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## Kitcher's *Deaths*

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It is always an occasion for celebration when a philosopher writes a wonderful book. It also is always an occasion for celebration when a philosopher comes to understand something truly important – particularly when it happens to be something fundamental about philosophy. Philip Kitcher's *Deaths in Venice* is such an occasion, on both counts. There are many things about the book that I greatly admire, not the least of which is Kitcher's astonishing intimacy with the works of literature, opera and film that he discusses, and the fertility of his mind as he relates fine points about them to each other. I cannot imagine what it would be like to have that sort of mind, and to be able to write such a book – even though I have had ample opportunity to observe him in action at close range, during the several years of our writing a book on Wagner's *Ring* operas together. I also would not know how to begin to comment on the many fascinating points of interpretation of these works and their creators to which he treats us here.

I shall, however, venture to say some things about what Kitcher does in the book – that is, both discusses and displays in it – that prompts me to want to celebrate it in the second respect. Those of us in philosophy whose primary association is with what I prefer to call the “interpretive” tradition after Kant have long lamented that our cousins in the mainstream of the “analytic” tradition seem so oblivious to or dismissive of our contention that there is or should be more to philosophy – to what doing philosophy can be and be about – than what they take it (prescriptively and proscriptively) to consist in. Kitcher long seemed to be content to dwell philosophically in the bosom of that other branch of the family, with occasional holidays to do other kinds of things such as our *Ring* book, in which we engage in what he here calls “philosophical criticism” of that Wagnerian masterpiece.

But no longer. He now has become convinced of the need to expand the conception of philosophy that has prevailed for some time in that branch, to include not only such reflections upon operatic, literary and other such artistic works that warrant and reward that sort of attention, but also *those works themselves*. An important part of what he seeks to do in *Deaths* is to share his enlightenment with the many in that mainstream who remain in need of it. The expansion he proposes here seems to me to be not only a very significant one, but one that takes him quite far in the “interpretive” branch’s direction. Indeed, he may well seem to his own long-time philosophical kin to have broken with them, going so far as to proclaim that “the oldest and deepest question of philosophy” is: “How to live” – which he glosses as “what would make a life worthwhile” – and that “the two post-Enlightenment philosophers who did the most to restore the centrality of [this] issue were [...] Schopenhauer and Nietzsche” (17)<sup>11</sup>

And there’s more to his sea-change: like his new kindred spirits in the interpretive tradition (Schopenhauer and Nietzsche among them), he now distances himself from satisfaction with and restriction to “the vision of philosophy as exemplified in the precise specification of theses and the defense of theses by argument” (13), and from the idea that “philosophy is done [exclusively] by *saying*” or articulating and asserting such theses and arguments (12). The name of the game, as Kitcher now understands it, where the consideration of the most important “questions of philosophy” is concerned, is *making up one’s “philosophical mind”* about matters relating to them, and achieving “changes of philosophical mind” about them in oneself and others, by “doing philosophy” at least partly and significantly in a different sort of way. He calls what he has in mind (and is both championing and exemplifying in the book) “the idea of [doing] philosophy by *showing*” (12).

That idea is what underlies and motivates Kitcher’s contention that writers like Thomas Mann and James Joyce, and composers like Wagner and Britten, and filmmakers like Visconti, are at least at times engaged in “philosophical explorations in their own right,” not (or not chiefly) in reflective commentary on or separately from their artistic works but in those very works themselves. So, for example (and most saliently here), Kitcher considers Mann to be a philosophical writer of importance – and not only because he read and esteemed Schopenhauer and Nietzsche: “Mann,” he writes, “merits our attention as a contributor to the philosophical discussions in which his sources were engaged” (10, his emphasis). How so? By paradigmatically exemplifying what Kitcher deems the highest “grade of

philosophical involvement” that such “works may manifest”: “using a fictional work for the exploration of philosophical questions” (11). And that “exploration” takes the form not of “saying” and straightforward “argument” but rather of what Kitcher calls “showing” – “this philosophical method, the method of showing” (17).

