ABSTRACT. This paper provides a detailed analysis of some of the most frequent proverbs and sayings in English and Spanish from a cognitive point of view. In our study we show the necessity to further develop conventional metaphoric and metonymic analysis into more complex patterns of interaction between the two. Furthermore, this paper stresses the relevance of subjectivity in cognitive conceptualizations; cross-linguistic differences arise in most of the expressions analysed, which show that cultural differences mark the choices of language. A more refined view of image metaphors is also provided in this paper, which claims the existence of a continuum ranging from one-shot purely imagistic to those that resemble image-schematic metaphors.

KEYWORDS. Proverb, metaphor, metonymy, metaphoric complex, subjectivity.

1. INTRODUCTION

Metaphor and metonymy have significantly evolved from being considered a mere aesthetic device –as studied within the realms of literature and rhetoric– to be regarded
as a matter of everyday language and thought, i.e. as a way of conceptualizing the world. This kind of approach stems from seminal work in Lakoff & Johnson (1980), successively developed by Lakoff (1987, 1993), Lakoff & Turner (1989) and Lakoff & Johnson (1999).

Their contribution has given rise to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, or CMT, which has been developed over the years by various scholars, such as Barcelona (2000, 2005), Gibbs (1994), Gibbs & Steen (1999), Kövecses (2000, 2002, 2005), Fauconnier & Turner (1994, 1998, 2002), and Ruiz de Mendoza and his collaborators (e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza, 1997, 1999, 2008; Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal, 2002; Ruiz de Mendoza & Mairal, 2007). In this paper we will pay special attention to the developments of this theory made by Ruiz de Mendoza (1997) and Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002) regarding the role of metaphor in conceptual interaction, and by Ruiz de Mendoza (2008) concerning metaphoric chains (metaphoric complexes).

The most recent development of CMT is found in Lakoff & Johnson (1999), who integrate Johnson’s (1997) theory of conflation (between judgments and sensorimotor experiences in childhood), Grady’s (1997) theory of primary metaphor (which arises automatically from everyday experience and which combines with other primary metaphors to form complex metaphors), Narayanan’s neural theory of metaphor (according to which, after the period of conflation, neural connections remain active and become cross-domain influential), and Fauconnier and Turner’s (1996, 1998) theory of conceptual blending (new inferences arise by the co-activation of different conceptual domains). The new theory makes emphasis on the unconscious and automatic nature of the acquisition of primary metaphors.

In this research context, the aim of this paper is to discuss and illustrate the subjective nature of figurative language by looking into the metaphorical and metonymic structure of some of the most popular English and Spanish proverbs and sayings involving birds and other winged animals. The term “subjective” should be understood in the present paper at least in a three-fold sense, as in (i)-(iii) below:

(i) As referring to the main clause subject/speaker and the degree of involvement implicit in his/her stance towards the proposition encoded in the clause;

(ii) As being connected with the semantico-pragmatic notion of subjectivity, that is, “the way in which natural languages, in their structure and normal manner of operation, provide for the locutionary agent’s expression of himself and his own attitudes and beliefs.” (Lyons 1982: 102; see also the collection of papers presented in Stein and Wright 1995 as well as Scheibman 2002: 1-16 for further reference on the different definitions proposed for this concept);

(iii) As pointing to subjectification, understood by e.g. Traugott (1995a: 32) as “the development of a grammatically identifiable expression of Speaker’s belief or Speaker’s attitude towards what is said” (cf. also Traugott 1995b; Traugott and Dasher 2002: 30).
The vast majority of the metaphors that arise from our analysis are ontological, following the taxonomical terminology initially put forward by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), who defined ontological metaphors as those which help us understand nonphysical experience in terms of substances and objects. In this connection, Ruiz de Mendoza (1999) has observed that most of these metaphors are essentially situational and, on the basis of preliminary work by Peña (2003), sheds new light into the matter by proposing a new classification (Ruiz de Mendoza & Otal, 2002), which will be useful for our analysis.

