⁵ *El País*, June 20, 2012.

unanimously condemned the way the Gaddafi regime was reacting to the massive popular revolts that had erupted in Libya, following - more successful - similar developments in Tunisia and in Egypt. The Resolution agreed an arms embargo as well as economic and financial sanctions, and a number of movement restrictions for Gaddafi and several regime leaders and family relatives. It also mentioned the future role of the International Criminal Court.

However, Brazil (among other states, including Germany) broke ranks in the following resolution that was adopted on 17 March 2011 following the growing violence and repression in Libya. Under UN parlance, Resolution 1973 called for the protection of the civilian population by all necessary means (i.e. including military), as well as adding more sanctions. It also specifically restricted those means to air power and did not allow for a military invasion. The Resolution was promoted by France, Britain and Lebanon and also counted with the support of the Arab League. The required minimum votes of 9 (out of 15) and the abstention of Russia and China (as permanent members with veto right) meant that the Resolution was approved. As noted, Brazil also abstained and so did India, thus delivering consensus among all four BRICs.

If one takes into account the active role of the European Parliament in encouraging the EU to play a more active role, not only in terms of the imposition of an air-exclusion zone but also in the recognition of the “rebels” as official representative of the Libyan opposition to the Gaddafi regime, then the gap between Brazil and civilian power Europe rhetoric could not be wider. In its Resolution of 9 March 2011 passed with 584 votes with 18 against and 18 abstentions, the EP:

[s]tresses that the EU and its member states must honour their Responsibility to Protect, in order to save Libyan civilians from large-scale armed attacks; points out that no option provided for in the UN Charter can therefore be ruled out; calls on the High Representative and the Member States to stand ready for a UNSC decision on further measures, including the possibility of a no-fly zone aimed at preventing the regime from targeting the civilian population (...).⁴⁶

The reference to the Responsibility to Protect/R2P is particularly relevant for a civilian power and its emphasis on morality and protection of human rights and other democratic principles. Again, such a “revolutionary” approach to International Relations⁴⁷ should be contrasted to the traditional Westphalian principles that seem to still be part of some important world powers such as the BRICS, and thus, including Brazil. It is equally noteworthy that the Libya episode occurred under Dilma

⁴⁶ Ivan Camilleri in Brussels, “Euro Parliament calls for Libya no fly zone”, *Times of Malta*, 10.03.11. <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20110310/local/european-parliament-calls-for-no-fly-zone-over-libya.354090>. For a detailed analysis of the EP’s reaction to Libya see Stavridis (2012), and for a comparative study of the way the EP reacted to Libya and to Syria, see Fernández Molina and Stavridis (2012).

⁴⁷ On R2P, see Weiss (2004); on the application of the principle to the Libya case, see Peral (2011).

Rousseff, a President who has been described (Malamud 2012, 226) as more akin to promote values and principles and not so much interests in the way Lula used to do.

This is why it is important to briefly mention the ongoing situation in Syria in order to find out if there has been some positive development in that particular area since last year: unfortunately, the situation remains the same with Brazil emphasizing the need for a negotiated solution through an “open political process” with the Assad regime in Damascus⁴⁸.

CONCLUSIONS: SOME RECOMMENDATIONS?⁴⁹

It is important first to highlight discrepancies between democratic states as it is much more difficult to make authoritarian and dictatorial regimes change their policies. There are no real examples of non-democratic regimes giving up power on a voluntary basis. This is why the continuity of those regimes is of vital importance for their survival. This is also why in times of transition it is possible to finally see real possibilities of a fundamental regime change.

No doubt, the EU should put its own house in order and avoid discrepancies between its rhetoric/s and its reality/ies. The continued comprehensive criticism of what it does wrong in the world should not cease. But like-minded countries should also be careful that - mainly due to playing to the ideological, national or regional publics – they should not undermine the EU attempts to make this world a better place to live in.

This article is trying to show the limits of an emerging world power in the worthy efforts to create a better, safer and more just international system. Brazil’s continued de facto support- or at least, tolerance - for unsavory regimes such as those in Cuba, Iran and even Venezuela do not help create such a new world. Lula and Rousseff have failed to lead by example in all those cases, let alone in Libya or Syria. Their stance on terrorist groups like Hamas does not help either. Even if there appeared to be some improvement over Iran – in particular, as noted above, in his January 2012 Latin America tour, there was no visit to Brazil for the Iranian President, nor meeting with Rousseff during his participation to the June 2012 Rio+20 Earth Summit⁵⁰ - there seems to be no dramatic change over Cuba. As for Honduras and Paraguay, Brazil has not managed to facilitate an acceptable solution in either case. In all examples, it seems prisoner of the past: following what Peter Birle has defined as a “*regime blind*” foreign policy⁵¹, that is to say a policy that does not take into consideration the type of political regime it associates itself with. This

⁴⁸ Interview with Antonio Patriota, Brazil’s foreign minister, “Brasilia défend le dialogue avec Damas en vue d’une transition politique », *Le Monde* : www.lemonde.fr, May 30, 2012.

