Philosophy of Education for the 21st Century: The Projects of Heidegger and Wittgenstein

Filosofía de la educación para el siglo XX: los proyectos de Heidegger y Wittgenstein

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Resumen:

Basándose en una redefinición de la filosofía que relega las preocupaciones epistemológicas a un asunto menor que es mejor abandonar, este ensayo examina las principales funciones y proyectos que los filósofos de la educación encontraron en Ludwig Wittgenstein y en Martin Heidegger. Sus proyectos –como el método de Übersicht de Wittgenstein y la solicitud y la deconstrucción de la historia de la ontología de Heidegger- son de especial importancia para la filosofía de la educación. Su promesa consiste en la apertura de canales de comunicación y en la creación de la posibilidad para dialogar.

Palabras clave: Übersicht, Ser y Tiempo, filosofía de la educación, solicitud, deconstrucción, historia de la ontología.

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Abstract:

Based on a redefinition of philosophy that relegates epistemological concerns to those of a minor issue best left alone, this essay examines the major roles and projects for philosophers of education found in Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger. Their projects—viz., Wittgenstein’s method of Übersicht and Heidegger’s solicitude and deconstruction of the history of ontology—are of particular importance to philosophy of education. Their promise lies in opening channels of communication and creating the possibility for dialogue.

Keywords: Übersicht, Sein und Zeit, philosophy of education, solicitude, deconstruction, history of ontology.

1. Introduction

In the 20th century, there was a decided change in the direction of philosophy—indeed, a revolution: epistemology, understood as the search for ultimate Truth, and which had largely ruled the day for the last 2,500 years, was abandoned. By the search for ‘ultimate Truth’ we mean the quest to find an absolutely certain and immovable foundation upon which to base any and all claims ‘to know’ anything whatsoever. Kurt Gödel, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger were the three principal architects of this revolution, i.e., they abandoned said search because they considered it impossible to complete. Their work is significant for educational practice because it enables teachers and students to engage in a form of critical thinking, which we discuss below, that creates the possibility for elevating one’s consciousness above Tradition.4

Gödel’s incompleteness theorems put the final nails in the coffin of the search for ultimate Truth and buried it. His work belongs to the branch of mathematics known as set theory, which “studies the properties of sets, [which are] fundamental objects used to define all other concepts in mathematics.”5 In short, set theory is foundational for mathematics. His work was a response to Bertrand Russell’s and Alfred North Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica, which was

“[T]he most nearly (but, as Gödel showed, by no means entirely) successful attempt to establish axioms that would provide a rigorous basis for all mathematics…. [Gödel showed] that within any rigidly logical mathematical system there are propositions (or questions) that cannot be proved or disproved on the basis of the axioms within that system, and that, therefore, it is uncertain that the basic axioms of arithmetic will not give rise to contradictions”.6

4 “Tradition” is “a morality, a mode of living tried and proved by long experience and testing, at length enters consciousness as a law, as dominating—And therewith the entire group of related values and states enters into it: it becomes venerable, unassailable, holy, true; it is part of its development that its origin should be forgotten—That is a sign it has become master—Exactly the same thing could have happened with the [Aristotelian] categories of reason” Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, New York, Vintage Books, 1968, pp. 277-278. On page 43 of Being and Time, in the first paragraph, it is clear that Heidegger inherited this problematic for his fundamental ontology—indeed, for Being and Time—from the just-quoted fragment, viz., p. 514.


As we have said, set theory is foundational for mathematics. The foundations of mathematics is

“[T]he study of the logical and philosophical basis of mathematics, including whether the axioms of a given system ensure its completeness and its consistency. Because mathematics has served as a model for rational inquiry in the West [including the quest for ultimate Truth, as we have called it] and is used extensively in the sciences, foundational studies have far-reaching consequences for the reliability and extensibility of rational thought itself”.7

Because Gödel showed that the axioms of any given mathematical system cannot ensure its completeness and its consistency, and thus that the foundations of mathematics are unreliable and of limited extensibility—i.e., when considered against the criterion of providing absolute certainty—and because such foundations, and hence mathematics in general, has served as a model for rational inquiry, which includes inquiry into the possibility of attaining ultimate Truth, then it follows that inquiry into the possibility of attaining ultimate Truth is also unreliable and of limited extensibility, or as we stated above, impossible to complete. Gödel’s work in the foundations of mathematical logic beyond this point, though interesting, is irrelevant for our present concerns.