These authors argue that metaphors can be classified by looking into the nature of the source domain (e.g. it can designate an entity, a situation, an image schema or an image) or by examining the number and kind of correspondences. From the point of view of the number of correspondences, we may have very simple (one-correspondence) systems as in the case of ontological metaphors working on one “quintessential” feature (cf. Lakoff & Turner’s discussion of *Achilles is a lion* meaning that Achilles is brave) or complex (many-correspondence) systems like *LOVE IS A JOURNEY* or *ARGUMENT IS WAR*, which are capable of giving rise to multiple meaning implications (e.g. *We are at a crossroads* may give rise to implications such as ‘We don’t know where to go’, ‘We wish we had taken a different route’, ‘We could always retrace our steps and find a different way’, etc.). If we take into account the nature of the mapping, we may distinguish, with Grady (1997), between resemblance and correlation metaphors; the former are based on perceived similarities between source and target (e.g. the enamel of teeth resembles the coating of a pearl), while the latter are grounded in the conflation of concepts (e.g. affection and warmth are conflated on the basis of our experience of feeling physical warmth when being intimate with other people).

Now, if we focus on the nature of the source domain, one of the three classificatory criteria expounded above, situational metaphors (a subtype of structural metaphors which present a metonymic expansion of the source domain that maps onto the target domain of the metaphor) can be further subdivided into scenic and non-scenic metaphors, which invoke situations that can or cannot be observed respectively. We will see that most of the examples in our corpus correspond to situational and scenic metaphors, but exceptions will be pointed out.

In Section 2 we will classify and analyze our examples in the light of Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez’s (2002) discussion of patterns of conceptual interaction. This study is a considerable improvement on Goossens (1990), since it takes into account the situational nature of most animal-based metaphors and systematizes a larger number of cases. The productivity of the analysis put forward by Ruiz de Mendoza and Díez (2002) has been shown by Urios-Aparisi (2009) in the context of multimodal metaphor.

For our current purposes we will take a series of expressions and proverbs involving winged animals that will be analyzed with special focus on the intralinguistic as well as cross-linguistic differences that arise from the subjective nature of human experience, which is the basis of categorization.

Section 3 provides an overview of the main findings of this paper.
2. DATA AND CLASSIFICATION

The data for the present paper have been sampled from a collection of animal-based proverbs and sayings in English and Spanish, gathered from various sources: the Oxford Spanish Dictionary and several electronic sources:

www.beautiful-chiangmai.com/thailand/birds/birds_proverbs.htm,
www.elrefranero.iespana.es,
www.tracyaviary.org/uploads/.../AVES%20Bird%20Proverbs.pdf,
www.birdsupplies.com/Articles.asp?ID=219,
www.cockatielcottage.net/proverbs.html, www.backyardchickens.com/fun-
chicken-sayings.html, www.es.wikiquote.org/wiki/Aves,
www.savidurias.com/tags/pollos/es/11607,
www.refranespopulares.com/.../refranes-a.htm,
www.geneura.ugr.es/~victor/refranero_castellano.txt,
www.es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aves_en_sentido_figurado, www.woodlands-
junior.kent.sch.uk/CUSTOMS/sayings.html,
www.cogweb.ucla.edu/Discourse/Proverbs/Spanish-English.html, www.learn-
english-today.com/Proverbs/proverbs.html,
www.proz.com/?sp=mt&eid_s=27139&float=y&glossary=8733

Proverbs, as part of folk culture, fit in nicely with the definition of subjectivity proposed by Sheibman and colleagues, which justifies our choice of this object of analysis for our purposes.

In our preliminary analysis it was observed that most expressions in our collection made use of the same basic conceptual pattern, that is, they depicted part of a situation based on common experience that could be conceptually made to stand for a more complex situational model; the situation then carried over to a real-world situation that the speaker wanted to reason about. This combination of concepts falls within one of the interactional patterns discussed in Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002), i.e. there is a metonymy built into the source of a situational metaphor. However, we also found certain sayings that suggested different interactional patterns, some of them not considered in Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002). It was also found that some expressions do not make use of metaphor-metonymy combinations but of metaphoric chains where one same metaphoric target is seen in terms of at least two different source domains. The notion of metaphoric chain –which may also be referred to as metaphoric complex– is first found in this sense in Ruiz de Mendoza (2008).

We also found that there are differences in register/style among the proverbs surveyed in this paper, and we will see that they display varying degrees of fixation/idiomaticity.

