

A Pragmaticist Feels the Tug of Semantics: Recanati's "Open Quotation Revisited"

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RESUMEN

En esta contribución, ofrezco una discusión crítica del capítulo 8 de *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*, una versión mínimamente modificada del segundo artículo clásico de Recanati sobre la cita "Open Quotation Revisited" (2008). Argumento que algunas concesiones que Recanati parece dispuesto a hacer a los defensores de las explicaciones semánticas de la cita, no deberían hacerse. Aunque las teorías semánticas son más explícitas que las pragmáticas, la cobertura empírica de las últimas es superior, debido esencialmente a la naturaleza no lingüística, figurativa, de la cita.

PALABRAS CLAVE: cita, comunicación figurativa, demostración, semántica vs. pragmática, cancelabilidad, teorías bidimensionales, cambios de contexto.

ABSTRACT

In this contribution, I offer a critical discussion of chapter 8 of *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*, a minimally modified version of François Recanati's second classic paper on quotation, "Open Quotation Revisited" (2008). I argue that some concessions that Recanati seems ready to make to proponents of semantic accounts of quotation should not be made. Although semantic theories are more explicit than pragmatic ones, the latter's empirical coverage is superior, due to the essentially non-linguistic, pictorial, nature of quotation.

KEYWORDS: Quotation, Pictorial Communication, Demonstration, Semantics vs. Pragmatics, Cancellability, Two-Dimensional Theories, Context-Shifts.

As Recanati explains at the end of chapter 7 of *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics*, "Open Quotation Revisited" was originally written with a view to doing mainly two things: (i) respond to papers on open quotation published after 2001, notably in the collection I edited as volume 17 of the *Belgian Journal of Linguistics* [De Brabanter (2005a)], and (ii) re-examine the more complex account of context-shifts that he had provided in *Oratio Obliqua, Oratio Recta*. As Recanati himself acknowledges, chapter 8 has a more semantic flavour than the nearly unconditionally pragmatic chapter 7. Towards

the end of this paper, I will devote two sections to explaining why I think concessions to the semanticist are better avoided.

I will begin by reviewing the three main topics of chapter 8, though in a different order. First, I discuss Recanati's treatment of the widely debated question of the cancellability of utterance ascription to the reportee in Mixed Quotation (*MQ*). Second, I devote some time to an assessment of Recanati's response to the strong objections that Bart Geurts & Emar Maier (2005) voiced against 'two-dimensional' theories of hybrid quotation (among which they included Recanati's). Third, I comment on Recanati's reappraisal of his own account of context-shifts.

I. CANCELLABILITY AND AMBIGUITY

Several authors hold that it is part of the semantic contribution of MQ that the quoted string is ascribed to the reportee (the referent of the subject of the reporting verb). This view is expressed notably by Benbaji (2005), Cappelen & Lepore (1997), (2005), McCullagh (2007). (I shall focus on Cappelen & Lepore, as their analysis has been by far the most influential.) These authors take this 'utterance ascription to the reportee' to be an entailment of MQ. This may seem surprising, since there are apparently quite straightforward counterexamples to this claim. It appears easy to cancel the putative entailment, which should therefore turn out to be a pragmatic inference instead. Take the following pair of examples. In (1), it is very tempting to ascribe the quoted words to Alice. Yet, the acceptability of (2) suggests that that ascription is cancellable:

(1) Alice said that life **'is difficult to understand'**.

(2) Alice said that life **'is difficult to understand'**, to use Rupert's favourite phrase.

In (2) the quoted words are ascribed to Rupert, not to the reportee, Alice.¹

In the face of examples like these, how can one continue to defend the 'entailment' story? By invoking the critic's failure to distinguish between cancellation and recourse to another sense of an ambiguous² expression. The argument then is that the metalinguistic comment shows that the words between inverted commas are not mixed-quoted, but, say, scare-quoted instead.

Generally, ambiguity-based analyses are dispreferred, because they are at odds with Grice's 'Modified Occam's Razor', which states that one should avoid multiplying senses if their postulation does no more descriptive or explanatory work than an independently justified general pragmatic mechanism. The principle is a difficult one to apply, though [cf. Sperber & Wilson (2005), p. 469], and judgments as to which account does more useful work

may be tricky to make. So it is not entirely surprising that the literature on quotation does feature a few theories that appeal to ambiguity.³ The question is this: other than the somewhat arbitrary application of Modified Occam's Razor, how can one reject an ambiguity-based account? The best way to go, it seems, is to attempt to show that the meaning distinction posited is ad hoc, or untenable in some other way. This is exactly what Recanati sets out to do. First, he submits variants of an example similar to (1), along the lines of:

(3) Alice said that life **'is difficult to understand'**, as she put it.

(4) Alice said that life **'is difficult to understand'**, to use her favourite phrase.

The quoted words are explicitly ascribed to the reportee, Alice, by means of a metalinguistic comment. So far, these examples are compatible with both Recanati's account (explicitation of a pragmatic inference) and Cappelen & Lepore's (double ascription of the utterance to Alice). But then, Recanati offers minimal variations on (3) and (4):

(5) Alice said that life **'is difficult to understand'**, as Rupert would put it.