Such “showing” is philosophical, for Kitcher, because it involves “the stimulation of the imagination” – in these instances through literature and music – in the service of “generating a new perspective on what has hitherto been taken for granted” (17), and so of contributing to the process of making up or changing our “philosophical minds” (as well as our sensibilities more generally) about things relating to “how to live.” For, Kitcher contends, “to understand how to live, one must become vividly aware of what it would be like to live in different ways”; and “literature and music play a role, arguably a necessary role, here (19)” – a bit of an overstatement, perhaps, but with a point: it is not by argument alone that *mattering* comes to be and can be understood. In sum, he writes:

Wagner and Joyce do not argue. They do not even present precisely articulated theses about the worth and value of human lives. Nevertheless, they do philosophy, *real* philosophy [...]. The philosophy lies in the showing. Instead of a rigorously connected sequence of clear and precise declarative sentences, we are offered a rich delineation of possibilities – accompanied by a tacit injunction: Consider this (23).

Kitcher’s newly enlightened picture has two further features that are deserving of comment. Let us call such “showers” (show-ers) who do this in various (literary, musical, theatrical, cinematic) media “artist-philosophers,” and what they do “art-philosophy.” Is that what Kitcher takes his new heroes Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to be and do? Well, no (even though Nietzsche undertook to be one at times, most notably in *Zarathustra*), because they are writers of a different sort, who while attentive to such works were themselves engaged more straightforwardly in “philosophical discussions” relating to “how to live.” But – in part for this reason – Schopenhauer and Nietzsche also were by no means exemplars of the kind of (one might say “argumentational”) philosophy and philosophers Kitcher here weighs and finds wanting. They instead were somewhere in between: both do a good bit of “saying” and *case-making* pro and con (their kind of argument), but of a rather different sort. Much of their “saying” is guided by and geared to interpretive and evalu-

ative interests and convictions that have something like the perspective-developing (and communicating) character of Kitcher's "showing." That sort of thinking and writing is characteristic of the *contest of interpretations and valuations* that has been the stock in trade of the post-Kantian interpretive tradition. Small wonder, therefore, that the likes of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche have attracted the serious attention of the likes of Mann, Wagner (in the case of the former) and Mahler (in the case of the latter) – and that, conversely, that Wagner attracted the serious attention of Nietzsche. (This is a point to which I will return.)

My second comment relates to the question of the relation of the efforts of philosophers like Kitcher (and me, and Bernard Williams) when they engage in what he calls the "philosophical criticism" or reflective analysis of works of artist-philosophers like Mann and Wagner, to the sort of (artwork-embodied) philosophy Kitcher says *they* "really do." We philosophical artwork critics are not ourselves artist-philosophers; but some of the latter (Wagner among them) have had no little to do with drawing mainstream philosophers like Williams (and now Kitcher) both *to engage* in such "philosophical criticism" and also *in the direction* of the kind of philosophical *thinking* that the interpretive tradition has featured during the past two centuries. Kitcher has an answer to the question of the relation of these activities to each other, and it is this:

The task of the philosopher-critic is to highlight the contours of the author's [or composer's, etc.] efforts. [...] The aim is to render more apparent what has been shown. [...] Taking the philosophical import of the arts seriously constructs a space in which something more conventionally identifiable as philosophy may operate. On the one hand lie the abstract treatments of philosophy [... such as] the challenge posed by Schopenhauer. On the other is the rich variety of [...] artistic sources. Philosophical criticism consists in bringing them into relation with one another, of showing how the elaborated presentations of a novel or an opera bear on the problems and schematic answers of philosophical treatises [...], in a way that will prepare for recognition of what is presented as a potential way to embody value and thus to serve as a basis for judgment, for endorsement or rejection (25).

This seems sensible enough – but upon reflection, it also seems to call into question just how seriously Kitcher's contention that artist-philosophers "do philosophy, real philosophy" is to be taken. Or perhaps it raises the question of what he takes that to mean. Kitcher sounds

here as though he regards “abstract treatments” of issues of the sort that one finds in Schopenhauer or Aristotle to be the philosophical “real thing,” or at any rate paradigmatic of “doing” it. And coming up with such “abstract treatments” and arguments is doing something quite different from creating works of literature or opera with “philosophical import” that may require the efforts of philosopher-critics to be seen to “bear on the problems and schematic answers of philosophical treatises.” These activities would seem to be too different to be deemed different forms of the same thing.