In the ensuing discussion, we will analyze and classify our proverbs and sayings first by considering the different patterns of conceptual interaction between metaphor and
metonymy and then by looking into metaphoric complexes or chains. Examples within the first category have been listed according to structural and meaning correspondences between English and Spanish equivalents. We will start with an English expression whose Spanish counterpart is a literal translation from one language to the other, which means that they share identical structure as regards conceptual interaction. In turn, we will see how other English/Spanish equivalent expressions that share their metaphoric/metonymic pattern convey distinct connotations within the target domain derived from different winged animals being involved. Lastly, we will see an example of how both metaphoric patterns and differences within the source domain (different animals identified with the same situation or characteristic) arise cross-linguistically. Moreover, we will discuss intralinguistic differences that come from the highlighting of different features of the same winged animal for the comprehension of different concepts.

Next in our classification, we will discuss and provide examples that illustrate the concept of metaphoric complex. We will see how metaphoric complexes license mappings from two source domains onto one target domain, thereby combining conceptual inferences that arise from various distinct basic metaphors. Within this context, we will also discuss the role and nature of image metaphors; here we will put in contrast Lakoff’s and Caballero’s perspectives regarding this matter.

2.1. Metaphor and metonymy in interaction

The first interactional pattern that arises from our data can generally be schematized as in figure 1 below, where the source of the metaphor contains a part-whole metonymy. Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002) have discussed this pattern as a case of metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source, on the grounds that the linguistic expression only supplies partial access to the source of the metaphoric mapping. We have found two variants of this general interaction pattern: one, which is not discussed in Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002), where only part of the metaphoric source is affected by metonymy; another, in which the whole source domain is obtained by metonymic expansion.

![Fig. 1. Metonymic expansion of a metaphoric source.](image)

Let us consider, first, the case of the expression *to clip somebody’s wings*, as represented in figure 2 below.
The metaphoric/metonymic structure of this expression adheres to the pattern of metonymic expansion of part of the metaphoric source. By mentioning a bird’s wings, we make reference to an essential characteristic of birds: their ability to fly. This ability maps onto the target domain of the metaphor as freedom, following a conventional association between flying and freedom (*I want to fly away, I want to be as free as a bird* are expressions in which flying and freedom are connected). So, in this sense, the meaning of the expression would be to deprive someone of his freedom.

The Spanish counterpart of this saying is a literal translation (*cortarle las alas a alguien*, lit. ‘clip someone’s wings’). Consequently, it shares structure and rough meaning with the one analyzed. Nevertheless, the meanings of the English and Spanish expressions are not identical. In Spanish, the expression can also mean ‘to deprive someone of his enthusiasm’, as in *Quería ser artista pero sus padres le cortaron las alas* (lit. ‘He wanted to be an artist but his parents clipped his wings’). The English version also has a slightly similar, though by no means identical, figurative meaning: ‘to restrain someone; to reduce or put an end to someone’s privileges’: *You had better learn to get home on time, or I will clip your wings; My mother clipped my wings. I can’t go out tonight*. Even from an intuitive point of view, it’s clear that in the Spanish sense outlined above involves a higher-scale project/activity than its English counterpart. While this would need to be validated by corpus evidence (and possibly other types of evidence), this preliminary conclusion is in line with Croft (2001: 55-58) and Goldberg (2006: 225-226) that argument structure is not only construction-specific.

The following pattern –see figure 3 below– differs from the one in figure 2 in that the metonymic expansion process affects the whole source domain.
The source of the built-in metonymy is supplied by the literal reading of *to stir up a hornet’s nest*. But this expression refers to the effects it would cause to stir a hornet’s nest: the insects would be agitated and fly out of their nest, probably stinging the person who stirred them.

In this way, the target domain of the metonymy constitutes the source domain of the metaphor. Thus, these concepts of messiness and agitation associated with the stirred up hornet’s nest map onto the target domain of the metaphor: to do something that causes agitation and, in some way, endangers the person who does it.

In this particular example, no significant differences arise from the comparison of the example above and its Spanish counterpart as regards the metaphor-metonymy pattern of interaction: *alborotar el gallinero* (‘to stir up a henhouse’). Nevertheless, in the English version the focus is placed on agitation and its dangerous consequences, whilst the Spanish version places special emphasis on the noise and the agitation.

