The Impact of Public Sector Organizational Specificities on Quality

Initiatives: the case of French administration

An empirical study

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**Abstract** 

This paper aims to study the impact of public organizational specificities on quality initiatives

within French public services. Our main assumption is that public organisational specificities do

have an impact on a quality initiative implementation process, from the choice of quality initiative

to implement up to the impact of this initiative. In this paper, we mainly focus our attention on

the impact of public organizational specificities on the nature of a quality initiative. In this

context, we propose an explicative model where quality initiative is our dependant variable and

public organisational specificities our independent variables. We carried out a survey among 63

public organisations. We use a multinomial logit model (MNLM) and find out that quality

initiative within public services are often politically determined, and incentives to impulse quality

initiatives are not from market and/or clients pressure, but from managers.

Key words: New Public Management, French Administration, Quality Initiative, Logistic model

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# 1. Context

We witness, since more than twenty years, in numerous OECD country members at a big movement of reforms within public sector, essentially by using principles of New Public Management (NPM) (OECD, 1995; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000; Chevallier, 1987)<sup>2</sup>. Since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, European and American models are largely questioned. Several technical, sociocultural, economical, legal evolutions encouraged governments to supersede afterwar compromises. Imperfections of the Welfare state, which is suspected to be profitable to certain social groups and not enough attentive to citizen expectations, are therefore more and more pointed out. At the same time, public expenditure in those same countries incurred a sustained increase and raised a real problem of financing. Commenting this situation, Pierre Rosanvallon said that "the welfare state is ill" (« l'Etat-providence » est malade)<sup>3</sup>.

In this context, administrative reforms have known an extraordinary progression within the major occidental countries since the 1980's (Politt and Bouckaert, 2000)<sup>4</sup>, widely influenced by a new managerial doctrine born in the Anglo-Saxon countries and known as *New Public Management* (NPM) that appears as a coherent and universal public management theory (Hood, 1991)<sup>5</sup>. In this context, Osborne and Gaebler (1992)<sup>6</sup> suggest to refer to management and organisation theory in order to improve the functioning of administrative structures and to allow an efficient public service. Among the NPM ideas, the notion of quality or a better administration to the citizens, is getting more and more important. The fundamental notion underlying efforts to improve quality is that administrations need to stop working only regarding to internal factors (François Dupuy), and rather take more care of citizen's needs. In the United Kingdom this view is at the root of the «Citizens charters ».

In this context France was not excepted from the tightening economical and budgetary conditions which pushed high in the political agenda what is now called, since 1993, the "reform of the State" ("*la réforme de l'Etat*"). Therefore, many themes of reform have been declared since twenty years by successive governments, and among them, quality of public services have a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Governance in Transition: Public Management Rearms in OECD Countries, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995. Public Management Developments: Update 1994, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995; Politt C. and Bouckaert G., 2000, Public management reform, Oxford University Press Oxford.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Rosanvallon P., 1992, La crise de l'Etat-providence, Editions du Seuil.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Politt and Bouckaert, 2000, Public management reform, Oxford University Press.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Hood C., 1991, « A public management for all seasons? », *Public Administration*, vol. 69, Spring.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Osborne A. et Gaebler T., 1992, Reinventing Government: How the entrepreneurial spirit is transforming the public sector.

special importance (Chevallier, 1987)<sup>7</sup>. Nevertheless, the French position seems to be relatively original regarding to the particular vision of public services (Stoffaës, 1995)<sup>8</sup>, and other European countries which can not easily transfer it, called it "the French exception", « *l'exception française* ».

Quality Management is a business management approach that gained great popularity in the private sector in the United States since the early 1980s. During the past decade, various quality approaches have been adopted by public managers in agencies at all levels of government in France and quality management has became an important organizational trend in the domain of management in the public sector. However, a wide literature devoted to those questions shows that, on one hand, a specific management prevails for public organizations due to their proper characteristics (Gibert, 1981; Laufer and Burlaud, 1980; Massenent, 1980; Nioche, 1982). On the other hand, a link would exist between quality and organizational data (Cochoy and De Terssac, 1999; Caldwell, 1995).

In this context, we examine the impact of public organizational specificities on quality initiative. Our main assumption is that organizational data have an impact on quality initiative in public organisations.

We will primarily expose the construction of our theoretical framework. Then, our empirical study is presented. The paper concludes with a discussion about the findings.

## 2. Theoretical framework

# 2.1. The dependant variable: quality initiative

Quality is "the whole of properties and characteristics of a product or a service which allow him to satisfy implicit or explicit user needs and expectations" (International Organisation for Standardization (ISO), ISO 8402).

