RESLA, 12 (1997), 7-25

FG, ILLOCUTIONS, AND COGNITION[1]

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ABSTRACT. *The present paper aims at assessing the degree of psychological adequacy of the Functional Grammar (FG) treatment of illocutions. This task shall be pursued in two stages. First, I shall present Dik's (1989, 1997) insights into illocution and the way it is dealt with within the framework of FG. Second, I shall discuss those aspects of the FG illocutionary component which are found wanting in relation to the still somewhat programmatic requirement of psychological adequacy which is postulated by FG. At the same time, I shall give an outline of plausible directions in which the explanatory power of the theory could be improved in this connection.*

KEYWORDS. *Illocutions, Functional Grammar, Cognition.*

RESUMEN. *El objetivo del presente artículo es el de analizar el grado de adecuación psicológica del componente ilocutivo de la Gramática Funcional (GF). En primer lugar, se presentan las propuestas de la GF sobre la ilocución (Dik 1989, 1997). En segundo lugar, se discuten aquellos aspectos del componente ilocutivo de la GF que han de ser elaborados en este sentido. Al mismo tiempo se ofrece una propuesta de análisis de actos de habla que permitiría al componente ilocutivo de la GF alcanzar un grado deseable de adecuación psicológica.*

PALABRAS CLAVE. *Ilocución, Gramática Funcional, cognición.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Dik's (1989, 1997) Functional Grammar (henceforth FG) requires its treatment of grammatical phenomena to be sensitive to pragmatic, psychological, and typological considerations. The present paper aims at assessing the degree of achievement of the FG approach to illocutions as regards the second of these methodological requirements, namely, its degree of psychological adequacy. The canonical FG treatment of illocutions is necessarily sketchy but has the essential ingredients for a more developed theory of illocutionary activity. Only some of its gaps in its treatment of illocutions are due to the absence of a proper commitment to the contemporary findings on the cognitive mechanisms involved in linguistic performance. Among such weaknesses we find the

lack of consideration of the prototypical nature of illocutionary categories[2] and related issues such as the concept of markedness, the existence of fuzzy boundaries between such categories which result in borderline instances of speech acts[3], the use of mental constructs such as cognitive models and constructions in the production and interpretation of speech acts, or the possibility of a gradation in the degree of codification of illocutions which cognitive theories of categorization, like Prototype Theory (Rosch 1977, 1978), would predict.

The following review of the FG illocutionary layer has been carried out within the framework of cognitivism. Therefore, I shall be closely following the proposals made by Lakoff (1987, 1989, 1993) on the nature of human cognition, in general, and on cognitive models, in particular. In addition, a considerable part of my discussion of the FG illocutionary component will take advantage of Rosch's (1977, 1978) insights into prototypicality effects and fuzzy categories. The paper is organized in two sections. First, I shall present Dik's (1989, 1997) insights into illocution and the way it is dealt with within the framework of FG. Second, I shall discuss those aspects of the FG illocutionary component which are found wanting in relation to the still somewhat programmatic requirement of psychological adequacy[4] which is postulated by FG. At the same time, I shall give an outline of plausible directions in which the explanatory power of the theory could be improved in this connection.

2. THE FG TREATMENT OF ILLOCUTIONS

The second volume of Dik's work, *The Theory of Functional Grammar* (henceforth TFG2), which has been posthumously published in 1997, offers a considerable expansion of his original proposals in the 1989 volume (henceforth TFG1) on the nature of illocutions and the kind of treatment and formalization that illocutionary phenomena should receive within his functional model of grammar. The inventory of conversion processes which are responsible for the derivation of different illocutionary values (or 'derived illocutions') from the three basic illocutionary types has been cut down to two: grammatical and pragmatic conversions. The third type of conversion suggested in TFG1 (i.e. lexical conversion) is not mentioned in TFG2. Furthermore, taxonomies of both grammatical conversions and illocutionary converters (i.e. those linguistic devices which implement grammatical conversions) are put forward. In spite of such an elaboration of his former view on speech acts, the study of the illocutionary layer that is presented to us in TFG2 continues to be sketchy and the space devoted to some key issues in the field of speech acts (e.g. indirect speech acts) is strikingly restricted. More specifically, as far as its achievement of psychological adequacy is concerned, hardly no step forward can be perceived in the second volume of the FG. These issues will be dealt with in more detail in section two of this paper. Before doing so, however, it is convenient to offer an outline of Dik's proposals on the illocutionary layer of language since continuous reference will

have to be made to them in the remainder of the paper[5].