Let us now discuss an instance in which structural differences can also be found between Spanish and English rough equivalents. Figure 4 stands for the saying *to be up with the lark*. See figure 5 below for the Spanish counterpart *levantarse al cantar el gallo*.

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**Fig. 3. To stir up a hornet’s nest.**

**Fig. 4. To be up with the lark.**
Note that an orientational metaphor is involved: CONSCIOUS IS UP/ UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN. This is an example of primary metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). This metaphor is grounded in our experience of adopting an upright position when we awake and of lying down when we go to sleep. The knowledge entailed in primary metaphors is acquired from combined experiential and neurological processes.

The structure of this expression follows the same pattern of conceptual interaction as the examples above: a metonymy can be found within the source domain of the metaphor; to be up with the lark refers to rising when larks are already active, flying around, which means that they are already awake. Thus, as we saw in the previous example, the target domain of the metonymy (to wake up when the larks are already flying around) maps onto the target domain of the metaphor, thus referring to someone who gets up very early.

The Spanish counterpart of to be up with the lark is levantarse al cantar el gallo (‘to rise as soon as the rooster starts to sing’) is represented in figure 5, which shows that there is no metonymy within the source domain of the metaphor. The mapping projects the moment of the rooster singing in the source domain to the moment someone gets up in the target domain:

![Fig. 5. Levantarse al cantar el gallo (‘to be up as soon as the rooster starts to crow’).](image)

Note that different animals are involved in the above equivalent English and Spanish expressions, which illustrates Lakoff’s proposal about intercultural differences that give priority to certain features of an animal over others. In English, the lark seems to be the bird associated with an early beginning of the day, whereas Spanish people attribute this role to the rooster.

Interestingly enough, another characteristic feature of the rooster is the basis of a popular Spanish metaphor: Ser un gallo (‘to be a tough guy’). As Lakoff (1993) observed, metaphors highlight certain aspects of concepts and hide others. The metaphor Ser un gallo, thus, focuses on the quarrelsome nature of roosters, but has no connection whatsoever with its wake-up-early condition. Therefore, it is only this characteristic of the rooster that is mapped from the source to the target domain: the metaphorical structuring is partial. As stated before, none of these features of the rooster is used in English to characterize neither a human being nor a given situation. In the same way, the lark does not seem to have any connection with the early hours of the morning for Spanish speakers.
The structure of the expression *to have butterflies in one’s stomach* in figure 6 is apparently identical to that of the above discussed *to stir up a hornet’s nest* (metonymic expansion of the metaphoric source). However, the target of the metonymy (and therefore, the source domain of the metaphor) is rather different: a metonymic relationship links the image of butterflies flying around and the hypothetical feeling that this quick movement would cause to someone who had them in his stomach.

![Fig. 6. To have butterflies in one’s stomach.](image)

Note that this analysis would seem to flout one of the assumptions of Conceptual Metaphor Theory, according to which the source domain must be tangible or conceptually fixed. Nevertheless, the conventional image of flying butterflies together with the experiential grounding provided by a particular feeling in the stomach makes this hypothetical situation concrete. Thus, despite the hypothetical nature of the source domain, the feasibility of this CMT tenet remains intact.

We find the same interaction pattern in another interesting example: *to have a bee in one’s bonnet about something* (figure 7), which illustrates the possibility of highlighting one feature of an animal over others.

![Fig. 7. To have a bee in one’s bonnet about something.](image)
Compare the role of the bee in this saying with that of the same insect in the simile *to be as busy as a bee*. It is obvious that in the latter, a property of the animal (its willingness to work) is transferred to a human being. But this characteristic, which is highlighted in this simile, is absent in the expression. In turn, the bee in this case represents unrest, uneasiness. In this sense, the image we get is similar to the one discussed above about butterflies in one’s stomach: a metonymy in the source domain makes reference to the feeling it would cause to have a bee in one’s bonnet. However, even though both situations can be considered hypothetical, it is clear that, although unlikely to happen, one could have a bee in one’s bonnet, whilst having butterflies in one’s stomach is not possible.

