

Introduction

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The Hispanic Atlantic

This selection of essays on the Hispanic Atlantic is prompted by the urgency to respond to changes in a specific cultural and geopolitical context. The Hispanic world (Latin America, Spain, and the Latino United States) is experiencing a very productive and critical reconsideration of its national and continental geopolitics and culture. As a result, the idea of Latin America and its academic discourse are being revised (Seed; Beverly, Oviedo, and Aronna; Castro Gómez and Mendieta; Moreiras). At the same time, Spain and Hispanism are undergoing a more beleaguered and not so critical revision (Millington and Smith; Graham and Labanyi; Resina; Loureiro; Bermúdez, Cortijo, and McGovern). Yet, recent work in Latin American and Hispanic Studies overlooks certain key developments: Spain has become, after the United States, the second largest investor in Latin America (Relea) at a time when Latin American as well as African immigration to Spain has become an undeniable influence on Spanish society (Ruiz Olabuénagana; Tornos and Aparicio). This immigration has gained a quantitative and qualitative importance that has probably never been known before in modern Spain. It is also unique because this demographic shift is triggered by chiefly economic circumstances (poverty and decline of the middle class) and not dictatorial regimes, and thus those involved are immediately marked as subaltern, identified by race, gender and class. This is not the immigration of a very

select and small group of intellectuals or political cadres, as in the '60s and '70s.

This two-way flow of capital and bodies across the Atlantic brings to the fore a host of political and historical problems that have not been fully addressed by neither Latin Americanists nor Hispanists. Is this new development an unprecedented and unexpected emergence of a "new" Spanish (neo) imperialism? Is it simply a distorted and anachronistic twist to a more global and less specifically Spanish economic reorganization? Or to put it otherwise, is it global capital disguised as Spanish? Are we about to face the resurgence of a Spanish imperialism that puts the Latin American history of the last two hundred or so years in historical parentheses? Or rather, do the Latin American national histories since the wars of independence form an imaginary fold between British and North American/global imperialisms? What are the effects of this global and imperialist geopolitical and economic reorganization for the Hispanic and Latin American formations of gender and sexuality? Does it point to a new, global, yet anachronistically conservative resurgence of a patriarchal Hispanicity or does it permit a new fluidity of sexes and genders across the Atlantic? Is the Hispanic Atlantic being feminized, masculinized, or just engulfed (McClintock)? What do we make of the national public and domestic spheres in a new Atlantic reorganization of social space? What is the new position of subalternity and race in this new geopolitical location? Is the Hispanic world being reorganized along more Anglo-American lines of race and ethnicity? Is the Latino condition the new *telos* of the Hispanic world? Is race being mobilized to reorganize this new imperialist

and postnational space? Are race, gender and sexuality the new and central organizers of this neoimperialist deployment, so that the nation no longer is the ultimate horizon of politics in Latin America and Spain? Is recent attention to race a sign that the Hispanic world is advancing towards recognizing subaltern subjects and communities, beginning with Chiapas?

I, Guest Editor of volume 5 of the *Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies*, and the rest of the collaborators have taken up this host of questions in order to explore different lines of inquiry that we hope will help us to rethink the Latin American, Latino, and Spanish world beyond Latinamericanism and Hispanism. I am fully aware that the recent nature of the developments described above makes it impossible to elicit definitive responses. For the time being, our contributions formulate a set of questions and explorations that simply want to open up the field of inquiry. As guest editor, I made a conscious effort to elicit collaborations from young scholars who are still defining their work. I chose scholars who do not hold preformed or preestablished opinions about the new Hispanic Atlantic reality that is unfolding in front of us. That is, these contributors do not have well-established institutional investments and alliances in Latin Americanism and Hispanism. Furthermore, I wanted to escape the tendency to gather the "stars" of the field in order to dress a new agenda in old theoretical clothes. The contributions have been arranged chronologically not in an effort to establish a teleology, but rather in an attempt to show the history of the condition of the Hispanic Atlantic—"history" still remains one of the

most general and familiar narratives to Hispanic readers.