In TFG2, Dik maintains his definition of the concept of illocution as simply an especial instance of verbal interaction as sketched in TFG1. Consequently, Dik (1997: 231) argues that just as it is generally possible to draw a distinction between the speaker's intention, the semantic content of the expression, and the addressee's final interpretation of the speaker's utterance, likewise illocutions appear as entities endowed with three different profiles which need not be identical: (1) Illocution-as-intended-by-S (Ill_S), (2) Illocution-as-coded-in-the-expression (Ill_E), and (3) Illocution-as-interpreted-by-A (Ill_A). In Dik's model, such a three-sided nature of illocutions triggers the following two implications. First, the addressee's task will be to reconstruct Ill_S on the basis of Ill_E and, therefore, the degree of explicitness of Ill_E will have a direct bearing on the difficulty and cognitive economy of such an undertaking. Second, a model of grammar (e.g. FG) will be "primarily interested in Ill_E: the illocution to the extent that it is coded in linguistic expressions" (Dik 1997: 232). Consequently, those instances of Ill_A which are reached via the addition of pragmatic information are beyond the scope of the FG model of grammar and belong to a wider theory of verbal interaction[6]. This methodological decision as such cannot, in principle, be argued against. However, as shall be illustrated in section II, such a strict separation of the realms of grammar and pragmatics is found to be unsound and unrealistic from a cognitive perspective, which would point to the existence of a continuum between these domains instead[7]. Given that one of the three criteria of adequacy formulated for the FG model is precisely that of psychological plausibility, it is possible to point to a slight contradiction in the methodological foundations of the theory. The positing of a level of cognitive adequacy is not compatible with an strict objectivist separation of two domains (i.e. grammar and pragmatics) which blatantly conflicts with what is known about the nature of human cognition.

A further consequence of the FG methodological decision of narrowing its treatment of illocutions to only those which have been somehow fully codified in linguistic expressions is the subsequent impoverishment of the theory regarding its explanation of the illocutionary component of language. This fact, which could already be anticipated in view of the proposals in TFG1, is confirmed when reading the chapter devoted to the illocutionary layer in TFG2. The original idea that the universal sentence types (i.e. declarative, interrogative, imperative, and to a lesser extent, exclamative) function as carriers of the homonymous basic illocutions is maintained and further justified in TFG2 (1997: 237)[8]. Therefore, natural languages are said to possess the following universal grammaticalized illocutionary system:

- Declarative: *S wishes*[9] *A to add the content of the linguistic expression to his pragmatic information.*
- Interrogative: *S wishes A to provide him with the verbal information as requested in the linguistic expression.*

– Imperative: *S wishes A to perform the controlled state of affairs as specified in the linguistic expression.*

And many, but not all languages, also have an exclamative illocutionary force codified into their grammatical systems:

– Exclamative: *S wishes A to know that the content of the linguistic expression impresses S as surprising, unexpected, or otherwise worthy of notice.*

Dik grounds his insight in the fact that it is only natural that "those speech act types which are functionally most important have been codified by distinct grammatical means (sentence types) in the grammar of a language" (1997: 237). His argument seems reasonable and nothing can be objected to it so far. Especially from a functional perspective, it is well-founded to believe that form (i.e. codification) is motivated by function, and that those illocutionary types which are more functionally relevant will be the first to achieve a grammatically fixed codified status. Nevertheless, suspicions about the correctness of the theory's account of illocutionary phenomena start to arise when Dik turns to present the inventory of grammatical conversions which are expected to expand the number of fully codified illocutionary values that are available to the speakers of a natural language for their everyday interaction.

Through grammatical illocutionary conversions an expression with the basic illocution Ill_E can be turned into an expression with the derived illocution Ill_E *. Dik (1997: 243-244) puts forward a catalogue of grammatical conversions which include the following[10]:

a. Declarative >Interrogative. E.g. She is a nice girl, *isn't she*?
   Declarative > Request. E.g. *Please* Johnny, I hate this music!
b. Interrogative > Request. E.g. *Please* , can you pass me the salt?
   Interrogative >Rhetorical question. E.g. What *DIF*ference does it make?
   Interrogative > Exclamation. E.g. Has she *GROWN!*
c. Imperative > Request. E.g. *Please* give me the scalpel.
   Imperative > Exclamation. E.g Look who's *THERE!*

The number of resulting derived illocutions is therefore seven. These, together with the four basic illocutionary types, make up a total of eleven codified illocutionary forces. It is at this stage that Dik's account of the illocutionary component of natural languages can be questioned. To begin with, the assertion that the above eleven codified illocutions are "sufficient to achieve the desired communicative effect" (Dik 1997: 254) in most of our everydaylife interactions is somewhat unrealistic. It does not seem intuitively plausible and, what is worse, it seems to disregard the findings of

traditional theories of speech acts (e.g. Austin 1962; Searle 1969, 1979; Bach and Harnish 1979), according to which the inventory of speech acts that are used in order to carry out interpersonal interaction is much bigger. Illocutionary forces like those of promising, advising, or suggesting, to name just three examples, are so recurring and everpresent in our daily lives that it is hard to believe that their implementation is based on sheer pragmatics and that languages have not somehow devised some kind of grammatical construction, with at least some degree of conventionalization, for their expression. Given that one of the advantages of codification is that it allows the speaker to use language in a more straightforward, automatic way, and that this results in economy of cognitive processing, it would be just too costly from a cognitive point of view for only eleven of all the possible illocutionary values to have achieved grammatical status. Problems do not end here.

