

# HOW EFFECTIVE ARE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AT RESOLVING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AMONG MEMBER STATES: A LOOK AT THE EUROPEAN UNION

---

© **Michael O. Slobodchikoff** School of Government and Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721, slobodcm@email.arizona.edu

*International organizations have been shown to be effective at mediating conflicts, yet little work has been done to examine how effective international organizations are at resolving conflicts among their own member states or future member states. This study examines territorial disputes in the European Union and determines that the EU is very effective at managing territorial disputes among its member states, and very effective at resolving territorial disputes among candidate states that wish to become members of the EU.*

**Keywords:** *EU, Territorial Disputes, Conflict Management, International Organizations*

The relative ability or inability of intergovernmental organizations to mitigate conflict has often been a source of disagreement among international relations scholars (Keohane and Martin 1995; Mearsheimer 1994). However, the fact remains that many states do join intergovernmental organizations, and that many of those organizations have a stated goal of bringing peace and stability to its member states (Grant and Keohane 2005; Martin and Simmons 1998). Since many states join both regional intergovernmental organizations and global intergovernmental organizations, scholars have begun to study which type of intergovernmental organization is most effective at mitigating conflict (Hansen, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008). Some scholars argue that regional

intergovernmental organizations are increasingly able to achieve conflict resolution among states (Chigas, McClintock, and Kamp 1996), whereas other scholars point to the fact that the United Nations has been the most frequent non-state mediator of interstate conflicts since World War II (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000). Although there has been some effort among scholars to try and get past the regional versus global intergovernmental organization debate (Hansen, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008), most of the scholarly attention has focused on third party mediation rather than examining how IGOs can effectively resolve territorial disputes between their member states or between their member states and neighboring states.<sup>1</sup>

With many IGOs acquiring the status of densely integrated, institutionalized, and politicized organizations, it is necessary to determine how such organizations are able to resolve territorial disputes, which have been shown to be one of the leading causes of war (J. A. Vasquez 2000; J. Vasquez and Henahan 2001). In this paper, I expand the arguments provided by many scholars of international relations concerned with third party mediation to examine how IOs can effectively resolve territorial conflicts not as a third party, but more specifically how IOs can effectively resolve territorial conflicts of their own member states as well as possible future member states. I specifically examine how effective the European Union (EU), a densely integrated, institutionalized, and politicized organization is in mitigating territorial disputes among its current or prospective member states. I find that pre Copenhagen Criteria conflicts of "old" member states tend to be both less intense and non-contiguous than the disputes among those states whose accession came after the Copenhagen Criteria. Moreover, I find that candidate states have shown a propensity for resolving territorial disputes, especially after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria. I argue that while EU is effective in resolving or managing territorial disputes among pre Copenhagen Criteria member states, it is especially effective in resolving territorial disputes among post Copenhagen Criteria member states through the accession process. I do this by examining the number of territorial disputes among both European Union member states and candidate states from the time of accession through the present. Using descriptive statistics, I separate those member states whose accession was prior to the end of the Cold War from those member states whose accession was during the post Cold War period to examine the EU's ability to mitigate conflict among both its member states and future member states prior to accession. I first examine the relevant international relations literature relating to IOs and conflict management. Second,

---

<sup>1</sup> For notable exceptions see (Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006; Higashino 2004)

I examine literature focused on the EU and conflict management. Third, I examine the EU as a normative actor as well as a normative foreign policy actor. I examine all of the territorial disputes from the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 through 2008, a year after the European Union expanded to 27 member states.

### **Regional International Organizations and Conflict Management**

Much of the scholarship on regional international organizations and their effect on conflict management focuses on third party mediation (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; Hansen, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008). Although some scholars have questioned the effectiveness of regional international organizations in effectively mediating conflict (Haas 1983), other scholars have noted that regional organizations increasingly are involved in conflict mediation (Pinder 1996). Moreover, regional organizations are increasing their success at conflict mediation (Chigas, McClintock, and Kamp 1996).

In fact, not only are regional organizations increasing their success at conflict mediation, they are also evolving into conflict management institutions. Powers and Goertz (K. Powers and G. Goertz 2006; Kathy Powers and Gary Goertz 2009) argue that not only are regional economic institutions (REI) subsuming the role of traditional military alliances, but that many REIs have evolved into conflict management institutions. They argue that since the end of the Cold War, REIs have recognized the importance of resolving conflicts, especially since conflict between member states has a very adverse effect on economic development. Thus, REIs have transformed from merely being economic institutions to also developing conflict management functions.

Recently, some scholars have examined the specific structure of organizations in order to determine which organizations are most effective at managing conflict either among their own member states or through third party mediation (Hansen, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008; Mitchell and Hensel 2007). Mitchell and Hensel (2007) find that international organizations can influence contentious interstate issues both actively and passively. Further they find that IOs that have binding clauses in their charters are much more successful at ensuring a successful agreement providing that they are actively involved in managing the conflict. By using binding techniques such as arbitration or adjudication, regional organizations are able to be more successful in solving disputes. In fact, certain organizations such as the European Union are even able

to initiate binding arbitration between member states with or without approval of the member state (Hansen, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008). However, it is important to note that the EU can only initiate binding arbitration between its member states and not between a member state and a third party that is not an EU member state.

The European Union is a very good example of an REI that has institutionalized many conflict management functions. Not only does the EU have the ability to force its member states into arbitration to resolve conflicts among member states, but the EU has also actively worked to actively resolve disputes and manage crises internationally. Following the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the EU determined that it must take more of an active role in conflict prevention and crisis management (Blockmans 2008). Since territorial disputes have been shown to lead to conflict and war, it is logical to examine just how successful the EU is at preventing conflict by resolving territorial disputes.