Various quality initiatives exist among which some have been specially build for public services. The Common Assessment Framework is an example<sup>9</sup>. And some others have not specially been build for public organisations but they can also implement them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> J. Chevallier, 1987, Le service public, Presses Universitaires de France, Que Sais-Je?,

<sup>8</sup> Stoffaës Ch., 1995, Services Publics, Questions d'avenir, Editions Odile Jacob, La Documentation Française.

Let's say that the introduction of quality methods into the public sector joins the more global issue of transferring and adapting private management to the public area. This issue is widely treated by the literature (Deming, 1986; King, 1987; Swiss, 1992; Rago, 1994 & 1996; Connor, 1997; Klagge, 1997, etc...) and gave place to two main opposite schools of thinking.

On one hand, some authors point out that the transfer of quality tools to the public area will improve governmental efficiency, in particular when all the organization levels are involved (Cohen et Eimike, 1994).

On the other hand, other authors (Swiss, 1992 and Rago, 1994), are against transferring quality tools to the public area (in particular Total Quality Management).

When finally oriented to use quality tools, public organizations are totally free to choose the quality initiative they plan to implement. In our questionnaire, sent to public organizations, to build our data base, we asked the organizations to indicate each quality initiative they implemented. Indeed, an organization may choose to implement one or more quality initiatives. The quality initiatives we proposed are those below:

- ISO 9000
- Quality commitment
- Quality Award
- Specific Service Referential
- Common Assessment Framework (CAF)

Table 1: Definition of the differ	rent tools of quality	
	Principle	Example
ISO 9000	An external organization guarantees the conformity the	
	standard ISO 9000	
Commitment to quality	To inform the users about a level of quality of service to reach	Charte Marianne
Quality Award	To compete for a specific quality award	Regional Price
Specific Service Referential	An external organization guarantees the conformity the a specific service referential	Qualifisc (for tax administrations)
Common Assessment Framework	A tool for self assessment according to the CAF criterions	,

For this study, we choose to keep only one answer for each organisation (even if this option led us to loose some information). Thus, our dependant variable takes the values below:

- ISO 9000: «1»

<sup>9</sup> A simple and easy-to-use tool that could help public administrations across the EU to understand and employ Total Quality Management (TQM) techniques, to embark on their "journey to excellence" and to compare themselves with similar organisations in Europe.

- Commitment to quality: «2»

- Quality Award: «3»

- Specific Service Referential: « 4 »

- Common Assessment Framework: «5»

2.2. The independent variables: organizational specificities

Bartoli proposes 4 main dimensions relative to organizations: « Strategy – Structure – Culture –

Behavior »), and which are compatible with public organizations. Shortell and al. (1995), show

that the degree of TQM institutionalisation within an organization depends on the organizational

structure (i.e., elements like size, member's profiles, etc.), the culture and the adopted

implementation strategy. Consequently, we decide to focus our analysis on the structural and

strategic variables, which represent two categories of independent variables in our model.

Structural variables

Generally, public organizations are characterized by important size and complex organization

charts. Many authors point out those elements to denounce complex and compartmentalized

systems suffering from piling up of problems and strategic compartmentalization.

H1: Structural variables have an impact on the implementation of a quality initiative within public

services.

Thus, the variables we choose to study are the nature of the organization (which can take the

value 1 to 6 corresponding to «1» State Service (centralized and decentralized); «2» Public

Structures and State owned structures; « 3 » Territorial Collectivities; « 4 » Public and Commercial

Structures; « 5 » Association (Law of 1901); « 6 » Other), and the nature of the service (which takes

the value «1» if the service is Direct; «2» if it is Indirect). The size of the organization charts,

the number of employees (thousands of employees), the annual functioning budget (in millions

of euros), and the annual budget devoted to quality (in euros) take the values 1 to 6 (or 7) in

order of importance.

Strategic variables

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
Concerning what we called the strategic variables, we choose to focus our attention on the fact that public services aim to guarantee collective public interest and are characterised by a non-competitive area (Santo and Verrier, 1997). Consequently, they hold perennial missions. Also, the school of Public Choice analyzed the fact that public organizations are often monopolies acting in a non-competitive area (Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1978)<sup>10</sup>. This particular status eliminates market regulations and the capacity to adapt to the environment. Consequently, this phenomenon can generate confusion between personal and public collective interests. Besides, public strategies are often politically determined (Swiss, 1992), and incentives to impulse quality initiatives are not from market and/or clients pressure, but from managers. In the light of those considerations, our second main assumption is:


H2: Strategic variables have an impact on quality initiatives within public services.

