

NATIONALITY OR RELIGION? VIEWS OF CENTRAL ASIAN ISLAM (1901-1991)

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Resumen: As the historical vista has already indicated, nationality does not necessarily equal religion, or vice-versa. Both attributes form parts of an identity defining function, as seen fit by the polity or the individual concerned. This is naturally true for Central Asians as well, as they have been buffeted by numerous waves of assaults, political or religious, on their identities over time stretching across millenia. Added to that mix are other elements, such as consciousness of origins as defined by leavening documents and linguistic affinity. This paper explores the basics of the mix that forms the underlying factors. Nationality, religion, Central Asia, literature, politics, anthropology, Soviet Union, ethnography, orientalism, democracy, nation-building, military, fundamentalism, history.

Palabras Clave: anthropology, Central Asia, democracy, ethnography, fundamentalism, history, literature, military, Nationality, nation-building, orientalism, politics, religion, Soviet Union.

1. INTRODUCTION

Today, many authors use the designation "Muslim" in their analyses when referring to the territories or people of Central Asia. This is a relatively new phenomenon among a long string of classifications. Central Asia was labelled "Tartary", or "Independent Tartary" by romantic European cartographers and travellers in the 15th-17th centuries, and the inhabitants were called "Tartar"¹. Perhaps Christopher Marlowe (1564-1593), by writing fiction about Timur (d. 1405), with a stretch of imagination calling him Tamburlane², is one popular source of this peccadillo. But Marlowe's and like-minded authors' writings also betray the inadequate information the Western world possessed on

Central Asia despite their fascination with the area. What they did not know, the authors created³. Only later would the Westerners begin to learn the Central Asian languages and dialects, in order to read what the Central Asians had written about themselves.

The designation *Altai*, as Ozbek and Kazakh, are primarily geographical, tribal or confederation names, not ethnonyms. Those appellations were mistakenly or deliberately turned into 'ethnic' or 'political' classifications by early explorers or intelligence agents arriving in those lands ahead of the Russian armies and bureaucrats. Early in the 8th century, the Turks themselves provided an account of their identity, political order and history. These were recorded on the scores of stelea, written in their unique alphabet and language, and erected in the region of Orkhon-Yenisey⁴. This information is corroborated in earlier written sources, in the Byzantine and Chinese chronicles, the Turks' Western and Eastern neighbors, respectively. Most mountains, cities, lakes, deserts, rivers in this region, from early historical times until the Soviet period, carried names of Turkish origin⁵.

Thus language alone was no sure indicator of ethnicity, for the educated came to be versed in the major languages of the Islamic world at Arabic, Persian and later, Turkish. Yet, the differences among them remained. Many pre-Islamic values of each culture survived the transition to Islam and was preserved in the native language of each people. Islamic period works of various courts reflected the retention of traditional values. Among the "mirror for princes" works⁶ the earliest is the Turkish-Islamic work of statecraft, the 11th c. Kutadgu Bilig. It calls upon the king to be a just ruler, mindful of the needs of the people, and thereby echoes older traditions⁷.

Those Central Asians farthest from the border of Islamic lands were the last to adopt Islam and retained their traditional beliefs to the greatest degree. The Kazakh and Kirghiz of the steppe were converted to Islam only in the late 18th-early 19th centuries by Volga Tatars thanks to policies of Catherine II, of Russia (r. 1762-96), who apparently hoped that Islam would soften those populations and make them more receptive to the tsarist empire. She allowed the Tatars to represent her court in Transoxania trade. On the way, the merchants were encouraged to form settlements and convert nomads⁸. The Kazakh and Kirghiz, even today, retain much of their pre-Islamic way of life including mastery of the horse, drinking kumiss⁹ and extensive personal independence of women so characteristic of steppe societies¹⁰.

Thus Arabs remained Arabs; Persians, Persians; and Turks remained Turks. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the non-Arabs would debate the real meaning of Islam for them and its role in their identities. The tension, even hostility, among them remained as well, and is documented by the slurs and stereotypes, and by frequent warfare (up to the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s) despite the ideal and rhetoric and dreams of Islamic brotherhood and the indivisibility of the *umma*.

The 'Great Game', the Anglo-Russian competition for land and influence across Asia, was played in two adjacent arenas. The main arena was Turkistan-Afghanistan, where tsarist armies moved south to annex the former as the British tried to keep them north of the latter, in defense of British India. Second, but in some respects more complex, was the Caucasus-Iran theater. Caucasia was the place where the Great Game met the Eastern Question, the multipower struggle over the eastern Mediterranean and the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian conquest of the Caucasus entailed two Russo-Iranian wars (1806-1813 and 1826-1828) and one Russo-Ottoman war (1828-1829). Russian power was now closer to the Mediterranean (and therefore Suez, a gateway to India) and to India's neighbor Iran. Perhaps more worrying for the British, the Russo-Iranian Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828) granted Russia concessions in Iran: Russian goods imported into Iran would be exempt from internal tariffs; Russian subjects would not be subject to Iranian law; only Russia could maintain a fleet on the Caspian. The latter potentially enabled Russian forces to land on the southeast Caspian shore, closer to Herat

(Afghanistan), a possible stepping-stone to an invasion of India, or so the British feared. England thereafter strove to gain a foothold in Iran as both she and Russia competed for legal and economic concessions there as a means to exert political influence¹¹. The Great Game also had a Far Eastern component manifested in its advances against China and a series of unequal treaties signed with Chinese rulers after 1858¹². Later in the 19th century, competition for colonies and for influence in Central Asia grew sharper. Political deadlocks in Europe often led the Powers to carry their rivalry to Asia or Africa. Russian gains in the Russo-Turkish war of 1875-1877 alarmed Europe which feared a Power imbalance, but especially Britain, always concerned over lines of communication with India. The resulting Congress of Berlin (1878), hosted by German Chancellor Bismarck, awarded the island of Cyprus to the British, assuring British dominance in the eastern Mediterranean. Though this arrangement by Bismarck and British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli soothed British nerves, it angered the Russians, seriously damaging German-Russian relations. To the Russians, expansion in Central Asia promised more certain returns on Russian 'investments'.

During the 1890s, the British and Russians negotiated the Russian-Afghan border, established Afghanistan as an official 'buffer' under English influence in 1907-1909 and thereby called a halt to the Great Game, at least for the time being¹³. Perhaps Britain had been pushed to the limit of tolerance and Russia knew that in a direct military conflict, victory could not be assured. Certainly both Powers feared the rise of Germany, mainly in Europe and on the seas, but also in the scramble for African colonies and because Germany was entering the Great Game. German interests envisioned a railroad from Berlin to Beijing, through the length of the Ottoman Empire and Central Asia. Due to the political and military conditions on the ground, the project was scaled down, and the railroad turned south towards Baghdad remained entirely within the Ottoman Empire.

The Great Game was not limited even to these political, diplomatic and economic moves. European states systematically acquired, stored and studied knowledge of the "Orient" in the proliferating state-sponsored Oriental Institutes¹⁴. European Orientalists, in service of their governments, laid the foundation for policies like Christian proselytization in

education and publishing, but also elaborated justifications for Europeans' 'civilizing' the peoples of Central Asia. Among these was the notion of "Pan-Turkism"¹⁵.

"Pan-Turkism" or "Pan-Turanism" was ostensibly a movement by Turks to establish hegemony over the world, or at least Eurasia. In fact, this "Pan" movement has no historical ideological precedent among Turks and has been documented to be a creation of the Westerners. Around the time of the occupation of Tashkent by Russian troops in 1865, the doctrine called or "Pan-Turkism" appeared in a work by Hungarian Orientalist Arminius Vambery. The premise of this notion was that since the overwhelming majority of the Central Asians spoke (and still speak) dialects of Turkish, share the same historical origins and history, "they could form a political entity stretching from the Altai Mountains in Eastern Asia to the Bosphorus", where the capital of the Ottoman Empire was located¹⁶. This pseudo-doctrine was then attributed to the Turks themselves, and the Russians and Europeans claimed it was a revival of Chinggiz Khan's conquests, a threat not only to Russia, but the whole of Western civilization¹⁷. In this tactic, attributing aggressive designs to the target, seemed to justify any action against Central Asia, a new 'crusade' in the name of 'self-defense'.