### **The European Union and Conflict Management**

The European Union is an organization that grew out of the ashes of World War II with a stated goal of never allowing such a war to happen again (Wallensteen 2007). European integration has commonly been viewed as an extremely important factor in leading to the peace and stability of Europe (Diez 2008; Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006; Higashino 2004; Wallensteen 2007). Prior studies of European integration have determined that one of the original goals of the European Community was to achieve lasting peace in Western Europe after World War II, and more specifically to develop a lasting resolution to the Franco-German conflict (Wallensteen, 2007). In fact, one of the early architects of European integration, Jean Monnet understood that one of the only ways to avoid war in the future was to integrate. At first this was through French steel workers using German Coal, but Monnet saw that integration would begin at an economic level and work its way to politics (Niemann and Schmitter 2009). The European Community did help to lessen the tensions between France and Germany through economic interdependence and spill-over effects, and this success helped to bolster the idea that further integration was necessary to achieve peace and stability in Europe. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, former Communist countries in Europe became independent, but were unstable. Thus, scholars argued that Europe would achieve lasting peace and stability by further integration to the east (Higashino 2004; Tocci 2008).

Once the European Union became fully established, norm diffusion emerged as one of the most effective ways in which integration could bring about peace and stability. This is due to the fact that as states adopt European norms, specifically those of peace and territorial integrity, freedom of movement, uncorrupt governments, a single market, and strong human rights, states become more democratic, which in turn leads to peace and stability (Hensel, Gary Goertz, and Diehl 2000; Maoz and Russett 1993; Russett 1993). Thus, the European Union uses integration as a means of norm diffusion (G. Noutcheva 2007; Gergana Noutcheva, Tocci, Coppieters, and Kovziridze 2004; Slobodchikoff 2010; Tocci 2008). The use of norm diffusion is especially prevalent in the post Cold War period, as the European Union began to focus on creating not just a stable and peaceful Europe, but a stable and peaceful Europe with a shared identity possessing similar norms. Although territorial integrity and the absence of territorial conflict were always important to the European Union, it wasn't until after the end of the Cold War that European norms related to territorial integrity, democracy and human rights were able to be spread to Eastern Europe as a way to achieve peace and stability in all of Europe (Diez 2008; Diez, Stetter, and Albert 2006).

Although the EU has generally been heralded as a success in creating a peaceful Europe and managing conflicts particularly in the post war years (Wallenstein 2007), few scholars have examined the success of the EU in solving territorial issues among its member states as well as states who wished to become members in the post Cold War period. One notable exception is Diez et al. (2006), who argue that one of the most effective ways that the European Union solves territorial issues is through the accession process. They find that as long as the European Union makes a credible offer of membership to European states with territorial issues with the proviso that any territorial issue must be solved prior to the actual accession process, then states actively work to solve their territorial issues. However, Diez et al. (2006) also find that territorial issues become less salient among the member states, but more salient between member states and non-member states. In other words, territorial issues become less salient within the borders of the EU, but become more salient between EU member states and non-EU member states.

Ultimately, the work by both Higashino (2004) and Diez et al. (2006) both point to the necessity of spreading a norm of territorial integrity to new states through the accession process. Doing so can ensure that Europe can remain peaceful and stable despite political changes in the rest of the world. However, it is logical to question whether the EU is able to diffuse the norm of territorial integrity to

Eastern Europe to ensure peace and stability or whether states wanting to join the EU are merely trying to temporarily resolve territorial disputes to become members of the EU. I now turn to a discussion on the EU as a “normative power” as well as a discussion on norm diffusion to address this question.

### **European Union as a “Normative Power”<sup>2</sup>**

Since its inception, the European Union has believed itself to be distinct from other organizations and states. It prides itself on not being a military power, but rather an ideational or normative power that is able to be used among member states or to influence other states to adopt prescribed behaviors (Borzel and Risse 2009; Grabbe 2006; Jabko 2006; Manners 2002, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Sjursen 2006; Slobodchikoff 2010).<sup>3</sup> Although many of the European Union’s official documents prior to the Copenhagen Criteria only implicitly discuss the norms espoused by the European Union, subsequent official documents such as the Copenhagen Criteria and the Treaty of Madrid specifically state that the European Union should be guided by those normative values upon which the European Union was founded in matters of international affairs (Tocci et al., 2008). By pursuing integration, the European Union can influence other states by the power of its ideas and norms and ensure democratic member states that share the European normative values of peace and stability.

### **The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor**

Normative powers that wish to expand should be concerned with how to effectively diffuse the norms to European non-member states. According to the lifecycle of norms, a norm must be internalized before it is fully diffused (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Thus, for a norm to be diffused to European non-member states, they must internalize the norm.

Scholars have noted that institutions can affect norm diffusion through the process of socialization (Checkel 1999, 2005; Flockhart 2005, 2006). For example, Flockhart (2005, 2006) argues that norm sets can be transferred, but it is only done through the socialization process. Moreover, successful socialization can only occur if there is a positive categorization process between socialize and socializee. In the case of the European Union, the EU would only be successful

---

<sup>2</sup> Term used by Manners (2002, 2006) used to describe European power to external states as being normative as opposed to military or economical.

<sup>3</sup> For an alternative view of what drives European Union foreign policy, see Youngs (2004); Hyde-Price (2006).



in socialization to non-member states if there is a positive categorization process. In fact, it has been noted that the EU is able to project its normative power to influence the behaviors of other states, which indicates successful socialization (Grabbe 2006; Haughton and Haughton 2011; Manners 2002, 2006; Phinnemore 2010; Sjursen 2006).

