

## THE DIVIDED SOCIAL MEMORY OF THE GREEK CIVIL WAR IN A VILLAGE OF RODOPI (WESTERN THRACE)

**ABSTRACT:** In this study several aspects of the divided *social memory* of the Greek civil war in the village Thrylorio of Rodopi in Thrace are considered. Its aim is to investigate how the history of the civil war is represented and experienced today by the inhabitants of the village, to visualize the atmosphere of the civil war period through the personal testimonies of its people. In particular, the present study examines the relation of the central political stage to the actual events that took place at the local level of the village, whether and to what extent the “local” was influenced by the central political stage of the two main opponent parties. The discussion is made within the perspective of the concepts of *violence* of civil wars, *memory* and *social memory*. The main methodological tools used are oral history and unpublished historical sources.

**KEY WORDS:** Social memory, Greek civil war, Oral history, Violence, Thrace, Thrylorio.

**RESUMEN:** Se analizan en este trabajo diversos aspectos de la *memoria social* dividida sobre la guerra civil griega en el pueblo de Trilorio de Ródope (Tracia). Su objetivo es investigar de qué manera la historia de la guerra civil es recordada y experimentada hoy por los habitantes de la localidad, reconstruir la atmósfera del periodo de la guerra civil a través de los testimonios personales de sus habitantes. En particular, se estudia la relación entre el escenario político central y los acontecimientos que tuvieron lugar en la villa, si los sucesos locales se vieron influidos por el escenario político central de enfrentamiento entre los dos principales contendientes y en qué medida. La discusión se enmarca dentro de la perspectiva de los conceptos de *violencia* en las guerras civiles, *memoria* y *memoria social*. Las principales herramientas de trabajo empleadas son la historia oral y fuentes históricas inéditas.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Memoria social, guerra civil griega, historia oral, violencia, Tracia, Tilorio.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The present study focuses on violence during the Greek civil war and how it is recollected by the inhabitants of a small village in the present time. In particular, I examine the microdynamics of such violence at a village of Northern Greece, Thrylorion of Rodopi, which suffered the consequences of the Greek civil war (1943–49) and thus constitutes an interesting case for study. The view that the local dimension of the historical research, the *micro element*, is likely to offer us an interesting perspective of the wider picture of the historical event, *the macro element*, under investigation has been widely accepted. The study of the “specific” does not mean to allow us the discovery of a different reality, but it can help us discriminate the subjects’ individual behaviour along with their motives and their particular actions. The value of the study of history at microlevels lies in the fact that it allows the possibility of recording social, political and economic manifestations and other qualitative elements that are absolutely necessary for a holistic view of things, enhancing thus the likelihood for a more objective discussion of the issues under investigation<sup>1</sup>. Microhistory, as a method of study (mainly of the Italian history school of C. Ginzburg and C. Poni) puts to the limelight the person as a subject and as a special entity and not as an abstract lever of the historic procedure<sup>2</sup>. It directs the attention to the humble, unknown person and their everyday subjective experiences. In contrast to the “frozen” history, it attempts to attribute the conditions / situations to “the human acceptance and temperature”<sup>3</sup>. Nowadays a shift of the scientific interest from the protagonists of history to the study of the individual or collective subjects has continually gained the ground allowing a more detailed mapping of the civil wars with robust local research projects.

<sup>1</sup> See Stathis KALYVAS, «Εμφύλιος πόλεμος (1943-1949): Το τέλος των μύθων και η στροφή προς το μαζικό επίπεδο», *Επιστήμη και Κοινωνία* 11 (2003), pp. 42, 44, 37-70; IDEM, «Armed collaboration in Greece, 1941-1944», *European Revue of History* 15: 2 (2008), p. 142; N. MARANTZIDES, «Τοπικές διαστάσεις του ελληνικού εμφυλίου πολέμου, 1943-1945: μεθοδολογικές επισημάνσεις», *Αρχαιοτάζιο* 5 (2003) 112-120.

<sup>2</sup> See Paraskevi KOPSIDA-VRETTOU, «Λογογραφία-Μικροϊστορία. Από τη συνολική θέαση στη “μελέτη περίπτωσης”», in: Chr. VEIKOU (ED.), *Seminario* 29 (2003), pp. 40-53.

<sup>3</sup> See Alex. ARGYRIUOY, *Αναμνηλαφήσεις σε δύσκολους καιρούς*, Αθήνα 1986, p. 52.

Violence is the analysis tool employed in this study. In particular, the present research focuses on violence and, in particular, on the microdynamics of violence as aforementioned. I regard civil war violence as “a social and political action”, as a social event which takes its form in a concrete framework of social relationships, as a “holistic social event”, as Marcel Mauss characterises it. In this sense, I consider it necessary to interpret its manifestations holistically on the basis of the particular historical circumstance and, most importantly, on the basis of the purposes and motives of the parties that perpetrate it. Therefore, violence is taken to be a dependent variable. I take the view that through the intercorrelations of the manifestations of violence, which are different in the Greek civil war case, a better understanding of its various phases can be achieved. Using a particular example, I aim at proving that the manifestations of violence can offer us a special angle for the study of the character of the conflict. The fundamental principle of the “discrimination between the civil war and the civil violence” is my starting point<sup>4</sup>. By “civil violence” I refer to the one perpetrated at the rear territories against civilians and not the one in the frontline of the war or in barricades which belongs to the conventional civil wars as defined by Laia Balcells<sup>5</sup>. More specifically, the forms of civil violence encountered in the present case study, which constitute the basis for the analysis of my data, abiding with Kalyvas’ schematic suggestion, are as follows:

a) the institutional “white” / “right” violence: this is the violence massively used by the official politics and State constitutions (the army, the police, etc.) or extra military groups (the so-called “white terrorism”) against “left” civilians<sup>6</sup> during the civil war.

b) the “left violence”: this is the violence perpetrated by D.S.E. (Democratic Army of Greece) which is constituted by the post 1946 united “left” insurgent groups of the previous period (1941-1946), their hegemonic figures and their politicians<sup>7</sup>. To the view of their opponents, this violence is the work

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<sup>4</sup> See Hannah ARENDT, *On violence*, New York 1970.

<sup>5</sup> Laia BARCELLS, «Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against civilians in conventional civil wars», *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2010) 291-313.

<sup>6</sup> For a totally different view on these “armed collaboration” bodies see Stathis KALYVAS, «Armed collaboration...»

<sup>7</sup> Kalyvas talks about a “system of terrorism” which aimed at the forced collaboration of the incombantants and at maximising the control over them: see «Κόκκινη τρομοκρατία: η βία της Αριστεράς στην Κατοχή», in: Mark MAZOWER (ED.), *Μετά τον πόλεμο. Η ανασυγκρότηση της οικογένειας, του έθνους και του κράτους στην Ελλάδα, 1943-1960*, transl. by Irini Theophylaktopoulou, Αθήνα 2003, p. 175.

of the “miasma of the nation”, the “Bolsheviks”, the “guerillas” or the “agents of slavian communism”<sup>8</sup>.

Both the above forms of violence (in the Greek case and not only in it) were perpetrated “privately” and “publicly”. However, a third form of violence was entwined within the above forms, the “dark face of social capital”<sup>9</sup> according to Kalyvas, discussed below.

c) the “private individual violence”: this is the selective violence perpetrated by individuals against individuals. In this case the view that people enlist in a certain organisation driven by their ideology or a common motive does not seem to be valid. It is true that the Greek civil war<sup>10</sup> was the ideological conflict between two opponent sides<sup>11</sup>. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that it was also the ground for the conflict among individuals who had a particular left or right identity but who also had roles, personal problems and psychological complexes or were spurred by various motives when joining either side. During the civil war certain personal concerns or chronic personal tensions, which had no connection to the ideological aspect, were settled down<sup>12</sup>. It is true that during peace periods the social relations and the law do not allow for violence to be used. During a civil war anomy condition, however, all these deterrents are put aside and this is the main reason that, to my view, the civil war violence tends to be the most repulsive one.

<sup>8</sup> See inter alia V. GOUNARIS, *Εγνωσμένων κοινωνικών φρονημάτων. Κοινωνικές και άλλες όψεις του αντικομμουνισμού στη Μακεδονία του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου*, Θεσσαλονίκη 2002, pp. 57 onwards, 197-198.

<sup>9</sup> Stathis KALYVAS, *The logic of violence in civil war*, Cambridge 2006, p. 351.

<sup>10</sup> For a comprehensive bibliography on the Greek civil war see N. ΚΟΥΛΟΥΡΙΣ, *Ελληνική βιβλιογραφία του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου, 1945-1949*, Αθήνα 2000. Some additional elements are provided in the work of Str. DORDANAS and Iak. MICHAILIDES, in: I. MOURELOS-Iak. MICHAILIDES (EDS), *Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος. Μια αποτίμηση. Πολιτικές, ιδεολογικές, ιστοριογραφικές προεκτάσεις*, Αθήνα 2007<sup>2</sup>, pp. 183-194.