A closer look at the catalogue of grammatical conversions reveals that their number could actually be smaller than eleven, if the distinction drawn by Dik himself between illocutionary modifications and illocutionary conversions is systematically applied[11]. Let us explain this in more detail. To begin with, the 'Interrogative > Rhetorical question' conversion type is straightforwardly presented in a tentative way by Dik (1997: 244) himself. As he explains, the idea that a grammatical conversion is at work in this case is based on the assumption that this kind of question displays a different prosodic contour. Unfortunately, as Dik goes on to prove, this assumption is debatable. Thus, Quirk *et al.* (1972: 402) remark that (1) in the case of wh-questions the intonation pattern of rhetorical questions is the same as that of ordinary questions, except that a rise-fall tone is likely, and (2) in the case of rhetorical Yes-No questions the only phonological distinction is the unusually low or high starting-point of the rise. Taking into consideration Quirk's observations, Dik (1997: 243) concludes that if these differences in intonation between ordinary and rhetorical questions "are not sufficient to be considered a form of linguistic coding, then the conversion [under consideration] is not a grammatical, but a pragmatic conversion"[12].

Dik (1997: 244) himself also questions the validity of the conversion 'Imperative > Request' by means of the illocutionary converter 'please' as in *Please, give me that scalpel.* Dik's argument is that this operation could perfectly well turn the imperative into a mitigated weaker imperative (modification) instead of into a request (conversion).

In my opinion, a similar argument could be put forward against another of the grammatical conversion types formulated in TFG2, namely, 'Imperative > Exclamative' as in *Look who's THERE!!* The question arises whether this is really a case of conversion of an imperative illocution into an exclamative, or rather an instance of imperative strengthening and, therefore, just an illocutionary modification.

In view of the above discussion, the actual number of grammatical conversion types would need to be reduced to only four (i.e. Declarative > Interrogative, Declarative > Request, Interrogative > Request, and Interrogative > Exclamation).

Together with the four basic illocutionary types the FG model would be able to account only for eight illocutionary types. A vast number of other illocutionary acts, which are frequently used in conversation, would lie beyond the scope of the grammar and would have to be explained by a wider theory of interaction. It is necessary to emphasize once more how uneconomical, in cognitive terms, a language which followed this scheme would be. As Dik (1997: 231) himself remarks, the production and interpretation of illocutions based on pragmatic, as opposed to grammatical or lexical means, is more costly and difficult. So, if we follow his own line of reasoning, it should be concluded that (1) either natural languages are in fact uneconomical from a psychological perspective (i.e. they actually make a wide use of costly inferential pragmatic processes in the performance of speech acts), or (2) Dik's account of the illocutionary layer should be elaborated so that it may become capable of accounting for the cognitive economy of everydaylife linguistic interactions. Given the speed and relative easiness with which speakers of natural languages generally communicate, the second view is more plausible. Moreover, it should be noted that in so doing we are just adhering to Dik's own view of codification as a more cognitively economical device for linguistic performance than pragmatic inference. The following section will be devoted to pinpointing those aspects of the FG treatment of illocutions which should be improved in order to endow the model with the cognitive adequacy that it lacks, and which clearly restricts its explanatory power as regards the illocutionary layer of language.

3. ASSESSING THE COGNITIVE ADEQUACY OF THE FG ILLOCUTIONARY COMPONENT

The degree of cognitive validity of the FG approach to illocutions will be assessed by considering aspects such as the recognition of cognitive continuums between linguistic domains (i.e. grammar and pragmatics), the model of categorization involved (Prototype Theory vs. Classical Theory), and the role played in the theory by mental constructs like cognitive models and constructions. In so doing, some specific subfields of the FG account of illocutions, especially its treatment of indirect speech acts, will be simultaneously examined.

In the previous presentation of the FG illocutionary layer, some of the problems of the model, whose origin lies in the lack of a serious cognitive commitment, have already been anticipated. Let us begin with its conceptualization of the linguistic domains of grammar and pragmatics as exclusive rather than continuous notions which would gradually merge into one another[13]. As is well known, cognitivism (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987) rejects the classical theory of categorization in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions in favour of a new approach, known as Prototype Theory (Rosch 1978), which establishes membership in a category depending on the

degree of similarity that an entity holds with the best example (i.e. the prototype) of the category[14]. In contrast to the well-defined strict concepts which result from the classical model, Prototype Theory yields categories which display different degrees of membership. These asymmetries in the internal structure of concepts give rise to what is known as 'prototype effects', which involve the existence of both central and peripheral members within categories. A consequence of the existence of prototypical effects is that the boundaries between categories become fuzzy, with some instances which cannot be easily ascribed to a particular category as they display features from more than one. A good analogy is provided by colour terms. In the same way that there exists an infinite range of hues of grey between white and black, our conceptualization of reality seems to allow for gradations and continuums between concepts. Such a mode of categorization can be applied to all domains of experience including abstract concepts such as the different linguistic levels of description. This has been evidenced by cognitive grammars like Langacker's (1987: 3): "There is no meaningful distinction between grammar and lexicon. Lexicon, morphology, and syntax form a continuum of symbolic structures". In this respect, the FG model does not seem to have attained the desired level of cognitive adequacy, since a strict division is posited between those grammatical and pragmatic conversions which are used to derive other illocutionary values from the four basic illocutionary types. Lip service is briefly paid to the fuzzy nature of the distinction between the grammatical and the pragmatic types of illocutionary conversion by referring to some instances of illocutions in which the pragmatic conversion seems to lead to a certain preferred reading (i.e. there is a process of conventionalization going on). However, the final conclusion remains unaltered, namely, that it is always possible to draw a strict line between both mechanisms even if the "pragmatic conversion is the rule rather than the exception" in some cases. The example presented by Dik (1997: 249) is the following:

(1) *Could you open that door?*

Dik's argument is that in spite of the fact that sentences like (1) are predominantly used as requests rather than as genuine questions about the addressee's ability to perform the specified action, there are some contexts in which they can still be assigned an ability reading as their primary force, as in:

(2) *You claim that you are very strong. Well, could you open that door, for instance?*

Dik concludes that whenever it is possible to find a context in which the literal meaning of the sentence can be maintained, then it is acceptable to say that the request force has not been codified in that linguistic expression in the least. In other words, the request reading of sentence (1) above is purely pragmatically motivated. There is

nothing in its linguistic form that should lead us to think that a request reading of the sentence is available. Dik's reasoning seems to have fallen into the trap of the objectivist[15] view of reality which does not allow for a gradation in the degree of grammatical codification of illocutions. As is well known, cognitive theories of categorization have amply shown the reality of such continuums which should necessarily be expected in the realm of illocutionary acts if a cognitively adequate account of these phenomena is to be accomplished. Therefore, sentence (1), though not yet fully codified as a request, displays a high degree of conventionalization, which makes this directive reading a more accessible one. The idea that the processes of codification (i.e. grammatical conversion) and inference (i.e. pragmatic conversion) constitute gradual choices rather than strict objectivist options was already suggested by Ruiz de Mendoza in 1994 as a necessary improvement on the FG treatment of illocutions. Ruiz de Mendoza (1994) rejects Dik's all-or-nothing classification of conversion types in favour of a more cognitively adequate one based on a gradation from purely inferential to purely codified conversions, while allowing for intermediate boundary cases of conventionalization in the middle of the continuum. This view on the processes of illocutionary conversion permits a classification of illocutionary values into three prototypical categories: coded (when a linguistic expression has specialized itself as the vehicle of a given illocutionary force), conventional (when a particular linguistic expression has a preferred reading as a given illocution in an unmarked context, and a different non-preferred illocutionary reading in marked contexts), and inferential (or pragmatic to use Dik's terminology, when the illocutionary force of the utterance is reached on the basis of pragmatic information alone). This picture of the processes of illocutionary conversion seems more natural from a cognitive point of view, and should therefore be preferred to Dik's rigorous separation of the domains of grammar and pragmatics.

The lack of acknowledgement of such a continuum between the two aforementioned domains has further negative consequences for the cognitive adequacy of Dik's theory. To begin with, Dik's conception of what counts as linguistically codified has the undesirable consequence of limiting the number of illocutionary types that can be accounted for by the grammar to only eleven. Moreover, as argued in section one of this paper, the inventory of fully codified illocutions could even be cut down to eight (i.e. declarative, imperative, interrogative, exclamative, declarative > interrogative, declarative > request, interrogative > request, and interrogative > exclamation). However, as traditional theories of speech acts have shown since the early 1970s, we make use of a bigger number of illocutionary forces in our everyday interaction (e.g. suggestions, advices, warnings, promises, etc.). The positing of such a reduced number of grammaticalized illocutionary values certainly threatens the cognitive welfare of the FG model, by maximizing the inferential load on the processes of interpretation[16].The problem with the FG view does not lie in the fact that it has not been able to find all the possible types of grammatical conversion that

exist. A larger typological search would most probably not be able to reveal many more. The real misconception lies in the explicit assumption that all those illocutionary values which are not derived via grammatical conversion are the outcome of inferential processes aided by the necessary pragmatic information. In other words, the belief that what is not fully codified is entirely inferred. As is reasonable to expect from a cognitively adequate perspective, and as argued in detail in Ruiz de Mendoza (1994), there is an intermediate stage between codification and inference: conventionalization. Conventionalized illocutions are certainly not as economical, in terms of cognitive processing, as codified illocutions are. However, they are obviously much less costly than the interpretation of utterances based on sheer inference, and hence they should be taken into account in a theory with aspirations to cognitive validity. Going back to Dik's example number (1), *Could you open that door?*, it is now clear that this sentence form (i.e. Could + you + verb + object?) is a conventional instance of request which is preferably read as such except in extremely marked contexts like the one provided by Dik himself (e.g. *You claim that you are very strong. Well, could you open that door, for instance*?). The knowledge that constructions of this kind have an unmarked reading, which is the commonly used one, results in a significant degree of economy of processing. Speakers will make use of the unmarked interpretation (i.e. request) as the default one, and only on those occasions when such interpretation fails to fit in the sense of the ongoing conversation, will they find themselves in the need of inferring a correct alternative. Dik's proposal is just the opposite. Every single instance of the 'Could...' construction would have to be pragmatically converted into a request.

Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the processes of conventionalization could eventually lead to fully-fledged codifications, as is the case with sentences like (4) below[17]:

(3) Why don't you paint your house purple?
(4) Why not paint your house purple?

The interpretation of the sentence as a suggestion, which is only the preferred reading of sentence (3), has reached the status of codification in the case of (4) where it has become the only possible interpretation[18]. Now consider the following sentences:

(5) Can you open the door?
(6) Could you open the door?
(7) Could you open the door, please?