Scholars have often noted the transformative nature of the European Union (see Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). For example, Grabbe (2006) argues that the European Union has extensive transformative power to affect domestic policies of states who wish to become members. She states that the way in which the European Union is able to transform the domestic policies of non-member states is through the accession process. The European Union is able to promise future membership to Central and Eastern European states in exchange for the adoption of territorial integrity and the absence of territorial issues. The key to Grabbe's (2006) argument just like that of Flockhart (2005, 2006) is that there must be an acceptance of the socialize by the socializee for any successful socialization to occur.

Given that the European Union wishes to influence the behavior of other states, a logical question arises as to whether or not non-member states would be interested in joining the European Union, and what their motivations are for joining. If they are not strongly motivated in joining the European Union, then no successful socialization can occur. To this effect, Caplanova et al. (2004) argue that states in Central and Eastern Europe are very much in favor of joining the European Union. They argue that this is largely due to self-interest. Citizens of those states see financial, free movement and security gains to be made by joining. Not only will citizens have access to the European market, but they will also be able to freely move, thus providing them with expanded human rights. Moreover, due to the rotating European presidency, states would be able to be the focus of much more attention than they would ever be able to as separate nation states. The increased focus would in turn bring more prestige and financial gain. Even though membership in the European Union would mean a reduction of state sovereignty, citizens are overwhelmingly in favor of joining the European Union as the benefits to membership far outweigh the costs.

The goals of both the European Union and European non-member states are mutually inclusive. The European Union wishes non-member states to solve their territorial issues, and non-member states are willing to solve their issues as long as they are considered for membership. Thus, it is only logical to assume that the European

Union would use the accession process to influence non-member states to solve their territorial issues. In fact, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) argue that the desire for the spread of peace and security by the European Union coupled with the desire of Central and Eastern European states to join the European Union has enabled the European Union to affect the domestic policies of candidate countries to an unprecedented degree. Moreover, Grabbe (2006) argues that states who wish to become member states are willing to fundamentally transform just to be considered for membership, which enables the European Union to affect domestic policies of non-member states to solve territorial issues prior to those states becoming candidate states.

The scenario of radical transformation of domestic policies to solve territorial issues in exchange for consideration of candidate status is only effective if there is enough time to transform prior to accession. Moreover, it is theoretically possible to resolve the territorial dispute prior to accession, only to begin the territorial issue anew once a state has become a member. However, if the candidate state has been properly socialized with the norm of territorial integrity, then the territorial dispute should not resume once the state has become an EU member state. Therefore, this study will examine territorial conflicts from the time of accession through the present to ascertain whether a state has indeed become socialized.

### **Theory and Hypotheses**

Based on the work of both Higashino (2004) and Diez et al. (2006), the EU can spread a norm of territorial integrity through the accession process. According to Diez et al. (2006), the European Union is able to decrease the salience of territorial issues among its member states along the internal borders. However, that shared borders between member states and non-member states actually become more salient. Therefore, I would expect that there would be very few territorial issues between members of the European Union, but that there would be territorial issues between those countries that immediately border the European Union. Thus:

H1: There should be a very small amount of territorial issues between member states while there should be a larger amount of territorial issues between member states and bordering non-member states.

According to Manners (2002, 2006), the European Union is a normative actor interested in spreading peace and security to the rest of Europe. In addition, the European Union has tremendous



transformative power (Grabbe, 2006). Moreover, since there is a socialization process that takes place (Lockhart, 2005), it is only logical that states wishing to become members of the European Union should fully adopt the European norm of territorial integrity. Specifically regarding territorial issues, all candidate states wishing to become member states should have very few unresolved territorial issues, and no salient territorial issues. Thus:

H2: There should be very few territorial issues (none of them salient) among those states that became member states of the European Union after the end of the Cold War.

Once a state has already gone through the accession process, there is little incentive not to resume the territorial issue. Only if the issue has truly been resolved prior to accession will there be no resumption of the territorial issue upon gaining membership to the European Union. Moreover, if socialization has fully occurred, the norm of territorial integrity will have been internalized. Thus, I predict that states will not continue the territorial issue upon accession. All territorial issues should cease prior to accession, and none of the previous territorial issues should resume post accession. Thus, the third hypothesis is as follows:

H3: There will be no resumption of territorial issues upon accession provided that the member states began the accession process after the Cold War

## 2.1 Methodology

This paper uses descriptive statistics in order to ascertain whether or not the European Union as a regional international organization is effectively able to resolve territorial issues among its member and candidate states, especially since regional international organizations have adopted many conflict resolution functions following the Cold War (see Powers and Goertz, 2006; 2009). Thus, I first examine the number of unresolved territorial issues in the post Cold War period. For the purposes of this study, a territorial issue is defined according to the definition used by Vasquez and Henehan (2001), where a territorial issue is a 'set of differing proposals for the disposition of stakes among specific actors.' In other words, a territorial issue is where two or more states lay claim to the same territory.

To ascertain the territorial issues, I use the CIA World Factbooks for the years 1990-2008. This period covers the post Cold War period up to 2008 to examine whether territorial issues resume once a state

has completed the accession process. Thus, all territorial issues that take place during the time period of study are included in the study, even if they did not begin in the period in question. The CIA World Factbook lists international disputes for each country listed in the World Factbook. For the most part, only interstate territorial issues are examined, however, certain cases such as Cyprus are examined where there is an intrastate territorial issue where the state does not possess complete territorial sovereignty. I further separate the territorial issues by severity to determine whether or not any of the disputes are salient and not effectively managed. This is due to the fact that there is a difference between a territorial dispute that is merely legal in nature, and a territorial dispute that is violence and could lead to war.

