

FROM GARCILASO TO ARGENSOLA: THE COSMOS REORDERED

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Few exercises illustrate the shattering of imperial aristocratic confidence brought on by the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries so well as a comparison between Garcilaso de la Vega's eclogues, and the sonnet "A una muger que se afeitaba y estaba hermosa," attributed to one of the Argensola brothers, usually Lupercio. Taken together these two works reveal clearly the trust in a vision of a well-ordered cosmos that unified Garcilaso's world, and the extent to which the Baroque aesthetic reflects a cosmic vision founded on ideas of deceit and deception. Two Italians, Castiglione and Galileo, play important roles in this transition and this study seeks also to illuminate their influence on the course of Spanish poetry in the Siglo de Oro.

Until the last two decades of the twentieth century many Garcilaso interpreters read his works, especially the eclogues, as *poèmes à clef*, autobiography disguised in pastoral dress. Most recently this problem, which is also one of "sincerity," has been discussed clearly and thoroughly by Daniel Heiple, who locates the poetic *yo* in a Petrarchan rhetoric of emotion rather than in the person of the poet (3-27). In spite of dedicating his attention primarily to Garcilaso's sonnets, Heiple observes of the eclogues, "Garcilaso's late poems show a self-awareness of style and a conscious distancing of the authorial voice . . . the poet consciously removes the poetic voice from the person who suffers to that of a disinterested narrator" (23).

The tendency to believe that his work is biographical also ignores the fact that Garcilaso himself calls attention to the fictional quality of it, as one can see from the dedicatory verses to both Eclogues I and III: "y en quanto esto se canta, / escucha tú el cantar de mis pastores" (Rivers I.41-42); "Aplica, pues, un rato los sentidos / al baxo son de mi çampoña ruda . . . De quatro nymphas que del Tajo amado / salieron juntas, a cantar me offrezco" (III.41-42, 53-54) for example, or from the contrast in Eclogue III between Thyreno and Alzino's supposedly genuine pastoralism and the mythological world of the tapestries. Thus Heiple's characterization of a "deliberate and purposeful distancing of the narrative voice from that of the poet."

Rafael Lapesa, citing Entwistle, believes that Eclogue II was composed, at least in part, before Eclogue I (102-07; 131-32; 201-02 n. 7; Gicovate 69-70). Although Lapesa believed firmly in the (auto)biographical nature of Garcilaso's poetry, this possibility would indicate that Garcilaso changed the order of the poems before their publication. In making this change Garcilaso focuses on discourse in the eclogues, rather than on story (Wescott, "Garcilaso's Eclogues" 75). I believe he did so to indicate an ideological agenda, and that when they are read together in the order of their publication the eclogues develop, through Nemoroso's passage from grief to transcendence and Fernando's rational control of his appetite on the occasion of his wedding, a sort of narrative that recasts in poetic form many of the ideas discussed in such Neoplatonic dialogues as Ficino's *In Convivium Platonis, sive de amore*, Bembo's *Gli Asolani*, and Castiglione's *Il cortegiano* (Wescott, "Nemoroso's Odyssey" 474). Garcilaso presents, through the eclogues' characters, Christianized Neoplatonic ideas on love that echo the emphasis on rational virtue in Stoicism and Epicureanism in order to make the point that there are two acceptable kinds of love: marriage as exemplified through don Fernando's self-control and fidelity, and the purely spiritual as presented through Nemoroso. Garcilaso "uses the pastoral to illustrate the transition among the international aristocracy from a courtly love ethic to a Neoplatonic one, and in the process opens the door to marriage as a fulfilling love relationship in poetry" (Wescott, "Garcilaso's Eclogues" 73). In his pastoral's focus on emotional and moral life, his poetry progresses from the self-absorbed passion of courtly love to a Neoplatonic call to rational virtue that lays open the pathway to married love, physical satisfaction, procreation, and a meaningful fidelity—that is, a more mature and stable version of love.