In (7) the request force has become part of the linguistic properties of the sentence via the use of the adverb 'please', which is an 'illocutionary converter' (i.e. a linguistic device which converts basic illocutions into derived illocutions, see Dik

1997: 246). That is not the case with (5) and (6) which could both have two different readings either as questions about ability or as requests. However, it is obvious on purely intuitive grounds that a request reading is more easily and automatically accessed in the case of number (6) than in the case of (5). The use of the past form of the modal 'can' has certain politeness connotations which almost automatically trigger a request interpretation of sentences like (6). Even though it is still possible to find some marked contexts in which the ability reading would be the appropriate one, the request interpretation is the one that comes to mind most effortlessly. Sentences like (6) have reached a degree of codification, as vehicles for the performance of requests, which seems to be half-way between the univocity of (7) and the less straightforward request interpretation of (5). Moreover, this process of conventionalization need not be static. In time, constructions of the 'could...?' type may end up as fully codified means for the expression of requests[19]. Let the above discussion suffice as evidence that the FG illocutionary component could be enriched with the addition of an intermediate level of conventionalization which would bridge the gap between the otherwise artificially insulated realms of grammar and pragmatics. I shall now deal with a rather more tangential issue which should serve to pave the way to a more natural treatment of illocutions by making it possible to account for those instances of conventional illocutionary values: the role of 'constructions' in the performance of illocutions.

Linguistic constructions could offer the perfect solution to the problem of accounting for that vast number of illocutions which are found along the coding-inference continuum, but which do not clearly belong to either domain. Once more, Ruiz de Mendoza's (1993, 1994) insights have anticipated this need. He never explicitly uses the term 'constructions', but his 'convention rules' are constructions in a way roughly similar to those postulated by Fillmore (1988) and Goldberg (1995)[20]. That is to say, they are pairings of forms (i.e. linguistic expressions) and functions (i.e. illocutionary values). According to Ruiz de Mendoza's (1993) proposal, the convention rule for a conventional request like *Can you open the window?* would be formulated in the following fashion:

> Convention Rule: *A polar question (INT) about one's ability to perform a certain action is to be preferably read as a request to perform such an action if the following conditions hold:*
> *[Condition 1]: the question takes the 'can + you + verb (inf without to) + (object)?'*
> *[Condition 2]: the second argument of the main predication tends to be specific rather than generic.*

Condition 2 accounts for the higher degree of conventionalization of a sentence like *Can you open the window?* in contrast to a similar sentence which contains a

generic second argument like in *Can you open a window?* In the latter case, the request reading is not so automatically activated as in the first example. It seems that a request reading is aided by the use of definite second arguments, which is only natural since it is necessary to delimit and define the entity or action that constitutes the speaker's wants or wishes in order for the addressee to carry out the requested action.

Though they also consist in pairings of form and function, Ruiz de Mendoza's (1993, 1994) rules of convention differ from Fillmorian constructions in an important respect, which explains why the construct of 'rule of convention' is better suited than that of 'construction' to account for conventionalized speech acts. Fillmore's and Goldberg's constructions constitute rigid pairings in the sense that a certain form is always uniquely associated with a certain function. On the contrary, rules of convention allow for a range of marked and unmarked interpretations, as shown above regarding the interpretation of a sentence like *Can you open the door*? This degree of ambiguity is not possible in Fillmore's constructions, which would fall in the realm of pure codification. However, it is useful for the purpose of formalizing those instances of conventional not yet fully codified illocutions.

As Ruiz de Mendoza (1993: 131) himself is careful to point out, it is arguable whether convention rules of this kind should be studied by the grammar. Like the phenomena that they describe, they seem to be half-way between pragmatics (inference) and the grammar (codification). In any case, the relevance of their formulation should not be underestimated, since they are one of the constructs which make possible the swift performance and retrieval of the vast number of illocutionary occurrences which do not fall within the domain of pure codification or of sheer inference (i.e.conventional illocutionary acts).

Together with convention rules, there is a certain kind of mental construct which also contributes to keep down the cognitive cost involved in the production and interpretation of linguistic messages, in general, and of speech acts, in particular. I am referring to those propositional cognitive models[21] whose formulation comprises and systematizes our knowledge about the relevant features and use conditions for each specific type of illocutionary act. In the FG account of the illocutionary layer no reference whatsoever is made to the role played by this or other cognitive models (e.g. metonymic, metaphoric, or image-schematic) in the performance of speech acts. In order to briefly illustrate the usefulness of propositional cognitive models in this task, consider the following oversimplified version of the propositional cognitive model of requests[22]:

Propositional Cognitive Model of Requests
(1) Requests involve a benefit to the speaker
(2) Requests are inherently polite

Now let us consider again the oft-quoted example of request: *Could you open the window?* At least two factors contribute to the straightforward relatively effortless understanding of this utterance as a request. The first of them is the existence of a rule

of convention such as the one formulated above, according to which sentences of this kind (i.e. *could you?* form plus specific second argument) are preferably used as requests. As pointed out above, the linguistic features captured by rules of convention function as cues for a default illocutionary reading of an utterance. The second factor has to do with the fact that the utterance of this sentence in the appropriate context (i.e. if for instance it is hot in the room) activates those pieces of shared knowledge which make up the ICM of requesting, therefore leading to the interpretation of the utterance as an instance of this particular speech act type. On the one hand, it is clear from the context that the carrying out of the requested action will result in a benefit to the speaker. On the other hand, the use of the modal in the past tense can be associated with an attempt by the speaker to increase the politeness of his act[23]. The formulation of the cognitive models and rules of convention of each kind of illocutionary act would help to explain the relative cognitive economy of conventional illocutions, thus representing a necessary step forward for a model which lists the achievement of cognitive validity among its basic methodological requirements.