This study is not specifically concerned with the year that a territorial issue began unless it begins during the period of study. In addition, I also examine the year that the territorial issue was resolved if it was during the allotted time period. Also, I separate the number of territorial issues of the pre end of the Cold War member states from the number of territorial issues of the post Cold War member states to ascertain the number of unresolved territorial issues among post Cold War member states at the time of their accession. Finally, since I am initially interested in the number of territorial issues occurring between 1990 and 2008, a single territorial issue involving more than one member state is only counted once in order to limit the problem of multiple effects.

Once I have examined the number of territorial disputes between 1990 and 2008, I examine the number of states that have unresolved territorial issues prior to the end of the Cold War. This number could be very different from a simple count of unresolved territorial issues in that some states could have multiple unresolved territorial issues, whereas other states might have no unresolved territorial issues. Again, I separate the member states according to whether they completed their accession process prior to the end of the Cold War or not. By separating the states, I will be able to ascertain whether or not any of the post Cold War member states had any unresolved territorial issues at the time of their accession. Furthermore, by examining these states between 1990 and 2008, I will also be able to determine when and if any territorial issues resumed upon completion of the accession process.

Finally, I will examine both the number of territorial issues and the number of states with unresolved territorial issues among those member states that become members prior to the end of the Cold War over time. Theoretically I should see a decrease in both the

number of territorial issues and the number of states with unresolved territorial issues over time.

### 3.0 Analysis and Data

During the period of 1990 to 2008, there are thirty territorial issues (see Table 1). Although there are thirty territorial issues between 1990 and 2008, there were only fourteen states involved. Thus, many of the states had more than one territorial issue. The country with the most territorial issues was France, which was one of the original members of the European Community (see Appendix I for a list of all territorial disputes). However, it should be noted that all of France's territorial disputes involve former colonies and are not on the European continent. Moreover, all of France's territorial disputes are legal in nature, and do not involve any violence.

Overall, only 23% of the territorial issues have been resolved over this time period. However, it is possible that there is a difference between the number of total European Union territorial issues and the number of states that have territorial issues during the period of study. Thus, it is important to examine the number of states that have territorial issues during the period of study.

There are fourteen states that have territorial issues between 1990 and 2008 (see Table 2). However, a slightly higher percentage of states have been able to resolve territorial issues than is apparent when just examining the total number of territorial issues. In fact, 36% of the states that have territorial issues between 1990 and 2008 are able to resolve their territorial issues.

It should be noted that the states that resolved their territorial issues during the period of the study were able to solve all of their territorial issues. In order to be counted as a state that resolved its territorial issues, it had to solve all of its territorial issues.

Table 1: Total EU Territorial Issues (1990-2008)	
Unresolved Territorial Issues	Resolved Territorial Issues
23	7
(77%)	(23%)
N=30	

Table 2: EU States with Territorial Issues (1990-2008)		
States With Territorial Issues	Unresolved Territorial Issues	States That Resolved Territorial Issues
9		5
(64%)		(36%)
N=14		

Following the theory proposed by Diez et al. (2006), hypothesis H1 states that there should be less territorial issues among European Member states than between European Union member states and bordering non-member states. However, the data do not seem to support the hypothesis (see Table 3).<sup>4</sup> If hypothesis H1 is correct, the first test would be to do a simple two-tailed t-test between the two groups to see if they are significantly different. The results of the t-test are insignificant. However, it is still possible to compare the two groups even if they are not significantly different from each other.

In fact, there does seem to be a general trend that more territorial issues resolved among European member states than between European Union member states and bordering non-member states. 43% of the territorial issues have been resolved during the period of study among European member states, whereas only 17% of the territorial issues have been resolved between European Union member states and bordering non-member states.

<sup>4</sup> Appendix II provides a list of territorial disputes involving pre-Copenhagen Criteria member states, and Appendix III provides a list of territorial disputes involving post-Copenhagen Criteria member states.

Interestingly, the only territorial issue to be resolved between European Union member states and bordering non-member states was not resolved prior to the accession of the European Union member state. However, the territorial issue was resolved soon after the accession process was completed.

Ultimately, even though the data seem to indicate that there could be a difference between the two groups in that more territorial issues are resolved among European Union member states than between European Union member states and bordering non-member states, due to the statistical insignificance of the t-test, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.

Table 3: Intra EU Territorial Issues vs. Inter Contiguous Territorial Issues <sup>a</sup>					
		Unresolved Territorial Issues	Resolved Territorial Issues	Resolved Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession <sup>b</sup>	
				Yes	No
Intra EU Territorial Issues	4 (57%)	3 (43%)	2 (67%)	1 (33%)	N=7
Inter EU-Contiguous Territorial Issues	5 (83%)	1 (17%)	0 (0%)	1 (100%)	N=6

a A two-tailed t-test was conducted on the two groups. The results were insignificant ( $p=.349$ ).

b This column is for whether territorial issues were resolved prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether territorial issues were resolved prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.

In order to ascertain whether the two groups of member states were significantly different from one another, I conducted a t-test. The results of the t-test are significant at the .01 level, confirming that member states that became member states prior to the end of the Cold War are significantly different from post Cold War member states.

Hypothesis H2 states that there should be few territorial issues and no salient territorial issues among those states that became members of the European Union after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria (see Table 4). Although the data do not completely support Hypothesis H2, the data do illustrate interesting differences between the member states that were members prior to the end of the Cold War and the post Cold War member states.

95% of the territorial issues among the pre end of the Cold War member states are unresolved, whereas only 45% of the territorial issues among the post Cold War member states are unresolved during the period of study. Thus, the post Cold War member states seem to be better able to resolve their territorial issues than the pre end of the Cold War member states. Moreover, 83% of the territorial issues that were resolved among the post Cold War member states during the period of study were resolved prior to the accession process. Candidate states were signaling their intent to fully internalize the norm of territorial integrity in order to gain membership to the European Union.