(2) [repeated] Alice said that life **'is difficult to understand'**, to use Rupert's favourite phrase.⁴

Now the quoted utterance is ascribed to Rupert. Recanati's reasoning goes like this: there seems to be every reason to put (3) and (4) on a par with (1): all of them involve MQ. Furthermore, since (2) and (5) only differ from (3) and (4) by one NP, they should be judged to exhibit MQ as well. Yet, Cappelen & Lepore would (have to) say that they involve scare quoting (ScQ) instead, a judgment that now appears ad hoc.

This is not a logically conclusive demonstration, but I take it that it does shift the onus on ambiguity theorists to show that their assumption that different meanings (or uses) of the quotation marks are involved in (2) and (5) is not arbitrary. Overall, I believe that the strategy that consists in questioning the boundaries between MQ and ScQ is worth pursuing. In my opinion, too many authors — this includes Recanati — have accorded far too much importance to Cappelen & Lepore's original definition of MQ. Though interesting in their own right, notably because of their alleged truth-conditional effects, the Cappelen & Lepore examples have resulted in theorists sometimes 'not seeing the forest for the trees'. From the perspective of an empirically sound theory of quotation, there is no particular reason to give Cappelen & Lepore's MQ precedence over other hybrid cases. I will add that that is so even if one's main concern is with truth-conditions. Thus, it is not clear that

the quotations in examples like (6) and (7) below have no impact on truth-conditions. None the less, they are certainly not amenable to a Cappelen & Lepore-type analysis, because they do not come under the scope of an obvious reporting verb:

- (6) Chateaubriand returned to France in 1800, **‘with the century’** [Recanati (2010), p. 272].
- (7) Mrs. Obama described herself as a “110-percenter,” which is how much she said she gives of herself to both her family and her job, which means she always feels **“like I’m failing.”**

The hybrid quotation in (7) is especially interesting because it includes an indexical, *I*. Clearly, it has a truth-conditional effect here (it shifts the context). Faced with a choice between semantic MQ and pragmatic ScQ, Cappelen & Lepore would not be able to account for this. In the end, I believe there are good reasons to hold that MQ and ScQ do not exhaust the domain of hybrid open quotations. It is not even clear that MQ and ScQ can be neatly distinguished in a non ad-hoc manner.⁵ I conclude that appealing to ambiguity in order to claim there is no cancellation of the ‘utterance ascription to the reportee’ in MQ is a strategy that fails.

II. TWO-DIMENSIONALITY

In their 2005 paper, Bart Geurts and Emar Maier outline a presuppositional account of hybrid quotation (which they call ‘mixed’). This is deliberately intended as a one-dimensional theory, because, as they see it, two-dimensional theories face major difficulties. In their critique, they focus on Potts (2007), the most fully worked out account from a formal point of view, but they add that “although we will confine our attention to one particular version [of two-dimensionality], our criticism is directed against the whole family of 2D theories” [Geurts and Maier (2005), p. 111], and this includes Recanati (2001) and Predelli (2003), to which I would add Cappelen & Lepore (1997), (2005) and García-Carpintero (2005).

Consider:

- (8) When in Santa Cruz, Peter orders **‘[e]pricots’** at the local market.

Potts’s (2007) theory states that two propositions are expressed, one independent of the quotation — the ‘use’ line below —, the other reflecting the ‘speech report’, the ‘mention’ line below.⁶

Use: When in Santa Cruz, Peter orders apricots at the local market.

Mention: Peter utters ‘[eɪ]pricots’.

According to Geurts & Maier, a first problem for this account is that it doesn’t capture the most obvious interpretation of (8), namely that “when Peter is in Santa Cruz *and buys apricots at the local market*, he says ‘[eɪ]pricots’. They suggest that the additional restriction might result from the quotation being in focus: “the restriction observed in this case coincides with the *complete* regular meaning (in Potts’s terms) of ‘Peter orders ‘[eɪ]pricots’ at the local market’” [Geurts & Maier (2005), p. 112], and not as is usual, with “backgrounded information in [the] scope [of the quantifier]” [Ibid.]. They are sceptical that the two-dimensional analysis can account for the focus effect observed.

What they see as an even more pressing problem arises in connection with an example like (9), in which the most natural reading has it that each soldier said ‘mommy’ to refer to his *own* mother, something which is not captured by the mention line underneath:

(9) Every soldier said he longed to go home to his ‘**mommy**’.

Use: Every soldier said he longed to go home to his mommy.

Mention: Every soldier uttered ‘mommy’.

Geurts & Maier point out further problems with metalinguistic negation and conclude that the two-dimensional analysis is ill-equipped to account for cases, like the above, where there is rich interaction between the two postulated levels of meaning.