Wittgenstein and Heidegger also insisted that the traditional epistemological concerns were misguided because they cannot be answered. In the analytic tradition, Wittgenstein insisted that we have been bewitched by the logic of our language and have been led down the wrong path, which has led us to ask the wrong questions. In the phenomenological tradition, Heidegger pointed to the impossibility of accomplishing the task set up by Husserl’s phenomenological method because bracketing off one’s subjectivity presupposes that one understands the extent to which Tradition has comprised it. In the process of explaining why and how this is impossible, Heidegger made it clear that the epistemological questions that drove Husserl fade into the background, and other questions rise to the forefront. In Heidegger’s words, such questions fade for the following reasons:

“When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always ‘outside’ alongside the entity to be known, and determines its character; but even in this ‘Being-outside’ alongside the object, Dasein is still ‘inside’, if we understand this in the correct sense; that is to say, it is itself ‘inside’ as a Being-in-the-world which knows. And furthermore, the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one’s booty to the ‘cabinet’ of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which knows remains outside, and it does so as Dasein. If I ‘merely’ know … about some way in which the Being of entities is interconnected, if I ‘only’ represent them, if I ‘do no more’ than ‘think’ about them, I am no less alongside the entities outside in the world than when I originally grasp them”.8

In another context in which Heidegger discusses the extent to which Reality—and thus the Real—is independent of consciousness, he says the following:

“The possibility of an adequate ontological analysis of Reality depends upon how far that of which the Real is to be thus independent—how far that which is to be transcended—has itself been clarified with regard to its Being. Only thus can even the kind of Being which belongs to transcendence be ontologically grasped…. These investigations … take precedence over any possible ontological question about Reality…. The ‘scandal of philosophy’ is not that [the proof confirming the connection between the ‘in me’ and the ‘outside of me’] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, aims, and demands arise from an ontologically inadequate way of starting with something of such a character that independently of it and ‘outside’ of it a ‘world’ is to be proved as present-at-hand. It is not that the proofs are inadequate, but that the kind of Being of the entity which does the proving and makes requests for proofs has not been made definite enough. This is why a demonstration that two things which are present-at-hand are necessarily present-at-hand together, can give rise to the illusion that something has been proved, or even can be proved, about Dasein as Being-in-the-world. If Dasein is understood correctly, it defies such proofs, because, in its Being, it already is what subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it…. The pursuit of such proofs presupposes an inappropriate formulation of the question…. Our task is not to prove that an ‘external world’ is present-at-hand or to show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has the tendency to bury the ‘external world’ in nullity ‘epistemologically’ before going on to prove it…. Our discussion of the unexpressed presuppositions of attempts to solve the problem of Reality in ways which are just ‘epistemological’, shows that this problem must be taken back, as an ontological one, into the existential analytic of Dasein‖. 9

Prior to this revolution, the epistemological questions, “What do we know?” and “How do we know it?” ruled the day. These questions demanded answers that were absolutely certain. Looking back to the 20th century, we can see that many philosophers abandoned the search for absolute certainty, and turned toward pragmatism. Their turn notwithstanding, their questions generally remained the same, i.e., they did not stop asking epistemological questions. What changed were the standards of acceptable answers, as illustrated by Dewey’s warranted assertability. 10 Because they did not stop asking epistemological questions, we see their turn toward pragmatism as a mistake. What happens as a result of this revolution and where philosophy can go after it is something we do not think has been fully appreciated by the philosophic community specifically, nor by the rest of the intellectual community generally.