Following Annabel Patterson's suggestion that we should focus on "'how writers . . . have used pastoral for a range of functions and intentions . . .'" rather than trying to determine what pastoral poetry is" (7; her emphasis), and Michael Riffaterre's idea of the "ungrammaticality" (2), will lead us to that curious combination in Eclogue II of pastoral interlude and epic tale, the centerpiece of the eclogues' over-arching narrative of Nemoroso's development as a character, a combination of interior obligation and exterior duty (i.e., morality and loyalty) often found in the personal lives of the imperial aristocracy for whom Garcilaso wrote the eclogues. From its earliest manifestations the epic genre was privileged as a form of instruction in the modalities of the warrior class, a method of presenting instances of exemplary social behavior.¹ The only male in the main cast of characters who is not a shepherd, Fernando conforms to most of Ficino's

description of the man who leads “an active and moral life.”² By reserving the privileged genre as the narrative model for his story, Garcilaso uses it to foreground Fernando’s conduct in marriage as one ideal of human love.³ Garcilaso’s shepherds also represent instances of exemplary social behavior in the pastoral’s sentimental arena. The thematic structure of the eclogues is outlined in Book IV of Boscán’s version of *El cortesano*, a text Garcilaso helped to translate (Castiglione/Boscán 4-12; Darst, *Boscán* 26-28). Castiglione’s Bembo says:

amor no es otra cosa sino un deseo de gozar lo que es hermoso. . . .
[E]n nuestra alma hay tres formas de conocer, es a saber, por el sentido, por la razón y por el entendimiento; del sentido nace el apetito, el cual es común a nosotros con las bestias; de la razón nace la elección, que es propia al hombre, y del entendimiento, por el cual puede el hombre participar con los ángeles, nace la voluntad.
(371)

Nemoroso’s love for Elisa embodies the Neoplatonic ideal of a purely spiritual relationship, while Albanio and Salicio characterize two possible ways in which carnal desire can lead to failure. All four couples thus represent different notes on a hypothetical musical scale of Neoplatonic amorous harmony.⁴

The problem of sincerity is also misleading because, for Garcilaso, to be personal was to be linguistically, literarily, and, above all, ideologically imperial in the mode of a Castilian aristocrat (Navarrete 136-40). His political and religious world view is manifested in that “una grey y un pastor solo en el suelo ... un Monarca, un Imperio, y una Espada” from Acuña’s sonnet “Ya se acerca, señor” (Rivers, *Poesía lírica* 108-09), while his universe is the closed Ptolemaic system of the spheres (Eclogue I.394-407), a world-view of order, peace, harmony, and the unity of man, nature and the gods exemplified again in Nise’s tapestry (Eclogue III.193-249). These ideals are those defended in the epic portion of Eclogue II, the portion in which Garcilaso especially lauds both the martial and marital fidelity of don Fernando. Indeed, the motto for Garcilaso’s life and eclogues could be framed as “make love and war.”

The Eclogues thus represent the ideological framework that shaped the lives of the Empire’s international aristocracy, a world-view essentially metaphysical in nature, coming from the scholasticism of an earlier age in which the notion of truth was intimately bound to an idea of the cosmos, which in turn was based on concepts of God and of man’s relation to Him. That cosmos is held together by love, Bembo’s “deseo de gozar lo que es hermoso.” Herschel Baker describes it this way: “Neoplatonists explained the beauty and order of the universe

as a result of love. It was love that first caused God to share his perfection with lower forms of creation, and it is love, inspired by beauty, that causes man to seek to return again to the perfection of God" (249).

The dedication to the Viceroy of Naples, don Pedro de Toledo, in Eclogue I reads:

agora estás atento sólo y dado
 al inclito gobierno del estado
 albano; agora buelto a la otra parte,
 resplandeciente, armado,
 representando en tierra al fiero Marte;
 agora, de cuidados enojosos
 y de negocios libre, por ventura
 andes a caça, el monte fatigando (. . .)
 y en quanto esto se canta,
 escucha tú el cantar de mis pastores. (I.10-17, 41-42)

The activities represented here, diplomacy, government, war, hunting, music, and poetry, make up the rather homogeneous culture of the upper nobility across the Empire, a world in which epic and pastoral go hand-in-hand. Garcilaso writes, in fact, not only for the imperial aristocracy, but for the larger world of humanism as well. His audience is no longer only Spanish, but European. The collapse of this metaphysics of idealism is connected to the collapse of the idea/ideal of heroic behavior, and indeed may be heralded by the type of disaffection from one's world described in E. C. Graf's recent interpretation of Garcilaso's mood in the Second Elegy, in which Graf notes an apparent questioning of the human cost of maintaining the idea/ideal of Empire (Graf 1320-23).