My guess is that Kitcher’s real position is that all three activities are (as he puts it early on, in a passage already cited) real “contributors to the philosophical discussions in which [philosopher-] sources were engaged” (10), *but* with philosopher-source-types being foremost among them (philosophically speaking), artist-sources included. I am not sure that I would agree – or that this is what Kitcher should really want to say. For one thing, there are many towering figures in the history of literature and theatre (from the Greek tragedians to Shakespeare and Cervantes to Goethe and Dostoevsky) who contributed much to what those of us who teach it call “philosophy in literature,” but who had no philosopher-sources comparable to Mann’s who were engaged in “philosophical discussions” to which their works may be said to have been “contributions.” *They* can be read for the contributions their works can make to philosophical discussions; but even when such discussions have been ongoing, they rarely can be supposed to have been on the minds of the works’ creators (as they were in the unusual cases of Wagner and Mann).

Moreover, the picture seems too simple. Nietzsche was indeed a philosophical “source” for Mann and many others; but he had his own “sources” to whom and whose issues he was responding – both philosophical (Plato, Schopenhauer) and artistic (Wagner, of course, but also Bizet and others), and religious as well (*Zarathustra* and Paul among them). And Nietzsche was himself Kitcher’s second type (artist-philosopher, in *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, a “philosophy in literature” favorite) – *and* also his third type too (critic-philosopher, in *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Case of Wagner*). Kitcher’s third and highest “grade of philosophical involvement” that literature can exhibit “using a fictional work for the exploration of philosophical questions” (11) – is a description that fits *Zarathustra* very nicely (along with a good bit of Kierkegaard, not to mention the literary output of Sartre, Camus and Beauvoir).

There actually is more than this about Nietzsche that seems to me to cause problems for Kitcher’s picture. Schopenhauer, as the author of

the formidable tome *The World as Will and Representation*, may pose his “challenge” on the “making life worthwhile” issue in the mode of “doing philosophy” that Kitcher has in mind in speaking of “the abstract treatments of philosophy” and “the problems and schematic answers of philosophical treatises” (even though he also does so in his many lively essays, most of which are not exactly abstract and schematic treatises). But Nietzsche is a paradigm instance of a philosopher who does *nothing of the kind* – even though he does extensively employ other sorts of “case-making” strategies. There is not an “abstract treatise” to be found among his works. Both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche engage in multiple modes of writing – some more expository and argumentative than rhetorical and expressive, others tilting the other way – in the course of their attempts to pursue and convey their thinking and make it convincing. Kitcher is quite right to “take the supposed barrier between literature and philosophy to be highly permeable” (13). But it might be best to put the point by saying that works of each can serve as “sources” for the other, and that each can serve as contributions of various sorts to discussions and grappling with similar problems and questions that have been going on for quite some time in different ways and styles in human history – such as “how to live,” and “what would make a life worthwhile.”

That theme of Kitcher’s discussion also warrants comment. “How to live” may indeed be “the oldest and deepest question of philosophy”; but it is fundamentally a *human* question that *thinkers* of various sorts have been wrestling with for a very long time. It is a question “of philosophy” only in the sense and to the extent that it is one of the kinds of questions that were latched onto by a number of Greek thinkers (before and including and after Socrates) who got the activity that came to be known as philosophy going – an activity that, in various forms, and has continued (off and on to) be of interest to some (but by no means all) of those who have associated themselves with the tradition that developed out of what they started. But it belongs to literature and religion and arts that lend themselves to thoughtful expression too; and it is probably true to say that humanity and those who think and communicate about such things in any of these modes owe much to those who have done so in all of them. Such questions and issues are inherently “philosophical” only if that is made true by definition, and “philosophy” is defined as something like the love and pursuit of wisdom with respect to such matters (at least at a minimum and perhaps among other things).

Kitcher does not go that far. But he does want to insist (along with his new-found comrades-in-arms in the interpretive tradition) that such

questions and issues are very definitely *legitimately* to be conceived as “philosophical” – and further, that a conception of philosophy that excludes or marginalizes them is a stunted and impoverished one that leaves much to be desired. Indeed, he goes farther, commending the accordance of “*centrality*” in philosophy to concern with them (17). And farther still: he seems to be contending that *contribution to the comprehension and assessment* of human reality and possibility in the pursuit of such wisdom, by way of the kinds of “showing” of which literature and music are capable and provide examples, is enough to render works of literature and music “philosophy, real philosophy,” and “philosophical explorations in their own right” – presumably regardless of whether the author or composer had any such explicit intention.

