What is normativity?

• Autores: John Skorupski
• Localización: Disputatio, ISSN-e 0873-626X, Vol. 2, Nº. 23, 2007, págs. 1-23
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • The thesis that the concept of a reason is the fundamental normative concept is in the air. In this paper, I examine what it amounts to, how to formulate it, and how ambitious it should be. I distinguish a semantic version, according to which any normative predicate is definitionally reducible to a reason predicate, and a conceptual version, according to which the sole normative ingredient in any normative concept is the concept of a reason.

    Although I reject the semantic version, I examine its potential in some detail.

    And I claim that the conceptual version is plausible.