One important caveat is that many of the territorial disputes of those member states who became members prior to the end of the Cold War are related to colonialism. For example, most of France's territorial disputes relate to former colonies. However, the most significant territorial dispute during this period of time involving member states who became members prior to the end of the Cold War was the dispute over Northern Ireland. This dispute was an extremely salient one, and was extremely violent. It is the only dispute of the pre end of the Cold War member states to be listed in the PRIO database. Although the dispute was extremely salient, it was resolved in 1998.



	Unresolved Territorial Issues	Resolved Territorial Issues	Began Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession <sup>b</sup>	Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession <sup>c</sup>	Resolved Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession <sup>c</sup>		
			Yes	No	Yes	No	
Pre end of the Cold War Member States	18 (95%)	1 (5%)	19 (100%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	1 (100%)	N=19
Post Cold War Member States	5 (45%)	6 (55%)	11 (100%)	0 (0%)	5 (83%)	1 (17%)	N=11

a A two-tailed t-test was conducted on the two groups. The results were significant at the .01 level (p=.0067).

b This column is for whether territorial issues began prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether territorial issues began prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.

c This column is for whether territorial issues were resolved prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether territorial issues were resolved prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.

It should be further noted that of the five unresolved territorial disputes among post Cold War member states, two of the territorial disputes were submitted to the International Court of Justice for a legal settlement (see Appendix III). Romania submitted these territorial issues to the International Court of Justice prior to the state's accession to the European Union, which was an effective signal to the European Union that it values territorial integrity, and helped to enable its accession process.

The data show that even though not all of the new member states resolve their territorial issues prior to undertaking the accession process, that there is certainly a trend in that direction. With the

exception of Cyprus and Slovenia, all of the other post Copenhagen Criteria states have been able to either resolve their territorial issues or at least to indicate a willingness to resolve their territorial issues through the International Court of Justice.

The case of Cyprus is more troublesome than that of Slovenia, as the territorial dispute on Cyprus is extremely salient, whereas the case of Slovenia is a legal case of new borders being drawn at the time of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The saliency of the case of Cyprus calls into question why the EU would confer candidacy upon Cyprus in the first place. After all, if there is a norm of territorial integrity in the EU, then why would a state that is politically divided and has no norm of territorial integrity be considered for membership?

Although the answer to why the EU would still be considered for membership despite not having resolved its conflict is complicated, it seems clear that the EU thought that scheduling talks on accession could speed up a solution to the conflict (Demetriou, 2004; Diez, 2002). In fact, the EU publically stated that by accepting Cyprus as a candidate state, that the EU could help the UN broker a solution to the dispute in Cyprus (Demetriou, 2004). Although the dispute has not been resolved during the time of this study, there is evidence pointing to the fact that attitudes are changing on Cyprus toward wanting to resolve the conflict, which is in large part due to the efforts of the EU through the accession process (Diez, 2002; Demetriou, 2004).

Despite the problematic case of Cyprus and presuming that territorial issues have actually been resolved prior to accession, there is a very small probability of a resumption of a territorial issue post accession. Thus, hypothesis H3 states that there should be no resumption of any territorial issues post accession. In fact, the data show that neither pre end of the Cold War member states nor post Cold War member states had any resumption or new territorial issues after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria or accession, whichever happened later (see Table 4).<sup>5</sup> The fact that there have been no new or resumed territorial issues seems to indicate that states are not aggressively pursuing new territory, and that in general there seems to be a trend towards at least not starting any new territorial issues and in certain cases actively trying to resolve current territorial issues. Thus, there should be no resumption of any territorial issues post accession.

---

<sup>5</sup> See Appendices IV-X for lists all of the resolved territorial disputes.

### **Conclusion**

This study has produced very mixed results. Although I expected the EU to have been able to resolve territorial disputes more than what the data show, what becomes evident from the data is that the EU is certainly effective at managing territorial disputes. Most of the ongoing territorial disputes are not salient disputes, and have actively been managed to avoid violent confrontation. In most of the pre end of the Cold War member states, those territorial disputes had to do with former colonies, and are not a major priority for those member states. Although they still legally lay claim to that territory, there is no significant threat of violence occurring in those territorial disputes. Therefore, it is still fair to state that the EU has a norm of territorial integrity, yet it also has norms of solving conflicts through legal negotiations as opposed to violence. Further, it has a norm of managing territorial conflicts, which has been shown among pre end of the Cold War member states.

The post Cold War member states as a whole have much more salient territorial disputes. Many of the territorial disputes arose due to dissolution of former states, i.e. the former Yugoslavia. Most of those border disputes are not just colonial disputes such as with the pre end of the Cold War member states, but are contiguous territorial disputes which have been shown to lead to violence (J. Vasquez and Henahan 2001). However, even in the post Cold War member states, it is evident that socialization has occurred and that those states have tried to solve their territorial disputes. However, there are still some problematic cases that must be addressed. Specifically, what distinguishes Cyprus, Slovenia and Romania from the other states that did resolve their territorial issues prior to their accession process?

The case of Romania can be explained by the fact that Romania requested that their territorial issues be ruled on by the International Court of Justice. Romania was the only state in the study to seek an outside ruling in order to help resolve its territorial issues. Clearly by seeking an outside ruling, Romania was able to demonstrate its willingness to abide by the Copenhagen Criteria while also limiting domestic audience costs should the ruling be unpopular. However, neither the case of Cyprus nor the case of Slovenia can be so easily explained.