<sup>11</sup> These two sides, however, were wider than the two extreme poles of the left and the right. In particular, the right side hosted a variety of supporters of former political parties, as mentioned later in this study. See George MAVROGORDATOS, «Οι διαστάσεις του κομματικού φαινομένου στην Ελλάδα: παραδείγματα από τον Μεσοπόλεμο», in: G. ΚΟΝΤΟΓΙΩΡΓΙΣ (ED.), *Κοινωνικές και πολιτικές δυνάμεις στην Ελλάδα*, Αθήνα 1977, pp. 153-173.

<sup>12</sup> See Manolis G. SERGIS, «“Μας έβαλαν τα ποτάμια μπροστά αφ’ όντις έρθαν στα χωριά αυτοί οι αντίχριστοι”: μνήμες γυναικών της Ηπείρου από τον Ελληνικό Εμφύλιο στο πεζογράφημα του Σωτήρη Δημητρίου *Σαν το λίγο το νερό* (2008)», *Erytheia* 32 (2011), pp. 424-425.

## 2. THE STUDY: METHOD AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The present study started with free or semi-structured interviews. When a saturation point was reached, I continued with structured ones. More specifically, I focused thereon on the recurring topics, common ground and recollections and proceeded with a more in-depth examination of them. My study therefore is a presentation of the “social memory”<sup>13</sup> of the particular village, with “oral history”<sup>14</sup> being my main methodological tool. The pool of my data derives from the narrations of the first and second generation inhabitants of the village and their offsprings, who all witnessed and experienced as observers or were involved in the events. Twenty informants were used (ten women and ten men) who belong to both ideological sides of the village. The first ones, whom I collectively hereon call “the left”, are supporters of the Greek Communist party and all belong to one of the two founding population groups of the village, the *Kaukasians*<sup>15</sup>. The remaining “non-left” are a mishmash of various political identities, namely, right-wing, middle-wing, nationalists, royalists, supporters of Venizelos, etc., whom I call collectively “right or nationalists” for practicality reasons. They mainly belong to the second founding population group of the village, the *Pontioti*s.

The modern considerations of the *Self*<sup>16</sup> maintain that the recollection procedure has a purely individualistic dimension, affecting thus what the informants choose to remember or consciously put to oblivion. These facts, along with the possible reasons that affect the informants’ recollection procedure and the possibility of interference of the present time, have all been taken into consideration in my study. I have also taken into consideration the way memory functions, which, according to Halbwachs, acts as a filter of the past events that aims at conserving the images that support the identity of the group in the present time<sup>17</sup>. In this vein, he further maintains that memory

<sup>13</sup> Anna COLLARD, «Διερευνώντας την “κοινωνική μνήμη” στον ελλαδικό χώρο», in: E. PAPA-THIARCHIS-Th. PARADELLIS (EDS.), *Ανθρωπολογία και παρελθόν. Συμβολές στην κοινωνική ιστορία της νεότερης Ελλάδας*, Αθήνα 1993, pp. 357-89.

<sup>14</sup> See Paul THOMPSON, *The voice of the past: Oral History*, London-N. York 2000<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> 80% of the *Kaukasians* of this village were left. See Manolis G. SERGIS, «Η “περιπέτεια” μιας τοπικής ταυτότητας: πραγματικοί και συμβολικοί ανταγωνισμοί σε ένα ποντιακό χωριό της Ροδόπης (1923-1970)», in: Iak. AKTSOGLOU-E. THOMADAKI-G. SALAKIDES-M. G. SERGIS (EDS.), *Εόρτιος τόμος για την δεκαετηρίδα του Τμήματος Γλώσσας, Φιλολογίας και Πολιτισμού Παραξενίων Χωρών*, Θεσσαλονίκη 2010, pp. 249-269.

<sup>16</sup> Dimitra GEFOU-MADIANOU (ED.), *Εαυτός και Άλλος. Ενωσιολογήσεις, ταυτότητες και πρακτικές στην Ελλάδα και την Κύπρο*, Αθήνα 2003.

<sup>17</sup> Anna MANTOGLOU, *Μνήμες. Ατομικές, συλλογικές, ιστορικές*, Αθήνα 2005, p. 73.

uses the “social frameworks”<sup>18</sup> to reconstruct an image of the past time in a way that fits the dominant conceptions of the society in each period of time<sup>19</sup>. The persons use them to determine and recognise their recollections<sup>20</sup> and it is them that allow the reconstruction of the past through the current meanings and conditions. In this sense, memory is no longer purely individual since it is interrelated to society. The persons have their own personality and personal recollections, but they are also contributors to the effort to keep personal recollections that interest their social group<sup>21</sup>. Both memories, collective and personal, intermingle with each other, the personal being the most vulnerable one to replacements, differentiations or transformations. The collective memory includes the personal ones and does not necessarily coincide with them, despite the fact that some personal memories might intrude in it changing in form by being put in a whole, which is no longer the personal consciousness of the individual<sup>22</sup>.

A second pool of data of this research comes from unpublished primary historical documents. These are sources that echo the written memory of the right wing. Written records of the “opposite side” have not been located.

Some problems that I encountered while the collection of my data were as follows. The first problem had to do with the actual use of the term “civil war” itself, which is used by the left-wing informants. Instead, the nationalists talk about “sedition”<sup>23</sup>. Another problem was the starting year of the civil war. Based on their experiences, they maintain that the civil war started when the Powers of Axe were defeated, their allies (Bulgarians) withdrew from their village (September 1944) and the E.A.M. (National Liberation Front) came to power. The end of the civil war is set in 1949, one year after the tragic event described below. I draw your attention to the fact that after the liberation of Thrace from the Bulgarians (September 1944) the administration of the village was assigned by the Greek government to the left<sup>24</sup>. This lasted for a six-month period (until March 1945).

<sup>18</sup> Maurice HALBWACHS, *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris 1925.

<sup>19</sup> M. HALBWACHS, *La memoire collective*, pref. de Jean Duvignaud, introd. de J. Michel Alexandre, Paris 1968<sup>2</sup>, p. 45 onwards.

<sup>20</sup> Anna MANTOGLOU, *Μνήμες...*, p. 49.

<sup>21</sup> M. HALBWACHS, *Les cadres...*, p. 79.

<sup>22</sup> M. HALBWACHS, *Les cadres...*, pp. 25-26.

<sup>23</sup> See N. SIDERIS, «Το εμφύλιο σπέρμα. Αντίσταση και Εμφύλιος ως φαντασίωση», *Δοκίμες* 4 (1996) 189-203.

<sup>24</sup> See Hans VERMEULEN, «Το βάρος του παρελθόντος. Η εξουσία των καπετάνιων στο χωριό του Κάιν και του Άβελ», in: E. ΠΑΠΑΤΑΧΙΑΡΧΙΣ-Th. ΠΑΡΑΔΕΛΛΙΣ (EDS.), *Ανθρωπολογία και παρελθόν...*, p. 119; St. ASCHENBRENNER, «Ο εμφύλιος από την οπτική ενός μεσοηνιακού χωριού», in: L. BAERENTZEN-I.

### 3. THE SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL DATA OF THE FIELD OF RESEARCH

Thyrlorio of Rodopi was founded in 1923 by two refugee groups of Pontian origin. The first one came from villages of the area of Kars (Russia nowadays) and the second one from villages of Kerasounta and Sampsounta of Minor Asia. They are correspondingly called *Kaukasioi* and *Pontiots* in the present study<sup>25</sup>. Therefore, this is a village of a mixed ethnic character, which, however, as mentioned later, is not a determinant factor of the events presented below.

Until the end of the Bulgarian occupation (1941-44), the village enjoyed a remarkable continuously developing economic welfare<sup>26</sup>. In this twenty-year period, based primarily on agriculture and secondarily on cattle, the village managed to surpass the difficult first years of the refugee settlement, increase in population and march towards a promising future. However, the Bulgarian occupation (1941-44), with the requisition of goods, the heavy taxation on the economic resources, the ideological terrorism, etc.<sup>27</sup>, stopped the progress of the village in many domains. Other deterrent factors were a) the negative consequences of the national defence war in Albania against Fascist Italians (2<sup>nd</sup> world war), where many men of the village fought, and b) the resistance war against the Bulgarians (allies of Germans and Italians), a task undertaken mainly by the group of the *Kaukasians*, which, as will be discussed later, is related to the civil war drama that followed. Equality in poverty characterised all members of the community until the temporal point of this study, therefore economic or class differences are excluded as possible reasons for what will be described below<sup>28</sup>.

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IATRIDES-O. SMITH (EDS.), *Μελέτες για τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο, 1945-1949*, transl. Aristeia Parissi, Αθήνα 1992, p. 129 onwards; Mark MAZOWER, *Στην Ελλάδα του Χίτλερ. Η εμπειρία της Κατοχής*, transl. K. Kouremenos, Αθήνα 1994, p. 293 onwards.

<sup>25</sup> For more elements on the origin of the inhabitants and the odyssey of their settlement in the village, see Manolis G. SERGIS, «Η αποκατάσταση των προσφύγων στη δυτική Θράκη (1923-1930): “σκηνές” από την εγκατάσταση των Ποντίων στο Θυρλόριο Κομοτηνής», in: M. G. VARVOUNIS (ED.), *Θράκη. Ιστορική και λαογραφική προσέγγιση του λαϊκού πολιτισμού της*, Αθήνα 2006, pp. 311-344; Manolis G. SERGIS, «Ένα χωρίο ποντιακό κε μπορεί να έχ' ένα ξένο όνομα: ιδεολογήματα, παρετυμολογίες και ιστορική ερμηνεία του τοπωνυμίου ενός ποντιακού χωριού της Ροδόπης», in: Manolis G. SERGIS (ED.), *Πόντος. Θέματα Λαογραφίας του ποντιακού ελληνισμού*, Αθήνα 2008, pp. 373-389.