After the Germans joined the Great Game, to undermine British control in Central Asia, Germans manipulated both "Pan-Turkism" and "Pan-Islamism"¹⁸. The Pan-Islamic Movement was an anti-colonial political movement of the late 19th century, and must be distinguished from the 'orthodox' Islamic unity of all believers, the *umma*. Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) established the movement in its political form, striving to achieve the political unity of Muslims to fight against colonialism and the colonial powers. It was popular among Indian Muslims and in north Africa. However, the movement also served the colonial powers well. Painted as a reverse-Crusade -without necessarily using the terminology, but through graphic allusions- the Colonial powers could mobilize both Western public opinion and secret international alliances to fight the 'emerging threat'. The Germans, after the death of al-Afghani, sought to make that threat as real as possible for the British in India¹⁹. The manipulation of both *Pans* would not die with the old century.

2. THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY

In 1905-1906 the defeat of the tsarist Russians by the Japanese began a new chapter against the Russian colonial rule in Central Asia. Since the tsarist military occupation of Central Asia, one of the inflexible Russian policies was the imposition of limits on printed material in Central Asian dialects by Central Asian authorship. Beginning with 1906, this long-standing ban against Turkish dialect publications were circumvented by the Central Asians through various ruses²⁰. Thereafter, there was a veritable explosion of periodicals and monographic publishing. According to one catalog, in one territory, more than one thousand different books were issued in less than ten years²¹. This activity was to be ended by the Red Army's occupation of Central Asia. Soviet censorship took on an additional face, employing new and revised methods²².

Before all the elected Central Asian Delegates could reach St. Petersburg, the First Duma (1906) was abrogated by tsar Nicholas II. A number of the assembled Central Asian Delegates signed the 1906 Vyborg Manifesto, protesting the Duma's dissolution. The meeting was carefully planned, with a touch of cloak-and-dagger to escape the tsarist secret police²³. The act itself marked a new resistance to the Russians, but the basic issues were already articulated on the pages of the bilingual Tercuman newspaper, published by Ismail Bey Gaspirali in Crimea²⁴.

The Second Duma (1907) was abrogated within three months, and the new electoral law of 1907 utterly disenfranchised Central Asia. They had no representatives in the Third and the Fourth Dumas. The memory of the occupation and resentment of the occupiers' repressive policies were fresh in the minds of the Central Asians, when the tsarist decree of 25 June 1916 ordered the first non-voluntary recruitment of Central Asians into the army during the First World War. The Central Asian reaction marked the beginning of the Turkistan National Liberation Movement. Russians were to call this struggle *Basmachi*, in order to denigrate it. The resentment was enhanced by historical memories: Central Asian empires antedated the first mention of the word Rus in the chronicles²⁵, and some had counted the Russians among their subjects.

The Turkistan National Liberation Movement was a reaction not only to conscription, but to the tsarist conquest itself and the policies employed by the tsarist state in that region. Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970) was for over half a century a professor of history [and shared similar objectives with his contemporary colleagues Czech Thomas Masaryk (1850-1937) and Ukrainian Michael Hrushevsky (1866-1934)]. A Central Asian himself and a principal leader of the 1916 Turkistan National Liberation Movement, Togan described the sources and causes of the movement as follows:

Basmachi is derived from *baskinji*, meaning attacker, which was first applied to bands of brigands. During tsarist times, these bands existed when independence was lost and Russian domination began in Turkmenistan, Bashkurdistan and the Crimea. Bashkurts [in Russian language sources: *Bashkir*] called them *ayyar*, by the Khorasan term.

In Crimea and, borrowed from there, in Ukraine, *haydamak*²⁶ was used. Among Bashkurts such heroes as Buranbay became famous; in Crimea, there was [a leader named] Halim; and in Samarkand, Namaz. These did not bother the local native population but sacked the Russians and the Russian flour-mills, distributing their booty to the population. In Ferghana, these elements were not extinct at the beginning of 1916.

*... After the proliferation of cotton planting in Ferghana the economic conditions deteriorated further. This increased brigandage. Among the earlier Basmachi, as was the case in Turkey, the spiritual leader of the Uzbek and Turkmen bands was Koroglu. Basmachi of Bukhara, Samarkand, Jizzakh and Turkmen gathered at nights to read Koroglu and other dastans*²⁷. *What has the external appearance of brigandage is actuality a reflection and representation of the thoughts and spirit of a wide segment of the populace. Akchuraoglu Yusuf Bey reminds us that during the independence movements of the Serbians, the hoduk; the kleft; and palikarya of the Greeks comprised half nationalist revolutionaries and half brigands. The majority and the most influential of the Basmachi groups founded after 1918 did not at all follow the Koroglu tradition, but were composed of serious village leadership and sometimes the educated. Despite that, all were labelled Basmachi. Consequently, in Turkistan, these groups are regarded as*

partisans; more especially representing the guerilla groups fighting against the colonial power.

Nowadays, in the Uzbek and Kazakh press, one reads about Chinese, Algerian and Indian Basmachi²⁸.

The Roman historian Tacitus also records the resistance of the Britons to the Romans, in the words of the Britons:

*"We [Britons] gain nothing by submission except heavier burdens for willing shoulders. We used to have one king at a time; now two are set over us -the governor to wreak his fury on our life-blood; the procurator, on our property. Whether our masters quarrel with each other or agree together, our bondage is equally ruinous. The governor has centurions to execute his will; the procurator, slaves; and both of them add insults to violence. Nothing is any longer safe from their greed and lust. In war it is at least a braver man who takes the spoil; as things stand with us, it is most cowards and shirkers that seize our homes, kidnap our children, and conscript our men -as though it were only for our country that we would not face death. What a mere handful of our invaders are, if we reckon up our own numbers! Such thoughts prompted the Germans to throw off the yoke; and they have only a river, not the ocean, to shield them. We have country, wives, and parents to fight for; the Romans have nothing but greed and self-indulgence. Back they will go, as their deified Julius [Caesar] went back, if we will but emulate the valour of our fathers. We must not be scared by the loss of one or two battles; success may give an army more dash, but the greater staying-power comes from defeat... For ourselves, we have already taken the most difficult step; we have begun to plan. And in an enterprise like this there is more danger in being caught planning than in taking the plunge"*²⁹.

Comparing Roman Britons to Russian held Turkistan, it appears that the Russians have not been as successful as the Romans and the Central Asians were also aware of their predicament. One of the first actions of the Turkistan National Liberation movement was to establish educational societies, and prepare for the founding of universities. Though precedent existed in US, Europe, Togan states that the Central Asians were not acting on such Western examples³⁰, as the tsarist censorship kept the Western works out of reach. The Central Asians were simply recalling their own past from their own sources, and wished to proceed with the

educational reforms. Even though considerable amount of those manuscript sources were forcibly collected by the Russians and transported out of Central Asia³¹.

The Turkistan Extraordinary Conference of December 1917 announced the formation of Autonomous Turkistan, with Kokand as its capital. Bashkurdistan had declared territorial autonomy in January of 1918; the Tatars also took matters in hand in forming their autonomous region. Also in spring 1918, the Azerbaijan Republic and others came into being in the empire's former colonies. It seemed as if the Russian yoke had ended and freedom reigned. However, since the overthrow of the tsar (February 1917), local soviets were established, again by Russian settlers, railroad workers and soldiers, for Russians to rule over the Central Asians. These soviets were increasingly encouraged by Lenin and the Bolsheviks, especially after the October 1917 coup.

Soviets were often headed by professional revolutionaries arriving from Moscow. Generous promises were made to the Central Asians, including indemnities for all property expropriated earlier. It proved to be a time-buying ploy. As Togan demonstrated, the soviets had no intention of allowing the much-touted 'self-rule' in Central Asia. This became clear when the Bolshevik forces burned Kokand on March 1918, and again massacred the population. The struggle not only had to continue, but became harsher. After a final series of conferences with Lenin, Stalin and the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party, Togan realized that the aims of the Bolsheviks were not different than those of their predecessors. Organizing a secret committee, Togan set about forming the basis of the united resistance, the leadership of which moved south to Samarkand and environs. A new, large-scale, coordinated stage of organizing the Turkistan National Liberation Movement commenced³².

