A fatal attraction? Smith's 'theory of moral sentiments' and Mandeville's 'fable'

• Autores: B. Kerkhof
• Localización: History of political thought, ISSN 0143-781X, Vol. 16, Nº 2, 1995, págs. 219-233
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • will point out that Mandeville makes a fundamental distinction between �self-love� and �self-liking�; �self-love� being the immediate orientation towards our self-preservation and �self-liking� being comparative: it is our inclination to overrate ourselves in comparison with others. We are more or less conscious that we overestimate ourselves and for this reason we constantly have to nourish our �self-liking�. To do this we even have sometimes to conquer our �fear of death� (self-love), e.g. when we commit suicide to avoid shame. The presupposition that mankind according to Mandeville is consistently motivated by �self-interest� apparently is in need of quite a few adjustments. This implies, further, that a difference between Mandeville and Hobbes becomes manifest, which undermines the supposition of their basic similarity. This is clearly illustrated by the suicide example: in the Hobbesian world suicide can only be understood as a sort of mental disease. After all, a suicide acts against the principle of self-preservation. In the Mandevillean world committing suicide belongs to the same category of phenomena as brave behaviour during wars and fighting a duel: in all of these cases the �fear of shame� (self-liking) conquers the �fear of death� (self-love).