In its moral dimension then, Garcilaso's later poetry may be seen as an attempt to influence the behavior of his fellow aristocrats. In this sense his eclogues have much in common with their many sources, and, in particular, precisely with that great manual of manners for the international imperial elite, Castiglione's *Courtier*. Garcilaso's literary voice is not a personal pleading, but the manipulation of literary convention for instruction of the elite and for pleasure—his own authorial pleasure of course, but primarily that of his readers. The metalinguistic codes in which Garcilaso speaks—Petrarchan, pastoral, mythological, Neoplatonic, Ptolemaic—are all social markers that identify their users as "members of the club," aristocratic vocabularies for the creation of other selves that appear to exist without affectation, selves constructed to seem effortlessly "natural." His eclogues are, like

Castiglione's *Courtier*, modes of instruction for the keepers of the Empire (Cruz "Self-Fashioning"; Cascardi 251).

There is, however, one crucial difference between the work of Garcilaso and that of Castiglione. In the figures of don Fernando and Nemoroso Garcilaso presents action and spirituality founded on a sense of rational virtue. These characters represent the best of the Neoplatonic tradition, as Albanio and Salicio are exemplars of weakness and poor decisions. Castiglione, however, makes clear that the ultimate goal of his manual is to teach the aristocrat how to please his prince, a project that will involve a very different kind of self-fashioning because it may rely on the courtier's duplicity, even as he trusts in the ultimate virtue of his prince. Castiglione's *sprezzatura* is a social marker containing an element that Garcilaso's vocabularies do not: an absence of that metaphysical link between the world-view and truth; *sprezzatura* is manifestly an ethic of pragmatism, not a metaphysical philosophy (Willey 10).⁵

Thus Castiglione's contradiction, a use of duplicity to achieve a pleasurable end, is the surface problem in Argensola's "A una muger que se afeitaba y estaba hermosa." But this sonnet also augurs the end of the old world order that had lasted from antiquity to the time of the voyages of discovery, and announces the coming of a new cosmos.

Yo os quiero confesar, don Juan, primero:
que aquel blanco y color de doña Elvira
no tiene de ella más, si bien se mira,
que el haberle costado su dinero.

Pero tras eso confesaros quiero
que es tanta la beldad de su mentira
que en vano a competir con ella aspira
belleza ygual de rostro verdadero.

Mas, ¿qué mucho que yo perdido ande
por un engaño tal, pues que sabemos
nos engaña así Naturaleza?

Porque ese cielo azul que todos vemos
ni es cielo ni es azul: ¡Lástima grande
que no sea verdad tanta belleza! (669)

On the poetic level the poem certifies the end of the style of love particularly associated with the Renaissance. The hallmark of courtly love and Petrarchan rhetoric is the unresponsiveness and/or absence of the beloved, an aspect explored in detail by Anthony J. Cascardi, Ruth El Safar, Rosilie Hernández-Pecoraro, and Yvonne Jehenson. The most striking aspect of this poem, however, is the fact that the lady has become a player in the game of love. Doña Elvira has sought to be

attractive to men by tampering with nature, and in this demonstrates the forceful active will characteristic of Baroque women, some deceitful and some not, such as Marcela and Dorotea, in *Don Quixote I*, Laura who inspires the people of Fuenteovejuna, or Rosaura in *La vida es sueño*. This propensity for willful deception described in the poem reappears in the character of the Duchess in *Don Quixote II*.⁶ Doña Elvira's use of money to tamper with nature, both Nature's nature and human nature, will reappear in such texts as Quevedo's "poderoso caballero es don dinero." Indeed, Quevedo will take the case against cosmetics to its ultimate point: cosmetics are not only a method of deceit, they signify a complete lack of substance (Navarrete 235-36).

Argensola rejects the idea that art is second to nature: "que es tanta la beldad de su mentira / que en vano a competir con ella aspira / belleza y gual de rostro verdadero." The nameless courtier who functions as the poem's *yo* accepts this judgment because, in his eyes, Nature lies in the first place: "Mas, ¿qué mucho que yo perdido ande / por un engaño tal, pues que sabemos / nos engaña así Naturaleza?" That is, the philosophical stance that identifies truth with natural beauty has been destroyed by the methods of observation that have revealed Nature's "deceit," Nature's other nature: "Porque ese cielo azul que todos vemos / ni es cielo ni es azul: ¡Lástima grande / que no sea verdad tanta belleza!"