Perhaps Kitcher’s basic point here is that it would be good for it to be agreed that the thoughtful consideration and treatment of issues relating to the kinds of Big Questions he has in mind can (for good historical reasons) be called “philosophical,” and that there are many different *ways of doing* this sort of thing, which may be helpful and fruitful in their very variety – among which are the ways exemplified by the writings not only of both Plato and Aristotle, but also of Sophocles and Euripides, and Dante and Augustine, and Shakespeare and Cervantes, and Goethe and Melville, and Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, and Hegel and Kierkegaard, and Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and Mann and Malraux, and by the compositions and creations of such figures as Bach and Beethoven, and Mozart and Verdi, and Wagner and Richard Strauss – and Van Gogh and Picasso too, for that matter. All help us to “become vividly aware of what it would be like to live in different ways” (19), and “generate new perspectives on what has hitherto been taken for granted” (17) and “potential ways to embody value” (25), and contribute to the “rich delineation of possibilities – accompanied by a tacit injunction: Consider this.” (23)

All do so through various sorts of what Kitcher means by “showing.” In the cases of music, opera, theatre and film – in all of which uses of sound play an important role – further ways of developing and exploring possibilities and values and meanings are deployed. Looked at with philosophical eyes, all of this can be seen as grist for the philosopher’s mill, contributing to philosophical ends – making sense of things, comprehending things, assessing things, making up one’s mind on matters of meaning and mattering, and the like. And philosophers would be foolish to fail – or even (on some sort of misguided principle) to *refuse* – to avail themselves of it if they care about such things. It is all philosophically relevant. But it may be overstating that point to say that it is all philosophy, *full*

*stop.* It also may be overstating a related point to say that “literature and music play a role, arguably a necessary role, here” (19) – particularly if the implication is that this is a game they (and related other art forms) *alone* can play.

I trust that it is clear that I am very sympathetic to what Kitcher is doing and trying to do in *Deaths* with respect to the conception and doing of philosophy. I now want to make a few comments that I intend not as criticisms but rather as something like proposed “friendly amendments” to his picture. I believe that Kitcher fundamentally is attempting to do two things on this score. To recapitulate them: one is to join in the campaign he associates with Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in particular to “restore the centrality of the issue” of “how to live” and “what would make a life worthwhile” to philosophy. The other is to promote “the idea of *philosophy by showing*” in conjunction with this campaign, as better suited to dealing with this “issue” than the contrasting “vision of philosophy as exemplified in the precise specification of theses and the defense of theses by argument.” In both sorts of philosophy the name of the game is to achieve “changes of philosophical mind,” presumably in the direction of enhancing the soundness of one’s thinking; but Kitcher’s point is that the “showing” sort lends itself better than the “saying” sort to that sort of enhancement in matters relating to the “how to live” and “make live worthwhile” issues. That strikes me as being quite right.

One thing that strikes me as not quite right is the seeming narrowness of the agenda of Kitcher’s newly envisioned and oriented sort of philosophy. Even if these issues belong at philosophy’s “center,” there are a great many others with which they connect and to which they lead that likewise benefit from being approached and dealt with in ways akin to his “showing” model (of which more in a moment). I hinted at the kind of agenda-broadening I have in mind above, when I used the phrase “human reality and possibility.” Their “philosophical exploration” goes hand in hand with Kitcher’s “how to live” issue, is essential to its intelligent pursuit, and so (for this reason) is just as “old,” “deep” and “central” in philosophy’s history. (Remember: “Know thyself!”) That associated exploration leads in many directions – for example, to questions relating to “quality of life” issues, to the reconsideration of matters relating to value, ethicality and normativity, both in general and; and to the rethinking of the world of human experience and activity in all of its richness and complexity (interpersonal, social and cultural). And the same is true of that further related question: What’s it all about? That is: What is the larger scheme of things (if any) and our place in it? These questions all have long been cen-

tral to philosophy, and deserve to be – even if the answers we come up with turn out to be disappointing.