Moreover, in order to comply with the postulates of cognitive models of categorization, the description of illocutionary cognitive models should be capable of accounting for both prototypical and peripheral cases of a given speech act. For this to be achieved, the variables used in such description need to be of a gradual nature. In this way, prototypical instances of a given illocutionary category would be characterized by their displaying all the defining variables to a maximum degree. Nevertheless, the model would still be able to explain less prototypical members as those which lack some of the features or which display them to a lesser extent[24]. Consider the following examples:

(8) *Could you mend my socks, please?* (benefit to the speaker + explicit politeness)
(9) *I need my socks mended* (benefit to the speaker + implicit politeness (indirection))
(10) *We'd better mend our socks* (benefit to speaker and hearer + implicit politeness (indirection)/no politeness).

Sentence (8) displays both features of our ICM of requesting at a maximum degree. The requested action involves a benefit to the speaker himself and the utterance is made polite by explicit linguistic means (i.e. use of past modal and of the adverb 'please'). Therefore, the utterance represents a prototypical instance of the directive category under consideration. Example (9) still displays the first of the features which are included in the ICM of requesting to a maximum degree (i.e. the benefit is clearly for the speaker), but it only displays the second of the variables (i.e. politeness) to a lesser degree (i.e. it is implied by the use of indirection instead of being explicitly conveyed by lexical or grammatical means). Therefore, sentence (9),

though still qualifying as a member of the category of requests, represents a more peripheral and less prototypical instance of this directive subtype. Finally, the utterance of (10) displays both features of the ICM of requesting but in an even less optimal way. As regards the cost-benefit variable, example (10) refers to a benefit both for the speaker and for the addressee. Thus, the first of the variables is not optimally satisfied. Besides, as was the case with (9) politeness is only implicit (i.e. it can be inferred from the indirect nature of the sentence but is not explicitly expressed via linguistic means). The fact that none of the variables which define our ICM of requesting is fully satisfied by sentence (10) explains why this is an extremely peripheral member of this category and the possibility of ascribing it to other illocutionary types like that of 'suggesting' in which case both speaker and addressee benefit from the performance of the specified action.

In connection to this, it should be noted that the lack of acknowledgement that illocutionary categories also show prototype effects is yet another gap of the FG account of illocutions when considered from a cognitive perspective. Not only no attempt is made to set up the basis for a prototypical description of speech act categories, but Dik's classification of the four basic illocutionary types (i.e. declarative, imperative, interrogative, and exclamative) clearly follows the tenets of the classical theory of categorization without considering the possible occurrence of peripheral or borderline cases of speech acts. As a matter of fact, those four basic illocutionary types do not represent clear-cut bounded categories. On the contrary, it is possible to observe borderline cases of speech acts which do not fully belong to any of those categories, but which are rather a mixture of two of them. Traditional accounts of illocutions, like Bach and Harnish's (1979), acknowledge the existence of boundary instances of this kind (e.g. 'assertive-directives' like 'advising', 'commisive-directives' like 'inviting', etc.) even though they are not yet seen as the product of categorization processes. Likewise, I believe that some of the illocutionary values which Dik presents as resulting from grammatical conversions (e.g. Imperative > Exclamative) could be better understood as mere borderline instances which blur the limits between those basic categories from which they draw their features.

4. CONCLUSION

In the preceding sections, the FG account of illocutions has been reviewed in relation to some basic notions of cognitive linguistics such as those of the prototypical nature of illocutionary categories, fuzziness and borderline cases of speech acts, the role played by cognitive models in both the conceptualization and performance of illocutions, and the relevance of the formulation of rules of convention (i.e. especial kind of constructions) for illocutionary production and understanding. The preceding discussion has given an overview of the major deficiencies of the FG treatment of

illocutions from a cognitive perspective. It can be concluded that, as regards its analysis of the illocutionary layer of language, FG does not live up to its own methodological requirement of attaining psychological adequacy. To begin with, no attention is paid to the findings of the prototype theory of categorization. On the contrary, the FG approach to illocutions is based on an objectivist view of categories which results in the positing of a strict clear-cut separation of the different linguistic components involved in the performance of speech acts. Grammar and pragmatics are seen as two exclusive options, so that those illocutions which are not fully codified need to be entirely inferred. The model does not take into account the high cognitive cost that this implies. Moreover, the FG covert ascription to the classical model of categorization has other negative consequences such as the overlooking of the prototypical nature of illocutionary categories. The four basic illocutionary types are presented as well-defined exclusive categories which do not allow for the existence of peripheral or borderline occurrences.