Although some might argue that if the severity of the territorial issues is not severe enough, we would not expect the European Union to have ensured either Cyprus or Slovenia to have resolved their territorial issues prior to accession. However, both Cyprus and

Slovenia have fairly severe territorial issues. In the case of Cyprus, the whole northern half of the island has become a de facto independent state (although it is not officially recognized as such), whereas Slovenia has publicly stated that it will not allow Croatia to become a member of the European Union until their territorial issues are resolved. Therefore both of these territorial issues are fairly severe. However, in both of these cases, the EU has tried to seek a political solution to these territorial disputes. Specifically, in the case of Cyprus, the EU thought that the accession process would serve to urge both sides to resolve their disputes. Although that has not happened, the EU has helped to lead the two sides toward a resolution, and there is hope for the resolution of the territorial dispute in Cyprus.

Although the EU has not been effective at resolving all of the territorial disputes among both member and candidate states, the EU has been effective at managing territorial disputes. This is extremely important, as a managed territorial dispute is much less likely to lead to violence, which is extremely important in keeping a stable and peaceful Europe intact. Although there are still some serious territorial disputes among EU member states that need to be resolved, overall the EU is effective at managing these territorial disputes.

Future research should focus on precisely what causal mechanisms allow for the EU to be effective at managing conflict, and whether or not those mechanisms are the same for both pre end of the Cold War member states and post Cold War member states.

## Appendices

### Appendix I – Total Disputes

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Began Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession? *	Ending Year
Cyprus	North and South Cyprus	Internal	2004	Yes	Not Resolved
Czech Rep.	Border--Slovakia	Slovakia	2004	Yes	Signed 1998
Czech Rep.	Liechtenstein--Territory taken from Royal Family	Liechtenstein	2004	Yes	2001 submitted to ICJ, ICJ refused case
Denmark	Faroe Islands Continental Shelf (Rockall)	UK, Ireland, Iceland	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
Denmark	Hans Island	Canada	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
Estonia	Narva Region and Border	Russia	2004	Yes	Initialed 1996, Signed 2005
France	Bassas da India	Madagascar	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Europa Island	Madagascar	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Glorioso Islands	Madagascar	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Juan de Nova Island	Madagascar	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Mayotte	Comoros	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Tromelin Island	Mauritius	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Border--Suriname and French Guiana	Suriname	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Matthew Island	Vanuatu	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Hunter Island	Vanuatu	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
Greece	Aegean Sea Disputes	Turkey	1981	Yes	Not Resolved
Ireland	Northern Ireland	UK	1973	Yes	1998

**Appendix I (CONT).**

Latvia	Abrene section of Border w/ Russia	Russia	2004	Yes	1997 signed, 2007 ratified by Russia
Latvia	Maritime Border w/ Lithuania	Lithuania	2004	Yes	1999
Lithuania	Border w/ Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast')	Russia	2004	Yes	Signed 1999
Portugal	Territory of Olivenza	Spain	1986	Yes	Not Resolved
Romania	Snake Island (Zmiynyy/Serpilor)	Ukraine	2007	Yes	Not Resolved, submitted to ICJ 2004
Romania	Black Sea Maritime Boundary	Ukraine	2007	Yes	Not Resolved, submitted to ICJ 2004
Slovenia	Bay of Pirin	Croatia	2004	Yes	Not Resolved
Slovenia	Adriatic Exclusive Economic Zone	Croatia	2004	Yes	Not Resolved
Spain	Gibraltar	UK	1986	Yes	Not Resolved
Spain	Spanish Coastal Enclaves in Morocco	Morocco	1986	Yes	Not Resolved
UK	Chagos Archipelago (Diego Garcia one of the islands)	Mauritius and Seychelles	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
UK	Falkland Islands and South Georgia Islands	Argentina	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
UK	British Antarctic Territory	Argentina and Chile	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
N=30					

\*This column is for whether disputes began prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether disputes began prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.



**Appendix II – Pre end of the Cold War Member States**

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Began Prior to Copenhagen Criteria?	Ending Year
Denmark	Faroe Islands Continental Shelf (Rockall)	UK, Ireland, Iceland	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
Denmark	Hans Island	Canada	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Bassas da India	Madagascar	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Europa Island	Madagascar	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Glorioso Islands	Madagascar	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Juan de Nova Island	Madagascar	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Mayotte	Comoros	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Tromelin Island	Mauritius	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Border-- Suriname and French Guiana	Suriname	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Matthew Island	Vanuatu	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
France	Hunter Island	Vanuatu	1951	Yes	Not Resolved
Greece	Aegean Sea Disputes	Turkey	1981	Yes	Not Resolved
Ireland	Northern Ireland	UK	1973	Yes	1998
Portugal	Territory of Olivenza	Spain	1986	Yes	Not Resolved
Spain	Gibraltar	UK	1986	Yes	Not Resolved
Spain	Spanish Coastal Enclaves in Morocco	Morocco	1986	Yes	Not Resolved

**Appendix II (CONT)**

UK	Chagos Archipelago (Diego Garcia one of the islands)	Mauritius and Seychelles	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
UK	Falkland Islands and South Georgia Islands	Argentina	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
UK	British Antarctic Territory	Argentina and Chile	1973	Yes	Not Resolved
N=19					