These questions underlie a considerable part of the agenda of philosophy in the interpretive tradition after Kant, which has at once “restored the centrality” of Kitcher’s “oldest and deepest question” and its companion questions to its agenda, and has expanded that agenda far beyond that of Hume and Kant, and of philosophy in the subsequent analytic tradition. (It is precisely for that reason that zealots of that tradition have often been contemptuous of the interpretive tradition; for that has been their attitude with respect to these very kinds of Big Questions and to attempts to pursue them – and so to anything akin to them.) It is wise to enlist the help of creators of perspective-generating and possibility-delineating artistic works – such as those who excel at becoming (and helping others to become) “vividly aware of what it would be like to live in different ways” – in the pursuit of the interpretive tradition’s extensive agenda to which Kitcher’s foray opens the way. That sort of “showing” may well be among the best of strategies philosophically as well as artistically. But the specific (“how to live issue”) issue he has in mind, important and central as it is, stands to all that warrants and needs such philosophical attention as tip to iceberg.

I do have some reservations about the adequacy and aptness of the term “showing” to Kitcher’s aim of capturing and conveying the expanded conception of philosophy he has in mind, in contrast to the “theses and arguments” conception of it. “Showing” is fundamentally a *visual* concept (or, by extension, depicting or describing sufficiently for visualization), and secondarily a demonstration concept (akin to “prove” and “establish”). It is clearly the former sort of thing that Kitcher has in mind, with things like novels and operas as prime examples, in which visually experiencing and envisioning are centrally involved. But opera brings music into play in an essential way, and sometimes takes one beyond all words and seeing (as Kitcher rightly points out, with some of the most powerful moments in Wagner’s *Ring* operas as cases in point) – as much of the rest of music does entirely. There may be no better single word available than “showing” for this sort of “doing” with philosophical import; but it could do with more discussion than Kitcher gives it. I take him to mean it to be understood as differing from “saying” in that “showing” involves *conveying* certain meanings, possibilities, sensibilities, and ways of mattering for our apprehension and consideration in non-assertoric ways, generally involving but not restricted to uses of language,

and presented in a manner intended to make an impression. But this all needs elaboration and refinement.

I have a similar sort of reservation with respect to Kitcher's use of the term "saying" to refer to that other way of doing philosophy that restricts itself to proceeding by way of thesis-articulation and argumentation pro and con. That is indeed a kind of "saying" activity in which philosophers engage; but it is by no means the only one in the history of philosophy, as a moment's reflection will suffice to remind one. And a great deal of what philosophers in the interpretive tradition have been doing during the past several centuries features thinking that proceeds by way of *other sorts* of "saying" better suited to their chosen philosophical tasks and issues. The word I prefer to use to refer to this tradition – "interpretive" – serves nicely to indicate their general character; although it needs to be understood to subsume associated modes of critique and assessment. The contest of interpretations and reinterpretations, and of valuations and revaluations, involves a great deal of "saying" and of contention of various sorts. It is philosophical activity that aspires to comprehension, and also to making a difference in human life. It thus could be said to be Kitcher's "central issue" *in action*, but pursued in ways that are more flexible than the kind of philosophy he finds wanting, and yet also more reflective, assertoric, and concerned with *sense-making* and *case-making* than his artistic alternative or supplement to it. It is exemplified by much of what we find Schopenhauer and Nietzsche doing – and by many others in that tradition, from Hegel and Marx to Kierkegaard and Mill to Foucault and Habermas (and, for that matter, at least some of the time, to Bernard Williams and Charles Taylor).

This now brings me to my final and most important point. Kitcher seems reluctant to acknowledge that there is anything between or other than the two ways of doing philosophy he identifies (argument-philosophy and art-philosophy), except the kind of "philosophical criticism" that mediates between them by articulating the philosophical import of the one to make it comprehensible to the other. Yet he also seems to be wanting at least to make room for a kind of philosophical thinking and writing that would be something like their collective *Aufhebung*, going beyond the limitations of all of them, while retaining something of each. That presumably is a part of the point of his singling out Schopenhauer and Nietzsche as philosophers of particular importance precisely because they are none of the above. Like his artist-philosophers, but in the mode of their own ways of "saying," they thought and wrote in a manner that poses challenges, "criticizes concepts and idioms," and "generates new

perspectives” in ways enabling them to expand and alter horizons and ways of thinking and esteeming.

