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Muerte y nihilismo en el pensamiento de J.G. Fichte

  • Autores: Virginia E. López Domínguez
  • Localización: Anales del seminario de historia de la filosofía, ISSN 0211-2337, Nº 11, 1994, págs. 139-154
  • Idioma: español
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  • Resumen
    • This article analyses the accusation of nihilism that F. H. Jacobi made against Fichte in a letter of mars. 1799, imputation that lays on the personal conception ofJacobi about the reason as a negative capacity which only can destroy its objects. The letter in question implicates two different types of nihilism: a)The cosmological one, accepted by Fichte and named acosmism by him. It is only a reformulation of the sensible world from practical principIes, but doesn't suppose an annihilation or scorn of this world. Qn the contrary, the religious view, for example, shows the world as a manifestation of godlite and, hased on moral exigencies, doesn~t admit the existence of death. Of course, the immortality isn't for a particular soul but for the order of moral actions (= God). b) The radical one, which doesn't exist in Fichte and lays on a bad interpretation of bis intellectual intuition assumed from a point of view next to Schelling.


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