We choose to analyse the impact of two main strategic variables on the decision of implementing a quality initiative and also the nature of quality initiative to implement. The first one is called the "incentive factor to implement quality initiative". We defined it by 6 modalities: "1" Personal commitment (the public quality manager has decided by his own to implement a quality initiative), "2" Hierarchical chief commitment (the chief of the quality manager decided to implement a quality initiative), "3" Users pressure to implement quality initiative, "4" Ministerial Policy (quality initiative like citizen charters, i.e "Charte Marianne"), "5" Important risks of non quality (i.e mad cow disease), "6" Other.

The second strategic variable is the moment the users have been asked about their expectations toward the service.

We obtained the explicative model below:





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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> W. A. Niskanen, 1971, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*, Ed., Atherton Aldine; G. Tullock, 1978, *Le marché politique: analyse économique des ressources politiques*, Paris, Economica,.

# 3. Econometric analysis

### 3.1. Data

The widely recognized problem of lack of data relative to the public management (OECD, 2006) led us to create and send a questionnaire (Annexe 1) to French public quality managers in order to construct a data base. This questionnaire contains two main parts. The first one aims to collect data about the quality initiative implemented. The second one aims to collect data about to the structure of the organisation which answers (size, budget, etc). We defined our potential sample on the base of official documents<sup>11</sup> and send our questionnaire to around 100 organisations. We collected 63 answers.


Our study aims to analyse the impact of the public organisational specificities (structural and/or strategic) on the "nature of quality" to implement.

# 3.2. Analysis

#### Statistical overview

A first analysis allows to assess the main features of our sample. We note that more than half of the organizations (60,66%) have implemented an ISO 9000 quality initiative. On the other side, only 10% of the organizations have implemented a Common Assessment Framework (CAF) quality initiative, knowing that this quality initiative tool have been drawn up at a European level for the public services.





<sup>11</sup> A direction devoted to users used to exist: "Direction des Usagers à la Simplification Administrative" which was in charge with questions related administrative modernisation; and an annual ceremony exists since 2003 which aims to award the better initiatives in terms of quality within public sector organisations.

The dominating choice of ISO 9000 quality initiatives, which is an internally oriented quality initiative led us to wonder about the moment the users have been asked. Note that a quality initiative is supposed to answer to users expectations. The table below shows the moment when the users of the service have been asked about their needs and expectations.

**Table 1:** Moment of the consultation of the users

Moment of consultation	Frequency	Percentage
Before	24	40%*
During	36	60%
After	34	56.67%

<sup>\* 40%</sup> of the population asked the users of their service before the implementation of the quality initiative.

We can note that users are essentially asked about their expectations during and/or after implementing the quality initiative, not before. Thus, the question is: if they are not users – expectations-oriented, what are the incentives to implement quality initiative within public services?

**Table 2:** Incentive factors to implement quality initiative

Incentive factors to implement quality initiative	Frequency	Percentage
Hierarchy commitment	36	57,14%
Ministerial policy	25	39.68%
Personnal commitment	24	38,1%
Risks of non quality	16	25.40%
Other	15	24.19%
Users pressure	7	11,11%

The table above shows that the most important incentive factor to implement quality initiative seems to be «hierarchy commitment» (57%) while only 11% of the organisations have implemented quality initiative impulsed by users pressure. Two points can be emphasied:

- i) There is a coherence between the fact that users are essentially asked about their expectations during and after the quality initiative implementation and the poor role of users pressure while implementing quality initiative.
- ii) An incentive factor seems to be more important than the others which is the role of the superior while implementing quality initiative.

# Data analysis: impact of the independent variables

# The multinomial logit model

The aim of this study is to analyse the impact of independent variables on the choice of quality initiative to implement. Thus, for a public organization we will try to define the likehood that it chooses a quality initiative rather than another. This choice depends on a vector of variables related to organizational specificities. The dependant variable "nature of quality initiative" can takes values from 1 to 5 where "1" indicates that the organization chosen ISO 9000, "2" indicates that it chosen commitment to quality, …,"5" ("5" is CAF). The dependant variable is composed by 5 binary modalities ("1" if the organization have implemented the quality initiative, "0" if no), thus the most appropriated model is the multinomial logit model (Borooah, Vani 2001) and the most widespread (Reggiani *et al.* 1989, Gerkent, J. 1989).