Wittgenstein and Heidegger insisted that we cease to ask epistemological questions. What they advocated is not a turn toward pragmatism, but rather that we simply ask different questions. The questions that replace epistemological ones are, ‘How does human consciousness develop, and how does it apprehend its environment?’ These are questions about education, as we discuss below, and philosophers of education are in many ways uniquely suited to answer them. While some readers may object that developmental psychology and/or cognitive science is/are better suited than philosophy of education to answer these questions, we would remind them that philosophy is the history of developmental psychology and cognitive science, which is to say that philosophy is the

9 Ibid, pp. 246, 249, 250, 251, 252.
source of the problems Gödel, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger tried to dissolve. Hence, it is likely that philosophers of education, by virtue of having been trained in philosophy, are more familiar with it than developmental psychologists and cognitive scientists, and thus it is likely that they are better suited to inquire into the source of the problems that contemporary educational theory and practice has inherited from philosophy. In short, it is likely that philosophers of education are better suited than developmental psychologists and cognitive scientists to undertake the deconstruction of the history of ontology—an issue that we discuss below. Now, we will proceed to illustrate some of the programs, projects, and problems which are of specific interest to philosophy of education as laid out in the works of Wittgenstein and Heidegger.

2. Wittgenstein’s Philosophy as Therapeutic Practice

Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the most influential philosophers in the twentieth century. His two main books, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921) and *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), are counted as classics of modern philosophy. Despite the popularity of his writings, Wittgenstein has been misunderstood, or at least interpreted in quite different ways. Many labels are used to describe him: e.g., behaviorist, positivist, skeptic, naturalist, and anti-realist. Whether or not interpreters agree about Wittgenstein’s philosophy, they tend to interpret him according to their perspectives.

What allows this multiplicity of interpretations? First, he did not publish any philosophical books after the *Tractatus*. Positivists ignored the mystical part of the *Tractatus*, which led to their line of interpretation. His later philosophy, on the other hand, spread out only through those who attended his lectures in Cambridge University. Although many of Wittgenstein’s writings were published after his death and are now available, most of them were written as notes and remarks that, in his opinion, did not yet deserve to be published as a book. Secondly, his approaches to language are so different between the early and later philosophies that scholars hardly find any continuity between them. Thirdly, his writing style leaves his work vague. Most of his work consists of aphorisms and segments, an important part of the *Tractatus* is not written on purpose, and the *Investigations* is filled with examples and questions, which readers are expected to answer. His writing style, and therefore the multiplicity of interpretations, is carefully chosen to serve the aim of his philosophy. We shall discuss the aim of his philosophy in order to understand this.

Wittgenstein had difficulty publishing the *Tractatus*. After three publishers turned down his request, Wittgenstein wrote to Ludwig von Ficker, the editor of *Der Brenner*, and asked about the possibility of publishing it. In the letter, Wittgenstein explained to von Ficker, who did not know much about philosophy and logic, the point of the work:

“The point of the book is ethical. I once wanted to give a few words in the foreword which now actually are not in it, which, however, I’ll write to you now because they might be a key for you: I wanted to write that my work consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book; and I’m convinced that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in this way."  

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The *Tractatus* is relatively short, having only seventy-four pages. It mostly talks about the logical structure of the world and language. But, according to Wittgenstein, the main part is not written. It is important that the Ethical is delimited by not being written. Why did he, then, not write the main part? How could he delimit the Ethical by not writing it? Wittgenstein also recommended that the editor should read its foreword and conclusion. He wrote in the foreword:

“The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence”\(^\text{12}\)

Wittgenstein writes a similar expression in the conclusion: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.”\(^\text{13}\) The reason why the main part was not written is that it is not to be said but to be *shown*. He thought that by talking about only what one can talk about, he could delimit and at the same time show what cannot be talked about. “Thus the aim of the book,” he continued in the foreword, “is to draw a limit to . . . the expression of thoughts.” The aim of the *Tractatus* is to show the limit of language clearly, and to distinguish what may be said from what may not.