<sup>26</sup> Manolis G. SERGIS, «Η αποκατάσταση των προσφύγων...»

<sup>27</sup> See Xanthippi KOTZAGEORGI-ZYMARI, *Η βουλγαρική κατοχή στην ανατολική Μακεδονία και Θράκη*, Θεσσαλονίκη 2002; EADEM, «Αναμνήσεις από τη βουλγαρική κατοχή της δυτικής Μακεδονίας: τρεις γενιές», in: Mark MAZOWER (ED.), *Μετά τον πόλεμο...*, p. 297 onwards.

<sup>28</sup> See Stathis KALYVAS, «Κόκκινη τρομοκρατία...», p. 163.

There was indeed a predominance of the *Kaukasians* over the *Pontiot*s, but this had only to do with the admitted by all informants cultural superiority of this group. More specifically, the *Kaukasians* were the most educated ones in the community and the ones who visualized and designed whatever had to do with the previously mentioned progress and welfare of the village, namely, the school, the church, the first agricultural association (1924)<sup>29</sup>. This creative action is substantiated by the fact that they led the agricultural association and the community, «they even had their own priest», reports one of my informants<sup>30</sup>. Their political hegemony was based on their cultural superiority and political influence. The *Pontiot*s had a blind confidence in them and their choices.

The two groups had only cultural differences as aforementioned, which were exhibited at a symbolic level as I have shown in another study<sup>31</sup>. The *Pontiot*s were more “conservative” as contrasted to the *Kaukasians*, who were “cosmopolitans” as shown in their beautiful and luxurious way of dressing, their European dancing culture (as opposed to the *Pontiot*s’ traditional dancing) and the rather “beyond ethical borders” behaviour. Their identification with the communist ideology was inevitable due to their coexistence (1917 onwards) with the Soviet Union *statu quo*. Consequently, they belonged to the left wing in their vast majority and they themselves admitted it: the village was one of the “Small Moscows” of Greece<sup>32</sup>. The *Pontiot*s were in their vast majority supporters of Venizelos (the prominent leader of the liberal party, a party of the Centre)<sup>33</sup> until 1945. Then on many of them joined the right. Indeed, most right informants verify that their parents were supporters of Venizelos before the civil war. They joined the right side out of reaction to the experienced or constructed propangadised historical reality about the left side. The D.S.E. and his political representatives’ ideology and practices were alien and hostile to them and created negative attitudes translated into mere repulsiveness or action: the communists’ atheism, the vio-

<sup>29</sup> Manolis G. SERGIS, «Η αποκατάσταση των προσφύγων...», p. 335.

<sup>30</sup> Manolis G. SERGIS, «Η “περιπέτεια” μιας τοπικής ταυτότητας...», p. 259.

<sup>31</sup> Manolis G. SERGIS, «Η “περιπέτεια” μιας τοπικής ταυτότητας...», pp. 249-269.

<sup>32</sup> N. MARANTZIDES, *Οι Μικρές Μόσχες. Πολιτική και εκλογική ανάλυση της παρουσίας του κομμουνισμού στον ελληνικό αγροτικό χώρο*, Αθήνα 1997.

<sup>33</sup> This was representative of the vast majority (70%-80%) of the 1922 refugees. They joined the Venizelos’ party out of a strong belief that it was the only political party that really wished their integration in the Greek State. This political decision was heavily revenged by the right side. See. N. MARANTZIDES, *Γιασασίν Μιλλέτ: Ζήτη το έθνος. Προσφυγιά, Κατοχή και Εμφύλιος. Εθνοτική ταυτότητα και πολιτική συμπεριφορά στους τουρκόφωνους ελληνορθόδοξους του δυτικού Πόντου*, Ηράκλειο 2001, p. 100 onwards.



lence perpetrated by them and other real events or propaganda that the right side accused them of. In this sense, they probably changed their political orientation out of willingness to get rid of the *stigma* of communism. This new right political identity remained with them for a long time. Indeed, the electoral results after 1950 reveal an outperformance of the right side until 1981, when Greece became “green” (the colour of the socialist party) and voted massively for PA.SO.K., Andreas Papandreou’s socialist party. Then on there has been a balance between PA.SO.K. and the right in the village with either side outperforming the other depending on the general acceptance of each party in Greece.

I consider it useful for my discussion to mention at this point the widely spread negative representations<sup>34</sup> of the *Kaukasians* by the dominant State ideology in the Greek territory after 1922. It was the first intact group that was integrated in the Greek left<sup>35</sup> because of the aforementioned influences of the communist ideology in Russia. This was the reason they were attacked by the representatives of the bourgeois conservatives; to them they were undisciplined, lacking in nationalism and constituted an unwelcome refugee group in Greek Macedonia because they were not expected to strengthen the Greek ethnological formation of its population, its Greekness. They belonged thus to the area of the *Others* since their arrival in the Greek territory. In this sense Thrylorion, which was inhabited by a large number of *Kaukasians* as already mentioned, was a village well known for its left-minded spirit and constituted a special case. This parameter allows us to interpret to a great extent the magnitude of the three dimensional violence perpetrated in its area.

What needs to be stressed is that:

a) The peak of the civil war drama in the village was not caused by the aforementioned symbolic rivalry between the two groups of the village, which was of a cultural nature as discussed above. Indeed, such evidence has not been able to be traced during my six-year long field research. All informants agree unanimously that this parameter had no role at all in what happened in their village.

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<sup>34</sup> From the continually enriched relevant bibliography, see Marcel MAUSS-Emil DURKHEIM, *On some primitive forms of classification. Contribution to the study of collective representations*, transl. Antonis Georgoulas, Athens 2001; Serge MOSCOVICI, *Social representations. Explorations in social psychology*, edited by G. DUVEEN, Cambridge 2000; Kay DEAUX, Gina PHILOGÈNE, *Representations of the social*, Oxford 2001; Jean MAISONNEUVE, *Εισαγωγή στην Ψυχοκοινωνιολογία*, transl. N. Christakis, Athens 2001, pp. 233-241.

<sup>35</sup> A. ATHANASSIADES-Chr. MICHAILIDES, *Γεννηθείς εις Καύκασον Ρωσίας*, Αθήνα 2010.

b) The two opponent political groups of the village were not involved in bloody military clashes against each other; there was not a civil “within the walls” conflict, feuds<sup>36</sup>, ethnic conflict<sup>37</sup> or civil violence during the Bulgarian occupation<sup>38</sup>. In this sense, the conflict between the “nationalists” and the “left” cannot be associated to past political cleavages, since local dynamics of political rivalries did not exist in the area before 1945<sup>39</sup>. It was only after this year that political reasons appeared in the conflict, which were intensified because of certain events mentioned below in this work and, most importantly, because of the interventions of the “central” opponent powers and their local political representative mechanisms. The view espoused in this study is, however, that even if central politics played a significant role during the conflict, the local, endogenous dynamics of the civil war are worth studying, as will be illustrated in this study.

c) In Thrace, the political influence of the Greek Communist party (K. K. E.) was quite limited, especially after 1930.

d) Similar events to those recorded in this study, but on a lower scale, took place in the wider area of Rodopi and other villages around Thrylorion. It cannot be considered a coincidence that these villages had quite a high percentage of communists among their inhabitants.

e) The geographical factor might prove important. In particular, the northern, neighbouring with Bulgaria, part of Rodopi is a mountainous, difficult to approach area. Such areas have been discussed as having a statistically greater possibility to host civil war.

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<sup>36</sup> See Stathis KALYVAS, «Κόκκινη τρομοκρατία...», pp. 161-204.

<sup>37</sup> See R. ALVANOS, «Μεταπολεμικές πολιτικές και εθνοτικές συγκρούσεις: ο ελληνικός εμφύλιος πόλεμος στην περιοχή Καστοριάς», *Επιστήμη και Κοινωνία* 11 (2003) 71-110; N. MARANTZIDES, «Εθνοτικές διαστάσεις του εμφυλίου πολέμου: η περίπτωση των τουρκόφωνων Ποντίων καπετανίων της Μακεδονίας», in: Elias NIKOLAKOPOULOS (ED.), *Ο εμφύλιος πόλεμος. Από τη Βάρκιζα στο Γράμμο (Φεβρουάριος 1945-Αύγουστος 1949)*, Αθήνα 2002, pp. 208-221.

<sup>38</sup> See Stathis KALYVAS, «Η γεωγραφία της εμφύλιας βίας στην κατοχική Μεσσηνία. Μια ποσοτική προσέγγιση», <https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:2KeXzowG1UJ:stathis.research.yale.edu/-documents/messinia.kalyvas.revised.pdf>

<sup>39</sup> For the issue of “polarization” see the theoretical postulations by Stathis KALYVAS, *The logic of violence...*, pp. 6, 74 onwards.