From 1918 into the 1920s Central Asia declared and exercised independence. Despite the Red Army's reconquest, several areas continued to hold out into the late 1920s and even the 1930s. The Turkistan National Liberation Movement was shaped directly by the attempt of the Bolsheviks to reconquer Turkistan. It must also be seen, however, as a culmination of a long process of Russian intrusion into Central Asia as

reflected in the "Eastern Question" and what Kipling dubbed the "Great Game in Asia".

3. THE SOVIET ERA

Bolshevik take-over of Central Asia occurred, like the tsarist conquest, in stages. Bolsheviks employed a combination of internal and external armed force, deception, promises and political pressure, as documented by Richard Pipes³³. Brutal conquest took another form in the Stalinist liquidations. With forced settlement of nomads and a man-made famine, caused by collectivization, millions of Central Asians perished. This is not unlike the Ukrainian experience³⁴.

Only after defeating prolonged resistance and establishing military, political and economic control could the Communist regime consolidate its power by social and cultural policies, including the anti-religious campaigns of 1920s and 1930s. They embellished the cultural imperialism policies of the tsarists and used a firmer hand. The Central Asians fighting Bolsheviks in the 1920s saw in their Russian adversaries the sons of 19th century military expansionists and missionaries as well as the "godless" Marxists they proclaimed themselves to be. Echoing tsarist claims to a "civilizing" mission in Central Asia, and the Bolsheviks said they were "liberating" colonial peoples. In efforts to attribute an aggressive, expansionist character to Central Asia and their defensive unity, both imperial and Bolshevik Russians portrayed the Central Asians as a threat. The nature of this threat was still said to be "Pan-Turkism" and "Pan-Islamism".

Despite its European origins and apart from its European goals, the Pan-Turkism notion took root among some Central Asian emigres (in Central Asia, the idea has had few adherents), as a means to remove the Russians from their homelands. Yet, accusations of "Pan-Turkism" were employed freely in the Soviet Union (and outside), not against political action, but cultural movements or scholarly works on the common origins and language of the Turks³⁵. The latter studies are irksome to Moscow, for they refute the Russian position that the dialects are separate and distinct languages, a claim that the regime has exerted much effort to propagate³⁶. Even the distinction Turkic and Turkish is alien to the Turks themselves, who before the arrival of the Russians, communicated unhindered, apparently oblivious to the fact that they were

speaking "totally separate and distinct languages".

The most articulate and thus dangerous opponent to Russian hegemony under the new "Communist" label was Mir Said Sultangaliev (1880-1939?)³⁷.

4. SULTANGALIEVISM

*"If a revolution succeeds in England, the proleteriats will continue oppressing the colonies and pursuing the policy of the existing bourgeois government; for it is interested in the exploitation of these colonies. In order to prevent the oppression of the toiler of the East we must unite the Muslim masses in a communist movement that will be our own and autonomous"*³⁸.

Sultangaliev used the English example as a thin cloak for his true thoughts against the ideology and practise of the RCP(b)³⁹. One had only to substitute the word "Russian", to understand the meaning of the statement. Having served as the deputy Commissar of Nationalities, as Stalin's assistant, Sultangaliev was well aware of Bolshevik methods and means of control. He, like many other non-Russians in the RCP(b), had seen the direction of the Bolshevik revolution: Russian domination. The only path to salvation was to form a separate party and political union to fight for independence.

Sultangaliev was briefly arrested in 1923 and Stalin denounced his former deputy:

*"...I accused [Sultangaliev] of creating an organization of the Validov type... nevertheless, a week later, he sent... a secret letter... to establish contact with the Basmachi and their leader Validov"*⁴⁰.

Sultangaliev was purged and disappeared in 1928, along with other adherents of the movement. But even the existence of the idea presented by Sultangaliev was causing nightmares for Stalin. Frequent exhortations against Sultangalievism among nationalities, especially Central Asians were made:

"The ideological and organizational destruction of Sultangalievism does not yet mean that our offensive against nationalism must come to an end. The Tatar Obkom invites all members of the Communist party to hunt down Sultangalievists, to reinforce the struggle against all kinds of national manifestations among backward

*masses, and to unmask the still numerous bearers of Sultangalievism in our party and Soviet apparatus"*⁴¹.

Of course, the bogey-man Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were once more put on display, this time even in more contradictory terms such as "Pan-Turkic Nationalism". Under the guise of slogans such as "internationalism", "brotherhood of nationalities", "coming closer", and "merging of nationalities", the policies beneficial to the Russians were pursued by the Soviet leadership in Moscow. The purges decimated the ranks of the educated Central Asians. A Russian dominated bureaucracy attempted to destroy Central Asian history, subvert their indigenous literature, exploit the Central Asian natural resources. While doing so, the regime destroyed the pristine environment. Not all of these crimes are yet known in the West, but more are gaining attention.

5. CENTRAL ASIAN ISSUES UNDER GORBACHEV⁴²

Only recently have the results of decades of political, economic, social, cultural, environmental abuse been aired. The Bolsheviks castigated tsarist use of Turkistan as a colony, but followed in their predecessors footsteps extracting cotton and raw materials for Soviet industry despite cost to the local population or environment. The cotton, irrigation, fertilizer "triad" has caused monstrous ecological and human health damage. Due to the overuse of chemical fertilizers and growth stimulants, infant mortality has jumped. Mothers were warned not to nurse their babies because their own milk is polluted. Shortened life expectancy plagues all Central Asian republics.

In 1987 almost one-third of all fish in the Volga basin died from pesticide poisoning. In many regions, pesticides are now turning-up in the water supply. According to Goskompriroda [State commissariat for the environment] more than 10,000 hectares of land contain concentrations of DDT above sanitary norms, some two to eight times the established norm. In one case, students were sent to the field to gather the onion crop. They were poisoned from handling the onions. It was discovered that the crop and the soil contained 120 times the norm prescribed for pesticides. The farm's director maintained that the students were suffering from exhaustion -apparently at the behest of local

party officials worried about "alarming" the public.

Komsomolskaya Pravda reported in April 1990 that 43 persons, including 37 children, were hospitalized in Uzbekistan after eating a meal of mushrooms which turned out to be toxic. Two of the children died. The mushrooms were of an edible variety, but they were contaminated with "...toxic chemicals, pesticides, and other muck" which had leached into the soil after heavy rains stated the paper.

Perhaps the most dramatic result has been the destruction of the Aral Sea, well known thanks to mass media coverage. Several US universities have either conducted conferences on the subject, or are planning to do so⁴³. The waters of the Aral Sea have been used to irrigate cotton, the reason for its disappearance. This has profound effects. In addition to the destruction of the sea's fish (and fishing industry), salt driven by winds from the dry sea bed has destroyed vegetation as far away as Chimkent [Green City], 450 miles to the east. Plague, claimed Radio Moscow in May, threatens the region. A television marathon in Kazakhstan (which bordered the sea on the north) raised almost 40 million rubles for a fund to help the people whose health and livelihoods have been destroyed by the drying up of the Aral Sea.

Kazakhstan has other environmental damage as well. In 1990, a Danish television documentary stated that inhabitants of a village in Kazakhstan's Semipalatinsk Oblast were used as guinea-pigs during an atmospheric nuclear test in 1953. The documentary, summarized by the French News Service (AFP), included an interview with a Kazakh man who had been one of the 40 guinea-pigs made to stay behind when other villagers were evacuated before the test. According to the report, all 40 contracted cancer, and 34 have already died from the disease. This report would not be news to the inhabitants of Semipalatinsk -the effects of the August 1953 test have been frequently described in great detail in the Kazakh press.