Here, Wittgenstein gives philosophy a new role. As we quoted above, he found the origin of philosophical problems in our misunderstandings of the logic of our ordinary language. For example, the word ‘is’ can be used as a copula, a sign for identity, or an expression for existence.\(^\text{14}\) When we misconceive the use of our language because of such superficial similarities, misunderstandings occur. He assigns philosophy a specific task of clarifying propositions and removing confusions by logical analysis. He characterized philosophy in contrast to the natural sciences:

4.11 The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science.
4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.
A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.
Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions,’ but rather in the clarification of propositions.
Without philosophy, thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

While the propositions of the natural sciences are either true or false and talk about the world, philosophy does not say anything about the world, but rather serves to clarify propositions. To do so, philosophy may produce pseudo-propositions, which cannot be either true or false, but rather nonsensical\(^\text{15}\) (he calls such propositions elucidations). Such results, as doctrines, cannot be philosophy in the Tractarian sense because the elucidating


\(^{13}\) Wittgenstein, TLP 7.

\(^{14}\) Wittgenstein, TLP 3.324.

\(^{15}\) Wittgenstein, TLP 6.54.
action is essential. Explaining clearly what can be said, philosophy draws the limits of expressions of thoughts and shows what cannot be said. For the earlier Wittgenstein, this is the only correct method of philosophy.

6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e., propositions of natural science—i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.

Although Wittgenstein once believed that there is only one correct method of philosophy, he questioned the idea in his later period. In *Philosophical Investigations*, he wrote:

“To say ‘This combination of words makes no sense’ excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it may be for various kinds of reasons [. . .] So if I draw a boundary line that is not yet to say what I am drawing it for”.

Removing nonsensical propositions and delimiting expressions of thoughts was the only philosophical method that Wittgenstein took to be right in the *Tractatus*. The later Wittgenstein admits, however, that the *Tractatus* has not yet achieved its task with that method. There is nothing wrong with the method itself. But drawing a boundary line can be used for various purposes. “If I surround an area with a fence or a line or otherwise,” for example, “the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may also be part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may shew where the property of one man ends and that of another begins; and so on.” Merely drawing a line between what can and cannot be said, one may not yet have accomplished what one wants to do. Wittgenstein recognized that he was wrong to believe that this one method resolved all philosophical confusions essentially. Did the later Wittgenstein, then, change his philosophy entirely? The answer is ‘no.’ He still thought that philosophy differs from the sciences. It is not a body of doctrine, but an *activity*. Philosophy’s task is still clarification, and philosophy does not *tell* but *shows* a right way. What he changed is his idea of what a philosophical method should be and how it works.

Removing nonsensical propositions is no longer philosophy’s only correct method, but is rather one of them. “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” It is important that he characterizes philosophical methods as therapeutic. Philosophy is seen as an activity of curing philosophical disease. The therapeutic treatment of philosophical problems is carried out through grammatical clarification. This clarification removes philosophical confusions, which occur when one is held captive by a certain philosophical picture. Thus, the task of philosophy—in the later

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17 Wittgenstein, PI 499.
18 Wittgenstein, PI 89-133; especially 90, 109 and 133.
19 Wittgenstein, PI 133.
20 Wittgenstein, PI 593.
Wittgenstein’s sense—is to set philosophers free from the philosophical pictures that hold them captive, as if philosophy cures their illness. What is wrong with the earlier Wittgenstein is, as he states, that he himself was held captive by a picture concerning the general form of propositions, and that he could not see any other functions of language. “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.” Thus, for the later Wittgenstein, “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.”

Although Wittgenstein’s concern is language, we should take it seriously when he states that language is the main part of forms of life. “And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.” He is very critical about the poverty of imagination used when considering different cultures. Wittgenstein criticizes Frazer because he interpreted customs of primitive people within the framework of his own culture and considered them stupid:

“The very idea of wanting to explain a practice—for example, the killing of the priest-king—seems wrong to me. All that Frazer does is to make them plausible to people who think as he does. It is very remarkable that in the final analysis all these practices are presented as, so to speak, pieces of stupidity. But it will never be plausible to say that mankind does all that out of sheer stupidity.”