In addressing Geurts & Maier’s critique, Recanati acknowledges from the outset that the theory set out in chapter 7 is multi-dimensional:

On the version of this view I put forward in chapter 7, any of [several examples containing a hybrid quotation] compositionally expresses a certain proposition — the same it would express without the quotation marks — and use-conditionally expresses a further proposition to the effect that the speaker is *R*-ing the enclosed words. In addition the utterance pragmatically conveys an array of propositions having to do with the speaker’s point in *R*-ing the enclosed words [Recanati (2010), p. 275].

In this citation, Recanati uses “*R*-ing” as a placeholder for a relation to be specified later in the chapter, so as to temporarily leave open the question of the conventional meaning of quotation marks. As we shall see in section 3,

the choice will be between the broad “using for demonstrative purposes”, as in chapter 7, and the narrower “using echoically”.

I showed in the essay devoted to chapter 7 that Recanati does recognise the rich interaction between the meaning of a quotation and truth-conditional content. Unlike Potts (2007), he has available a couple of tools that *are* designed to capture the interactions between levels, namely free pragmatic enrichment and context-shifts. These two mechanisms are quite capable of explaining indirect effects of pragmatic meaning upon an utterance’s (intuitive) truth-conditions.

In his response to Geurts & Maier, Recanati basically repeats his analysis of MQ: if the quotational point is to make the addressee understand that the quoted words were uttered by the agent of the speech event, that point will enrich the truth-conditions of the utterance. In other words, the contextual meaning of the quotation affects the truth-conditional content. His conclusion: “One may deny that free enrichment exists, but if it exists, then it provides an explanation of the interaction of semantic content and quotational meaning in [MQ] that is fully compatible both with multi-dimensionalism and with a pragmatic approach to open quotation” [Recanati (2010), p. 279].

Now it seems to me that Geurts & Maier’s criticism goes further and concerns aspects of meaning that are perhaps less easy to deal with than basic MQ. In the next couple of paragraphs, I will therefore propose what I take to be a Recanati-style analysis of examples (8)-(9), and see how it fares. Let us begin with (8). Geurts & Maier’s idea was that, as a result of the quotation being in focus, there is an extra domain restriction affecting its interpretation, and that Potts’s separation between the regular and the quotational meaning makes it difficult for him to capture this interaction. The difference between Potts and Recanati is that the latter makes allowances for pragmatic intrusions into truth-conditions. Elsewhere, he has provided analyses of quantifier domain restriction in terms of free pragmatic enrichment [Recanati (2004), pp. 87-88; (2010), section 6.1 of chapter 3], and I shall do likewise here: probably helped by the intonational focus on [eɪ]pricots, the addressee understands that one major aspect of the meaning of (8) — closely linked with the quotational point —⁷ is the West Coast pronunciation of *apricots*. This may help him see that (8) does not convey that “all the time that Peter is in Santa Cruz, he is (constantly) buying apricots at the local market”. The inference about the quotational point together with our world knowledge (people are not normally buying fruit all the time) seems enough to trigger the extra contextual restriction which affects the truth-conditions of (8).

I have little reason to assume that Geurts & Maier would disagree with this sort of account. Note that they themselves offered no detailed explanation of how the extra domain restriction arose in the first place (merely suggesting the influence of intonational focus), and they might therefore be open

to the free enrichment account. An extra argument stems from the following observation: the disquoted counterpart of (8) seems to lend itself to at least two salient readings:

(8_{DISQ}) When in Santa Cruz, Peter orders apricots at the local market.

Reading a: “every time Peter is in Santa Cruz, he goes to the local market and orders apricots”

Reading b: “every time Peter is in Santa Cruz and goes to the local market, he orders apricots there”.

I take it that the place of the intonational focus will favour one or the other reading.⁸ On reading a, there is no extra domain restriction. But on reading b, there is. Now this restriction is different from that in (8), but that is not what matters here. The important point is that there should be a restriction at all, in the absence of any quoting. The lesson I wish to draw from this is that the requirement for a satisfactory account of both (8) and (8_{DISQ}) is, first and foremost, that it incorporate (something like) free enrichment. So, where Geurts & Maier thought they had found fault with two-dimensional accounts of quotation in general, the problem may actually have been with two-dimensional frameworks that did not allow for free enrichment. I’d go even further than that. The problem was probably not with two-dimensional accounts *per se*, but with those frameworks that include nothing like free enrichment, irrespective of the number of meaning dimensions they postulate.

Turning now to (9), we see that the extra meaning component posited by Geurts & Maier does not affect the truth-conditions of the utterance, which are neatly captured by the use line. In Recanati’s parlance, the extra component is entirely a matter of the pictorial meaning. The quotation marks (in speech, some intonational feature) indicate that the word *mommy* is produced for demonstrative purposes. The addressee fleshes this out by identifying an internal target: the word *mommy* is used echoically, mimicking each soldier’s use of the word to refer to his own mother. This is the expected result. Though impressionistic, the Recanati-like account probably gives a good idea of how Geurts & Maier themselves hit upon the notion that each token of *mommy* was not merely uttered, as the mention line of the Potts-like analysis suggests, but uttered to talk about a particular person.