Even after the testing has stopped, the effects will linger. A recent news report indicated that out of the total population of Kazakhstan, seven million now suffer from some form of cancer. During 1990 a private philanthropic fund was established to provide medical assistance to children affected by nuclear testing in Semipalatinsk. The people who suffer from the

ills of this state-caused disaster are spending their own money to find a cure.

Economic policies inflicting less overt damage involve trade between Moscow and the individual republics. In the case of Kazakhstan, the Kazakh trade deficit is over one billion "trade rubles". This, despite the large exports of varying commodities from Kazakhstan to the Russian republic. The primary reason is that Moscow sets the prices and the republics have to sell their produce at artificially low prices, well below those of the world market. On the other hand, they must pay much more for their imports from Moscow usually at market prices. The republics never had control over the transactions; Gosplan (the Central State Planning Office) decided who manufactured what, where and when, including investment for construction of facilities. The same may be said of every Central Asian republic.

The economic issues are linked to fundamental matters of national identity and culture. Following again the tsarist precedent, the Soviet regime retained sharply divided education (technical education is in Russian), linguistic and attempted social and biological russification campaigns, low investment in Central Asia, and settlement of Russian workers as the 'price' of new factory construction. The terminology has been changed, but the substance has not⁴⁴. Among the legacies of Moscow's rule was the death and destruction of forced collectivization, and against this protest has been pronounced.

A group of writers who made up an advisory council to the Kazakh literary weekly *Qazaq Edebiyeti* have called for the erection of a monument to the Kazakhs who died in the collectivization campaign in the 1930s. According to their appeal, published on the front page of *Qazaq Edebiyeti* April 13, 2.5 million Kazakhs perished under Stalin. The writers would like the memorial to be completed by 1992, the sixtieth anniversary of the collectivization-caused famine.

6. ANARCHY IN CENTRAL ASIA?⁴⁵

Central Asians' long standing demands can be summed-up in two broad categories: 1) the end of centrally ordered quotas, ranging from out-of-region-origin cadre appointments to colonial-style forced cotton production, and settlement of non-native populations; 2) an end to environmental pollution from nuclear tests to

pesticide poisoning. Central Asians, like other non- Russians, have been interested in economic justice and greater autonomy in their internal affairs. But accurate information on Central Asia not readily available to Western journalists or policymakers. Moscow has been able to use that ignorance to play on various Western fears and prejudices, raising the specter of political chaos, nuclear proliferation and, the successor to the Pan-Islamic threat, Islamic Fundamentalism.

First, the "Treaty Principle of the Soviet Federation", raised by Gorbachev at the 28th Party Congress, was not abandoned after the coup attempt of August 1991. Treaty bonds are still said to have "the enormous advantages of the new Soviet federation," which would foil the plans of "all kinds of separatists, chauvinists, and nationalists" who are trying to "deal a decisive blow to perestroika which threatens their far-reaching aims"⁴⁶. Whatever the nominal power relations in a new union treaty, the old economic realities would preserve Central Asia's de facto colonial position vis-a-vis Russian industry. Moreover, the "economic logic" of continued ties to Russia would make it that much more difficult to alter the pattern, and Central Asia would have to go on supplying raw materials for still higher priced Russian manufactures constructed under the Soviet regime.

Second is Moscow's "Revival of Islam" offensive. After the Bolshevik revolution, the Oriental Institute was gradually Bolshevized and attached to the USSR Academy of Sciences. It was reorganized many times between the late 1920s and late 1950s. The "Muslim Spiritual Boards" were revived in 1941, seemingly along the very same lines as under the tsars. The new Islamic ulama is trained by the state.

Both tsarist and Soviet regimes have blamed 'Islam' for anti-colonial actions by the Central Asians against Russian conquest, colonization, economic exploitation, political discrimination, and russification. Many repressions by the center have been carried out to suppress alleged Islamic movements, "Pan-Islamism" in the last century, "Islamic fundamentalism" today. The "usual suspects" are targets: "zealots, fanatics, feudal remnants...". Gorbachev used these accusations the day before ordering troops to open fire in Baku in January 1990. More recently, a "senior member" of the Oriental Institute (Leningrad) has spoken of the danger of an "Islamic Explosion". The speaker stated that

the "European-centered approach to Islam" had caused the USSR to pursue incorrect policies in Central Asia. He advocated the rejection of that approach in favor of one that treats Islam on its own terms⁴⁷.

The Orientalist's words may have been meant to incite a debate within the Western scholarly community concerning perestroika in academe. The wish in the Soviet Oriental Institute may have been to keep the Western specialists too busy to pay attention to these demands Central Asia shares with other nationalities. This treatment of Islam is not only not new, it continues to err in the same way as before - attributing all of the grievances of the Central Asians to Islam, as if Moscow's understanding of Islam can help the government make better cotton policies. Is it lack of understanding Islam that led to the destruction of the Aral Sea?

Further, by the continuing attribution of unrest to Islam, the government signals the West that no action is too drastic to quell it. If Western analysts grasped more clearly that national autonomy or political liberty were at the root of Central Asian discontent, Western governments might look upon it with a very different eye, one less tolerant of Moscow's use of force. Along the same lines, Moscow employs a "Sociological Approach". The anti-religious campaigns that started in the 1920s by the Bezbozhnik (Godless) League later became the task of the "Institutes of Scientific Atheism". The next step now appears to be embodied in the Institutes of Sociology, fathoming the depths of the society, attempting to conduct an opinion poll to determine the hold of Islam in Central Asia. A Soviet journal reportedly published one such survey, which revealed, contrary to the official line, that the USSR had not become a land of convinced atheists; Religious beliefs are not declining every year; Religion is not confined to more "backward groups" -women, the elderly⁴⁸.

What probably began as a means of keeping responsible committees informed, may now be a public relations tool as well. Under the authority of a "Scientific Institute," the results can be disseminated and endorsed to form the bases of future actions. It can also serve as the seal of approval from the *intelligentsia*, supporting the actions of the Center.

A recent program announced by several US scholarly societies and associations aims to

develop Soviet Sociological Research Projects. One hopes that such an endeavor would develop to remove the abuses of such "opinion poll taking".

An especially popular, if unimaginative, tool of the Soviet government is "Corruption Charges". Since the Andropov period, several cycles of corruption charges have been brought against the Central Asians. Throughout the USSR, there are no doubt genuine cases of corruption as defined in a democratic society: influence peddling, embezzlement, bribe taking, skimming money from the cotton crop. On the other hand, some of these charges appear trumped-up to root out Central Asian efforts to gain some measure of local control over their own economy. What is labelled corruption by the Center, can be directly aimed at independently minded Central Asian elites. During the Gorbachev period, a similar crackdown was undertaken⁴⁹. The Special Prosecutors were later accused of using "inhuman methods to extract confessions" from the suspects. Soon afterward, the former Prosecutors themselves came under investigation for their excesses.

Gorbachev also attributed the problems in Transcaucasia to "representatives of the shadow economy", i.e. the sort of entrepreneurship which perestroika purported to allow. This not only cast aspersions on the nature of his economic "restructuring", but also suggested that he nurtured a different vision of perestroika for Central Asians than for Russians or Balts.

Failing verbal dissuasion and political pressure, Gorbachev has been as willing as his predecessors to use force. He coupled it with justification, another tactic for international opinion that may be called "The Stick" (or, the Praise for the Armed Forces). The use of lethal force during January 1990 in Azerbaijan, in the city of Baku was also meant as a demonstration to Central Asia. Similar brutality was used against Kazakhs in 1986⁵⁰ and Georgians in 1989, though it was worse in Baku where two hundred or more were killed by the Red Army. Later, Gorbachev warmly praised the armed forces for keeping order and warned the Soviet media not to engage in anti-Army propaganda. The message was clear: if you do not accept our political solutions, we shall use Leninist-Stalinist muscle, no matter what the new vocabulary. The citizens of the Baltic Republics, along with those Central Asians have been experiencing this "stick".