The multinomial logit model or independent multinomial logit model (MNLM) has been introduced by Mc Fadden (1968) and Theil (1969) at the end of the 60s. In this model, the dependant variable is qualitative and is composed by more than 2 modalities. Formally, the MNLM can be written as:

$$\ln \mathbf{\Omega}_{m/b}(x) = \ln \frac{\Pr(y = m/x)}{\Pr(y = b/x)} = x \beta_{m/b} \text{ for m=1 to J}$$

where b is the base category, which is also referred to as the comparison group.

As  $\ln \Omega_{b/b}(x) = \ln 1 = 0$ , it must hold that  $\beta_{b/b} = 0$ . That is, the log odds of an outcome compared with itself are always 0, and thus the effects of any independent variables must also be 0. These J equations can be solved to compute the predicted probabilities:

$$Pr(y = m / x) = \frac{exp(x \beta_{m/b})}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} exp(x \beta_{j/b})}$$

The tests required for the MNLM are *Likelihood Ratio Test*, *Wald* test and *Lagrange* test. Those tests are asymptotically equivalents and are not reliable for small samples.

#### 4. Results and conclusions

We run a multinomial logit model and obtain the results presented on the table below. We try to assess the influence of the independent variables on the choice of quality initiative.

Table 3: Influence of organizational specificities on the choice of quality initiative

	ISO 9000	Commitment	Quality award	Specific service	CAF
		to quality		referential	
Constant	-11.089	-11.959	-44.380		
Personal commitment	Ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
Superior commitment	2.500*	3.561*	ns	ns	ns
	(1.3787)	(1.5187)			
Users pressure	Ns	ns	18.867***	ns	ns
			(2.6655)		
Ministerial policy	2.426*	2.716*	2.828*	ns	ns
	(1.1658)	(1.3644)	(1.4977)		
Risk of non quality	Ns	ns	ns	ns	Ns
Pseudo R2	0.2015				
Number of obs.	57				
Log likelihood	-68.632119				

Ocommon Assessment Framework (CAF) is the comparison group

Our independent variable, organisational specificities, is composed by two categories of variables: the structural dimension and the strategic dimension. The model shows no significant influence of the structural variables on the choice of a quality initiative over another. This may come from the low number of observations (57) or from the way the organizations have filled our questionnaire. However, the model shows some significant influence of the incentive factors on the choice of a quality initiative over another.

The ratio of the probability of choosing one outcome category over the probability of choosing the reference category is often referred as relative risk. So another way of interpreting the regression results is in terms of relative risk. In this context, the model shows some significant influence of the ministerial policy on the choice of quality initiatives. By ministerial policy we mean a governmental instruction toward service quality improvement. But we can observe that this same incentive factor is not at the root of the same choice in terms of quality initiative to implement. Besides, the ratio of the relative risk of choosing quality initiative ISO 9000 over CAF quality initiative for the is exp(2.42) for the ministerial policy, the ratio of relative risks of

<sup>° \*</sup> p<0.1 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.001

choosing commitment to quality over CAF is exp(2.71) for ministerial policy and the ratio of relative risk of choosing Quality Award over CAF is exp(2.82) for ministerial policy. We can explain those various choices by the nature of the ministerial policy. Indeed, the French government seems to privilege an ascending approach based on the creativity of the executive services. As well, this approach doesn't impose any standards of quality. Such an approach presents the advantage of a great adaptability to specificities, but, at the same time, it carries its own limit. The major disadvantage is of the lack of voluntarism and consequently, the lack of results because this little implication of the central administration and the administrative leaders handicaps the possibility of creating a significant effect of driving a collective project. A comparison with the English experience, which became an emblematic example in terms of public service quality allows a better comprehension of the role of more authoritarian directives (Albertini, 2000). Indeed, the United Kingdom, for its part, has chosen a much more directive method. The exercise had been narrowly controlled by a team in central administration (Citizen' S Charter Units) which was very active on defining the type of standards required and the implementation. Not only its role was to evaluate, but also to control whether administrations fit well in the principles of Citizen Charter. In the end, the French mode of piloting raises the question to know how to reconcile an ascending approach with a necessary generalization of change.