⁴⁹ A number of specific points have not been covered in this piece, like free trade or climate change, especially the “negative impact” of Brazil’s belonging to BRICS and IBSA (Gratius 2012b, 241).

⁵⁰ See also M. Á. Bastenier, “El ‘picnic’ de Ahmadineyad”, *El País*, January 18, 2012.

⁵¹ Comments made during the Simposio Internacional sobre *Los BRICs: Brasil, potencia emergente*, organized by the Instituto de Iberoamérica (Salamanca), Centro de Estudios Brasileños (Salamanca), Instituto de Latinoamérica (Moscu), CEISAL (Consejo Europeo de Investigaciones Sociales de América Latina) in Salamanca (7-8 April 2011).

may be due in part to the fact that, as Maria Regina Soares de Lima points out, there is a need for organized civil society actors to *democratize further* the steps that Lula has taken in making Brazil an important regional and world actor⁵². This may be indeed an important difference between emerging powers and countries or entities like the EU, as Jorge Castañeda has stressed elsewhere: powerful civil societies fix limits to traditional power politics and this not the case in Brazil or India to date⁵³.

The wider context of the rise of the BRICS makes such a debate more important and urgent. This “dogmatic obsession” with national sovereignty⁵⁴ renders current efforts to develop a new international system, including at the UN level, to say the least, problematic. Trade and Power should not be the only criteria for a new world order.

Otherwise, Brazil would just be “yet another emerging power who believes in the right to export and who renounces to take on international responsibilities”. A qualification used to describe recent German foreign policy⁵⁵ which I intentionally use here to show that what I criticize in this study is policy and not of course the country itself. But, as always, actions speak louder than words. A more representative world may no doubt be required but one should not fall into the trap of wishful thinking: there is no guarantee that it would also mean more efficient and fairer international relations⁵⁶. The general growing role of China, be it in Latin America⁵⁷, in Africa or elsewhere does not bode well if it means an end to the democratization forces that have developed over the last two centuries at such a heavy cost.

⁵² “El legado de la política exterior de Lula”, *El País*, 29.09.10. For more on the link between civilian power and the democratization of foreign policy decision-making process, in the specific case of the EU, see Stavridis (2006).

⁵³ “Jorge Castañeda, “Los países emergentes y el derecho internacional”, *El País*, August 26, 2010. See also Gratius (2011, 8).

⁵⁴ To use the words of an Editorial in *Le Monde*, “L’ Iran et la Chine”, *Le Monde*, March 8, 2010. Even if Haiti could be perceived as a change in Brazilian policy, it falls better within the tradition “blue helmet” peace-keeping role of the Cold War years, and not that of “peace-enforcing”, let alone “peace-making” roles that the post-Cold War era has “created” (or is trying to create). See also de Souza (2012, 294-300).

⁵⁵ José Ignacio Torreblanca on Germany, “El mejor ZP”, *El País*, March 25, 2011. On the appearance of serious, though not necessarily irreversible, signs of “de-Europeanization” in Germany’s foreign policy see Daehnhardt (2011).

⁵⁶ Jorge Castañeda, “Los países emergentes y el derecho internacional”, *El País*, 26.08.10. See the joint 2011 Declaration by Presidents Dimitri Medvedev and Hu Jintao on developments in Arab status and Libya in particular: “Russia, China warn West against Arab interference”, *AFP*: “Russia and China oppose outside interference in the unrest in the Arab world, the two presidents said on Thursday in a declaration, as the West seeks their support for increasing pressure on Syria.

The sides believe that the search for settling the situation in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa should take place in the legal field and through political means,” said the declaration signed by Presidents Dmitry Medvedev and Hu Jintao. “Outside forces should not interfere in internal processes in the countries of the region”, June 17, 2011. <http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=31813>

⁵⁷ “China dispara su presencia en América Latina”, *El País*, November 9, 2011. See also Jenkins (2009).

If effective multilateralism wants to have an even remote chance of success in the future it is important to bear in mind that it will not do so if democratic states and groupings do not at least adopt a rhetoric that is consistent with their principles, norms and values. The recent and current Brazilian rhetoric and practice means that the few cases where there had been some EU coherence were seriously undermined.