Moscow seems to create conditions in which it can use force. The decision to "announce", or "leak the news" of the settlement of Armenians in Tajikistan antagonized the housing-poor Tajiks. It is inconceivable that Moscow would not have anticipated a Tajik response. The media, predictably, report on "a Muslim population's violence". Such manipulation was by no means isolated. The retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin stated that the KGB probably had a role in inciting the anti-Armenian violence in Baku: "Naturally, it is their job to stir up everyone against everyone else". Kalugin sharply criticized the Moscow leadership for withholding information on the KGB's involvement in Sumgait and in Tbilisi⁵¹. In this light, perhaps the events connected with the Kirghiz-Ozbek, Georgian-Ossetian, Ozbek-Meskhetian⁵² confrontations of 1989-1990, and the Kazakh-Russian "incident" of 1986, ought to be reexamined as well⁵³. Even the center's support for creating of "hostage" pockets in ethnically uniform populations seems aimed at diluting homogenous areas capable of mounting national movements and to incite inter-ethnic enmity⁵⁴.

If "the Stick" was applied to Central Asia, "the Carrot" is used elsewhere. The invitation to the West to believe that the USSR has been trying very hard to become just a Western democracy was yet another aspect of the image manipulation. Anyone in the West expressing doubts as to the genuineness of the Soviet efforts was dubbed "a grave digger of perestroika". Further, Soviet spokesmen stated that they "are confident that West would decide against those individuals"⁵⁵. To fortify the image of efforts being expended to make the transition to a Western type democracy, a number of other public relations demarches were also undertaken. Authorities grant exit visas to Jews, and hold talks with the Iranian government on border crossing points for the Azerbaijan Turks. These, of course, addressed the humanitarian issues raised in the West with respect to reuniting divided families.

Whether or not the Center was expecting "Anarchy in Central Asia", Moscow clearly anticipated Western impatience with "turmoil", especially if it threatens to upset the status-quo. This appears to be true even when the elements of the existing government, which assaulted human rights throughout its existence, attempted to seize power in a coup and the challenge is

mounted by a population seeking to regain its independence. Nonetheless, current democracies seem to prefer dealing with one great power they know than numerous new and small powers. The view is similar to those when the Bolshevik regime was in its infancy but Great Powers at Versailles refused to recognize independence of most tsarist colonies except Poland and the Baltic. Such refusal policies are more easily justified when those groups seeking independence can be dismissed as "fanatical" or at least "anti-democratic"; even if the challenged power is not democratic or democratically elected.

As if to help his Western counterparts support him and the empire -and in case Moscow decides to use force as in Azerbaijan-Gorbachev provides justification for their fears and his use of force. Russian spokesmen continue to claim in the 1990s that they "civilized" Central Asia, protected and fed it. Western observers seem rarely to ask how Russia "civilized" a demonstrably older civilization than itself, from whom Russia protects Central Asia, or how the Central Asians managed to feed themselves before the arrival of the Russians and their cotton agenda.

7. PERSPECTIVE ON THE 'POST-OPENNESS' PROSPECTS

President Franklin Roosevelt (1882-1945), in his famed 5 October 1937 "Quarantine speech," stated:

*"...Those who cherish their freedom and recognize and respect the equal right of their neighbors to be free and live in peace, must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice and confidence may prevail in the world. There must be a return to a belief in the pledged word, in the value of a signed treaty. There must be recognition of the fact that national morality is a vital as private morality... It ought to be inconceivable that in this modern era, and in the face of experience, any nation could be so foolish and ruthless as to run the risk of plunging the whole world into war by invading and violating, in contravention of solemn treaties, the territory of other nations that have done them no real harm and are too weak to protect themselves adequately"*⁵⁶.

World War II began two years after this speech. It would not be a credible assertion today to claim that the Central Asians are preparing to

attack the Russian Federation. But the Russians are behaving just as Hitler did in the period when F. D. Roosevelt gave his speech: demanding more land.

The coup attempt of August 1991 might represent a new turn in Russian politics. Whether this turn is towards true democracy with its full implication of freedom, or a turn towards yet another kind of Russian domination, it is too early to surmise. Some pronouncements from the "center", immediately after the failure of the hardliner's coup attempt, began talking of 'border adjustments' in favor of the Russian Federation should the republics opt to secede. Those "adjustments" are precisely in the areas where the Russians have earlier expropriated lands from other nationalities; for example, in Kazakhstan⁵⁷. A 'border agreement' was soon signed between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. The Bolshevik leadership, too, had signed a variety of agreements with the Bashkurts and other Central Asian polities in the 1920s but shortly afterward disregarded them as "so much paper"⁵⁸. It was also the USSR that signed the United Nations Charter in 1945, and the very next day demanded land from another UN Charter Member, the Turkish Republic; precisely in the areas covered in the 1921 border treaty signed between the two states⁵⁹. The idea is still not abandoned in Moscow, or the Russian circles, and public policy speeches are being delivered on the subject⁶⁰. In fact, the newly constituted Russian Rapid Deployment Forces are also seen as the instruments of this policy, in preparation for anticipated action. The ostensible reason, of course, is going to be the "protection of Russians" in "those" territories. This is clearly seen in the behavior of the 14th Russian/CIS Army in Moldova during 1991 and 1992.

Russians have no significant experience with democracy. Many Russian thinkers and groups have fought democracy at every turn⁶¹. Slavophiles and even some Westernizers of the 19th century tsarist empire preferred an "organic link" of autocrat and subjects to the artificial guarantees of constitutions and the rule of law. Though the tsar declared Chaadaev insane to discredit his "dangerous" notions⁶², it was society that produced the People's Will terrorists, the Union of the Russian People⁶³, Lenin, and Stalin and Dzerzhinsky⁶⁴, who despite their actual ethnic origins, sprang from the ruling Russian society. Konstantin Pobedenostsev, legal scholar, head of Holy

Synod and tutor to Alexander III and Nicholas II, wrote of "The Falsehood of Democracy"⁶⁵. The lack of a Russian legal consciousness or sense of legality has been analyzed⁶⁶. It was an environment in which private initiative was always suspect. What caused the citizen to heed the commands of the state was not a sense of citizenship, or civil consciousness, but compulsion, often coercion by the state. After the fall of the tsarist regime and its Okhrana, that body's place was taken by the Bolshevik Cheka, and its successors.

Two days "at the barricades" during August 1991, around the Russian Federation Parliament, is not likely to transform and "democratize" the deeply autocratic experiences of the Russian tradition. Yeltsin's proclamation that Russia had "saved democracy for Russia and the world" gave no hope that "democratic Russia" -should it ever materialize- foresaw any place for non-Russian democracy.

After the failed coup of August 1991, the Central Asians have again taken to organizing and publicly articulating their wide ranging grievances. To restrict our view of Central Asia's troubles to the economic realm alone is to overlook the essential threat to their conscious existence as a people. Overt demonstrations against economic policy or political administration have been possible only rarely⁶⁷.

NOTAS

¹ The designation "Tartar" is found in the Orkhon-Yenisey stelea, erected beginning early 7th c. Vid. Tekin, T., *A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic*. Blomington, 1968, Uralic and Altaic Series, LXIX, which contains the texts and their English translations. The latin *Tartarus*, meaning "the infernal regions of Roman and Greek mythology, hence, hell" had already come into use through chronicles written by the clergy of Europe. Perhaps St. Louis of France was the first, in 1270, to apply this unrelated term to the troops of Chinggis Khan.

² Timur (or Temur) Bey, was wounded in a battle, which caused him to become lame. Therefore, in some Turkish sources he is sometimes referred to as Aksak Timur. Arab sources call him Amir Timur. In Persian sources, he became Timur-i leng. Hence, the corruption. Vid. Ahmad Ibn Arabshah (Sanders, J. H., tr.), *Tamarlane or Timur the Great Amir*. London, 1936; id. (Jarrett, H. S.), *The Timurnama or Ajayabul magfur fi akhbar-i Timur*. Calcutta, 1882; Forbes Manz, B., *The Rise and Rule of Tamarlane*. Cambridge, 1989.

³ The poem "Kubla Khan" by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) is another example of this "abundance of enthusiasm."

⁴ Vid. Tekin, T., *A Grammar...*, op. cit.