I conclude that Recanati’s two-dimensional theory is sufficiently different from Potts’s to withstand Geurts & Maier’s objections. It is equipped with conceptual tools that enable it to capture refinements that are inaccessible to a formally more precise but pragmatically poorer two-dimensional picture like Potts’s.⁹

III. ARE CONTEXT-SHIFTS ENCODED IN THE CONVENTIONAL MEANING OF QUOTATION MARKS AFTER ALL?

Still, Recanati feels, a challenge remains. The fact that the tough examples brought up by Geurts & Maier can be dealt with by his two-dimensional framework does not prove that the latter is *superior* to Geurts & Maier's one-dimensional semantic theory of hybrids. Recanati is willing to face the challenge, and possibly to reconsider his views, as we shall see.

Recanati observes that the account of non-cumulative hybrids in chapter 7 involves a revision of the classic Kaplanian framework [Kaplan (1989)]. As stipulated by Kaplan, semantics assigns a character, namely a function from contexts to contents, to a sentence. The problem with sentences containing non-cumulative hybrids is that no single context (neither the 'current' one, nor the 'shifted/source' one) yields the right content.¹⁰ Now one may decide to give up the notion that whole sentences have characters, so that "only simple expressions will be assigned characters: for more complex expressions like sentences, we will directly compose the contents determined by the characters of the parts in their respective contexts" [Recanati (2010), p. 283]. But, Recanati points out, we may prefer to keep the Kaplanian framework unchanged. One way of doing this is to make the context-shift "internal to the character of the sentence [...] by assigning to the sub-clausal quotation¹¹ a metalinguistic character, which maps the context in which the sub-clausal quotation occurs (viz. the current context) to the content expressed by the enclosed expression when interpreted in the source context" [ibid.].¹² This analysis, put forward in *Oratio Obliqua*, *Oratio Recta*, still leaves open the question whether quotation marks are interpreted as the syntactic vehicle for the context-shifting operator. If they are not, the operator is simply a tool of the metalanguage, and the context-shift remains a fully pragmatic mechanism operating at the pre-semantic level. If they are, however, then context-shifts are semanticised, in the sense that they are now *effected* by a linguistic device, the quotation marks themselves.¹³

Interestingly, whereas Recanati opted for the pragmatic alternative in *Oratio Obliqua*, *Oratio Recta*, he now concedes that the issue is controversial, declaring himself ready to reassess the conventional meaning of quotation marks in hybrids.

He begins his assessment by showing that the pragmaticist cannot make use of the following objection: "though non-cumulative hybrids are (usually) echoic, they involve no context-shift since they do not affect the truth-conditions of the utterance in which they occur". With reason, Recanati dismisses this objection: in modifying the character of an expression, context-shifts need not affect their content; they may be 'benign'. Now, if it turned out that all uses of quotation marks in hybrids are echoic, it would be tempt-

ing to say that quotation-marks-as-used-in-hybrids conventionally encode echoicity, rather than just a demonstrative intention.

In chapter 7, Recanati offered the quotation in (10) as an illustration of flat (non-echoic) mention in hybrid quotation:

(10) A ‘fortnight’ is a period of fourteen days.

His revised opinion is that this sort of example alone cannot refute the view that quotation marks encode echoicity. It does not seem illegitimate, at any rate, to say that the display of *fortnight* echoes a sort of generic speaker, something like ‘the competent English speaker’. Given the current state of our knowledge, Recanati judges himself unable to determine whether there exist unmistakable examples of non-echoic hybrids.

If further empirical research should find no instances of non-echoic hybrids, then, Recanati volunteers, he would be ready to adopt Geurts & Maier’s presuppositional analysis, which he deems very similar to the analysis in terms of a metalinguistic character. That, however, would make context-shifts a semantic phenomenon: in Geurts & Maier’s analysis, presupposition is a kind of anaphora that needs to be resolved as part of semantic interpretation. Exit the pre-semantic analysis, then.

Still, Recanati feels that this concession to semanticists does not mean that a proper treatment of quotation can do without two dimensions. One still needs to deal with the quotational point. “If we leave aside what I called ‘the contextual meaning of the quotation’, we get only a truncated account” [Recanati (2010), p. 289].

I definitely agree with Recanati. However, I feel that few philosophers would not. After all, even diehard semanticists-about-quotation like Cappelen & Lepore devote entire pages to the pragmatics of quotation [Cappelen & Lepore (2005), pp. 55-57], and it is clear that they defend a dual approach distinguishing between semantics and ‘speech-act heuristics’. There is worse, I believe. If Recanati grants that the meaning of quotation marks in open quotation is echoic while at the same time maintaining, correctly, that there are cases of closed quotation that are not echoic, he tacitly admits that quotation marks are polysemous.