In spite of these shortcomings, there is enough evidence which suggests that the FG treatment of illocutions still contains the essential ingredients for a sound analysis of these phenomena. The positing of four basic universally codified illocutionary forces is supported by typological studies (Dik 1997: 238). Likewise, the idea that there exists a small number of fully codified illocutionary forces which can be accounted for in terms of conversion processes is consistent with the assumption that forms used recurrently to perform certain common functions end up achieving a codified status in the grammar of languages. However, in contrast to the FG analysis of illocutions, it is also reasonable to expect, for the sake of economy of cognitive processing, that not all those instances of illocutionary force which do not fall into the realm of pure codification are pragmatically inferred. In order to avoid the high cognitive cost that this would involve, it may be suggested that the FG illocutionary component should also take into consideration those instances of so-called conventionalized illocutions and attempt to formalize them in terms of both their corresponding propositional cognitive models and rules of convention as suggested in this paper.

NOTES

1. Financial support for this research has been given by the DGES, grant no. PB96-0520, Ministry of Education and Culture, Spain, and by the University of La Rioja, Research Department, grant no. API-97/B18.
2. The question of prototypicality and speech act categories has been treated with some detail in the works of authors like Verschueren (1985), Vanparys (1996), and Pérez (1997, 1998a, 1998b).
3. The realization that there are some instances of illocutionary acts which are somehow half way between two categories without fully qualifying as members of either led some traditional speech act theorists to posit new mixed categories like Bach and Harnish's (1979) 'assertive-directives' (e.g. advising, warning), 'expressive-directives' (e.g. excusing, forgiving), 'assertive-commisives' (e.g. surrendering, swearing), or 'commisive-directives' (e.g. offering, inviting). Within a cognitive

framework there would be no need for such an *ad hoc* formulation of new categories. Given that conceptual categories may display fuzzy boundaries, peripheral or intermediate cases of speech acts become predictable rather than problematic (see Vanparys 1996: 87).

4. According to Dik a sound model of language should take into account contemporary theories about the mind and should be able to explain the processes of production, interpretation, and acquisition of language (i.e. it should attain psychological adequacy). Nevertheless, as shall be shown in this paper, the FG treatment of the illocutionary component of language does not take into account recent findings on the nature of human cognition such as the prototype theory of categorization (Rosch 1977, 1978) or the works on cognitive models (Lakoff 1987; Johnson 1987).
5. This presentation of the FG treatment of illocutions is mainly based on TFG2. References to TFG1 will be explicitly indicated. Previous proposals on the illocutionary component within the FG framework include Moutaouakil's (1986), Hengeveld's (1988, 1989), Dik *et al.* (1990), and Risselada's (1990).
6. Moutaouakil (1986) argues for the possibility that both the literal and the contextually inferred illocutionary forces of an utterance should be captured by predication operators. However, this solution does not seem to be entirely in keeping with the principles of FG. Within this framework, operators capture the grammatical means through which a derived illocutionary value arises from a basic illocution. Contextually inferred illocutions are not represented at the clause level by the expression rules, therefore, they cannot be represented in the underlying structure by operators.
7. Though not from a cognitive perspective, Risselada (1990: 1) also points to the difficulty of determining "to what extent illocutionary force can be considered as actually coded in linguistic expression and at which point a pragmatic analysis should take over the job". Risselada's insight is simply acknowledging the fuzzy nature of the boundaries which separate the realms of codification and inference.
8. Dik's belief that there exist three universal sentence types (i.e. declarative, interrogative, and imperative) is widely shared within Linguistics (see Levinson 1983; Sadock and Zwicky 1985). Sadock and Zwicky (1985) point to the existence of some other minor sentence types like "suggestions" (e.g. *Why not paint your hourse purple*?). On the contrary, since constructions of this kind also share a number of properties with average interrogative sentence types, Dik (1997: 249) opts for an explanation in terms of interrogative sentences "converted" into suggestions, rather than in terms of *ad hoc* minor sentence types.
9. The basic illocutionary types have been redefined in TFG2. It should be noticed that, as opposed to the definitions given in TFG1, in the 1997 version the speaker no longer 'instructs' but 'wishes' the addressee to do something. This seems to be a very appropriate modification since the verb 'instruct' was inevitably endowed with some directive connotations that were not desirable in the case of Declarative, Interrogative, and Exclamative illocutionary types.
10. Italics indicate the 'illocutionary converters' (i.e. linguistic devices) which effect the grammatical conversion from one of the basic illocutionary types to a derived illocutionary value.
11. While in the case of illocutionary conversions the result is always a different 'derived' illocutionary value, in the case of modifications, the illocutionary act remains the same, though its force is somehow modified (e.g. weakened, strenghtened, etc.). Dik (1997: 237) rightly acknowledges the fact that the borderline between the phenomena of illocutionary conversion and modification is not always easy to determine. On the issue of the distinction between illocutionary modification and conversion, see Hengeveld (1988) and Risselada (1990).
12. After this discussion, a counter example from Dutch is included which is intended to prove that at least in this language this type of grammatical conversion exists. The reality of this type of conversion, in my opinion, would need to be confirmed with further typological evidence.
13. Other functional models like Givon's (1984, 1990, 1995) Functional-Typological Grammar explicitly recognize the existence of a continuum between the domains of cognition and language, and between the different subdomains of language (i.e. lexicon, syntax, pragmatics). For a review of the cognitive adequacy of Givon's model, see Martín Arista (1997). As could be expected, the gradual nature of both

cognitive and linguistic categories and notions is straightforwardly acknowledged in the case of cognitive grammars like Langacker's (1991).