⁵ *Kasgarli Mahmud, Kitab Diwan Lugat at Turk*. Completed ca. A. D. 1074/ 1077. Editio Princeps by Kilisli Rifat (3 Vols.) (Istanbul, 1917-19). English Translation by R. Dankoff with J. Kelly as *Compendium of Turkic Dialects* (3 Vols.) (Cambridge, MA., 1982-84).

⁶ Although there are some including guidance to sensual pleasures, such as the Persian *Kabusnama*. Nizam al-Mulk, *The Book of Government*, H. Darke (Tr.) (Yale University Press, 1960), is a combination of autobiography (written partly to exonerate himself), and political advice to two Seljuk rulers.

⁷ *The language of Kutadgu Bilig* (Completed A. D. 1069) echoes the above referenced Orkhon-Yenisey inscriptions. A Turkish edition is: Yusuf Has Hacib (Arat, R. R., ed.), *Kutadgu Bilig* Ankara, 1974, 2nd Ed. KB is translated into English as *Wisdom of Royal Glory* by R. Dankoff (Chicago, 1983).

⁸ Concerning related issues, vid. Martin, J., *Treasure of the Land of Darkness: A Study of the Fur Trade in Medieval Russia*. Cambridge, 1986; Rorlich, A. A., *The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience*. Stanford, 1986; Fisher, A. W., *Crimean Tatars*. Stanford, 1978; Bennigsen, A.; Lemerrier-Quelquejay, Ch., *Islam in the Soviet Union*. NY & London, 1967; Bennigsen, A.; Broxup, M., *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*. London, 1983; Schamiloglu, U., "Umdet I-Ahbar and the Turkic Narrative Sources for the Golden Horde and the Later Golden Horde", en Paksoy, H. B. (ed.), *Central Asian Monuments*. Istanbul, 1992.

⁹ Also known as quimiss, etc. Vid., inter alia, Kasgarli Mahmud ..., op. cit., 184. It is still an immensely popular drink, contains -due to the fermentation process in its preparation- natural alcohol. However, it is not in the same category as hard liquor, possessing much less intoxicating agents. Russians became aware of the nourishing and rejuvenating qualities of kimiz after their occupation of Kazakhstan. Currently, several sanatoriums are operating in the Kazakh steppe where ingestion of kimiz is the primary dietetic and therapeutic prescription, especially against diagnosed tuberculosis. Probably this discovery of the beneficial effects of kimiz on TB caused Moscow to reconsider and relax the sovhoz-kolhoz rules in the area, in order to insure the maintenance of large herds of mares necessary to supply the sanatoriums where the CPSU Officialdom is treated.

¹⁰ On the social position of women in Central Asia, even at the turn of the 20th c., vid. Togan, Z. V., *Hatiralar*. Istanbul, 1969.

¹¹ Frye, R. N., "Oriental Studies in Russia"; Vucinich, W. S., "Structure of Soviet Orientology", both in Vucinich, W. S. (ed.), *Russia in Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russia on the Asian Peoples*. Stanford, 1972. The British Government periodically issues reports updating the history and structure of

Oriental Studies in Great Britain, which is stated to go back to the 15th century. However, such efforts were thoroughly organized by the beginning of the 20th century. Vid. *Oriental Studies in Britain*. London, 1975 (Her Majesty's Stationary Office).

¹² For an early treatment of the subject, vid. Akura, Y., *Uc Tarz-i Siyaset*. Ankara, 1976. Akura's analysis was first printed in the newspaper *Turk* published in Cairo during 1904. For the English version, vid. Thomas, D. S. (tr.); "Three Policies", en Paksoy, H. B. (ed.), *Central Asian ...*, op. cit.; Georgeon, F., "Yusuf Akura: Deuxieme Partie-Le Mouvement National des Musulmans de Russie (1905-1908)". *Central Asian Survey*, V-2 (1986).

¹³ Vambéry, A. H., *Travels in Central Asia*. London, 1865. Vambéry masqueraded as a mendicant dervish across Central Asia, around 1860-61. Upon his return to Europe, he wrote several books on his adventures. Vid., for example, his *Sketches of Central Asia*. London, 1868. Vid. also Hostler, C. W., *Turkism and the Soviets*. London, 1957. Vambéry, it is now known, was in the pay of the British Government. For archival references, vid. Oke, M. Kemal, "Prof. Arminius Vambéry and Anglo-Ottoman Relations 1889-1907". *Bulletin of the Turkish Studies Association*, IX-2 (1985).

¹⁴ For example, L. Cahun's Introduction a *l'Histoire de l'Asie, Turcs, et Mongols, des Origines a 1405*. Paris, 1896, was written to suggest that a belief in racial superiority motivated the conquests of the Mongol Chinggis Khan. This book was published on the heels of the 1893-1894 Franco-Russian rapprochement, at a time when Russia justified its conquest of Central Asia as part of its own "civilizing mission". In the *Secret History of the Mongols*, written c. 1240 A. D., after the death of Chinggis, there is, of course, no reference to racial superiority. Instead, it quotes Chinggis: "Tangri (God) opened the gate and handed us the reins". Vid. Temir, A. (trans.), *Mogollarin Gizli Tarihi*. Ankara, 1948, 227, indicating that Chinggis regarded only himself ruling by divine order. Vid. also Cleaves, F. (tr., ed.) *The Secret History of the Mongols*. Harvard, 1982. The "Great Khan" himself was and remained the focus of power, as opposed to the clans under his rule. In any event, the Mongol armies were distinctly multi-racial. Vid. Allsen, T., *Mongol Imperialism*. Berkeley, 1987; Rossabi, M., *Khubilai Khan*. Berkeley, 1988. Another representative sample of the use of the "Pan-Turkism" bogeyman is H. M. Government, *A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism*. Oxford, 1918 (Naval Staff Intelligence Department), a work that was based on *Vambéry's Turkenvolk*. Leipzig, 1885 and that it was compiled by Sir Denison Ross, as Sir Denison later personally informed Togan. On this work, vid. Togan's comments in *Turkili*, 560-563. Even Alexander Kerensky, in Paris exile after the Bolshevik Revolution, was utilizing the same Turanian rhetoric, calling it "a menace threatening the world".

¹⁵ "Pan-Islam" never did obtain a foothold in Central Asia. Even when Enver Pasha was forced to sign

declarations to that effect during 1920-1921, his audience had no clear conception of the specific term or its implications. The best work on Enver, which utilizes Enver's diaries and journals, is Aydemir, S. S., *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Pasha*. Istanbul, 1974 (Three Volumes. There are several printings). Enver left an autobiography. It was utilized by Aydemir. There is a German translation of Enver's autobiography, in typescript, located in the Sterling Library of the Yale University. Vid. also Swanson, G., "Enver Pasha: The Formative Years". *Middle Eastern Studies*, XVI-3 (October 1980). Azade-Ayşe Rorlich provides a further view of Enver in her "Fellow Travelers: Enver Pasha and the Bolshevik Government 1918-1920". *Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs*, XIII (Old Series LXIX), Part III (October 1982). Vid. also Yamauchi, M., "The Unromantic Exiles: Istanbul to Berlin - Enver Pasha 1919-1920". *Research Report on Urbanism in Islam*, 11 (1989); id., *The Green Crescent Under the Red Star: Enver Pasha in Soviet Russia*. Tokyo, 1991. Close colleagues and classmates of Enver from the Ottoman Military academy left memoirs in which Enver is featured prominently. Among those, Marshal Fevzi akmak, General Kazim Karabekir, Ismet Inonu and Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) are notable. Approximately half of those were written at the height of Enver's success and powers.

¹⁶ Among many works on Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani and Pan-Islamism, vid., Gibb, H. A. R., *Modern Trends in Islam*. Chicago, 1947; Keddie, N., *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": a Political Biography*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972. About the Recidivist Movement of 31 March 1909, vid. Aksin, S., *31 Mart Olayi*. Ankara, 1970. For the political environment of the period, vid.: Ramsaur, E. E., *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908*. Beirut, 1965; Mardin, S., *Jon Turklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908*. Ankara, 1964; Ahmad, F., *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*. Oxford, 1969; Hanioglu, M. S., *Bir Siyasal Orgut Olarak "Osmanli Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti" ve "Jon Turkkluk" 1889-1902*. Vol. I, Istanbul, 1985; Arai, M., *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*. Leiden, 1991.