IV. WHY RESIST THE SEMANTICISATION OF QUOTATION MARKS?

I identify the multiplication of senses as one of the tools available to the semanticist when it comes to accommodating phenomena or properties uncovered by the pragmaticist. Recall that we saw in section I how Recanati disposed of the objections to the possibility of cancelling utterance ascription to the reportee in mixed quotation. In retrospect, this looks like a Pyrrhic vic-

tory. Pending the results of further empirical enquiry, Recanati is poised to accept that there are two meanings (or uses) of quotation marks: one simply consists in signalling a demonstration, the other encodes echoicity, i.e. takes the meaning of the quoted string ‘ σ ’ to be something like “what echoed speaker X means by ‘ σ ’”. Though not negligible, the only difference with the distinct meaning that Recanati rejected earlier is that the quoted utterance is ascribed to some agent (to be contextually determined) rather than systematically to the reportee.

The first question to ask is whether there are non-echoic hybrids? It does seem that examples like (10) — the *fortnight* type — behave differently from their closed counterparts. Thus, the addition of a metalinguistic comment such as *as X says (in L)* seems more felicitous in (10) than in (11):

(10’) A ‘fortnight’, as one says in English, is a period of fourteen days.

(11) ‘Fortnight’ is a noun.

(11’) ? ‘Fortnight’, as one says in English, is a noun.

This possible difference in acceptability between (10’) and (11’) may be grist to the mill of the theorist who leans towards generalised echoicity in hybrid quotation: in (10’), it is the ‘generic English speaker’ who is echoed, and this may be what (10) implicitly conveys too. However, the data are rather complex. Consider:

(12) ‘AWOL’ means “absent from one’s post but without intent to desert”.

(12’) ‘AWOL’, as they say in the army, means “absent from one’s post but without intent to desert”.

In (12), we have a closed metalinguistic citation. Yet, a metalinguistic comment suggesting an echoed speaker seems perfectly acceptable here. If anything, this confirms Recanati’s claim that a thoroughgoing empirical study is needed.

Our current inability to settle the above question doesn’t have to mean that we must leave the issue aside until further notice. I believe that a case can be made against ‘going the Geurts & Maier way’ *even if it should turn out that there are no non-echoic hybrid quotations*. My main arguments will be that it is better (i) to steer clear of an ambiguity theory of quotation marks, and (ii) to avoid splitting the theory of quotation into one theory of written instances and another theory of spoken ones.

I hinted above that ambiguity theories are more typical of semantic than pragmatic accounts. What all ambiguity accounts agree on is that quotation

marks have distinct conventional meanings. But they may regard the role of quotation marks as being more or less important to the generation of quotations, i.e. they may be more or less semantically-orientated. As I see it, the relevant positions are defined by the answers to the following three questions:

- (a) do spoken and written quotations work on the same mechanisms? Is it legitimate to try and devise an integrated theory of quotation that applies, across the board, to spoken and written instances?
- (b) do spoken quotations also have quotation marks (i.e. some intonational or paralinguistic counterpart to quotation marks)?
- (c) are quotation marks necessary to the generation of quotation, or are they optional?

To begin with question (a), I believe the theory laid out in chapter 7 of *TCP* is an integrated theory of quotation, emphasising the pictorial dimension of the interpretation of all quotational utterances. This theory, though illustrated with mainly written examples is clearly also intended (actually even more strikingly so) to have relevance to spoken quotations. It is also an account that gives pride of place to the quoter, and to how the quoter exploits a variety of tools (only a few of them conventional) to mark a string as quoted and to guide the addressee towards a correct apprehension of the quotational point.

It seems to me that the ambiguity theorist is at risk of pushing the quoter into the background and of giving up on an integrated theory. Whether she does depends on how she answers questions (b) and (c). Below, I sketch what I take to be the main theoretical positions defined by answers to (b) and (c):

position 1: There is no quotation without quotation marks. Any putative counterexample will be explained away as no more than apparent. There are several ways of dealing with (apparently) unmarked quotations, which I can only hint at here:¹⁴ unmarked ‘quotations’ are simply not quotations [e.g. Cappelen & Lepore (2005)]; unmarked quotations trigger blatantly false readings that require pragmatic repair [cf. García-Carpintero (2004), Gómez-Torrente (2005)]; ‘unmarked’ quotations are marked in logical form (and/or in syntax) even when the marks are invisible at the surface of things. The surprisingly popular view of the indispensability of quotation marks is the most profoundly semantic one that I can make out. When taken to apply only to written instances, it has the additional consequence of ruling out any integrated account. When taken to apply to both speech and writing, it is com-

patible with an integrated account, albeit one that plays down the pictorial dimension and the role of the quoter: it is quotation marks that ‘do the quoting’.

position 2: Quotation marks exist in both writing and speech. If tenable, this view is consistent with an integrated theory. Moreover, if quotation marks are taken to be optional, the theory does not have to downplay the role of the quoter. But is it tenable? So far, no one has been able to show that speech uses anything like the conventional quotation marks of writing. That doesn’t mean there never are any marks of quoting in speech, there are, but these are variable and it’s unclear that they are more than indicators triggering some pragmatic inference as to the occurrence of a quotation.¹⁵ Admittedly, a lot more empirical work needs to be done into this question, but at this stage it would be awkward for an ambiguity theorist to adopt position 2.

position 3: quotation marks are optional in writing and have no conventional counterpart in speech. This is certainly the more pragmatic position, and the one that I suppose Recanati would opt for if he ended up adopting Geurts & Maier’s view on hybrid quotation. Note, however, that Geurts & Maier seem to regard quotation marks as necessary *in hybrid instances*.¹⁶ Indeed, a distinction could be made between optional marking in closed and autonomous open cases, and compulsory marking in hybrid ones.