Following Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal’s (2002) criterion for the classification of metaphors, *to have a bee in one’s bonnet about something* is a situational, scenic metaphor, whilst *to have butterflies in one’s stomach* is actually a situational non-scenic metaphor (the situation that the metaphor refers to cannot be observed).

The interpretation of the metaphor *to have a bee in one’s bonnet about something* relies on the uneasiness that the bee would cause in one’s bonnet, and the fact that one would probably look up and frown while wondering what is happening. The frowning caused by the bee in the bonnet is mapped onto the target domain: the frowning caused by worry or concentration on something.

The Spanish counterpart *tener algo entre ceja y ceja* (‘to have an idea between one’s eyebrows’) does not fit into the above pattern, and will be analyzed in 2.2 in the light of the concept of metaphoric complex.

The Spanish expression *subírsele a alguien el pavo* (lit. ‘to have a turkey going up someone’) does not have a literal or near-equivalent in English, although some of its correspondences are also to be found in English. In colloquial parlance, a person who is a turkey (lit. ‘pavo’) is thought to be shy and withdrawn, and ultimately dummy due to his timid behavior, both in English and Spanish. There is a connection between the frightful nature of a turkey and the shyness of an easily embarrassed person. Besides, the red color in the face of the turkey maps onto the red color of a person who is embarrassed as shown in figure 8.

Fig. 8. ¡Qué pavo eres!
Similar ways of reasoning govern the expression _subírsele a alguien el pavo_ (‘to blush’, ‘to go bright red’). Nevertheless, this extension leads us to another new pattern of metaphor-metonymy interaction, not discussed in Ruiz de Mendoza & Díez (2002), which is represented in figure 9 and schematized in figure 10 below.

![Fig. 9. Subírsele a alguien el pavo (lit. ‘the turkey rises up to someone’).](image)

![Fig. 10. Metonymic reduction of a metaphoric source and metonymic expansion of the target domain.](image)

Although related to the above example _ser un pavo_ (lit. ‘to be a turkey’), _subírsele a alguien el pavo_ (lit. ‘to have a turkey come up on someone’, i.e. ‘to blush’, ‘to go red’) follows a more complex metaphoric-metonymic pattern of interaction, as represented in figure 9. Interestingly enough, the only correspondence between the source and the target domains arises from the red color in the turkey’s wattle, which is associated with the red color in the face of a person who is embarrassed. This red color comes, in the case of the person, from the flowing of blood up to the face, which gives consistence to the expression _subírsele el pavo._

Compare the metonymic structure within the metaphoric source and target domains. Whereas the metonymy ‘turkey-red wattle’ involves domain reduction (the turkey stands...
for a part of the turkey, that is, WHOLE FOR PART), the metonymy ‘resultant red color-
embarrassment’ maps a physical feature (the effect) onto a related attitude or emotion (the
cause). Therefore, the metonymy that operates within the target domain is in fact EFFECT FOR CAUSE.

2.2. Metaphoric complexes

As pointed out by Ruiz de Mendoza (2008), the collaboration of two or more
different metaphors is necessary for the understanding of certain expressions. That is the
case of the following example of chaining (Ruiz the Mendoza, in prep.) in figure 11,
which results in a metaphoric complex: He slapped some sense into me (“He caused me
to acquire some sense by slapping me”, i.e. “He slapped me and in so doing caused me
to acquire some sense”).

Fig. 11. He slapped some sense into me.

Following this pattern, let us now analyze the expression tener algo entre ceja y
ceja, which is the Spanish equivalent of our previous example (section 2.1) to have a bee
in one’s bonnet about something.

In Spanish, this expression involves a different set of implications: when we are
worried, even obsessed about something, we tend to frown, and when we frown, it is
between our eyebrows that the frowning shows. Thus, the implication is that what we are
thinking about is located in that specific part of the forehead. So again we have the
metaphors IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER and
ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE. In this way, the part of the head
located between the eyebrows is the one that holds the ideas that we are intent on.
Furthermore, it is the mental image of someone frowning that leads us to the choice of
that part of the head and not another.

