Hobartian voluntarism and epistemic deontologism

• Autores: Andrei A. Buckareff
• Localización: Disputatio, ISSN-e 0873-626X, Vol. 2, Nº. 21, 2006, págs. 1-17
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Mark Heller has recently offered a proposal in defense of a fairly strong version of doxastic voluntarism. Heller looks to the compatibilist theory of free will proposed by R.E. Hobart in the first half of the twentieth century for an account of doxastic control. Heller�s defense of Hobartian Voluntarism is motivated by an appeal to epistemic deontologism.

    In this paper I argue that Heller�s defense of a version of strong or direct doxastic voluntarism ultimately fails. I finally argue that the failure of his theory of epistemic agency does not imply the untenability of epistemic deontologism.