Castiglione approves the use of cosmetics, but only sparingly, so that, "whoever sees her is uncertain whether she is painted or not" (65). His discussion of the use of cosmetics occurs in the context of his general remarks on grace and affectation, and is related to his concept of *sprezzatura*, that ability to "conceal all art and make whatever is done or said appear to be without effort and almost without any thought about it" (43). As Eduardo Saccone points out, this is a virtue in the courtier because it admits him to the "club of the happy few," those who understand the oxymoron on which *sprezzatura* is based: that it is an "art without art; a negligent diligence, an inattentive attention" (44).

Since Castiglione believes that makeup is to be used sparingly, so that, "whoever sees her is uncertain whether she is painted or not," the degree of *sprezzatura* that a lady demonstrates lies precisely in the degree of uncertainty her viewer feels when trying to determine whether she has used cosmetics. Only those who can solve the riddle can belong to the happy few who are the true courtiers. Saccone explains it as related to the use of irony:

the essential thing for the practice of irony, as also of *sprezzatura*, is dissimulation: . . . a discrepancy between being and seeming . . . intended to the disadvantage of someone. . . . The success of irony, as of *sprezzatura* . . . depends on its reception. . . . To put it differently, *sprezzatura* is the test the courtier must pass in order to be admitted to this club, to obtain the recognition of his peers. (46-47)

Thus the capacity for deceit becomes a virtue in the courtier, an admission to the aristocratic club, and like the other aspects of aristocratic behavior, celebrated in poetry. Harry Berger Jr. emphasizes that since there will be losers in the game of wits, it is also a source of apprehension (15).

The speaker of this sonnet demonstrates a courtier's blasé sophistication, his own *sprezzatura*. That Nature deceives was not really news, even to Garcilaso, who based the final conceit of his sonnet 23 on an awareness that the unchanging nature of time is masked by its appearance of constant change: "todo lo mudará la edad ligera, / por no hacer mudanza en su costumbre." Argensola's Nature mirrors Garcilaso's paradox of time: neither the universe nor matter is what it appears to be, "ese cielo azul que todos vemos / ni es cielo ni es azul," yet it still maintains its eternal pattern: *E pur si muove*, as Galileo is said to have said. And Galileo is one of those who, by this time, has contributed to the speaker's underlying unease, in spite of his languid tone that intends to show his insouciant unconcern with the suddenly unrecognizable infinity of the universe and the unintelligible nature of Nature. Richard Tarnas observes in *The Passion of the Western Mind*: "If the Moon's surface was uneven, like the Earth's, and if the Sun had spots that came and went, then these bodies were not the perfect, incorruptible, and immutable celestial objects of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology" (259). Tarnas also notes that the effects of Kepler's mathematical and Galileo's observational support of the heliocentric theory did not stop with astronomy:

That the Earth and the other planets moved in elliptical orbits around the Sun seemed clear, but if there were no circling aetheric spheres, then how did the planets, including the Earth, move at all? And what now kept them from flying out of their orbits? . . . If the stars were so numerous and distant, then how large was the universe? What was its structure, and where was its center, if any? . . . And where was God in this cosmos? (262)

"A una muger que se afeitaba y estaba hermosa . . ." can still be interpreted as based on a Neoplatonic system of values, an understanding of the Platonic/Neoplatonic tenet that Nature is superior

to art. Its major thrust, however, is the undermining of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic method of explaining the universe by the Copernican-Galilean revolution, a sea-change in western thought that sounded the death-knell for Neoplatonism as the dominant philosophical and moral system, and would ultimately change the nature of Christianity and the position of the church in the world. Baker has observed that, "Renaissance optimism was predicated upon a sense of security, the felt existence of order, pattern, and sequence . . . by which man could view his world as the manifestation of an omniscient and omnipotent God and himself as that God's special creation" (223). After Galileo this will no longer be true, and Lupercio de Argensola knew it.

"A una muger que se afeitaba . . ." indicates a new view of man's qualities, his spiritual life and his relation to God. If beauty greater than Nature's efforts can be constructed artificially, what becomes of Neoplatonism's practice of approaching the spiritual through the physical? Is the spiritual automatically superior to the physical, as Neoplatonism customarily held?