The metaphoric chain that explains these correspondences is the following:
The analysis of the expression above leads us to the following considerations on the nature of image metaphors. Consider Lakoff’s concept of image metaphor as a “one shot” metaphor that maps only one image onto another image. Metaphors of this kind would not allow (many) conceptual correspondences between source and target domains. In this respect, Rosario Caballero (2003, 2005) argues that division between conceptual and image metaphors is rather fuzzy, and asserts that image metaphors can indeed map conceptual knowledge and patterns of inference structure from the source domain onto the target domain (cf. also Deignan, 2007). Caballero supports her claim using instances taken from the architectural jargon aiming to demonstrate that image metaphors occur beyond the realm of literature. In this way, she emphasizes the more conceptual and less imagistic nature of the so-called image metaphors.

In Caballero’s examples, both the source and the target domain of the metaphor are images. Nevertheless, if we look carefully into these metaphors, her corpus suggests that there is a continuum of cases in which we have purely imagistic metaphors (as Lakoff proposed), metaphors which select only one imagistic feature (a combination of images and conceptualizations) and in the other extreme, metaphors that are closer to be considered image-schematic metaphors due to the abstract nature of its domains (cf. Peña, 2003, 2008). Let us see an example of each of these metaphor types (Caballero, 2003):

1. The basic structure “started with a bowstring truss we took out of the building”.
   The nature of this image metaphor is purely imagistic: the image of the source domain and the image of the target domain merge into one.
2. Many architects regard their built artefacts as (...) having ‘wrinkles’ of growing ‘bellies’.
   This set of metaphors maps only one feature from one domain onto the other. However, these features are related to ‘shape’, which makes this metaphor conceptual in nature.
3. The decision to air-condition lower-floor public spaces required ingenious weaving of ductwork in ceilings.
   In this case, the metaphor should be regarded as image-schematic if we consider the abstract nature of the source domain in which physical structure is involved.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE →</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>← SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Container organized in different parts</td>
<td>Mind (Head)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects</td>
<td>Ideas (that one is intent on)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objects located in a specific region of the container</td>
<td>Organization (of ideas) in “parts” of the mind</td>
<td>The part of the forehead between the eyebrows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Going back to our example in figure 9 *to have an idea between one’s eyebrows*, note that the first source domain must be labeled as image-schematic in accordance with its abstract nature (location, ideas, physical structure). Nevertheless, the other source domain (‘the part of the forehead between the eyebrows’) evokes a mental, static image which makes it fit into Lakoff and Turner’s concept of image metaphor. So this expression conjoins the two extremes in the continuum of images that we established above, and still the target domain is non-imagistic.

The following saying in figure 12, further exemplifies Ruiz de Mendoza’s proposal of metaphoric chain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOURCE</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>← SOURCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birds</td>
<td>Ideas</td>
<td>Objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying around disorderly</td>
<td>Lack of organization</td>
<td>Lack of physical structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confined space</td>
<td>Mind</td>
<td>Container</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 13. *tener pájaros en la cabeza* (‘to have birds inside one’s head’).

This case is interesting, because it’s completely lexically filled-in in Spanish, but partially filled-in in English (the possessive phrase being an open slot).

Three different metaphors cooperate in the interpretation of this expression:

THE HEAD IS A CONTAINER

IDEAS ARE OBJECTS

ORGANIZATION IS PHYSICAL STRUCTURE > LACK OF ORGANIZATION IS LACK OF PHYSICAL STRUCTURE

Stating that someone has something (birds, in this case) inside his head invokes the conception of the head as a container (of ideas). The image of the flapping of the wings inside a confined area (the head) leads to the idea of lack of organization. There is a mapping from the domain of birds flying around disorderly onto the domain of lack of mental organization. These elements in the source domain map to the target domain. Thus, the mapping of these ideas from one domain to the other results in the conception of a person whose head is governed by lack of organization. The embedded metaphor has the function of giving prominence to the same meaning implication that is produced by its English counterpart (*to be scatterbrained*). In the same way, the image of a brain whose parts are scattered in the source domain is mapped onto the target domain, mapping the idea of lack of physical organization onto the person’s ability to organize his thoughts. This is so because of our folk model of the brain as a physically structured container where ideas fit into well defined and ordered areas. Note that in this case there is only one source domain and a set of correspondences which are mapped onto the target domain. Unlike the Spanish *tener pájaros en la cabeza*, this metaphor is
situational and non-scenic: one can observe birds within a confined space, but not the ‘scattered’ parts of the brain.