¹⁷ Concerning this censorship, Choldin, M. T., *A Fence Around the Empire: Censorship of Western Ideas under the Tsars*. Durham, 1985; Daniel, B., *Censorship in Russia*. Lanham, 1979; Seton-Watson, H., *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917*. Oxford, 1967. Vid. also Kuttner, T., "Russian Jadidism and the Islamic World: Ismail Gasprinskii in Cairo, 1908". *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique*, 16 (1975).

¹⁸ Allahverdiyev, B., *Kitablar Hakkında Kitap*. Baku, 1972. For further examples, vid. also Lazzarini, E., "Gadidism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: A View From Within". *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique*, 16 (1975).

¹⁹ Vid. Paksoy, H. B., Alpamysh ; Dewhurst, M.; Farrell, R., *The Soviet Censorship*. Metuchen-NJ,

1973; Branson, L., "How Kremlin Keeps Editors in Line". *The Times*, 5 January 1986, 1.

²⁰ Under the influence of Peter Stolypin (1862-1911), the author of "We Need A Great Russia", *Gosudarstvennaia Duma Stenograficheskie Otchety*. St. Petersburg, 1907. Cf. Riha, T. (ed.), *Readings in Russian Civilization*. Vol. II: Imperial Russia 1700-1917. Chicago, 1964.

²¹ Seton-Watson, H., *The Russian Empire ...*, op. cit.

²² Gasprinskii, I. B., *Russkoe Musul'manstvo: Mysli, Zametki Nablyudeniya*. Simferopol, 1881 (Society for Central Asian Studies. Oxford, 1985, Reprint No. 6); Lazzerini, E. J., "Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's Perevodchik/Tercuman: A Clarion of Modernism", en Paksoy, H. B. (ed.), *Central Asian Monuments*. Istanbul, 1992; id., "From Bakhchisaray to Bukharain 1893: Ismail Bey Gasprinskii's Journey to Central Asia". *Central Asian Survey*, III-4 (1984); id., *Ismail Bey Gasprinskii and Muslim Modernism in Russia, 1878-1914* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1973); id., "Gadidism at the Turn...", op. cit.; Seydahmet, C., *Gaspirali Ismail Bey*. Istanbul, 1934.

²³ For example, *Annales Bertiniani* of the 9th c. For related discussion, vid. Sinor, D., "The Historical Role of the Turk Empire". *Journal of World History*, 1 (1953); Chavannes, E., *Documents sur les Toukies (Turcs)*. St. Petersburg, 1903; Obolensky, D., *Cambridge Medieval History* Vol. IV, Part 1; Schacht, J.; Bosworth, C. E., *The Legacy of Islam*. Oxford, 1974, Second Edition.

²⁴ An exclamatory term, akin to the exhortation "lets go", especially used when rounding-up or rustling livestock.

²⁵ Vid. Paksoy, H. B., *Alpamysh*.

²⁶ The last references are to the respective anti-colonial movements. It should be remembered that Togan was writing the 1920s. For a treatment, vid. id., "The Basmachi (Turkistan National Liberation Movement)", en *Modern Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and Soviet Union*, Vol. IV. Florida, 1991, 5-20; id., "Zeki Velidi Togan's Account: The Basmachi Movement from Within", en id. (ed.), *Central Asia Reader*. New York, 1994.

²⁷ Tacitus, 65-66.

²⁸ Conceivably, examples such as the Britons were foremost in the minds of the men leading the 1776 American Independence movement. American Founding Fathers may have also have been remembering the admonitions that a republic can only exist with an educated public; and that both the Greeks and the Romans did not heed Plato's advice and saw the replacement of their republics with dictatorships. (Plato's Republic has been widely available). Hence, the early American battle-cries "Give me liberty, or give me death," and "No taxation without representation" were not mere accidents. The American Founding Fathers at once began establishing secular universities in the new republic. University of Pennsylvania (Established as College of Philadelphia) was founded in 1753 with the help of Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790). George

Washington (1732-1799) gave encouragement and aid to the establishment of more than one college, one of which still bears his name. Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) led the way in establishing the University of Virginia in 1819. Later, Johns Hopkins (1876) and University of Chicago (1892) were also founded as secular institutions of higher learning. As it is known, the universities established in colonial America were first and foremost training clergy. Later, these existing colleges and universities followed the lead of the new institutions by revising their curricula, giving weight to liberal arts education.

²⁹ Y. Bregel, in his Introduction to *Munis and Agahi, Firdaws al-Ikbal: History of Khorezm* notes: "...The West first learned about the existence of these works through a Russian orientalist named A. L. Kuhn, who accompanied, together with several other Russian scholars, the Russian military expedition against Khiva in 1873 which resulted in the capturing of Khiva and establishing of the Russian protectorate over the Khanate. In the Khan's palace the Russians found a great number of archival documents and about 300 manuscripts; they were all confiscated... Some of the publications confiscated in Khiva by the Russians in 1873 were transferred in 1874 to the Imperial Public Library in Petersburg, but others were kept by Kuhn in his private possession; these included the manuscripts of the works by Munis and Agahi...". [From P. 54, Note 304 of the Introduction] The MS C is slightly damaged by water from which several marginal notes at the beginning of the MS especially suffered. Many pages of E are also damaged by water, but it does not appreciably affect the legibility of the text. The cause of this damage is probably to be explained by a story told by Palvan (Pahlavan) Mirza-bashi, the secretary of the khan of Khiva, to a Russian official and orientalist N. P. Ostroumov in 1891. According to this secretary, "Kun [Kuhn] took away from Khiva about fifteen hundred different manuscripts, but when he transported them across [the Amu-Darya] in a boat, most of the manuscripts got wet, and he requested about 150 mullas from a madrasa to dry the wet copies". (Cited from Ostroumov's diary in Lunin, *Srednyaya Aziya*, 345, n. 523). It may also be stated that, there was a second reason why Ostroumov and other Russians were seizing manuscripts: to study and understand the Central Asians better, to discover more effective means for control. Subsequent publication of some of those manuscripts have been largely confined to Soviet "nationalities specialists," in strictly controlled circulation.

³⁰ For further details, vid. Paksoy, H. B., ""The Basmachi": Turkistan...", op. cit., id., "Zeki Velidi...", op. cit.

³¹ Pipes, R., *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923*. Harvard, 1954.

³² Conquest, R., *Harvest of Sorrow*. New York, 1982.

³³ Landau, J. M., *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A study of Irredentism*. London, 1981. This volume is primarily concerned with the emigre aspects of "pan-Turkism".

³⁴ Paksoy, H. B., *Alpamysh*.

³⁵ For the career of Mir-Said Sultan Galiev, vid. Yamauchi, M., "One Aspect of Democratization in Tataristan: The Dream of Sultangaliev Revisited" presented to the *Conference on Islam and Democratization in Central Asia*, held at the University of Massachusetts -Amherst, 26-27 September 1992; id., *The Dream of Sultangaliev*. Tokyo, 1986; Bennigsen, A.; Wimbush, S. E., *Muslim National Communism in the Soviet Union: A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World*. Chicago, 1979.

³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, 46, from Z. I. Gimranov, at the Ninth Conference of the Tatar Obkom, 1923, and published in *Stenograficheskii otchet 9oi oblastnoi Konferensii Tatarskoi organizatsii RKP (b)*. Kazan, 1924, 130.

³⁷ It is recalled that during 1922-1923, the British Labor party was rapidly becoming a parliamentary force. In January 1924, Ramsey Macdonald headed the first Labor government, which was replaced by Conservatives led by Stanley Baldwin in November the same year. Also, the Irish rebellion of 1921 was still in the background, that gave an added urgency to the nature and prospects of political leadership in Britain.

³⁸ Russian Communist Party (bolshevik).

³⁹ Ahmet Zeki Velidi Togan. See above. Before his move to West, he was known as Zeki Validov.