#### 4. THE FOCI OF THE “PRIVILEGED MEMORY” OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE VILLAGE<sup>40</sup>

The elements that constitute the informants’ “privileged” memory depicted in their narrations and the written documents I investigated all focus on violent events. The first violent event that will be discussed and interpreted below is the massive running away of the left population to Bulgaria in 1948.

##### 4.1. The “massive flight” (March, the 13<sup>th</sup>, and April, the 4<sup>th</sup>, 1948) and its causes. Voluntarily or violently expatriated?

One of my informants remembers that the news for the evacuation of the village was announced in Komotini, where her family members had moved, the day following to the event, Sunday. Indeed, the 13<sup>th</sup> of March 1948 was Saturday. Another informant reports on the first wave of the evacuation that «tonight the village was evacuated». The second wave (April, 4<sup>th</sup>, 1948) is described as follows: «what you could see were loaded horse-carts with few utensils and a little food for the journey. Mainly women were moved away. Earlier [according to another informant] the left insurgents had come down to the village to take the women, assemble them at the old windmill of the village and take them up to the mountain Poutfere». Chryssoula Kyriakides narrates that «none, not even the left had suspected or foreseen the upcoming expedition». Her own sister (who was one of those who left) had kept it a secret due to her pregnancy, while her children played with their cousins only some time before the running away. These two dates are inscribed in the social memory of the village as an ill-omened day, because they signalled the complete destruction of the village which has never recovered since<sup>41</sup>. To my informants the flight of the left had started earlier sporadically with the leading left figures of the village who acted in this way either out of devotion to their left mission or to avoid the right violence.

The oral testimonies of the inhabitants of both sides, left and right, along with the written documents I have in my possession agree on the number of the families and the corresponding number of people who voluntarily or violently left the village those days. They were 40-44 families and 200 or 220 persons. In one of the documents (nr. 2, dated May 18<sup>th</sup>, 1949, and signed by the president of the village) the number is 214 persons described as follows by the president of the village:

<sup>40</sup> For the term “privileged memory” see Maria ΘΑΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΥ, *Η προφορική μνήμη του πολέμου. Διερεύνηση της συλλογικής μνήμης του Β΄ Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου στους επιζώντες ενός χωριού της Λευκάδας*, Αθήνα 2000, p. 121.

<sup>41</sup> See Anna COLLARD, «Διερευνώντας την κοινωνική μνήμη...», p. 381.

128 adults who joined the camp of the left insurgents (voluntarily)  
 78 abducted children  
 7 adults who were forcibly mobilized  
 1 abducted adult<sup>42</sup>

Another document (nr. 1, dated August 16<sup>th</sup>, 1948, signed by the president of the village: «List of names of the parents of the abducted by the insurgents children») comes to confirm the above numbers. The number of the children on this list is indeed 78 and they are listed according to their age as follows: 1-5 years old: 29; 6-10 years old: 20; 11-15 years old: 29.

The collective memory is divided for the case of the 78 children<sup>43</sup>. Some report that they were taken by the left army to be carried and saved from the consequences of the civil war beyond the Greek frontier<sup>44</sup> (the left labeled this “children caretaking”). The children were taken to Bulgaria, to this view, in order to be protected from fascism and the orphanages directed by queen Frideriki. The right side, however, call this *paidomazoma* (children abduction)<sup>45</sup>.

The document nr. 3 is titled as «list of names of the Thrylorion families who joined the insurgents’ camp on the April, the 4<sup>th</sup>, 1948» and mentions the persons who left during the second wave of the evacuation of the village. There are 60 fugitives in this list. Most people are women and children this time. Taking into account that 214 persons were expatriated from the village,

<sup>42</sup> To the same document five men and one woman (from the enlisted ones) were arrested or surrendered. After their escape, three persons (from those forcibly mobilised) surrendered.

<sup>43</sup> Th. MITSOPOULOS, «Η αποστολή των παιδιών στις χώρες της ανατολικής Ευρώπης κατά την διάρκεια του Εμφυλίου (1946-49)», in: Eft. VOUTYRA-V. DALKAPOUKIS-N. MARANTZIDES-Maria BODILA (EDS.), *Το όπλο παρά πόδα. Οι πολιτικοί πρόσφυγες του εμφυλίου πολέμου στην ανατολική Ευρώπη, Θεσσαλονίκη 2005*, p. 77, reports that 2.000 children were settled in Bulgaria. Left sources provide larger numbers, at least 25.000. To Baev, who used the Greek Red Cross documents, 2.660 children were in Bulgaria in January 1950. See Iordan BAEV, «Έλληνες πολιτικοί πρόσφυγες στη Βουλγαρία», in: Kl. KOUTSOUKIS-I. SAKKAS (EDS.), *Πτυχές του εμφυλίου πολέμου 1946-1949*, Αθήνα 2001, p. 58.

<sup>44</sup> Demos VOGIATZOPOULOS, *Η Ξάνθη πριν και μετά τον Β΄ Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο*, Ξάνθη 2008, p. 477.

<sup>45</sup> Tassoula VERVENIOTI, «Περί “παιδομαζώματος” και “παιδοφυλάγματος” λόγος ή τα παιδιά στη δίνη της εμφύλιας διαμάχης», in: Eft. VOUTYRA-V. DALKAPOUKIS-N. MARANTZIDES-Maria BODILA (EDS.), *Το όπλο παρά πόδα...*, pp. 101-123; Irini LAGANI, *Το “παιδομάζωμα” και οι ελληνογιουγκοσλαβικές σχέσεις (1949-1953). Μια κριτική προσέγγιση*, Αθήνα 1996; G. GAGOULIAS, “Παιδομάζωμα”. *Τα παιδιά στη θύελλα του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου και μετά*, Αθήνα 2004; G. MANOUKAS, *Παιδομάζωμα, το μεγάλο έγκλημα κατά της φυλής*, Αθήνα 1961; L. BAERENTZEN, «Το “παιδομάζωμα” και οι παιδουπόλεις της βασιλίσσας», in: L. BAERENTZEN-I. IATRIDES-Ole SMITH (EDS.), *Μελέτες για τον εμφύλιο πόλεμο, 1945-1949*, pp. 67-164.

as proven earlier, it can be deduced that the list of the first wave included 160 persons, mostly of the male gender.

A safe proof of the significant reduction of the population of Thrylorion is the official census documents from 1928 (the first one) until 1951 (three years after the evacuation tragedy):

1928	433 inhabitants
1940	713 inhabitants
1951	584 inhabitants

Document nr. 6 (dated 1945, December 19<sup>th</sup>, unofficial census signed by the president of the village) reveals that 390 persons were lost from the body of the community between 1940 and 1951.

The question whether these people were violently or voluntarily expatriated provided two answers and directly or indirectly revealed the causes of this tragedy: to the former, the “right violence”, and to the latter, the “left” one. More specifically:

a) The right (white) violence: «We ran away to the mountain because we were hunted down being left». This is the core of every left narration. There are no ideological reasons or “pressure” from their duty to the party they belong to, which is probably the case only for the leading figures of the village. To my left informants, the condition in the village after 1945 turned to be un-supportable and they hold the State administration responsible for this situation. In particular, they report that they were surveilled and controlled by the policemen day and night, they were hunted down, beaten and repeatedly called for interrogations. This terrorism on the part of the State administration tended to increase as years passed.

Some informants of the right (none of the left) verify that this violence on the part of the right administration increased due to incriminating evidence against the left administrators who were in power during the period September 1944-March 1945<sup>46</sup> when, as mentioned above, were given this authority by the Greek government. In particular, the left community administrators of that period were accused of having blacklisted (proscribed) 18 persons, who managed to escape the death penalty thanks to the shift of power to the National Government. The right informants also stress that du-

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<sup>46</sup> Information on the “folk power” during this period can be found in N. MARANTZIDES, «Το κράτος του Γράμμου. Όψεις της κομμουνιστικής εξουσίας στην Ελλάδα, 1943-1949», in: I. MOURELOS-Iak. MICHAILIDES (EDS.), *Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος...*, pp. 89-94.

ring that period some of the *Kaukasians* of the village were quite provocative by insulting the king and the royal constitution which was communicated to the authorities. The *Kaukasians'* abstention in the elections of 1946 was another factor that contributed to the right violent behaviour against them since the persons who did not vote that day confirmed their communist / left identity<sup>47</sup>.

There are 5 or 6 villagers of the right who bring to the left informants loathing recollections. They systematically perpetrated selective violence against some of the left. They would blackmail innocent villagers to denounce them to the authorities. One, in particular, according to my informants, walked around the village accompanied by policemen and threatened the left families, especially those of the leaders. «Every morning the policeman was out of the door» for interrogations or to elicit information for wanted left persons my informants recollect. The police was after Th. Avramides from 1945 onwards, as his daughter reports. To her, Th. Avramides rarely used his home to sleep at night because the authorities wanted to assassinate him. «This is the reason he decided to run away to the mountain because he was a dead person here in the village and a dead person up there too». The verbs used by the daughter-informant reveal important meanings: others decided to take him away; he would not consent to this because he had disagreed anyway with the choices / decisions of the communist party. «I am a communist of the fields and I am not good enough for the mountain» he kept repeating. All this is probably the cause of his tragic end described later in this work.