Interestingly enough, the Spanish tener pájaros en la cabeza has a very close English counterpart, as shown in figure 14, but as we will point out, significant differences in meaning arise.

The link that motivates the mapping from the source domain (belfry) onto the target domain (head) arises from the physical location of both the belfry on top of the tower and the head on top of the human body. The conceptual correspondence that links head-container-belfry is the same as in the above example (head-container-confined space). Nevertheless, the confined space in this case comes from the linguistic expression itself (belfry), which provides a clearer image of the situation.

Regarding the aforementioned differences in meaning, note that different implications emerge from cross-linguistic comparison. On the one hand, different animals represent this lack of organization within one’s head. On the other hand, the implications derived from disorderly flying within a reduced space are not identical. Whereas tener pájaros en la cabeza refers to someone whose ideas are not clear, to have bats in one’s belfry means ‘to be crazy/nuts’, whose Spanish counterpart is estar como una cabra (‘to be as crazy as a goat’). This set of equivalences show that these expressions are grounded in subjective values (there are no objective reasons to attribute craziness to a goat instead of inferring this craziness from bats in one’s head). Even if each of these expressions may be rooted in experience and mental associations, there are no objective principles that support them.
The meaning of the following example further illustrates our claim that subjectivity and cultural values are implicit in proverbs and sayings. In the proverb *the early bird catches the worm*, the mapping of conventional concepts from the source domain onto the target domain allows us to comprehend the essence (in this case even moral lesson) of the proverb. In most of modern Western culture, values like time and work are given priority over others. Thus, a hard-working, responsible person is considered to be good. In the same way, good people are thought to deserve a reward. These implications are deeply embedded in our culture, as illustrated by the proverb above. The early bird in the source domain maps onto a person who gets up early in the target domain. The worm (something valuable for the bird) maps onto something valuable for the person in the target domain. In this proverb, we see how the person who rises early in the morning receives some kind of reward.

Furthermore, this metaphoric expression reflects the competitive nature of human beings. In some way, a deeper interpretation of this metaphor would come to the point of saying that the earlier you get up, the more time (and opportunities) you get to achieve success. The Spanish counterpart of this proverb is *a quien madruga Dios le ayuda* (lit. ‘God helps those who get up early’), which reinforces the positive values attributed to hard work and the profitable use of time. This proverb is rooted even deeper in human beliefs while the English equivalent makes use of the speakers’ every-day experience of nature.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of our corpus of examples has provided evidence in favor of the following claims:

- Proverbs and sayings –which are part of our everyday speech– are not always explainable in terms of straightforward metaphoric mappings; rather, they are constructed on the basis of more complex patterns of metaphor and metonymy in interaction.
- Intralinguistic differences are patent in the sense that different expressions within the same language will highlight different features of a winged animal. As a consequence of this highlighting process metaphoric mappings need only make use of partial source-domain structure to be mapped onto the target.
- Cross-linguistic differences arise between English and Spanish counterparts. Experiences of the world and values may vary cross-culturally (Kövecses, 2005). This is reflected in everyday life and also in language.
- Metaphoric complexes are essential for the understanding of certain expressions and proverbs. In these cases, postulating a single conceptual mapping is not enough for a fully-fledged interpretation. In a metaphoric complex, different sources have correspondences for the same target; the metaphoric complex specifies the way in which their meanings are integrated.
- Image metaphors must be handled carefully since there are no clear-cut boundaries that separate conceptual and image metaphors. Rather, there is a
continuum whose extremes are constituted by purely imagistic metaphors (Lakoff’s one-shot image metaphors) and by metaphors that strongly assimilate to image-schematic metaphors.

– The structure of proverbs and sayings is subjectively arranged. The motivations that assign one role or another to a given animal arise from cultural and environmental factors, and may consequently vary cross-linguistically, cross-culturally and even across time. However, certain expressions focus on animal attributes whose experiential grounding is more evident than the grounding of other expressions (cf. a lion’s ‘courage’ in Achilles is a lion versus a goat’s ‘craziness’ in Sp. estar como una cabra ‘be like a goat’).

NOTES

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