REFERENCES

Ajenjo Fresno, Natalia y Stelios Stavridis. 2011. *La Asamblea Parlamentaria EUROLAT: ¿Un modelo de relación entre bloques de integración regional?*. Working Paper 31, Programa de América Latina. Buenos Aires: Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales. Accessed May 11, 2011. <http://www.caei.com.ar/es/programas/latam/31.pdf>

Ayllón Pino, Bruno. 2012. "Contribuciones de Brasil al desarrollo internacional: coaliciones emergentes y cooperación Sur-Sur". *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals* 97-98: 189-204.

Ayuso, Anna. 2009. "Encuentros y desencuentros de la asociación estratégica eurolatinoamericana". *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals* (85-86): 185-209.

Bermúdez, Ángel. 2011. "La apuesta española por Cuba: entre la renuncia castrista y el escepticismo europeo (2010)". En *Entre la irrelevancia internacional y el aprendizaje institucional: la presidencia española de la Unión europea*, Esther Barbé (coord.), 165-172. Barcelona: UAB, Barcelona.

Brun, Elodie. 2011. "Brazil into the Mediterranean Strategic Outbreak on Socio-Historical Background". *Conjuntura Austral* 2 (5), Publicação digital do Núcleo Brasileiro de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais (NERINT) – UFRGS. <http://seer.ufrgs.br/ConjunturaAustral/index>

Buck, Karl. 2010. "Some Comments on the Relations between Cuba and the EU". *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series* 7 (3). Miami: University of Miami. Accessed April, 2012. <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/BuckCubaEU20EUMA10edi.pdf>

Contreras, Delia. 2010. *La Unión Europea ante los retos de la democratización en Cuba*. Documento de Trabajo Serie Unión Europea 35. Madrid: CEU Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos, Universidad de San Pablo.

Daehnhardt, Patricia. 2011. "Germany in the European Union". In *National and European Foreign Policies: Towards Europeanisation*, Reuben Wong, Christopher Hill (eds), 35-56. London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group.

De Souza Silva, Karine. 2012. "La asociación estratégica entre UE y Brasil". En *América Latina-Unión Europea: integración regional y birregionalismo*, Stelios Stavridis, Rut Diamint, Jorge Gordín (coords.), 279-305. Zaragoza: Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza.

Fernández Fernández, José Javier. 2011. "La dimensión parlamentaria de la Asociación Estratégica Birregional UE-ALC: la Asamblea Parlamentaria Euro-Latinoamericana (EUROLAT)". En *Gobernanza Global Multi-Nivel y Multi-Actor – Ejemplos de Europa, el*

Mediterráneo y América Latina, Stelios Stavridis, Celso Cancela, Carolina Ponce de León, Georgina A. Guardatti (coords.), 319-325. Pressas Universitarias de Zaragoza, Zaragoza.

Fernández Molina, Irene and Stelios Stavridis. 2012. The European Parliament’s reactions to the conflicts in Libya and Syria: efficient “moral tribune” or mere “talking shop”? Paper presented to the 26th SISP (Società Italiana di Scienza Politica) Conference (Rome, 12-15 September).

Gomes Saraiva, Miriam. 2010. *Brazil’s view on Europe*. FRIDE Policy Brief 44, March, Madrid.

Gratius, Susanne. 2011. “El triángulo atlántico: arquitecturas multilaterales y reajuste de poder entre nuevas y viejas potencias”. *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* (8): 3-21.

---. 2012a. ‘Brasil y la UE ante los poderes emergentes y la pujanza asiática’. *Revista CIDOB d’afers internacionals* (97-98): 231-243.

---. 2012b. “La UE a la luz de otros actores externos de América Latina: Estados Unidos, China, India y Rusia”. En *América Latina-Unión Europea: integración regional y birregionalismo*, Stelios Stavridis, Rut Diamint, Jorge Gordín (coords), 307-317. Zaragoza: Pressas de la Universidad de Zaragoza.

Hooijmaaijers, Bas. 2011. *The BRICs at the UN General Assembly and the Consequences for EU Diplomacy*. Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Network on ‘The Diplomatic System of the European Union’ Policy Paper 6, September.

Iglesias Rodríguez, Ana Isabel. 2010. *Retórica y Pragmatismo en las Relaciones Euro-brasileñas. Vol1: La asociación estratégica UE-Brasil*. Madrid CEU Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos, Universidad de San Pablo. Serie Unión Europea, 36.
<http://www.idee.ceu.es/index.php?item=1371&lang=esp>.

Jenkins, Rhys. 2009. “El impacto de China en América Latina”, *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals* (85-86): 251-272.

Jones, Roy. 1979. *Principles of Foreign Policy - The Civil State in its World Setting*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.

Keukeleire, S. and Bruyninckx, H. 2011. “The European Union, the BRIC’s and the emerging new world order”. In *International Relations and the European Union*, C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.), 380-403, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Krauthammer, Charles. 1990/1991. “The Unipolar Moment”. *Foreign Affairs* 70 (1): 23-33.