I do not think that Geurts & Maier are right on this point. It turns out that some hybrid quotations are not marked by quotation marks (or any other device) at all [cf. De Brabanter (2010), pp. 113-115]. This often happens in allusions, notably allusions to well-known sayings or famous literary works. In those cases, the utterer may choose to help her addressee (by using quotation marks, or intonational marking in speech, cf. (13)) or to make him go to the extra effort (and reward) of detecting the presence of the allusion himself ((14, 15)).¹⁷

(13) ... consider this, just how many of our immigrants are **‘huddled masses yearning to breathe free’**? And how many are coming for just the economic benefits? (<https://www.economist.com/user/3070969/comments?page=2>).

(14) BPM files weren’t of good quality, and, since **beauty is in the eye of the beholder**, I’ve pulled out some of the screens that I like [BNC, HAC 4519].

(15) So ended the attempts of these **poor, yearning, tired huddled masses** to gain asylum in the US [*New Statesman*, 17/01/2000, p. 16].

In (13), the writer is quoting a line from the poem by Emma Lazarus that is inscribed on the base of the Statue of Liberty, the symbol for the United States' hospitality towards immigrants (see (16) below). In (14), even in the absence of any signalling, the proverb *beauty is in the eye of the beholder* is sufficiently well-known to be widely identified as an echoic hybrid quotation. Whether the citation will be rightly attributed to its originator (in this case, conventional received wisdom) is immaterial. In (15), the sequence *these poor, yearning, tired huddled masses* is used to refer to a group of Haitians who had tried to enter U.S. territory clandestinely. It evidently conjures up Lazarus's poem, with alterations. The original wording of the relevant passage is:

- (16) Give me your tired, your poor / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.

These alterations do not, I contend, prevent these well-known lines of the poem from being echoed.

Other unmarked cases of (what are perhaps) hybrid quotations were offered long ago by Roman Jakobson (1985) in his sketch of the 'metalingual function' of language. Jakobson claimed that definitional examples like (17) (and, *mutatis mutandis*, (18)) "impart information about the meaning assigned to the word *hermaphrodite* [...] but [...] say nothing about the ontological status of the individuals named" (1985: 119):

- (17) Hermaphrodites are individuals combining the sex organs of both male and female.
- (18) A sophomore is a second-year student.

These examples are exactly like (10), were it not for the missing quotation marks, which are easy to supply:

- (17_Q) 'Hermaphrodites' are individuals combining the sex organs of both male and female.
- (18_Q) A 'sophomore' is a second-year student.

This suggests that (17)-(18) can be regarded as unmarked hybrids.

The lesson to be drawn from these examples is this: in hybrid instances, quotation marks are not systematically necessary to make the addressee understand that he is to ascribe a string of words to some echoed speaker. This highlights the fact that the quoter can, given the right circumstances, rely solely on contextual clues, with no need to signal the allusion with a dedicated linguistic marker.

None of the above conclusively shows that it would be misguided to adopt a one-dimensional semantics for quotation marks in hybrid quotations. Yet, it does make that option much less attractive. For one thing, if, as I've claimed is desirable (and in the spirit of *TCP*), the theorist seeks to devise an account of quotation that covers writing and speech, then she will have to provide a pragmatic explanation of how quotation works in the absence of any conventional marking. And this she will have to do not just for non-hybrid but also for hybrid instances. This theory exists: it is the radical pragmatic theory that Recanati defends in chapter 7.

This, to me, means that it should be much less tempting to endorse a polysemic account, even if only for written quotations. A pragmatic account is necessary for written cases too, since we have seen that unmarked written instances exist both in the non-hybrid and the hybrid variety. One consequence is that quotation marks cannot be said to be a necessary ingredient of echoic quotation. If quotation marks are, as Geurts & Maier propose, context-shifting operators, then they are sufficiently powerful to 'do the quoting' by themselves. The role of the quoter is reduced to selecting the requisite means to achieve her communicative purpose. But examples like (14) and (15) show us that it's the quoter who does the quoting (and the additional echoing in the relevant cases), and that she does not need quotation marks to that end. Since we have a theory that can deal with all varieties of quotation, there's no need to take on the extra baggage of a partial theory (one of marked written hybrids) that requires (what now turns out to be an unnecessary) multiplication of senses. Here, the application of Modified Occam's Razor seems to be fully warranted.

In "Open quotation", Recanati appeared to seize every opportunity to show why one should embrace truth-conditional pragmatics. Most of the effects on truth-conditions (except those resulting from recruitment as a singular term) were convincingly explained in terms of independently justified pragmatic mechanisms. In this respect, "Open quotation revisited" takes a step backward. Most earlier critics of Recanati's theory of quotation found fault with him for being too pragmatic about quotation. Instead, my criticism is that the Recanati of chapter 8 may have responded too keenly to the tug of semantics.

V. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS

I take François Recanati's pragmatic theory of quotation to be among the best. Though I have not refrained from criticising what I took to be less compelling aspects, only in a few cases have I made suggestions as to how to remedy the purported flaws. The critic's 'destructive' task is always easier than the author's painstaking construction.

I suppose I should stress that Recanati somehow makes his critic's life easy, precisely because he is at pains to provide as detailed and complete a depiction as possible of the many mechanisms involved in the interpretation of quotation. It is this determination to leave no stone unturned that inevitably provides his critic with opportunities for disagreement.

A typical criticism against Recanati is voiced by Gómez-Torrente: "With inspiration from Herbert Clark, François Recanati has claimed that quotation marks quite generally "conventionally indicate the fact that the speaker is demonstrating the enclosed words" [Gómez-Torrente (2001), p. 680] [...]. *It's hard to make precise sense of this vague claim* so that it can seem true of all uses of quotation but not of any other use of expressions" [Gómez-Torrente (2005), pp. 131-132; my italics]. I understand Gómez-Torrente's concern: pragmatic theories of quotation seem inherently to exhibit some degree of vagueness (and intricacy). Recanati's is no exception. This makes understandable the semanticist's eagerness to offer more definite characterisations of the meaning of quotation, via a specification of the meaning(s) of quotation marks, conceived as necessary to quotation. This way the semanticist gets a good grip on the phenomenon and eschews vagueness.

There is, however, a price to pay: semantic theories¹⁸ tend to provide descriptions that are much more limited in scope. Thus, some semanticists dismiss one or other quotational phenomenon from the domain of quotation. Cappelen & Lepore's treatment of scare quoting is a case in point. But there were precedents. Peter Geach judged that the mention of sheer nonsense (i.e. strings that do not correspond to actually existing elements of any language) could not qualify as quotation, and therefore excluded such mentions from the data that the theory was accountable for [Geach (1957), p. 85]. Nowadays, although most theorists grant that 'just about anything' can be quoted, be it linguistic or non-linguistic material, few — with the exception of a couple of pragmaticists-about-quotation like Recanati or, especially, Clark — attempt to account for those 'quotations' where they are really challenging, i.e. in open cases, outside of inertia-inducing linguistic recruitment. Now, it is possible that further empirical research will show that certain phenomena which some now wish to include within the ambit of quotation do not belong there. My worry is that the semanticist, because of the tools at her disposal, will occasionally rule these out *a priori*.

Pragmaticists-about-quotation may seem to keep away from rigorous definitions and the kind of formalisations that enable clear predictions. They may also seem to engage in vaguer, less easily evaluable, language than semanticists. However, their best representatives — and Recanati, together with Clark & Gerrig (1990), ranks amongst the finest — truly engage with the complexity and variety of quoting in a way that the semanticist (so far, at least) seems to me incapable of doing. Only pragmaticists, so far, have carefully attended to the fundamental pictoriality of quotation. Naturally, their at-

tempts at describing, not to mention explaining, what goes on in the various kinds of quoting do not yield the sorts of strong predictions that semanticists are looking for. But it is in the nature of pictorial meaning to be less definite than linguistic meaning (especially linguistic meaning as approached by the formal semanticist). Therefore, the relative vagueness of the analyses and predictions matches the actual vagueness of the interpretation of pictorial signaling. What the pragmaticists lose in precision, they gain in scope.

There is a major virtue to the semantic theories: they force the pragmaticist to become more and more precise. While the pragmaticist forces the semanticist to develop frameworks capable of accounting for an ever increasing variety of data. It is a fact that recent developments in formal semantics have shown an ability to deal with a very broad range of data. Emar Maier's work stands out in this respect. So, we might optimistically conclude: "let the interaction between semantics and pragmatics continue this way, and the theories will keep improving". I still have a worry, though. That worry is very similar to the one Recanati voiced in the introduction to "Open quotation": doing what the semanticist does, which in essence means regimenting quotation, involves the risk of turning the researcher's attention away from the essential feature of quotation, its pictoriality: at bottom, quotation is a non-linguistic communicative act. That is something, I believe, that *must* escape the semanticist, simply because semantics is not designed to deal with 'non-symbolic' communicative behaviours, notably 'iconic' ones. What it can do is clarify certain important aspects of quotation, those in which linguistic elements do play a significant role. Semantics alone, however, can never offer a viable alternative to pragmatics in terms of empirical coverage. That is why pragmaticists-about-quotation must be wary of 'going semantic'. The point is not simply a matter of defending one's own turf, an understandable but ultimately irrational goal, but to continue working towards the only sort of theory that can hope to describe and explain quotation, because it starts from the recognition of its essential pictorial quality.

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NOTES

¹ At least — and this is what matters — this reading is possible. But perhaps the quoted words can be simultaneously ascribed to both Alice and Rupert.