“What a narrow spiritual life on Frazer’s part! As a result: how impossible it was for him to conceive of a life different from that of the England of his time! Frazer cannot imagine a priest who is not basically a present-day English parson with the same stupidity and dullness.”

Rather than taking a scientific approach, Wittgenstein recommends that we undertake Übersicht (or overview) in order to understand different cultures:

“And so the chorus points to a secret law,” one feels like saying to Frazer’s collection of facts. I can represent this law, this idea, by means of an evolutionary hypothesis, or also, analogously to the schema of a plant, by means of the schema of a religious ceremony, but also by means of the arrangement of its factual content alone, in a ‘perspicuous’ (übersichtliche) representation. The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental importance for us. It denotes the form of our representation, the way we see things”.

The key to release us from a captive picture is our ability to see or even invent a link between something familiar and something strange:

“A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view (übersehen) of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity (Übersichtlichkeit ). A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connection’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases”.

21 Wittgenstein, PI 114.
22 Wittgenstein, PI 115.
24 Wittgenstein, PI 19.
26 Wittgenstein, PO 125.
27 Interpreters of Wittgenstein have had difficulties in translating the cognates of Übersicht into English, which has been translated as ‘survey,’ ‘surview,’ ‘bird’s eye view,’ ‘synoptic view,’ or ‘perspicuity’ as well.
28 Wittgenstein, PO 133.
29 Wittgenstein, PI 122.
Again, there is more than one method for curing philosophical illness: describing how we use words, asking how we teach and learn words, inventing fictional language games, and so on. These methods help us to get a clear view of the use of our words and understand what is wrong with them. “This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e., get a clear view of)”\(^{30}\) The clarification as Übersicht is more than removing nonsensical propositions. It is expected to cause changing attitudes, freeing oneself from the old view, or seeing the world differently.

Wittgenstein teaches a skill or technique to make oneself free from captive pictures: “what mattered about his work was not its specific results, but its new way of philosophizing, a method or skill, which would enable us to fend for ourselves.”\(^{31}\) There is no longer the single right way of seeing the world. Philosophy never offers the only correct view of the world. Instead, it teaches the technique with which one releases oneself from a captive picture. He writes, “What is your aim in philosophy? To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle”\(^{32}\)

The specific projects resulting from Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy are many, but of those the following are of special interest to philosophers of education. We should help to show those who are captured in a logically closed system a way out by explaining that other views are also possible. This would also be the case for those with closed minds, or who are trapped in an outdated view. Such are those who are satisfied with themselves and think that they do not need to learn anything new. It is they, however, who stand to learn how to make something familiar strange in order to begin to abandon an outdated view.\(^{33}\) For example, An Education (2009), a film directed by Lone Scherfig, depicts several scenes within a traditional classroom, the like in which many, if not most readers have been formally educated: e.g., desks in neat rows where students are expected to sit; the teacher’s desk situated across from them; a blackboard; and other schoolroom paraphernalia. This film also depicts several scenes without this place—e.g., in a concert hall, a jazz bar, a hotel room, domestic spaces, etc.—where the main character receives an informal, though (arguably) no less valuable education. A professor of education could use this film with pre-service teachers who, like our readers, have likely been formally educated in traditional classrooms, and thus who are familiar with them, to discuss what may be strange notions of what an ‘education’ entails. Through such an exercise, a teacher may render strange what students have otherwise presumed is familiar, and thereby expand their notions of ‘education.’ The point here is not to demonstrate that their views are necessarily incorrect and that these other views are true, but simply that there may be other perspectives worthy of consideration.