Due to the above, persons who had a relation of any kind (friendship, kinship, spiritual relationship, etc.) with the leading group of the left and belonged to the Greek communist party (K.K.E.), as suggested in the narrations, decided to run away to the mountain to save themselves. «My husband ran away to the mountain quite early because he was afraid he would be put in prison. His cousin Th. Avramides had run away first and then on the authorities suspected my husband would cooperate with the insurgents. Very bad times, I remember. Is it a nice thing to leave your home and run away to the mountain?», narrates one lady-informant who was wife to an insurgent and later a political refugee. This woman is crystal clear that if it were not for the right violence she would have never left the comfort of her home to go to the mountains. This is the reason some of my right informants wonder how

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<sup>47</sup> From the plethora of bibliography on the issue of the elections of 1946, see B. KONTIS, «Σταθμοί στην εξέλιξη του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου», in: I. MOURELLOS-Iak. MICHAILIDES (EDS.), *Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος...*, p. 21.

the left took this thoughtless and catastrophic for themselves and the village decision to run away. In their narrations they recollect the abundance of goods these people left behind. The same informants interpret the women's decision to run away (during the second wave) as a result of a false estimation on their part that they would be away for only a short period of time and would return to their homes after the turbulence was over. This is actually why they took with them only the absolutely necessary things from their homes.

As far as these women are concerned, it is beyond any doubt that they paid for their relationship with their husbands and relatives. As mentioned earlier, they left with their children during the second wave of the running away. All my left informants agree that they could no longer endure the selective right violence without the protection of their husbands who had all left for the mountain during the first wave. They report every day threats and thefts of their property by the police that pushed them «to eventually run away to the mountain». This narration suggests a voluntary, conscious, and pre-determined (by their husbands) exit from the village due to the right violence. This sounded as the best solution for them and they do not seem to accept that all this might be part of a wider plan of the left to remove the children and the people from the country (as the right informants suggest). Elisavet Avramidou (listed as abducted, 13 years old in 1948) narrates that her sister went to prison in 1946 because they were after her husband. She also says that her brother was caught in 1947, beaten to death in his own house and carried to Xanthi by train, where he died a few days later<sup>48</sup>. Thanassis Avramides's wife suffered many interrogations and imprisonments. The right informants narrate that some left women complained to their husbands, when they met them on the mountain, about the disastrous impact of their decision to join the insurgents' army and their own decision to follow them. The right informants, therefore, claim that the women repented for their flight but do not accept the violence of their wing as the cause of this action.

b) The left violence against the persons of the same political mind; the recruitments; the politically targeted left violence.

A brief retrospection on the historic canvas of 1948 in Greece will help the reader see the link between the history and the folk historic narrations. In spring 1947, after the announcement of the Trouman plan for the finan-

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<sup>48</sup> In G. GAGOULIAS, «Παιδομάζωμα»..., p. 66.

cial support of Greece and Turkey<sup>49</sup>, Greece was moved to the American sphere of power instead of that of Great Britain. Also, the rift between Tito and Stalin and the consequent dismissal of Yugoslavia from Cominform affected the relations of this country with the Greek left insurgents. The leaders of the Greek communist party chose the soviet camp against the Yugoslavs, who, as revenge to the Greek communists, gradually seized the suppliance of munitions to the D.S.E. The Yugoslavs also started blocking the so far smooth trespassing of their frontiers and finally stopped it (mid 1949). Another important element is the approval of the “plan Lakes” on September, the 10<sup>th</sup>, 1947, according to which the primary strategic duty of D.S.E. was the liberation of all the area of Macedonia-Thrace with Thessaloniki as its centre<sup>50</sup>. This duty required a more massive involvement of fighters and a better organisation. The decision of the 2<sup>nd</sup> subdivision of the Political Bureau of the central committee of the Greek communist party (of December, the 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1947) maintains that there is a delay in the development of “a whole sided people resistance in the cities” and the recruitment of new fighters, and asks for more attention on the part of the headquarters of western, central, eastern Macedonia and western Thrace, which was well behind schedule<sup>51</sup>. The eastern Macedonian headquarters repeatedly reassured that it would double and triple its armed force, but by December 1947 these promises were not fulfilled. The headquarters accused the commanders that they did not have a clear picture of reality and put the blame upon the leaders’ shoulders<sup>52</sup>. At the end of 1948 the insurgents’ force in Thrace numbered 1.800 men<sup>53</sup>. Are all the above connected to the violent recruitment that took place in Thrace this same period of time? All my right informants and many from the left side agree on the fact that there were many violent recruitments, mainly of young persons qualified to fight in the battlefields.

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<sup>49</sup> Th. SFIKAS, «Ένα ιστοριογραφικό ταξίδι στη χώρα του Γκιούλιβερ: η ελληνική ιστοριογραφία και οι διεθνείς διαστάσεις του ελληνικού Εμφυλίου Πολέμου», in: I. MOURELLOS-Iak. MICHAELIDES (EDS.), *Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος...*, p. 68 onwards.

<sup>50</sup> Filippos ILIOU, *Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος. Η εμπλοκή του Κ.Κ.Ε.*, Αθήνα 2005, p. 204. See also D. VOGIATZOPOULOS, *Ξάνθη...*, p. 469. The State plan “Terminous” had preceded aiming at the extermination of the insurgents. The third part expected the liquidation of the opponents between Strymonas and Evros. In May of the same year the division commander Lassanis (from the “other side”) creates the headquarters of Eastern Macedonia-Thrace, where captains Labros, Kriton and Gagoulias acted. This was a subdivision of the general headquarters of the D.S.E. (National Liberation Front).

<sup>51</sup> Filippos ILIOU, *Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος...*, pp. 250, 251.

<sup>52</sup> Filippos ILIOU, *Ο ελληνικός Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος...*, pp. 250, 255.

<sup>53</sup> D. VOGIATZOPOULOS, *Ξάνθη...*, p. 469.



In what follows, cases of people who experienced the civil war and confirm the violent recruitment are cited. The left Yannis Lazarides reported that his “companions” recruited him violently for the D.S.E. because they would not allow him to join the National Army, which was about to happen. Achilleas Nikolaides, one of the most active left members of the civil war drama, narrates that he was violently recruited in December 1947. His aged father was ill and his mother had hidden him, but they found him. «That night they took 20-22 young men». The “invaders” came from Evros (place far away from Thrylorion) and Aetolofos (neighbouring village of Thrylorion). The same informant narrates that there was a type of competition between the insurgent groups as to the places they selected to “attack”. If, for instance, insurgents from Evros invaded Thrylorion and recruited young persons, the Thrylorian insurgents would in turn “attack” an Evrian village. Achilleas describes the living condition at the mountain in the area of Rodopi as very difficult. «I was taken to the mountain and was hosted in a herb hut and was offered three beans and a container of water».

This pressure upon the left extended to the right-wing villagers as well. One day, when the insurgents recruited some other children from the village, captain Nikos Papageorgiou (Thrylorian) asked from Kyriakides (a person of the right according to most of my informants) to follow him to the mountain saying to him: «we need even the fanatic of the right side»<sup>54</sup>. Kyriakides escaped the recruitment thanks to his friendship to the captain. Other insurgents from another division went back to take him later, but his wife lied to them that he had already joined the insurgent forces earlier with N. Papageorgiou. Another case is that of Elias, who had been recruited violently but with his parents’ consent. He had decided to desert, but his parents convinced him to stay with the insurgents as they had decided to join them as well. According to one informant, he came to his village in a miserable condition to ask for some clothes and shoes from one of his aunts for a last time and he was killed some days later.

The Thrylorian women who ran away from their village were some of the “temporarily hosted in Bulgaria”<sup>55</sup> women refugees<sup>56</sup>. The neighbouring country was an entrance gate for the leadership of the Greek communist party

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<sup>54</sup> These fanatic supporters of the right were called *Bourantades* after the head of the police during the fascist/nazist occupation, *Bourantas*.

<sup>55</sup> Katerina ΤΣΕΚΟΥ, *Προσωρινώς διαμένοντες. Έλληνες πολιτικοί πρόσφυγες στη Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία της Βουλγαρίας (1948-1982)*, Θεσσαλονίκη 2010.

<sup>56</sup> The Greek refugees were called “temporarily hosted” by the official Bulgarians at the beginning. See Katerina ΤΣΕΚΟΥ, *Προσωρινώς διαμένοντες...*, p. 135.

during the civil war and a subsequent supporter of the D.S.E. fight by providing financial and material aid<sup>57</sup>. 1793 adults and 1752 children refugees had found shelter in this country until June 1948<sup>58</sup>. From 1950 onwards this number decreased because other communist countries had accepted in the meantime (with the approval of Moscow) to host Greek refugees of the civil war<sup>59</sup>. Few Thrylorians remained in Bulgaria<sup>60</sup> (only 30 families to my estimation). Their majority moved to Romania first and then to Czechoslovakia, eastern and western Germany, Poland and Russia. Almost all their descendants have returned to Thrylorion till today.

I have so far reported the violence inflicted by the left on people who had the same political spirit. I will proceed with other manifestations of violence by the left.