Besides, the model shows that when the incentive factor to implement a quality initiative is ministerial policy, the choice can be commitment to quality but it also can be ISO 9000 quality initiative or even quality award initiative. The French government created "Charte Marianne", a service charter which aims to a better reception within administrations. On the contrary, ISO 9000 quality initiative is an internally oriented initiative, focused on the improvement of the principles of management. At this level, we can put forward the French definition of quality to try to explain why administrations choose ISO 9000 quality initiative rather than commitment to quality. Indeed, much more than the Anglo-Saxon countries, the French State has always conferred some power to the technicians and engineers. Consequently, quality appeared coherent with the tradition of a State presumed to provide the best service to users, and quality - as an optimum of the professional expertise - was felt as being in continuity with the existing idea of the public service: quality is what the French public service would have always delivered. However, what caused a kind of cultural "shock", is the fact of having just one single criterion to evaluate the user's satisfaction. For several French administrations, quality is initially the intrinsic quality of the products, their technical quality, even if it exceeds what the customer would like to

get. In France, the tradition of quality seems to be a "technical" tradition, as well as an experiment of the civil servants. For that, quality appeared a controversial topic. It was at the same time new, compared to the tradition of the French State but also somewhat familiar, for certain reasons (Trosa, 1996). By opposition, in the United Kingdom, quality is initially quality of what is called the provision of services, i.e. the quality of the relations between the civil servants and the users. Quality is more about the way in which the service is provided than about its technical specification, and must answer some nationally accepted criteria, such as courtesy, transparency, and the right to be informed of the standards, ... Because the underlying assumption is of a very poor quality of the services delivered to the users, consequently the proclaimed principle is that of the "customer comes first".

Another aspect can be putted forward, related to the conception of the users of the public service. The evolution of the relationship between users and public services is the focal point questioning the traditional mode of delivering the public services. For a long time users did not have any say or any role in the definition and the evaluation of the public services. But the concept of quality questions the idea that administrations should less function in an endogenous way, but that they should rather organize the services on the basis of needs and expectations of their users. However, in practice, in France, the granting of a place to the user (as well in the formulation as in the evaluation of the public policies) suffers from certain slowness.

Besides, the elements cited above, of a technical definition of quality and the poor attention paid to users needs, can help to understand that the ratio of relative risks of choosing ISO 9000 over CAF for superior commitment is exp(2.5) and the ratio of relative risk of choosing commitment to quality over CAF is exp(3.56) also for hierarchical commitment. This result is coherent with the theory which concludes that public strategies are often from managers and not from market and/or clients pressure (Swiss, 1992).

The context of our analysis is the public service modernisation which is taking place in France since the 80's with a focus on the improvement of public service quality. Our main assumption is that public service organisational specificities do have an impact on the choice of a quality initiative rather than another. The results allow us to confirm the theory according to which public strategies are often politically determined, and incentives to impulse quality initiatives are not from market and/or clients pressure, but from managers (Swiss, 1992).

## **ANNEXE 1: Questionnaire**

# QUESTIONNAIRE QUALITY INITIATIVE WITHIN PUBLIC SERVICES

### Introductory Questions

Q.1 What is your quality general policy?

Q.2 What is the nature(s) of quality intiative(s) impulsed within your organization?

**Q.2.1** ISO 9000

(1) = yes; (2) = no

**Q.2.2** Service Committments

Q.2.3 Quality award

Q.2.4 Specifique service referential

**Q.2.5** CAF

**Q.2.6** Other

#### About quality inititative

Q.3 What quality would you like to improve?

**Q.3.1** Administrative organization quality

(1) = yes; (2) = no

Q.3.2 Technical quality of the service

**Q.3.3** Quality of management costs

**Q.3.4** Quality of the provided service

**Q.3.5** Other

Q.4 How are the receipients of the quality initiative?

**Q.4.1** Particular users

(1) = yes; (2) = no

Q.4.2 Companies users

**Q.4.3** Local collectivities

Q.4.4 Other State Services

Q.5 What was the incentive to impulse quality initiative?

Q.5.1 Personal committment

(1) = yes; (2) = no

Q.5.2 Hierarchical chief committment

**Q.5.3** Users pressure

Q.5.4 Ministerial Policy

Q.5.5 Important risks of non quality

**Q.5.6** Other

Also about quality initiative

Q.6 When did you launch the quality initiative?