Despite the seeming modernity of several of Garcilaso's observations—the remark about the nature of time, for example—, there is no doubt that to the late twentieth-century reader his pastoral world seems fantastical, and more important, fantastically antiquated not only in comparison to where we now are spiritually, but to the pastoral of Theocritus as well, given that it does not admit the easy physicality present in the eroticism of those earlier, pagan, eclogues. This is partly due, I think, not only to the absence of irony but also to the fact that some of us have viewed his pastoral as an alternative to the epic, when in fact it is imbued with, and based upon, the same set of aristocratic values and norms of noble behavior. His treatment of his illegitimate child reflects a sense of duty and loyalty characteristic of the best of his class (Vaquero Serrano), just as his conception of the universe reflects his philosophical attitude toward love, truth, and beauty. With the coming of the new age of observation—a methodology—the philosophical notion of truth will no longer be tied to ideas of nature and the cosmos, and man is literally set adrift upon a sea of unanswered, perhaps unanswerable, questions.

It seems too much of a coincidence to say that Castiglione's method of approaching reality by suggesting that the appearance of always giving approval and admiration to one's master—a bit of harmless theater—may be somehow related to the great paradigm change in man's view of the cosmos that took place in the seventeenth century. Yet both Castiglione and Galileo produce trains of thought that ultimately leave behind the belief that there is an essential, unalterable nature to things that must be honored in the name of nobility. There is

a relationship between the *escudero's* assertion in the third *tratado* of the *Lazarillo* about his ability to serve a noble master, made as if referring to completely normal behavior (“yo sabría mentille tan bien como otro y agradalle a las mil maravillas; reille ya mucho sus donaires y costumbres, aunque no fuesen las mejores de el mundo; nunca decirle cosa con que le pesase, aunque mucho le cumpliese” [104-05]), and the poet’s *yo* who so admires the painted lady’s ability to make herself beautiful when she is not (“no tiene de ella más, si bien se mira, / que el haberle costado su dinero / . . . / la beldad de su mentira”).

But the crisis goes even deeper. In “The Lady is Out of this World,” Edward Dudley finds that the separation of truth from beauty expressed in this poem led to a “hermeneutic break that subverted not only man’s confidence in his own senses but also in language itself” (186). In this context he cites Menéndez Pidal’s observations that truth and beauty are no longer synonymous, that Spaniards are losing confidence in Nature, in the simple referentiality of language, and in themselves as well.

By the time the Argensola sonnet is written, the ideal world view of a harmonious and peaceful empire has disappeared in the conflicts of the Reformation and Counter Reformation. The belief in a harmonious Ptolemaic-Platonic universe, held together by love, has gone with it under the impact of Copernicus and Galileo. Garcilaso’s belief that he can reach a spiritual dimension through physical beauty has given way to amazement and disbelief at the deceptive success of artifice. The pastoral world as a literary vehicle has become an anachronism, as *Don Quijote* will show, and irony will become the major mode of expression.

Risking some interdisciplinary confusion, I would say that Botticelli’s evenly lit mythological figures in his Renaissance Neoplatonic allegories are being displaced by the enigmatic real people who inhabit the chiaroscuro of Caravaggio’s and Velázquez’s contingent, individualized truths. “A una muger que se afeitaba . . .” undermines past beliefs and foresees the anxieties of the nascent modern age, a cosmos disordered and reordered in which we can trust so little of what our senses perceive.

Notes

¹Aurora Hermida-Ruiz's discussion (17-18) of how Lapesa downplays Garcilaso's stature as a soldier and courtier in his *Trayectoria* to avoid associating the poet with the Franco dictatorship perhaps accounts to some degree for the current interest in that aspect of his life and career. Ficino makes this allowance for conjugal relations and procreation: "Est etiam in generandi potentia occultus quidam stimulus ad sobolem procreandam. Isque amor perpetuus est, quo assidue incitatur, ut superne pulchritudinis illius similitudinem in procreate proles effigie aliquam effingamus. . . . quoniam tam sobolis procreatio quam indagatio veritatis necessaria et honesta censetur" (Marcel 211)[“There is also . . . a certain mysterious urge to procreate offspring. This love too is eternal; by it we are continuously driven to create some likeness of that celestial Beauty in the image of a procreated offspring. . . . the procreation of offspring is considered to be as necessary and virtuous as the pursuit of truth” (Jayne 119)].