#### 4.2. The “strange” deaths of two leading figures of the left, Thanassis and Nikolas Avramides

Thanassis Avramides (captain Thivaioi in D.S.E.) was one of the protagonists of the political life of the village. He had served the army during the war against the Italians in Albania, had been imprisoned and tortured violently in Komotini during the Bulgarian occupation. «His hands were badly injured and so he had to trail his sleeping mattress with his teeth when he was moved from one cell to the other», said my informant. He was later exiled as a political refugee to Bulgaria by the Bulgarian occupational administration. After Bulgarians had left and during the six-month rule of the people in Thrylorion he was assigned a leading role. His daughter remembers the night when he was taken to the mountain by the insurgents (November 17, 1946). The same informant narrates that his best man Nikolas Avramides kept saying that «Thanassis talks a lot and I think he will not escape assassination». It seems that he foresaw his violent death. He was murdered (according to his daughter and other left and right informants) in the mountains of Rodopi in January 18, 1947. The official explanation, that caused laughter to his daughter<sup>61</sup>, was that he died by accident when a log he was carrying fell upon him.

<sup>57</sup> Katerina TSEKOU, *Προσωρινώς διαμένοντες...*, pp. 113, 116.

<sup>58</sup> Katerina TSEKOU, *Προσωρινώς διαμένοντες...*, p. 128.

<sup>59</sup> Katerina TSEKOU, *Προσωρινώς διαμένοντες...*, p. 129.

<sup>60</sup> According to Baev, while in his country there were 4.000 refugees in September 1949, they were reduced to 2.000 in early 1950. See Iordan BAEV, «Greek political refugees in Bulgaria», in: Kl. KOUTSOUKIS - I. SAKKAS (EDS.), *Πτυχές του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου...*, p. 208.

<sup>61</sup> He was buried in a ditch in the monastery next to Nea Santa village, as the person who buried him confessed later. The bad news did not reach his wife Anasta, who was 34 years old

According to another informant (Achilleas Nikolaidēs), it was an assassination. According to him, Nikolas Avramides was betrayed in Aratos village by a left companion, who led the police to his hiding place<sup>62</sup>. He was injured and arrested by the police and died in the Xanthi prison. To some other information, the man who betrayed Nikolas also murdered the shepherd who saw him running from the hiding place just after the Nikolas' arrest. This piece of information is confirmed by Giannis Lazarides, who heard it when he was held as a political prisoner in Gyáros by another left prisoner (a leading figure of K.K.E.) who acted in Rodopi that period.

### 4.3. The plunder

The condition of the village was quite disappointing this period. It had been evacuated from 1947, a usual practice of the State administration<sup>63</sup>, and the inhabitants, who lived for safety reasons in Komotini (6 km away), returned to the village to work every morning and went back to the town at night on foot. The small children who had remained in the village with their grandmothers disappeared from the roads when the sun set to hide in their homes. One informant remembers that her sister was once late in coming back home and stayed all night in a hencoop and was alive with lice. The insurgents (mainly from the surrounding areas, Aetolofos, Aratos, Evros) came down from the mountain during the night, stayed in their relatives' or companions' houses, were supplied with food and clothes and returned to the mountain<sup>64</sup>. The village was paradoxically unguarded by the National Army or the MAY (Security divisions of the countryside, an extra military organization that settled at the edge of the village after the 1948 flight).

No one would dare denounce the insurgents to the police for fear of reprisals. Chryssoula Kyriakides (from the right wing) narrated that she was

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and 5 month pregnant. She was informed later, in June, by a person who used to help them with the cultivation of their land, called Dimitris from Drama.

<sup>62</sup> The betrayers, as a group of reference, are recollected by both sides of my informants. The right deny their existence, while the left confirm that 5-6 such persons existed in their village and that they belonged to the right side. It is noteworthy that the narrations of many left suggest the existence of betrayers within their own side. Apart from the aforementioned cases, Ach. Nikolaidēs attributed the failure of the seizure of Komotini by the D.S.E. in November 1947 to the decisions of an "agent" who had the responsibility of the expedition as he was informed by his brother Ananias who participated in this expedition. See G. KATEMIS, «Μελέτη επιχείρησης Κομοτηνής, 12.11.47», *Δημοκρατικός Στρατός* 47 (July 1948), pp. 240-243.

<sup>63</sup> See Hans VERMEULEN, «Το βάρος του παρελθόντος...», p. 120.

<sup>64</sup> See D. VOGIATZOPOULOS, *Ξάνθη...*, p. 453.

hiding Nikolas Avramides in her house when a neighbour came to see her. The insurgent coughed and was noticed by the neighbour, but he revealed himself and threatened her that she would not find a place to hide if she dared betray him. This fear, and not their admiration for their bravery and ideology, made the villagers of the right wing keep their mouth sealed, accept and host insurgents. It seems that the greater the control by the insurgents over the population was, the higher the degree of cooperation was<sup>65</sup>.

Document 4 (signed by the president of the village<sup>66</sup>) presents a list of the damages caused by the insurgents during January 1947-mid 1949. In this list we can see numerous cases of grabbing of property by the insurgents, such as machinery, food, clothes, cattle, horse carts, the community type machine and telephone, fuel (used to put to flames a nearby bridge), etc. The insurgents' poor condition is provided as the main cause of such plunder<sup>67</sup>. It is reported that hunger «had transformed the fighters to starving flocks who grabbed whatever they found». The members of the Political Bureau of the Greek communist party expressed their discontent for such actions and attributed them to the lack of support of the local communities to their war. Many of my left informants and all the right ones were of this view as well. Actually, to them, the main reason of Thanassis Avramides' political assassination mentioned above was his open criticism against the policy of the leaders of the communist party and the D.S.E. for their injustice against the poor farmers, which created a negative impression to the rest of the people. «We agreed to attack the cities. The poor people are with us», he used to repeatedly remind to the party and military leadership of the mountain where he had run away very early (before many of his co-villagers). On the basis of this evidence, we can conclude that one form of the left violence against the village was derived from the general negative circumstances of the D.S.E.

My informants reveal the many practices they had invented to hide their goods. A mother's heroic effort, for instance, to save the ox of the family, which was the main nutritive source of her family, who counted many members (as was usual with Pontian families of the time), is mentioned. Another informant, a then young girl, narrates another event. A young insurgent girl<sup>68</sup> and her group had collected eight sacks of wheat, and some loaves of

<sup>65</sup> See Stathis KALYVAS, *The logic of violence...*, pp. 111, 132.

<sup>66</sup> Unfortunately the last page of this document is lost.

<sup>67</sup> N. MARANTZIDES, *Δημοκρατικός Στρατός Ελλάδας, 1946-1949*, Athens 2010, pp. 108, 109.

<sup>68</sup> The recruitment of women was published in the gazette of the Temporary Government 20.2.1948, l. 5, paragraph 3, see Tassoula DERVENIOTI, *Το διπλό βιβλίο. Η ιστορική ανάγνωση*, Αθήνα 2003, pp. 53-54; Manolis G. SERGIS, «Μας έβαλαν τα ποτάμια μπροστά...», pp. 425-427.

bread. Her mother, widow (my informant), pleaded the girls to leave some of the goods behind or otherwise the other members of the family would starve to death, which was done. The insurgents noticed this and started looking for her sister S. «Tell her to join us next Wednesday», a threat that was never executed. The actions of plunder are mostly reported by the women informants due to the fact that they had the role to feed their families and such actions were more traumatic for them.

Document nr. 5 (dated May 26, 1949, signed by the president of the village) lists the damages of goods caused by the insurgents in the village. In it we can see that 3 houses were completely destroyed, 50 houses were partially destroyed, the school was completely destroyed, tones of wheat, clothes, oxen, cattle, horses were seized, etc.

#### 4.4. The death of the rural guard Stavros Chatzipanagiotou

This incident shows the rigid and stereotyped lens through which the two opponent sides interpret the events of the civil war. In document nr. 4 (signed by the president) the following is reported: «insurgents' raid 14.1.1947 against Thrylorion, children's abduction and assassination of the rural guard Stavros Chatzipanagiotou».

All right informants recall the tragic moments of this person's execution but few of the left side believe this rumour despite the fact they heard about it. To the former, Stavros Chatzipanagiotou (married to a Thrylorian woman) was a rural guard of a very low profile who had never thought to escape and join the national army or live in the safety of the town Komotini (as others had done) because he had nothing to be afraid of or remorse about. He had no personal differences with anyone, which might allow us to attribute his assassination to a personal revenge, an element that deserves our attention in civil war studies. A left informant, however, says that «persons who betray others need to be more cautious». Some other informants of the same side also called him «a snooper». Therefore the violence against him was selective.

The exact cause and conditions of his death have remained an unsolved mystery. The right informants believe that he was killed because he was part of the «mechanisms of repression of the people»<sup>69</sup>. He was assigned the post of the rural guard after the withdrawal of the Bulgarians (September 1944). He was arrested in the village by left Thrylorians, tied with a wire rope and held until night when insurgents from the mountain came and took him to

<sup>69</sup> See Anna COLLARD, «Διερευνώντας την κοινωνική μνήμη...», p. 383.

the forest of Organi (a concentration place for the insurgents, near the Bulgarian borderline). To my informants he was tied naked on a log and covered with honey to attract insects. The source of the right informants, a Pomakos sheperd, narrates that he offered to him a cigarette during his martyrdom. The same sheperd found him beheaded some days later and buried him. A rumour points to a woman insurgent as the person who ordered the death as following: «why do you keep this dog alive? Behead him».