\(^{30}\) Wittgenstein, PI 125.
\(^{32}\) Wittgenstein, PI 309.
\(^{33}\) We hope that readers will understand our meaning here by way of an example drawn from the arts—in particular, the film An Education (2009), directed by Lone Scherfig. This film depicts several scenes within a traditional classroom, the like in which most readers (we would venture to say) have been formally educated: e.g., desks in neat rows where students are expected to sit; the teacher’s desk situated across from them; a blackboard; and other schoolroom paraphernalia. This film also depicts several scenes without this place—e.g., in a concert hall, a jazz bar, a hotel room, domestic spaces, etc.—where the main character receives an informal, though (arguably) no less valuable education. A teacher could use this film with pre-service teachers who, like our readers, have likely been formally educated in traditional classrooms, and thus who are familiar with them, to discuss what may be strange notions of what an ‘education’ entails. Through such an exercise, a teacher may render strange what students have otherwise presumed is familiar, and thereby expand their notions of “education”.
3. Heidegger’s Philosophy as Striving toward Authenticity

Heidegger was also concerned about how people become trapped within a particular worldview, and he expressed his concern in Being and Time. Its accessibility is enhanced if readers understand that Heidegger speaks with many different voices throughout the text, and learn to identify each in their turn. For our purposes, we will limit ourselves to two: Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, and his deconstruction of Western intellectual history. Dasein is Heidegger’s term for that which is common to all human existence. His analysis of it is the primary task of Being and Time, and has the effect of correcting/replacing Aristotle’s analysis of human nature in terms of categories.

3.1. Solicitude

Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein revolves around the notion of authenticity. The problem of authenticity—i.e., the central problem of Being and Time—is a problem of education, but Heidegger did not explore the educational aspects of this issue. It can be understood in the following way. When one tries to follow a moral rule, one must apply it to unique situations. Such situations will have similarities and differences with and from previous ones, and to the extent that the differences are significant, one must interpret the rule in order to apply it correctly. This is exactly what cannot be done unless one understands the basis, or the ground for the rule. Only if the ground for the rule has become one’s own—i.e., only if one has come to the rule as the conclusion of long thought and experiential process—is one in a position to interpret the rule properly. Exactly to the extent that Dasein exists without a ground of its own it exists inauthentically, and to the extent that it has made that ground its own, it exists authentically.

As Dasein struggles to make a ground of its own—i.e., as it works to lay down a basis of understanding upon which its authentic existence will rest—it interacts with the world in two different ways, which fall under the general heading of care: concern and solicitude. Dasein exhibits concern when it interacts with entities that are not Dasein. The type of care that Dasein exhibits towards others of its own kind, other Daseins, is solicitude. We may think of education as a form of what Heidegger called solicitude. We will discuss the two extremes of positive solicitude here, leaping in and leaping ahead, as these apply to education and teaching.

On the one hand, a teacher may ignore her students’ concern with particular objects and ideas and leap in for them, effectively expelling them from the ground they could otherwise claim as their own. When they return, they find it has been colonized by Tradition. Without an understanding of its primordial sources (i.e., as a mode of living that emerged in a particular place at a particular time, and was expressed in a particular manner), most students become dependent upon and dominated by Tradition’s claim that the issues they raise have been settled once and for all. This approach to education destroys learning, for it denies students the opportunity to face novel situations, to weigh their relative similarities and dissimilarities with previous situations, and to decide whether Tradition’s scripted answers should be accepted, modified, or rejected.

One will also occasionally find Heidegger critiquing and correcting Husserl’s phenomenological method. However, there is one overriding voice that is always present in Being and Time, and that is Heidegger engaging Aristotle in discussion.
On the other hand, a teacher may leap ahead of her students by understanding their own individual ground and aspirations. Effectively, the teacher prepares the ground for them by introducing novel situations and gauging her students’ comprehension of them, and by getting out of their way so they themselves may choose whether, and if so the extent to which Tradition is useful in facilitating interpretation, and ultimately assimilation. In leaping ahead, the teacher is intervening in the process of interpretation, not in guaranteeing its results.

Let’s take what we consider to be a common dictum of contemporary education as an example, while citing a historical event to illustrate our point. Students cannot genuinely accept a rule such as, “Thou shalt respect cultures different from thine own,” unless two conditions are met. First, they must have a ground of their own from which to accept, revise, or reject it; and second, they must understand the ground upon which the rule rests. If the first condition is not met, then students cannot choose to accept, revise, or reject said rule. If the first condition is met but the second is not, then they may seek for its ground, modify it if found, or abandon the search altogether. This is where teaching shades into persuasion—not persuasion to accept the rule, but persuasion to consider, learn, and understand it.