**Appendix III – Post Cold War Member States**

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Began Prior to Accession?	Ending Year
Cyprus	North and South Cyprus	Internal	2004	Yes	Not Resolved
Czech Rep.	Border--Slovakia	Slovakia	2004	Yes	Signed 1998
Czech Rep.	Liechtenstein--Territory taken from Royal Family	Liechtenstein	2004	Yes	2001 submitted to ICJ, 2005 ICJ refused case
Estonia	Narva Region and Border	Russia	2004	Yes	Initialed 1996, Signed 2005
Latvia	Abrene section of Border w/ Russia	Russia	2004	Yes	1997 signed, 2007 ratified by Russia
Latvia	Maritime Border w/ Lithuania	Lithuania	2004	Yes	1999
Lithuania	Border w/ Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast')	Russia	2004	Yes	Signed 1999
Romania	Snake Island (Zmiynyy/Serpilor)	Ukraine	2007	Yes	Not Resolved, submitted to ICJ 2004
Romania	Black Sea Maritime Boundary	Ukraine	2007	Yes	Not Resolved, submitted to ICJ 2004
<b>Appendix III (Cont.)</b>					
Slovenia	Bay of Pirin	Croatia	2004	Yes	Not Resolved
Slovenia	Adriatic Exclusive Economic Zone	Croatia	2004	Yes	Not Resolved
N=11					

**Appendix IV – Total Resolved Territorial Issues (1990-2008)**

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Ending Year	Resolved Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession?*
Czech Rep.	Border-- Slovakia	Slovakia	2004	Signed 1998	Yes
Czech Rep.	Liechtenstein-Territory taken from Royal Family	Liechtenstein	2004	2001 submitted to ICJ, ICJ refused case	Yes
Estonia	Narva Region and Border	Russia	2004	Initialed 1996, Signed 2005	No
Ireland	Northern Ireland	UK	1973	1998	No
Latvia	Abrene section of Border w/ Russia	Russia	2004	1997 signed, 2007 ratified by Russia	Yes
Latvia	Maritime Border w/ Lithuania	Lithuania	2004	1999	Yes
Lithuania	Border w/ Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast')	Russia	2004	Signed 1999	Yes
n=7					

\*This column is for whether disputes began prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether disputes began prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.

**Appendix V - Pre end of the Cold War Member States Resolved Territorial Issues**

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Ending Year	Resolved Prior to Copenhagen Criteria?
Ireland	Northern Ireland	UK	1973	1998	No
N=1					

**Appendix VI - Post Cold War Member States Resolved Territorial Issues**

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Ending Year	Resolved Prior to Accession?
Czech Rep.	Border--Slovakia	Slovakia	2004	Signed 1998	Yes
Czech Rep.	Liechtenstein-Territory taken from Royal Family	Liechtenstein	2004	2001 submitted to ICJ, ICJ refused case	Yes
Estonia	Narva Region and Border	Russia	2004	Initialed 1996, Signed 2005	No
Latvia	Abrene section of Border w/ Russia	Russia	2004	1997 signed, 2007 ratified by Russia	Yes
Latvia	Maritime Border w/ Lithuania	Lithuania	2004	1999	Yes
Lithuania	Border w/ Russia (Kaliningrad Oblast')	Russia	2004	Signed 1999	Yes
N=6					

**Appendix VII – Territorial Issues Involving Only EU Member States**

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Resolved Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession?*	Ending Year
Cyprus	North and South Cyprus	Internal	2004	No	Not Resolved
Czech Rep.	Border--Slovakia	Slovakia	2004	Yes	Signed 1998
Denmark	Faroe Islands Continental Shelf (Rockall)	UK, Ireland, Iceland**	1973	No	Not Resolved
Ireland	Northern Ireland	UK	1973	No	1998
Latvia	Maritime Border w/ Lithuania	Lithuania	2004	Yes	1999
Portugal	Territory of Olivenza	Spain	1986	No	Not Resolved
Spain	Gibraltar	UK	1986	No	Not Resolved
N=7					
*This column is for whether issues began prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether disputes began prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.					
**Iceland is not a member of the EU, but the other disputing states are.					



**Appendix VIII - Disputes Between EU Member States and Bordering Non-Member States**

EU Member State	Territorial Dispute	Dispute State	Accession Year	Began Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession?*	Ending Year	Solved prior to Copenhagen Criteria / Accession?***
Estonia	Narva Region and Border	Russia	2004	Yes	Initialed 1996, Signed 2005	Yes
Greece	Aegean Sea Disputes	Turkey	1981	Yes	Not Resolved	—
Ireland	Northern Ireland	UK	1973	Yes	1998	No
Romania	Snake Island (Zmiynyy/Serpilor)	Ukraine	2007	Yes	Not Resolved, submitted to ICJ 2004	—
Romania	Black Sea Maritime Boundary	Ukraine	2007	Yes	Not Resolved, submitted to ICJ 2004	—
Slovenia	Bay of Pirin	Croatia	2004	Yes	Not Resolved	—
Slovenia	Adriatic Exclusive Economic Zone	Croatia	2004	Yes	Not Resolved	—
n=7						

\*This column is for whether issues began prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether disputes began prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.

\*\*\*This column is for whether issues were solved prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether issues were solved prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.

**Appendix IX Resolved Territorial Issues Among Member States**

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Resolved Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession?*	Ending Year
Czech Rep.	Border--Slovakia	Slovakia	2004	Yes	Signed 1998
Ireland	Northern Ireland	UK	1973	No	1998
Latvia	Maritime Border w/ Lithuania	Lithuania	2004	Yes	1999
N=3					
*This column is for whether disputes began prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether disputes began prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.					

**Appendix X Resolved Territorial Issues Between Member States and Bordering Non-Member States**

EU Member State	Territorial Issue	Dispute State	Accession Year	Resolved Prior to Copenhagen Criteria/Accession?*	Ending Year
Estonia	Narva Region and Border (Treaty Signed 1996, not ratified)	Russia	2004	Yes	Signed 2005
N=1					
*This column is for whether disputes began prior to the Copenhagen Criteria for those who were members prior to the Copenhagen Criteria, and for whether disputes began prior to accession for those countries that became member states after the adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria.					