⁴⁰ Speech at the Fourth Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) with the responsible Workers of the National Republics and Regions, 10 June 1923. Published in "The Sultan Galiev Case." *Stalin, J. V., Works*. Vol. 5: 1921-1923. Moscow, 1953. Cf. Bennigsen, A.; Wimbush, S. E., *Moslem National ...*, 158-165.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁴² A more detailed version of the discussion in this section was presented by H. B. Paksoy to YALE University-Hopkins Summer Seminars, 9 July 1990.

⁴³ Vid. *AACAR Bulletin*, IV-1 (Spring 1991).

⁴⁴ Gleason, G., "Educating for Underdevelopment: The Soviet Vocational Education System and its Central Asian Critics". *Central Asian Survey*, IV-2 (1985); Carley, P. M., "Ecology in Central Asia: The Price of the Plan. Perceptions of Cotton and Health in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan". *Central Asian Survey*, VIII-4 (1989).

⁴⁵ A more comprehensive version of the discussion in this section was presented by H. B. Paksoy, to the Japanese Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, during June, 1991.

⁴⁶ *RL Daily Report*. 6 February 1990.

⁴⁷ The interview was printed in the Leningrad youth newspaper *Smena*, and reprinted in *Komsomolets Uzbekistana*, in a "slightly abridged form". Vid. "Islamic Explosion Possible in Central Asia". *RL Daily Report*, 5 February 1990.

⁴⁸ The January 1990 issue of *Nauka i religiia*. Vid. "Three Soviet Myths on Religion Exploded". *RL Daily Report*, 2 February 1990.

⁴⁹ Critchlow, J., "Corruption, Nationalism and the Native Elites in Soviet Central Asia". *The Journal of Communist Studies*, IV-2 (1988).

⁵⁰ For reports, vid. *Conflict in the Soviet Union: The Untold Story of the Clashes in Kazakhstan*. New York, 1990 (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights). Cf. *AACAR Bulletin*, IV-1 (Spring, 1991); Turkestan, Supplement to *AACAR Bulletin*, III-2 (Fall, 1990), repinted in Paksoy, H. B. (ed.), *Central Asia Reader*, op. cit.

⁵¹ In an interview published in the *West Berlin daily Tageszeitung* of June 25, 1990. *RL Daily Report*, 26 June 1990 (Victor Yasmann). Moskovskie novosti published the biography of KGB General Oleg Kalugin, whose recent revelations about the KGB have attracted so much attention: Born in 1934, Kalugin joined the KGB in 1958. The next year, he was sent --along with Aleksandr Yakovlev-- as one of the first Soviet exchange students to study for a year at Columbia University. He stayed in the US for several years, working for the KGB first as a journalist and then as first secretary of the USSR Embassy in Washington under Anatolii Dobrynin. In 1972, Kalugin became chief of the KGB's counterintelligence service in Vladimir Kryuchkov's First Chief Directorate. In 1980, KGB boss Yuri Andropov transferred him to the post of first deputy chief of the KGB Administration in Leningrad. Vid. *RL Daily Report*, 26 June 1990 (Alexander Rahr).

⁵² Moreover, some of the Soviet "ethnic" and "nationality" appellations were created by decree, partly for that purpose. For example, Meskhetians are not ethnically Turks, but were so designated during the Second World War (on 15 November 1944) to suit the needs of the Soviet regime. Vid. Wimbush, S. E.; Wixman, R., "The Meskhetian Turks: A New Voice in Soviet Central Asia". *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, XVII-1 (1975).

⁵³ Vid. the supplement to *AACAR Bulletin*, III-2 (Fall, 1990).

⁵⁴ "...When he [Lenin] wanted faithful guards, Lenin took Latvian riflemen with him. He knew that if you want to protect yourself against the Russians, you put minorities in charge. If you are afraid of minorities, you use Russians". Vid. Wimbush, S. E., *The Ethnic Factor in the Soviet Armed Forces*. Rand Report, R-2787/1, 1982, 19. Also, Curran, S. L.; Ponomareff, D., *Managing the Ethnic Factor in the Russian and Soviet Armed Forces: An Historical Overview*. Rand Report, R-2640/1, 1982.

⁵⁵ *RL Daily Report*, 6 February 1990.

⁵⁶ Rosenman, S. I. (ed.), Franklin D. Roosevelt, *The Public Papers and Addresses*. New York, 1938-1950 (Vol. VI).

⁵⁷ Demko, G. J., *The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan 1896-1916*. Bloomington, 1969. Uralic-Altaic Series, XCIX (Indiana University). Soviets also made land demands on other nationalities, and

took land by military force, including in the Baltic region.

⁵⁸ Vid. Togan, Z. V., Turkili ..., op. cit.; id., Hatirlar ..., op. cit.; Blank, S., "The Struggle for Soviet Bashkiria 1917-1923". *Nationalities Papers*, 1 (1983); id., "The Contested Terrain: Muslim Political Participation in Soviet Turkestan, 1917-1919". *Central Asian Survey*, VI-4 (1987); Baumann, R., "Subject Nationalities in the Military Service of Imperial Russia: The Case of Bashkirs". *Slavic Review* (Fall/Winter 1987).

⁵⁹ For the 1921 Kars Treaty, vid. Karabekir, K., *Istiklal Harbimiz*. Istanbul, 1960.

⁶⁰ Rahr, A., "Zhirinovskiy's Plea for Dictatorship", *RFE/RL Daily*, 124, 2 July 1992. The leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, told Rossiya (No. 27) that a majority of Russians favor dictatorship. He said that he wants to reinstall the Russian empire, first within the boundaries of the former USSR, but subsequently along the borders of the former Tsarist empire. He stated that right-wing forces will come to power in Russia and Germany under the slogan of the protection of the white race and divide eastern Europe among themselves. He added that after the forthcoming demise of the United States, Alaska will also be incorporated into the Russian empire. He noted that, if elected president, he would strengthen the army and state security forces."

⁶¹ Berlin, I., *Russian Thinkers*. London, 1978 (Hardy, H.; Kelly, A. (eds.)); Keenan, E. L., "Muscovite Political Folkways". *Russian Review*, XLV (1986).

⁶² Chaadaev (1794-1856) wrote the "A Philosophical Letter, ...that caused the suppression of the newspaper which published it, dismissal of the censor who passed it, its editor to be exiled, and Chaadaev was declared madman... By order of Nicholas I [Chadaev was] put under police supervision. For a year he had to endure daily visits by a physician and policeman". Vid. Riha, T. (ed.), *Readings in Russian Civilization* ..., op. cit.

⁶³ Also known as the "Black Hundreds," was founded in 1905 as a modern party in support of autocracy. "[This party] ...showed special hostility to the intelligentsia. Above all it was anti-Semitic and nationalist. Its support came from those who organized the pogroms of Jewish property in the southern and south-western provinces. It was essentially the forerunner of the fascist movements of the 1930s". Cf. Seton-Watson, H., *The Russian Empire* ..., op. cit.

⁶⁴ Feliks Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy, founder of Bolshevik police to enforce the decisions of the Russian Communist Party, later to become KGB. Vid. Dziak, J. J., *Chekisty: A History of the KGB*. New York, 1988.

⁶⁵ Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827-1907), professor of civil law, Moscow University; member of government committee drafting judicial reforms of 1864; member of the ruling State Council. "Pobedonostsev is said to have served as a model for

Dostoevski's Grand Inquisitor". Vid. Riha, T. (ed.), *Readings in Russian Civilization* ..., op. cit. "The Falsehood of Democracy" appeared in Pobedonostsev, K., *Reflections of a Russian Statesman*. London, 1898.

⁶⁶ Shapiro, L., "The Pre-Revolutionary Intelligentsia and the Legal Order", en Dahrendorf, E. (ed.), *Russian Studies*. London/New York, 1987. Reprinted from *Daedalus* (Summer, 1960); Wortmann, R., *The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness*. Princeton, 1978.

⁶⁷ Vid. Paksoy, H. B., "Nationality and Religion: Three Observations from Omer Seyfettin". *Central Asian Survey*, III-3 (1984).