This manifestation of violence along with the following two allows me to examine violence from an ethnographic perspective and consider it as a “performance” which aims at communicating certain messages. More specifically, violence as a performance has a symbolic dimension. The public burning of a school or of the house of an opponent (see below for such a case), for instance, offers “visual recordings” which are messages of power and immunity with a specific target (e.g. public beating of left civilians or exposure of their cut-off heads to public view, etc.). There is a need to establish the necessity of violence as the unique vehicle of settling down the conflict, which through a “legitimization code” ends to be considered as a *sine qua non* by the society.

#### 4.5. The burning of the primary school of the village

In document nr. 4, the president reports that «on March 22, 1948, Charalambos Papageorgiou [a leading figure of the insurgents] put the school on fire, which completely destroyed the building and all furniture and tents inside it». All my left informants agree that insurgents from neighbouring villages burnt the school because there was a rumour that it was about to be used by the National Army, but refuse to accept that their co-villagers would have ever burnt their school. They are probably ashamed for this action nowadays since: i) they had to fight the Pontiotics’ reaction when they built it in 1923, or ii) such actions do not reflect the values that the left propangadized during the civil war<sup>70</sup>. This is a remarkable example of the subversion of values during this period. The school was a significant place for the Pontian refugees of 1923<sup>71</sup>, a founding element of their everyday life and cultural identity. All right informants believe that their beautiful school was put to flames by the left Charalambos Papageorgiou, who led the insurgents’ raid to their village the night of March 22, 1948.

A right informant (neighbour of Charalambos) and another left one (relative of the insurgent Charalambos and his brother Nikos, the one accused

<sup>70</sup> See Maria THANOPOULOU, *Η προφορική μνήμη του πολέμου...*, p. 320 onwards.

<sup>71</sup> See Manolis G. SERGIS, «Η αποκατάσταση των προσφύγων στη δυτική Θράκη...», p. 339.

for the arson of the houses of the policemen below) wonder how these persons committed such a crime since they «were very religious persons and especially the second would fast every Wednesday and Friday and he had some priests as his relatives». Also this person had helped in the building of the school himself. People from Pontos have always been known for their deep religiousness. Indeed, the Orthodox Church had always been supportive of the Minor Asia Pontiotics and their collective identity, being its constitutional expression in the hostile foreign context of their origin<sup>72</sup>. In the days of the civil war it was expressed as an anti-communist action. The questions set by Stathis Kalyvas as to the meaning and the conditions of the political integration and the reasons why a person turned to be a communist or a nationalist are of primary importance here<sup>73</sup>. Some informants suggest that «it was a matter of the propaganda which “changed their blood”». There was a different answer to this question by another informant, however: «the people who built the school also destroyed it», which puts to the limelight the issue of the shaking of the values by the passion enhanced by the political party.

#### 4.6. The burning of the houses of two policemen

In document 4 we read that an insurgent raid under the leadership of Nikos Papageorgiou, in which other Thrylorians participated as well, the houses of the policemen Panagiotis Nikolaides and Charalampos Salpigides were burnt to ashes. Thirteen villagers of the same political spirit were recruited that day. According to my informants, the insurgents put to fire the house of Nikolaides first and went on to burn the other house. Neighbours and relatives brought water from the nearby wells and temporarily had the fire under control, but the insurgents returned and destroyed the house completely. While the burning, the two children of the owner were inside and no relatives were indoors to rescue them. Their aunt Despoina Papageorgiou rushed into the burning house, however, and saved the small children. The son, named Savvas, five years old at that moment, narrates that he was indeed saved by his aunt when she threw him out and returned to take the younger one George. He confirms the information that one insurgent tried to stop her from entering the burning house, but was pushed away violently by the woman, who shouted at him: «I am the wife of captain Nikos Papageorgiou and you are trying to burn my brother's children?». Her husband was indeed the captain Nikos Papageorgiou of the insurgent army (who, according to the president, is the

<sup>72</sup> Cf. N. MARANTZIDES, *Γιασασίν Μιλλέτ...*, pp. 45, 50.

<sup>73</sup> Stathis KALYVAS, «Ο Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος (1943-1949)...», p. 49.

person who set the fire), but she had not followed him to the mountains. The rumour that her brother influenced her decision was, to some informants, the reason that the insurgents burnt her brother's house.

Nonetheless, Panagiotis Nikolaides was, according to the informants, a democratic person who had fought against the Bulgarian occupation and a beloved member of the community. It is stressed by them that his house was burnt by left insurgents and captains from other villages, and certainly not by Thrylorian ones (as reported in document nr. 4). Another informant narrates that captain Nikolas Avramides, who happened to be in the village that day, contributed to the rescue of the children. This person happened to be a friend and best man of Panagiotis Nikolaides. What is not mentioned in document 4 is the immediate decision of the right for reprisals (burn the houses of the left), which was never carried out thanks to the right Theodoros Salpigides (brother of the policeman whose house was burnt to ashes), who managed to prevent this catastrophic domino of revenge.

##### 5. THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL NETWORKS AND THE “PERSONAL” VIOLENCE

The example of the left leader who contributes to the rescue of the children of his political opponent, mentioned above, allows me to attempt to trace the role of the “local networks” in the tragic events of those days; how kinship, friendship and other social networks contributed or not to the reproduction of the various discriminations imposed by the “State” or the “party” on the “local”. In what follows some examples from the informants' narrations are cited.

Thanassis Avramides' daughter recalls that her father avoided arrest due to a “good woman” who was the wife of a leading figure of the right who happened to be a relative and friend of him. This right person also helped the left one by providing food, clothes or weapons, or by hiding the insurgents in his house, a place beyond suspicion for the left. The same is reported as providing the insurgent Odysseas Vassiliades (17 years old that period) with weapons. His action was imitated, to my right informants, by other people who were relatives of insurgents. It is well known that family relationships are quite strong ethical and ideological bonds that affect until nowadays Greeks' behaviour at various levels<sup>74</sup>. It seems that the opponents of the above

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<sup>74</sup> See Vassilis NITSIKAKOS, *Παραδοσιακές κοινωνικές δομές*, Athens 1993<sup>2</sup>, p. 65 onwards.



examples do not avoid complying with this omnipotent principle<sup>75</sup>. In this vein, an informant narrates that her uncle had come down from the mountain with a “companion” to collect food and recruit fighters: «he comes into the house, hugs me and says nothing. I do not recognise him but he embraces me with tears in his eyes. They exchange glances with the other one, they look around the house, he looks at me again, keeps hugging me, they left the house through the back door. I came out as well and hid myself to hear his companion saying to him: “Captain N, why didn’t you take anything from this house and why did you hug and cry for the little girl?” He answered: “She is my sister’s child who died early. She was quite small then ... this is why I did not take anything...”, and they left....».

In the case of the burning of the policeman’s house we might have a violation of the principle of the protection of relatives and friends, if Nikos Papageorgiou is the person who put to fire his brother-in-law’s house<sup>76</sup>. However, other similar examples have not been reported by my informants.

The civil war was a conflict between people with personal passions. Thrylorion offers such recollections, but not many. Many informants mention the effort of some right and left villagers to get rid of some undesirable to them co-villagers of the same ideological spirit<sup>77</sup>. Some others recollect some false accusations against left villagers for personal reasons only. Unanimously, they refer to a co-villager (captain of the insurgents) who exploited his authority to his benefit and got rich by grabbing the property of the neighbouring Muslims. He was assigned the duty to collect money from the Muslims, but he very rarely rendered the plunder to the D.S.E.

## 6. THE FEW CONVERGING ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL MEMORY

So far we have discussed the elements of the divided social memory of the village of this study. In this last part I will report the few converging ones. One of these elements is their unanimous admiration for the cultural quality of the left people who were violently or voluntarily expatriated: «they were the most creative and rich persons of our village». These

<sup>75</sup> See Manolis G. SERGIS, «Μας έβαλαν τα ποτάμια μπροστά...», p. 430.

<sup>76</sup> See Stathis KALYVAS, «Μορφές, διαστάσεις και πρακτικές βίας στον εμφύλιο», in: Elias ΝΙΚΟΛΑΚΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ (ED.), *Ο Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος. Από τη Βάρκιζα στο Γράμμο...*, p. 201.