14. A vast amount of research carried out by experimental psychologists and anthropologist since the 1960s supports these facts, which are nowadays widely accepted. See Berlin and Kay (1969), Labov (1973), and Rosch (1977, 1978). For a comprehensive critical review on the experiments leading to the formulation of Prototype Theory, see also Ungerer and Schmid (1996).
15. The adjective 'objectivist' was coined by cognitive linguists like Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) in order to refer to the philosophical paradigm which stems from Aristotle and which follows the classical theory of categorization in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. One of the fallouts of this way of conceptualizing reality is that entities are forced into strictly fixed categories which have clear-cut boundaries and which allow no peripheral or intermediate types of membership. Thus, inclusion in a category boils down to a matter of all or nothing.
16. And, as pointed out in the previous section, contradicting Dik's own belief that the production and interpretation of illocutions based on pragmatic, as opposed to grammatical or lexical means, is more costly and difficult (1997: 231).
17. These recurring examples were originally put forward by Gordon and Lakoff (1975), and later on considered by different authors like Searle (1975), Levinson (1983), and recently Dik (1997) himself.
18. As pointed out in Goldberg (1995: 22), sentences like (4) represent 'constructions' in the Fillmorian sense (Fillmore, 1988), since their meaning is not strictly predictable from the component parts of the sentence or from other constructions existing in the grammar. It is essential to note that the use of the negative adverb (i.e. 'not') is necessary for this type of interrogative sentence to have a 'suggestion' reading. The absence of the negative adverb (i.e. *Why paint your house purple?*) results in a different construction which conveys a certain degree of disagreement or dislike on the part of the speaker towards the hearer's actions (cf. *Why do you paint your house purple?* or *Why are you going to paint your house purple*?, both of which are just average questions aimed at obtaining some information (i.e. the reasons why the hearer is going to paint his house purple as opposed to any other colour), but which do not necessarily imply any criticism of the hearer's choice.
19. The existence of grammaticalization processes (i.e. the gradual emergence of automatic processing) is overtly acknowledged by other functional models like Givon's (1989: 256).
20. There are several important respects in which Ruiz de Mendoza's (1993, 1994) 'rules of conventions' and Fillmore's (1988) or Goldberg's (1995) 'constructions' differ, which shall be dealt with below.
21. As defined by Lakoff (1987: 68), Propositional Idealized Cognitive Models (or propositional ICMs) are organizing structures of knowledge. Lakoff's concept of propositional cognitive models has developed within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics following Fillmore's (1982) 'frames', which in turn, are similar in many ways to Rumelhart's (1975) 'schemas', Minsky's (1975) 'frames with defaults', and Schank and Abelson's (1977) 'scripts'. However, we agree with Ungerer (1996: 211) that Lakoff's propositional ICMs are of a more general nature than Fillmore's 'frames' in the sense that the latter are just one of all the possible types of propositional cognitive models: scenarios, scripts, frames, radial categories, taxonomies, etc. (Lakoff 1987: 284). Furthermore, Lakoff's propositional ICMs are embedded in a more comprehensive theory of conceptual structure, where three more kinds of structuring principles of knowledge are recognized (metaphors, metonymies, and image-schemas). Thus, in Lakoff's model, the ICM of a given concept can include the four kinds of structure or only some of them.
22. For the sake of brevity we are offering an oversimplified version of what would constitute an ICM of requesting. A more complete formulation of such an ICM would include features like the amount of cost or benefit involved for the participants, the degree of optionality that the speech act grants to the addressee, the degree of indirectness of the illocutionary act, the ratings of the participants as regards variables like social power or social distance, the formality of the context, etc. These features are among the most relevant ones in the description of directive illocutions. Studies on speech acts such as Leech's (1983) or Verschueren's (1985) support these claims. However, it should be borne in mind that propositional cognitive models are characterized by their non-exhaustiveness. A concept can be

described in relation to an infinite number of contexts, hence the open-ended nature of its corresponding propositional ICM. For a further discussion on this issue, see Ungerer and Schmid (1996). For a more detailed and comprehensive formulation of the ICM of Requesting, see Pérez (1997).

23. An interesting explanation, in terms of cognitive metaphors, of why the use of modals in the past tense implies politeness can be found in Taylor (1989: 152-153). Two conceptual metaphors underlie the use of past modals as politeness devices. First, there is the metaphor which construes the 'time' domain in terms of space (e.g. 'distant past', 'near future'). Second, there is the metaphor which enables our understanding of social involvement as space (e.g. 'close relatives', 'distant friends'). Through the working of these metaphors, Taylor (1989: 153) concludes, the use of the past modals can be understood as an attempt by the speaker to distance himself from the speech act that he is performing, which explains the greater tactfulness of past modals.
24. An attempt to formulate the propositional cognitive models of several directive speech acts has been made by Pérez (1997, 1998a, 1998b). See also Pérez (1996) for a first approach to the role of other cognitive models (image-schemas, metaphors, metonymies) in the performance of directive illocutions.

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