## References

- Bercovitch, Jacob, J. Theodore Anagnoson, and Donnette L. Wille. (1991) "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations." *Journal of Peace Research* 28(1): 7-17.
- Bercovitch, Jacob, and Gerald Schneider. (2000) "Who Mediates? the Political Economy of International Conflict Management." *Journal of Peace Research* 37(2): 145-165.
- Blockmans, Steven. (2008) *The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects*. Cambridge University Press.
- Borzel, T. A, and T. Risse (2009) "The Transformative Power of Europe." In *The EU Promotion of Good Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood*", paper prepared for the ERD workshop, Florence, April, p. 16-17.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T (2005) "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework." *International Organization* 59(04): 801-826.
- . (1999) "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe." *International Studies Quarterly* 43(1): 84-114.
- Chigas, Diana, Elizabeth McClintock, and Christophe Kamp. (1996) "Preventive Diplomacy and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe: Creating Incentives for Dialogue and Cooperation." In *Preventing conflict in the post-communist world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. Brookings Institution Press.
- Demetriou, O. (2004) *EU and the Cyprus Conflict: perceptions of the border and Europe in the Cyprus conflict*. The European Union and Border Conflicts.
- Diez, Thomas (2008) *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association*. Cambridge University Press.
- . (2002) *The European Union and the Cyprus conflict: modern conflict, postmodern union*. Manchester University Press.
- Diez, Thomas, Stephan Stetter, and Mathias Albert (2006) "The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration." *International Organization* 60(03): 563-593.
- Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change." *International Organization* 52(04): 887-917.
- Flockhart, T (2006) "Similar and Yet So Different: The Socialization of Democratic Norms in Post-War Germany and Present Day Iraq." *International Politics* 43: 596-619.
- . (2005) *Socializing democratic norms: the role of international organizations for the construction of Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan.

- Grabbe, H. (2006) *The EU's Transformative Power: Europeanization Through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Grant, Ruth W., and Robert O. Keohane (2005) "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics." *American Political Science Review* 99(01): 29-43.
- Haas, E. (1983) "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations." *International Organization* 37(2): 189-256.
- Hansen, Holley E., Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Stephen C. Nemeth (2008) "IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(2): 295-325.
- Haughton, Tim, and Tim Haughton (2011) "Half Full but also Half Empty: Conditionality, Compliance and the Quality of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Half Full but also Half Empty: Conditionality, Compliance and the Quality of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe." *Political Studies Review, Political Studies Review* 9, 9(3, 3): 323, 323-333, 333.
- Hensel, Paul R., Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl (2000) "The Democratic Peace and Rivalries." *The Journal of Politics* 62(4): 1173-1188.
- Higashino, Atsuko (2004) "For the Sake of 'Peace and Security'?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 39(4): 347-368.
- Jabko, Nicolas (2006) *Playing the Market*. Cornell University Press.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Lisa L. Martin (1995) "The Promise of Institutional Theory." *International Security* 20(1): 39-51.
- Manners, I (2006) "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered." *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2): 182-99.
- (2002) "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40: 235-258.
- Maoz, Z., and B. Russett (1993) "Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946-1986." *American Political Science Review*: 624-638.
- Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons (1998) "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions." *International Organization* 52(04): 729-757.
- Mearsheimer, John J (1994) "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19(3): 5-49.
- Mitchell, Sara McLaughlin, and Paul R. Hensel (2007) "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4): 721-737.
- Niemann, Arne, and Philippe C. Schmitter (2009) "Neofunctionalism." In *European Integration Theory*, eds. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez. Oxford University Press.
- Noutcheva, G. (2007) *Fake, Partial and Imposed Compliance: The Limits of the EU's Normative Power in the Western Balkans*. CEPS Working Documents No. 274. CEPS Working Documents No. 274.

- Noutcheva, Gergana, Nathalie Tocci, Bruno Coppieters, and Tamara Kovziridze. (2004) "Europeanization and Secessionist Conflicts: Concepts and Theories." *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 2004: 1.
- Phinnemore, David (2010) "And We'd Like to Thank ... Romania's Integration into the European Union, 1989-2007." *Journal of European Integration* 32(3): 291-308.
- Pinder, John (1996) "Community Against Conflict: The European Community's Contribution to Ethno-National Peace in Europe." In *Preventing conflict in the post-communist world: mobilizing international and regional organizations*, eds. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes. Brookings Institution Press.
- Powers, K., and G. Goertz (2006) "The Evolution of Regional Economic Institutions (REI) into Security Institutions or the Demise of Traditional Military Alliances." 47th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA: 22-25.
- Powers, Kathy, and Gary Goertz (2009) "The Evolution of International Institutions: the Liberal Transformation of Regional Economic Institutions and Military Alliances into Conflict Managers."
- Russett, B. (1993) "Can a democratic peace be built?" *International Interactions* 18(3): 277-282.
- )Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004) "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 11: 661-679.
- Sjursen, H. (2006) "The EU as a 'Normative' Power: How Can This Be?" *Journal of European Public Policy* 13(2): 235-251.
- Slobodchikoff, Michael O. (2010) "The New European Union: Integration as a Means of Norm Diffusion." *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 9(1): 1-25.
- Tocci, Nathalie (2008) *The European Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor*. CEPS Working Documents 281. CEPS Working Documents 281. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1337970](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1337970) (Accessed January 6, 2010).
- Vasquez, John A. (2000) *What Do We Know About War?* Rowman & Littlefield.
- Vasquez, John, and Marie T. Henehan (2001) "Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992." *Journal of Peace Research* 38(2): 123-138.
- Wallensteen, Peter (2007) *Understanding conflict resolution: war, peace and the global system*. SAGE Publications.