² *Ambiguity* is a vague term, covering both the linguist's 'polysemy' and 'homonymy'. I shall stick to it, however, because most discussions of this kind in the philosophical literature are framed in terms of ambiguity.

³ To my knowledge, Gómez-Torrente (2005), (2011), is the only one to fully articulate a theory on which quotation marks have several conventional meanings. Geurts & Maier write that "quotation marks seem to be polysemous rather than just ambiguous" [Geurts & Maier (2005), p. 127], but do not expand on that view. Finally, both Cappelen & Lepore (2005) and Benbaji (2005) resort to strategies that resemble appeals to ambiguity, while being at pains to deny postulations of ambiguity.

⁴ Should you have any trouble with these examples, think of modalised sentences like *Alice might say that life 'is difficult to understand', to use your favourite expression.*

⁵ For a more detailed critical assessment of the distinction between MQ and ScQ, see De Brabanter (2010), pp. 115-117. García-Carpintero is among the few authors who have made allowances for "cases in between mixed quotations and scare quotes, i.e., cases in which there is in the background a direct-discourse ascription to a speaker, but the utterance itself is not a saying-ascription" [García-Carpintero (2011), p. 129].

⁶ I have transformed Potts's fully explicit formulas into plain English.

⁷ The likely quotational point here is "getting the addressee to understand that people on the West Coast of the USA pronounce *apricots* /'eprɪkɔts/'".

⁸ At first blush, unmarked focus on *market* would favour reading a, while reading b would be facilitated by marked focus on *apricots*. The latter might signal a contrast with, say, peaches, rather than with an East Coast pronunciation /'æprɪkɔts/, as in the quotational example (8).

⁹ This is not meant to diminish the merits of Potts (2007), which offers a fully worked out grammar, something that Recanati does not do. I'll return to the issue of the differences between semantic and pragmatic accounts in the concluding remarks to this paper.

¹⁰ This is an overstatement. There are cases in which the shifted context will yield the right content, albeit in a manner that cannot satisfy the theorist. Consider a variation on (6):

(6') 'Quine' wants to have breakfast.

The current context would yield the wrong content, since (6') would be construed as being about the real Quine. By contrast, the shifted context (James's) yields the right content, provided the other words in the sentence receive the same interpretation in ordinary English and in James's idiolect/from James's perspective (this was the reason for removing the indexical *us* from the example). Still, the latter analysis is unsatisfactory because it does not differentiate between an utterance of (6') and one, say, of:

(6'') 'Quine wants to have breakfast',

where the quotation takes scope over the whole sentence.

One more point: Recanati himself explicitly makes allowances for cases like (6') when he describes some context-shifts as 'benign' [Recanati (2010), p. 286; see further in this section].

¹¹ *Clausal/sub-clausal* are terms from Potts (2007). I prefer *hybrid/non-hybrid*, however, because:

- (i) there are instances of so-called ‘sub-clausal’ open quotation that are clausal after all, e.g. *Her idea that “Feminist studies should, by definition, entail respect for the views and intentions of authors” (238) ought, in fact, to have been extended to her discussion of other plays (mclc.osu.edu/rc/pubs/reviews/liruru.htm)*;
- (ii) Potts’s *clausal* applies to open *and* closed quotations, regardless;
- (iii) there are instances of so-called ‘clausal’ open quotation that prove less than clausal, e.g. **‘In the fridge?’** *What on earth was it doing there?*

¹² In this chapter, ‘echoic use’ and ‘context-shifting use’ are used interchangeably.

¹³ I have not been able to pin Geurts & Maier down to either position. Nowhere in their (2005) do they say explicitly that their meaning-shifts are triggered by the quotation marks. In later writings, though, Maier writes that English (as opposed to e.g. Ancient Greek) *requires* quotation marks in order to achieve meaning-shifts [Maier (2012)]. In this case, it is quite clear that he is talking about *syntactic* quotation marks. In previous work, he made a distinction between the latter and *semantic* quotation marks: “There are well-known constructions, even in English, that are completely unmarked, intonationally and orthographically, yet contain quotation marks semantically” [Maier (2007)]. I have not been able to determine if these semantic quotation marks belong to the object-language or to the metalanguage.

¹⁴ See De Brabanter, “Quoteless quotations” (in preparation), for details.

¹⁵ In the sparse literature on the subject, the conclusions tend to be negative: “[i]t would be an overstatement to claim that prosodic marking is used systematically as a sign of reported speech in talk the way quotation marks are in texts” [Klewitz & Couper-Kuhlen (1999), p. 473; see also Kasimir (2008)].

¹⁶ At least Maier (2012), p. 133 does, about English (though not Ancient Greek). Cf. footnote 13.

¹⁷ J. Rey-Debove called such instances ‘*crypto-citations*’ [Rey-Debove (1978), p. 261].

¹⁸ As we saw in section 4, one can be more or less semantic-about-quotation. In the remaining paragraphs, the term ‘semantic theories’ will designate the radical accounts that regard quotation marks as necessary to quotation, and a theory of quotation marks as the right kind of theory of quotation.

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