³In 1486 Pico della Mirandola, echoing the Epicureans, held that the “Great Artisan,” as he put it, said to Adam: “You, who are confined by no limits, shall determine for yourself your own nature, in accordance with your own free will . . . We have made you neither heavenly nor earthly, neither mortal nor immortal, so that . . . you may fashion yourself in whatever form you shall prefer. You shall be able to descend among the lower forms of being, which are the brute beasts; you shall be able to be reborn out of the judgment of your own soul into the higher beings, which are divine” (479). Not surprisingly then, Garcilaso's eclogues, imbued with the Christian Neoplatonism of the Florentine Academy, can easily take the shape of an ethical inquiry. We already know that this was the designated function of the epic. The classical world, not surprisingly, was basing itself on the values of a warrior society when it elevated the epic to the highest rank of all the genres, seeing it as the most suitable way to teach the Homeric ideas of nobility and the classical curriculum: the *areté* and the *paideia* (Jaeger 42; Mazzeo 24-25; Colie 22-23; Greene 54-56; Fowler 70-71, 99; Jenkyns 154-55). This tradition of regard for the epic as the perfect combination of entertainment and teaching mechanism is general in the Renaissance, as we can see from the comments of Giangiorgio Trissino who, in his *Poetica* of 1529, wrote that: “Since the greater part of men are of such nature that they unwillingly lend their ears to instruction and listen with delight to stories and pleasant things, I judge those ancient poets should be greatly praised who considering delight and general usefulness have mingled with fables and stories of battle the most excellent instructions on human life, and in that way have made them pleasing to the people, whereas if these teachings had been unadorned they would perhaps have pleased little” (213).

⁴Fernando de Herrera, the annotator who prepared the 1580 edition of Garcilaso's works, understands the soul in much the same way: *La mente . . . se divide en superior, que es entendimiento, que guarda y considera las cosas divinas, y en inferior, que es razón, que rige y tiempla las cosas*

humanas, discerniendo lo bueno y lo malo y diferenciando unas cosas de otras. Tiene ésta por terrible contrario . . . al apetito injerto en el cuerpo y los sentidos. (Gallego Morell 403). This is the standard Neoplatonic view, as can be seen from Ficino: "Hinc triplex, ut diximus, subrepat amor. Aut enim ad contemplativam, / aut activam, aut voluptuosam vitam prompti et proclives geniti educative sumus. . . . Contemplativi hominis amor divinus, activi, humanus, voluptuosi ferinus cognominatur" (Marcel 212) ["Hence a three-fold love arises, as we have said. For we are born or brought up inclined and disposed toward the contemplative, active, or voluptuous life. . . . The love of the contemplative man is called divine; that of the active man, human; that of the voluptuous man, bestial" (Jayne 119-20)]. Joseph Matteo points out that: "For Pico [della Mirandola], man's dignity lies in his freedom to dwell on different levels of being, all of which not only make up the external world but are epitomized within him. Thus he can freely choose to live on the angelic level or descend to the grosser levels of existence, and his dignity lies precisely in his freedom to ascend the hierarchy of being, not in his possession of an immortal soul and his patrimony of eternal life. . . . Pico's conception of man is also a limit, ordering man in relation to the pure spirits above him as well as in respect to the lower orders of nature. . . . Man's glorious freedom is also finite, and the liberty he possesses to exalt or debase himself to various levels of being defines him, to be sure, as of the highest worth, but also as fallible and prone to error" (36-37).

⁵Lope provides yet another sign of the change in sensibility by his reversal of the social markers in *Fuenteovejuna*. He parodies the Petrarchan class marker by having the peasants Barrildo and Mengo debate Neoplatonic doctrines on the nature of love in Act I, about which Edward M. Wilson and Duncan Moir have said that "Barrildo's words, 'Sin amor, no se pudiera / ni aun el mundo conservar,' are, in reality, the core of the arguments which Lope puts forward in the drama." These peasants represent true nobility of spirit. The Comendador's arrogant disdain toward the peasants in his protection not only represents a perversion of the original ideal of aristocracy, but is the "antithesis of that true love which holds the whole universe and its contents, both macrocosm and microcosm, together in perfect harmony" (64-65). Lope, in other words, turns the Renaissance social order upside down.

⁶There are actually two points here: 1) the disappearance of the absent/passive Petrarchan beloved, replaced by the active, forceful women of the Baroque (Marcela chooses her freedom, Dorotea pursues Fernando and convinces him to marry her, Laura inspires the people of Fuenteovejuna with an impassioned speech and leads the revolt against the Comendador, Rosaura arrives on stage in pursuit of Segismundo); 2) the use of deceit, since Dorotea and Rosaura are disguised as men. The Duchess is an example of both tendencies run amok.

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