If at the beginning of the lesson it is already the case that the students have a ground of their own upon which to stand, then the rest of the lesson becomes easier to teach in the way we desire, but it is not hopeless without this being the case. If the students lack a ground of their own, then teaching in the way we desire is the first step towards helping them to build it. Teaching in the traditional way, the teacher would predetermine that students’ accurate reproduction of the rule in an assignment would constitute a correct understanding of it. If, as is generally the case, the students are aware that such a predetermination has been made and their adherence thereto determines their passing or failing, then the conditions exist for the students to acquiesce to Tradition’s prescriptions, and thus to exist inauthentically. In such cases, the teacher supposes that students have both understood the rule and have chosen it for themselves, when in fact they have made no such choice. What they have done is little more than to memorize a rule that they have agreed to try to follow blindly.

As disturbing as it may seem on the surface, we insist on a different course, one that provides a space in which students may choose to respect other cultures on their own, or in any given case choose not to do so. We believe, and will endeavor to demonstrate below, that when in the process of building a ground of their own, students come to ask why they should respect other cultures, and we as teachers leap ahead of them and provide opportunities for their choices to emerge. We believe they will themselves choose to respect other cultures, insofar as they share the same ground as their own. Only by having a ground of their own, and only by understanding Tradition’s primordial sources—viz., self-preservation—can students choose at all and not fall prey to what Tradition asserts to be self-evident. In short, what we are advocating is not a goal or a destination, but rather a process of self-authentication.

Let’s suppose we are Heideggarian high school teachers who leap ahead of our students. Our subject is Modern European History, and our topic is the treatment of Jews and Muslims in Spain under the Inquisition. Shunning the possibility of merely telling our students that disrespecting cultures other than their own is wrong, we would together consider some of the potential consequences of such treatment. In leaping ahead of them, we may present the following points to them: the presence of large numbers of Muslims and Jews made Spain the only multiethnic and multireligious country in
Western Europe at the dawn of the 15th century. In effect, what the Inquisition mounted against them amounted to crown-sanctioned intolerance, spying, torture, theft, expulsion, and extermination. Its Jewish victims totaled nearly 200,000, and nearly 300,000 Moors suffered as well. What the Catholic monarchs apparently failed to consider was their identity beyond being mere so-called infidels. Importantly, Jews were essential members of the merchant and financial class. They were also administrators of the state, which included the affairs of colonial management. In their absence, not only did state administration suffer, but also much domestic and foreign policy financing was left in the hands of South German and Genoese creditors, which encumbered their future revenues with alien interests. Moreover, the expulsion of the Muslims hurt many urban creditors to whom they were indebted. Combined with the exorbitant price of trying to convert heretics on both sides of the pond, while also failing to develop domestic investment in infrastructure and industry, Spain was incapable of maintaining its geopolitical stature.

In light of the foregoing example, what reasonable conclusions may we expect our students to reach regarding observing respect for cultures unlike their own? If they admit that the United States, like 15th century Spain, is a multiethnic and multireligious nation whose subgroups are critical to its cultural and economic life, we may help them to reach the conclusion that crippling our nation’s capacity to profitably conduct internal and external trade would have deleterious effects on their ability to thrive. In short, we believe that self-interest (individually and collectively) would compel them to infer that individuals, regardless of their differences, need each other to flourish. More generally, if students cannot find it in their hearts to love or celebrate others’ uniqueness, then students may at least come to respect others’ indispensable contributions to our nation. Anything short of this ethical approach to instruction would run the risk of crippling our students’ critical faculties and thereby of preventing them from responsibly exercise their rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. We would expect our students to arrive at these conclusions, but other possibilities exist. There are no guarantees here and we will not try to veil this fact.