<sup>77</sup> See St. ASCHENBRENNER, «Ο Εμφύλιος Πόλεμος...», p. 126.

rationalisations were coming up or ended almost all the narrations I collected. «As soon as the Kaukasians left to the mountain, the village stopped progressing and flourishing and now we reached the zero point. This was the disaster of the village; half of the village vanished...». This running away marked the future of the village and it is a wound that was never healed, since in the '60s more people left the village to emigrate to European countries for economic reasons. All informants wished not to live similar situations again in the future.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

Stathis Kalyvas' theory on the existence of three types of violence observed in the Greek civil war (1943-1949) has been confirmed in the case of Thrylorion in this study, mainly the left and the right ones, since few examples of private violence have been revealed. I argue that the difference with other Greek examples can be attributed to: i) the pre-war (from 1923-1945) political culture of the village, which was characterised by lack of rivalries; there were no sparkles of hatred that might cause an explosion despite the ethnic differences, as I have stressed at the beginning of this study; ii) the Pontians' cultural ethos, which might not be generally accepted in all cases. More specifically, the Pontians who settled down in Greece in 1923 had a strong tradition of community life, solidarity, religiousness, ethical values based upon their Orthodox faith. This was due to the fact that all the above had acted as deterrents to the exogenous cultural and other pressures and strengthened forces that ensured their survival in Minor Asia for centuries. Their Greek culture and their religious faith have always been the basic characteristics of their identity, that discriminated them from the foreign social context they lived in as mentioned earlier. Their violent immigration and settlement in Greece acted as enhancers of their Pontian identity, since after 1923 they came to realize that they had to keep the discriminant characteristics of their identity, their social cohesiveness and solidarity in their new hard conditions of life. Their effort to establish and maintain hundreds of cultural associations that aim at keeping their traditions alive is well known. All the above then, to my view, along with the local kinship network, were the main deterrents for private violence to be perpetrated.

The other two forms of violence (right and left) have their own particularities as well in the case of Thrylorion. The right violence was an endogenous phenomenon with a few Thrylorian snoops involved, but it was

mainly perpetrated by the constitutional tools of the right State. The left violence was “imported” and was caused by left insurgents from other villages and cities of Thrace. More specifically, the plunder, the fires against houses and the school, and primarily the political exodus from the village were imposed by the leaders of the Greek communist party and the D.S.E. This study has shown that the vast majority of those who joined the insurgents’ camp were forced to do so. The 220 persons who ran away from their homes during the first and the second wave described in this study were also violently pushed to this desperate action. The historical circumstances of 1948 allow me (despite the opposite views of my left informants) to consider positively the high likelihood of a previously organised, well designed plan of people’s flight, recruitment and children’s abduction (*pedomazoma*). An exception to the above might be the execution of the rural guard and the arson of the school that seem to have been perpetrated by Thrylorian insurgents.

Therefore, it seems that the *supra local* (*national*) prevailed over the *local*. The endogenous dynamics of the civil war in the village were guided / directed by “political” factors; the flight, the destruction of the village is the outcome of the choices and decisions of the central political stage and the army leaders of the revolutionary left. It goes without saying that the constitutionalised right violence also urged towards the tragic end. The divided social memory of the civil war in the village has also shown that in the context of the village the civil war created political subjects that seem to have kept their party identities to the present day. Only two or three of the informants reported a shift to the general antithetical ideological scheme that prevailed in the village due to the civil war. The question of whether the informants’ memory functioned selectively or in a conciously misleading way, whether they are autonomous and free of the collective memories of the group they belong to, remains an open issue.

The civil war is a central point for the articulation of the anti-communist speech. The Greek bibliography is a mixture of propaganda texts of the right or the left side, myths of the winners and the defeated that dominate the Greek present time. From the propagandistic right speech we have passed to the monolithic left one of victimization of the defeated, especially after 1974. These views still remain under the control of the interest of the political parties. This research has shown that 63 years after its end the civil war is still with us. The beginning of the civil war has been an unsolved problem for the Greek historians. This study has confirmed that it cannot be easily defined, but varies according to the particular circumstances. It seems,

however, that Kalyvas' position for its beginning in 1943 and end in 1949 covers many different, local versions.

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1.

Ουκρανική Βίβλη

Καθημερινή των αποβιβαζομένων & των παιδιών των συρραφισμένων αιχμαλώτων στρατών

α/α	Όνομα πατέρα	Όνομα μητέρας	Όνομα παιδιού	Ηλικία	Χρονιά	Περίοδος	Τόπος	Σημειώσεις
1	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Αγγελίδης	14	Κοζάνη	13-3-48	Παγγαίου	επίσημα εγγεγραμμένος
2	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Μιχαήλ	13	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	11	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	4	"	"	"	"
3	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος	14	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	11	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	9	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	6	"	"	"	"
4	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος	8	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	5	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	3	"	"	"	"
5	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος	14	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	10	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	5	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	3	"	"	"	"
6	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος	13	"	4-4-48	"	"
	"	"	"	7	"	"	"	"
	"	"	"	3	"	"	"	"
7	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Χρυσός	13	"	"	"	"
8	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος	13	Κοζάνη	13-3-48	"	"
	"	"	"	11	"	"	"	"
9	Αθανάσιος Αγγελίδης	Χρυσός Αγγελίδης	Αθανάσιος	3	Κοζάνη	4-4-48	"	"
	"	"	"	2	"	"	"	"


Doc. 1: List of names of the parents of the abducted by the insurgents children

2

Κοινότητα Θυλίου                      Κατάλογος

Αριθμούνται μετ' εἰς τὰς Συμπλοκὰς ἐκταξθεῖσαν καὶ ἄλλῃ ἐπαλοῦσιν  
 ἄλλων κατὰ χροῖον καὶ ἡλικίαν κατὰ τὸ ἀποταξθεῖσαν ἀναγινώσκοντες  
 ἡμεῖς καὶ οἱ κατὰ τὸν ἕκαστον ἐκ τῶν Συμπλοκῶν.

α	Ὀνόματι Χροῖον ἡλικία	ἐκταξθεῖσα ἐπιπέτα		ἐπαλοῦσιν ἐπιπέτα		ἐκταξθεῖσα ἀναγινώσκοντες	ἐκταξθεῖσα ἐπιπέτα	ἐκ τῶν ἐκταξθεῖσαν ἐπιπέτων ἐκταξθεῖσαν		ἐκ τῶν ἐκταξθεῖσαν ἐπιπέτων ἐκταξθεῖσαν		ἐπιπέτα ἐκταξθεῖσαν	
		ἄρσενες	θηλεῖς	ἄρσενες	θηλεῖς			ἄρσενες	θηλεῖς	ἄρσενες	θηλεῖς		
1	Θυλίου	69	59	7	—	78	1	214	5	1	3	—	205
2	Φύλακα	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	1

Ἐπιπέτα 18/5/1949  
 Κοινότητα Θυλίου  


Doc. 2: List of the a) adults who joined the camp of the left insurgents (voluntarily) or were forcibly mobilized and b) of the abducted children



α/α αριθμ σειρ	α/α αριθμ σειρ	Όνοματεπώνυμο	Όνομα πατρών αριθμ	α/α αριθμ σειρ	α/α αριθμ σειρ
	25	Ναυπαχίδης Αντωνίου	ομογενής	18	
	26	Λοΐς	ομογενής	14	
	27	Παυλίδης	ομογενής	12	
	28	Χατζηγιάννης	ομογενής	11	
	29	Βαλβάνης	ομογενής	9	
10	30	Παυλίδης Κωνσταντίνος	Χατζηγιάννης	38	ομογενής
	31	Καπρινός	ομογενής	20	
	32	Παυλίδης	ομογενής	18	
	33	Καπρινός	ομογενής	15	
	34	Μαργαρίτης	ομογενής	13	
	35	Ευαγγελίδης	ομογενής	7	
11	36	Παυλίδης Ευαγγελίδης	Παυλίδης	68	ομογενής
	37	Παυλίδης	Μαργαρίτης	15	ομογενής
	38	Καπρινός	ομογενής	10	
12	39	Παυλίδης Κωνσταντίνος	Καπρινός	31	ομογενής
	40	Παυλίδης	ομογενής	10	
	41	Βλαχίδης	ομογενής	4	
	42	αίμα Βαλβάνης	ομογενής	2	
13	43	Καπρινός	Βλαχίδης	42	ομογενής
	44	Μαργαρίτης	Καπρινός	9	ομογενής
14	45	Καπρινός Κωνσταντίνος	Παυλίδης	23	ομογενής
	46	Παυλίδης	ομογενής	3	
	47	Καπρινός	ομογενής	2/αριθμ	
15	48	Παυλίδης	Καπρινός	57	ομογενής
	49	Καπρινός	Καπρινός	51	
	50	Καπρινός	ομογενής	16	
	51	Χατζηγιάννης	ομογενής	13	

Doc. 3: List of names of the Thylorion families who joined the insurgents' camp on April, the 4th, 1948

**4**


Ερυθρία

Απογραφή των ζημιών που οφείλονται στην Επανάσταση  
 1) 21-4-1947 Επανάσταση 21-4-1947 Επανάσταση 21-4-1947  
 2) 9-4-1947 Επανάσταση 9-4-1947 Επανάσταση 9-4-1947  
 3) 7-5-1947 Επανάσταση 7-5-1947 Επανάσταση 7-5-1947

... (The rest of the handwritten text is illegible due to the cursive script and fading)

Doc. 4: Descriptive report of the damages caused by the insurgents in the village





Doc. 5: List of the damages of goods caused by the insurgents in the village

Κατάσταση

Ποσότητα των κατοίκων της Κοινότητας Θρυλλορίου

Παιδιά έτος	Αριθμός των γυναικών			
	0-7 έτων Γεννήσι	7-17 έτων Γεννήσι	18 έτων ναίαιαι επιπέρι	18 έτων ναίαιαι δύο
996	187	283	242	264

6

27/12/1945

Εν Αθήναις την 19/12/1945.  
Ο Βερέτης Κοινότητας

Doc. 6: Population of Thrylorion in 1945