Magide, Aquiles. 2010. *Condicionantes de la acción de la OEA y Brasil en la crisis hondureña*. CIDOB, 9/03/2010, Barcelona.

Maihold, Günther. 2010. “¿Demasiado mundo?: Lula, Brasil y Oriente Medio”. *ARI* (62). Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano.

Malamud, Andrés. 2011. “A Leader without Followers? The Growing Divergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian Foreign Policy”. *Latin American Politics and Society* 53 (3): 1-24.

---. 2012. "La Unión Europea, del interregionalismo con América Latina a la *asociación estratégica* con Brasil". *Revista CIDOB d'afers internacionals* (97-98): 219-230.

Mota, Rodrigo dos Santos. 2010. "O caso do programa nuclear iraniano: a busca por soluções pacíficas negociadas e o apoio brasileiro", *Mundorama* (37). Brasília.
<http://mundorama.net/>

Peral, L. 2011. *Implementing R2P in Libya – How to overcome the inaction of the UN Security Council*. Paris: ISS, European Union Institute for Security Studies.

Poletti, Arlo. 2007. "The EU for Brazil: A Partner Towards a 'Fairer' Globalization?". *European Foreign Affairs Review* (12): 271-285.

Popper, Karl. 1945. *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. London, Routledge.

Rezende, Bruno Pereira. 2010. "As relações Brasil-Cuba: liberalização, integração e desenvolvimento", *Mundorama* (37). Brasília.
<http://mundorama.net/>

Roy, Joaquin. 2003. *The European Union Perception of Cuba: Frustration to Irritation*. Obs Working Paper 47. Barcelona: Observatori de Política Exterior Europea, Institut Universitari d'Estudies Europeus, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Accessed May, 2012.
<http://www.uab.es/iuee>

Roy, Joaquín. 2011 "Cuba: el papel de EEUU, América Latina y la UE". *Pensamiento Iberoamericano* (8): 243-260.

Sadjadpour, Karim. 2010. "Irán-EE UU: anatomía de un compromiso". *Política Exterior* XXIV (136): 130-140.

Salvador Ortiz, María. 2010. "Iberoamérica y la diplomacia de las cumbres". *Política Exterior* XXIV (136): 40-48.

Sanahuja, José Antonio. 2010. "Entre los valores y los intereses: Las relaciones entre América Latina y la Unión Europea tras el golpe en Honduras". *Nueva Sociedad* (226): 125-144.

Schoeman, Maxi. 2011. "Of BRICs and Mortar: The Growing Relations between Africa and the Global South". *The International Spectator* 46(1): 33-51.

Stavridis, Stelios. 2006. *Strengthening the continued relevance of the concept of 'Civilian Power Europe': the need to re-visit its forgotten democratic scrutiny dimension*. Hellenic Centre for European Studies EKEM Paper 6, July, Athens.

---. 2008. *La Unión Europea y el conflicto chipriota (1974-2006)*, Barcelona: Editorial Icaria.

---. 2012. "Parliamentary diplomacy and conflict resolution: The European Parliament's reaction to the 2011 military action in Libya". Paper presented to the ECPR Joint Sessions of Research (Antwerp, 10-15 April).

Stavridis, Stelios and Natalia Ajenjo. 2010. “EU-Latin American Parliamentary Relations: some Preliminary Comments on the EUROLAT”. *Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series* 10 (3). Miami: University of Miami. Accessed April, 2012.

[http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/StavridisAjenjoEULATlongEdi\[1\].pdf](http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/StavridisAjenjoEULATlongEdi[1].pdf)

Stavridis, Stelios and Natividad Fernández Sola. 2011. “The EU: what kind of international actor?”. In *Russia, the EU and the US as a security triangle – action, interaction and challenges ahead*, George Voskopoulos, Ilias Kouskouvelis (eds), 23-51. Athens: Eurasia Publications.

Stavridis, Stelios and Aline Hoffmann. 2011. *Brasil como potencia emergente y su impacto sobre el concepto de potencia civil europea: una evaluación preliminary*. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 11 (2). Miami: University of Miami. Accessed June, 2012. <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/StavridisHofmanBrazil2011edi.pdf>

Szmolka, Inmaculada. 2011. ‘Democracias y autoritarismos con adjetivos: la clasificación de los países árabes dentro de una tipología general de regímenes políticos’. *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* (26): 11-62.

Volgy, Thomas J. and Sabic, Zlatko, and Roter, Petra, and Gerlak, Andrea K. 2009. *Mapping the New World Order*. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.

Weiss, Thomas G. 2004. ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era’. *Security Dialogue* 35 (2): 135-153.