Q.7Does the quality concerns:

Q.7.1 One service

(1) = yes; (2) = no

Q.7.2 Many services

#### **Q.7.3** The whole organization

#### Q.8 Within your strategy, does quality

Q.8.1 The main goal (1)

Q.8.2 Essential goal, but to conciliate with other priorities (2)

(3) Q.8.3 Important objective, but secondary relatively to other

#### Q.9 Did you consult users:

**Q.9.1** Before the choice (1) = yes; (2) = no

**Q.9.2** During

Q.9.3 After the choice of quality

#### Implementation

# Q.10 Which category of human ressources have been involved in this initiative?

(1) = yes; (2) = noQ.10.1 Catégorie A

Q.10.2 Catégorie B

Q.10.3 Catégorie C/D

#### Q.11 The employees

Q.11.1 Have been informed

Q.11.2 Have been associated

Q.11.3 Have been associated to quality assessment

Q.11.4 Have been formed to their news responsibilities

#### Q.12 Did the quality initiative needed for training?

$$(1) = yes; (2) = no$$

# Q.13 Have you contracted other external experienced resources to implement quality initiative? (1) = yes; (2) = no

**Q.13.a** Why

**Q.13.b** When

#### Q.14 About the means you had to conduct the quality initiative:

**Q.14.1** Human Really enough (1); Enough (2); Not enough (3)

Q.14.2 Technical

**Q.14.3** Financial

Q.15 Did you create a permanent quality?

$$(1) = yes; (2) = no$$

#### Impact of the initiative

### Q.16 About the quality initiative, which situation describes the best your situation:

Q.16.1 The results are measured

(2) (3) **Q.16.2** The impact seems to be positive

Q.16.3 The initiative hasn't significative result

#### Q.17 Had you implement tools to measure quality?

Q.17.1 Quantified indicators (1) = yes; (2) = no

Q.17.2 Discrete indicators

Q.17.3 Indicators about users satisfaction

Q.17.4 Qualitative judgments

<ul><li>Q.18.1 Employees motivation</li><li>Q.18.2 Efficiency and quality of the provided s</li><li>Q.18.3 Users satisfaction</li></ul>	service		(1) = yes; (2) = no
	and		
Q.20 Do you think the quality initiative im	pulsed allowed to	reach expect	ted results?
<b>Q.20.1</b> Yes <b>Q.20.2</b> Plus or minus <b>Q.20.3</b> No			(1) (3) (2)
Q.21 Did the initiative generated modificat	ions within the org	ganization?	(1) = yes; (2) = no
Q.22 Do you think you'll extend it to other	departements?		(1) = yes; (2) = no
A	bout your organiz	ration	
Q.23 What is your field of activity?			
Agriculture Art/culture Trade Justice Defense Eco/Finances Education Family/Health Other	(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)		
Q.24 What is the nature of your organization	n?		
Q.24.1 State service (centralised and decentralised Q.24.2 Public structures and state owned structures and State owned structures Q.24.3 Territorial Collectivities Q.24.4 Public and Commercial structures Q.24.5 Other		(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)	
Q.25 What is the nature of the provided ser	vice?		
Direct Indirect		<i>(1) (2)</i>	
Q.26 Obligatory nature of the service (is the	is service the only	alternative a	nd only provided by the State?
Yes No			(1) (2)
Q.27 How many hierarchical levels?			
Q.28 How many employees (thousands of	employees)?		
1 to 9	1)		

Q.17.5 Other types of indicators
Q.18 What are the main benefits?

10 to 49	(2)
50 to 99	(3)
100 to 249	(4)
250 and +	(5)

### Q.29 Your annual operating budget?

< 10	(1)
20 < X < 40	(2)
40 < X < 60	(3)
60 < X < 80	(4)
80 < X < 100	(5)
X > 100	(6)

### Q.30 Your annual budget devoted to quality initiative (euros)?

$X \le 10\ 000$	(1)
$10\ 000 < X \le 20\ 000$	(2)
$20\ 000 < X \le 40\ 000$	(3)
$40\ 000 < X \le 80\ 000$	(4)
$80\ 000 < X \le 100\ 000$	(5)
$X \le 100\ 000$	(6)

# Level of activity

Q.31 National level (1) = yes; (2) = no

Q.31.1 How many entities (regional or local) are under your control?

Q.32 Local level (1) = yes; (2) = no

Q.32.1 The quality initiative is

Local (1)
National (2)

#### To conclude...

### Q.33 Among those points, which ones are important to conduct quality initiative according to you?

Q.33.1 Central administration support Important(1); Relatively I (3); Not I (3)

Q.33.2 Requirement to be accountable of precise quality aspects

Q.33.3 A bigger financial autonomy

**Q.33.4** A bigger autonomy on other aspects

**Q.33.5** Procedure simplification

Q.33.6 Trainings on quality methods

Q.33.7 A bigger autonomy on work

Q.33.8 Result based financial incentives

Q.33.9 A better knowledge of users expectations

**Q.33.10** Involvement of the users

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