Philosophers in the interpretive tradition generally have tended to proceed in this alternate mode – which is significantly akin to what Kitcher calls “philosophy by showing.” In their thinking and writing, what he says of the likes of Wagner and Joyce applies to them: we are offered a “rich delineation of possibilities” – possibilities not just of “what it would be like to live in different ways,” but of what it would be like *to construe* various aspects of life and the world in different ways, and of what there is to be said for (and against) doing so, in language with all of the persuasive richness these thinkers can muster. That is what is going on in (and between) Schopenhauer and Nietzsche – and Hegel and Marx and Kierkegaard and Mill and Heidegger and Sartre and the rest. So Nietzsche writes (and goes on to elaborate), in one of his most famous notebook entries: “And do you know what ‘the world’ is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror?” [Nietzsche Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, VII 38:12; my translation.] And his companion project of a “revaluation of values” – one that is radically at odds with Schopenhauer’s take on value and values – is another case in point.

Not all of the philosophers in this tradition offer “world-interpretations” and value-reconsiderations of this comprehensiveness; but the understanding of human reality and possibility, both in general and in various of their aspects, are very commonly at issue – just as in the case of many of the artist-philosophers Kitcher discusses. Both intend their portrayals to be understood as accompanied by what he nicely calls the “tacit injunction: Consider this.” The “injunction” actually is seldom “tacit” (23) in the cases of the interpretive philosophers; but it is not exactly subtle in the case of Wagner either. And the fact that these philosophers and Kitcher’s artist-counterparts to them are much more commonly “sources” for each other than is the case with other philosophers is no mystery; for they are in this respect kindred spirits, notwithstanding the differences in their modes of expression.

Kitcher pretty clearly wants more for philosophy and from philosophy than more of the “assertion and argument” kind of “saying” plus a round of applause for the art-philosophical “show-ers.” Or at any rate he should; because if doing the sort of “exploring” and “delineating” and “showing” that the latter do in their artistic venues not only is *needed by* philosophy but also *counts as* philosophy “in its own right” (10), the same has to apply to the efforts of their interpretive-tradition allies. Both, by Kitcher’s own lights, must be recognized to be practicing real and valua-

ble ways of doing philosophy, that are all the more important because they venture to go where their more staid mainstream philosophical colleagues neither want to go nor are able to go – unless, like Kitcher, they come to realize that doing so is a good thing to do, and join with him in expanding their sensibilities and capabilities, in the directions in which we find him moving in this book.

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> I use numerals in parentheses to refer to the page numbers in Philip Kitcher's *Deaths in Venice. The Cases of Gustav von Aschenbach*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2013.

#### RESUMEN

El libro de Philip Kitcher, *Muertes en Venecia*, aborda de manera significativa, no solo las obras que discute, sino que también expande la concepción de la filosofía que propone y que, en el resto del libro exemplifica y utiliza. Mi ensayo se concentra en este punto y aplaudo la expansión que propone. Sugiero también que tal expansión, en el estado en que está, empuja su concepción en la dirección de la idea de la filosofía como fundamentalmente una especie de pensar interpretativo, que se desarrolló en la tradición interpretativa postkantiana, y que, mientras que Kitcher sólo hace referencia significativa en esa tradición a Schopenhauer y Nietzsche, la hace de una manera que invita a proponer una reforma de su explicación que se vería suplementada con la adición de la idea de la filosofía como un “mostrar” [artísticamente modelado] a la corriente mayoritaria que defiende una idea de la filosofía como un “decir” [modelado por la argumentación], con el añadido posterior de la idea de la filosofía como “interpretación” [modelada por el uso de posibilidades].

PALABRAS CLAVE: *interpretación/interpretar; Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Wagner, Ópera*.

## ABSTRACT

Kitcher's *Deaths in Venice* importantly addresses not only the works he discusses but also the expanded conception of philosophy that he proposes, which he proceeds in the rest of it to exemplify and draw upon. That is the focus of my essay. I applaud the expansion he proposes. I also suggest that the proposed expansion, as it stands, draws his conception in the direction of the idea of philosophy as kinds of fundamentally interpretive thinking that developed in the post-Kantian interpretive tradition; and that, while Kitcher only makes significant reference to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in that tradition, he does so in a way that invites an amendment of his account that would supplement his addition of the idea of philosophy as [artistically modeled] "showing" to the mainstream idea of philosophy as [argument modeled] "saying" with the further addition of the idea of philosophy as [case-making modeled] "interpreting."

KEYWORDS: *Interpretation/Interpreting; Nietzsche; Schopenhauer; Wagner; Opera.*