3.2. Deconstruction of the History of Ontology

Deconstructivism is a term which is likely familiar to the reader. It is closely allied with the writings of Jacques Derrida, wherein it signifies a position of extreme criticism bordering and sometimes running over into skepticism, and as such the meaning is almost completely negative. Yet the term’s contemporary usage originates with Heidegger. When Heidegger uses the phrase, it points toward two different projects, one narrow and the other broad, each of which are positive at their core in potential outcome. The point of each is to discover or rediscover the basis for Tradition. The narrower of these is something that must be done by each of us individually. Seen in this way, it is an extension of what we have discussed above when we spoke of authenticity and the attempt to build a ground of one’s own.

The second of these projects, the broader, is the one of interest to us here, for it points to a role specifically suited to philosophers of education. Heidegger involves himself in this task in many of his writings (e.g., *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, and others), but it is as a philosopher who goes back and examines the history of philosophy, finds mistakes that have been made, and opportunities missed, and original meanings that have been distorted. As philosophers of
education, our task would be to undertake similar investigations in the history of philosophy as they have influenced educational theory and practice. One might also see this as an attempt to discover those unspoken and sometimes forgotten assumptions upon which our current theories rest, with the point being to reexamine these as to their current validity. One need but look at the three most prominent names in the history of education—Plato, Locke, and Dewey—to realize that all three were philosophers, and thus are subjects of study uniquely suited to our talents. These are but three examples of where such studies might go. Many others are possible. It is not necessary that such examinations be limited to studying key figures. Instead, one may look at the basis of educational theories, concepts, categories, or most anything else.

One such project, in which the authors of this paper are personally involved, is to reexamine Aristotle’s picture of how the human brain works—i.e., of how it learns—and then to trace the influence of this picture (which is considerable) through the writings of Aquinas, Locke, Kant, and finally to 20th century writers such as Dewey,35 Piaget, the Behaviorists, and others. What we are doing is trying to understand how our view of education would change in light of the substantial alterations of Aristotle’s picture that are present in Heidegger’s revision, and then to correlate this with our current knowledge of the brain that comes from the neurosciences.

As we stated above, Heidegger opens the door to these investigations and points the way. While he was aware of the application to the educational arena, he left this work to others to carry out. It is also important to remember that for Heidegger, as it is for us, the move to deconstruct is a positive one, which will normally (but not necessarily) yield a positive result.

4. Conclusion

Discussions of the turn toward pragmatism dominate philosophy in the later part of the 20th century, and continue to the present day. In light of this, we need to be very clear about what we are saying here. What we are advocating is that philosophers, as well as philosophers of education, need to cease asking the standard epistemological questions, regardless of whether their answers are claiming to be absolutely true, or just provisionally so. The questions themselves need to change. Certainly, this does not give us leave to once again seek for ultimate Truth. Our answers cannot now nor will they ever reach that standard.

We have tried to identify a variety of roles and projects in which a philosopher of education may be profitably involved. In sum, according to Wittgenstein, a philosopher of education may profitably undertake logical analyses of propositions in order to clarify them; draw the limits of expression; dissolve, if not eliminate, confusion from communication; set other philosophers (and students) free from philosophical (or outdated) pictures that hold them captive; describe how we use words, and ask how we teach and learn them; strive to change philosophers’ (and students’) attitudes; and to see the world through a variety of language games. According to Heidegger, a philosopher of education may profitably undertake to help other philosophers (and students) to interpret and apply

35 One of the authors of this paper recently defended a dissertation in which he discusses the influence of Aristotle’s picture on Kant’s transcendental philosophy, on Dewey’s notion of the essence of morality, and on how Heidegger may have corrected them all.
moral rules correctly to help them decide whether Tradition’s scripted answers to their moral questions should be accepted, modified, or rejected; and deconstruct the history of ontology for two reasons: a) for the sake of helping others to live authentically; and b) for the sake of discovering how conceptual mistakes in said history have (and do) influence contemporary educational theory and practice. Indeed, both Wittgenstein and Heidegger, though in different ways, suggest how teachers may open their students’ minds to see the world through an unfamiliar lens. Both insist that no one position or perspective is necessarily better than another, thus increasing the possibilities for dialogue—the furtherance thereof being our fundamental concern.