I chose the title for this special section as a way to begin discussion. After Paul Gilroy's seminal work, *The Black Atlantic*, it seemed necessary to take an Atlantic approach to discuss Latin American and Hispanic reality. Although there may not be much agreement as to the neo- or non-neo-imperialist nature of recent developments in Spain and Latin America at least there seems to be an agreement as to the locus: the Atlantic. As the original space of Spanish imperialist expansion into the Americas, the Atlantic is a foundational space and yet, perhaps because of globalization, it is making a new appearance with a (post) historical—and theoretical—synergy that we are only now beginning to feel, grasp, and analyze.

This introduction presents the contributions of each collaborator, simultaneously intertwining them with some of the most central problems pertaining to the Atlantic: modernity, race, postmodernism, globalization, sexuality, postcolonialism, subalternity, gender, and class. The goal of this introduction is not simply to situate the above contributions within a pre-established, and mostly Anglo-American, theoretical and discursive context. Rather the opposite: the goal is to reverse the traditional and unidirectional flow of theoretical production from the Anglo-American to the Hispanic world, so that the theorization of the Hispanic Atlantic interpellates and repositions most Anglo-American discourses as well as their geopolitical grounding. Given the relative newness of this Atlantic focus in Hispanic Studies, most of the hypotheses advanced here are speculative and open-ended rather than solid, clear, and con-

clusive—i.e. derived from a pre-established institutional and epistemological framework. Not surprisingly, these contributions aim at questioning the geopolitical framework of their hailing disciplines, so that the resulting Hispanic-Atlantic relocation opens up new lines of thinking and theorization.

It may seem a cliché to say that the strengths of this introduction stem from the contributions of the collaborators and the shortcomings solely from the author, but this is the case. Editing these articles has been a source of theoretical and political motivation and enlightenment without which I would not have been able to write this introduction.

The Chronotope of Modernity in the Black Atlantic

Although most Latin Americanists and Hispanists are familiar with Gilroy's work, *The Black Atlantic*, few have considered the importance of his work for the field and even fewer have engaged in an active discussion as to its relevance and usefulness. Thus, it is important to re-evaluate Gilroy's contribution as a way to start a historically coherent discussion of the Atlantic. My theorization of the Hispanic Atlantic acknowledges his contribution while at the same time reevaluates it from a Hispanic relocation.

Judith Butler reflects on Gilroy's theoretical contribution by remarking that his work's relevance does not simply affect the Black Atlantic *per se* but modernity at large:

Paul Gilroy [...] in the *Black Atlantic*, takes issue with forms of contempo-

rary skepticism that lead to a full-scale rejection of the key terms of modernity, including 'universality.' [...] The main terms of modernity are subject to an innovative reuse—what some might call a 'misuse'—precisely because they are spoken by those who are not authorized in advance to make use of them. (40)

Consequently, it is important to underscore the fact that Gilroy situates modernity in a new chronotope as a result of which the former is displaced out of the West and into the Atlantic.

Furthermore, Gilroy's relocation of modernity has unprecedented repercussions for the debate over the historical shift from modernity to postmodernity. After *The Black Atlantic* we can conclude that the break separating modernity and postmodernity does not have a bearing on the Black Atlantic. As Gilroy concludes:

[The theorization of the Black Atlantic] can be used to offer a firm rebuke to the mesmeric idea of history as progress and because it provides an opportunity to re-periodise and reaccentuate accounts of the dialectic of Enlightenment which have not always been concerned to look at modernity through the lenses of colonialism or scientific racism [...] [this reperiodization offers] an opportunity to transcend the unproductive debate between a Eurocentric rationalism which banishes the slave experience from its accounts of modernity while arguing that the crises of modernity can be resolved from within, and an equally occidental anti-humanism which locates the origins of modernity's current crises in the shortcomings of the Enlightenment project. (53-4)

In other words, Gilroy situates the modern/postmodern debate geopolitically, so that "modernity and its crisis" become one modernity among others, that is Western, hegemonic modernity. Finally Gilroy makes clear that the modern subject of history and culture changes its location—from universal to particular—since the slave's double consciousness reorganizes the genealogy of the modern subject that narrates the dystopic continuity from the Cartesian subject to the postmodern dead (Foucault) or schizophrenic (Deleuze, Jameson) subject.

Over all, and following Butler, one could conclude that the "irruption" of the Black Atlantic has the uncanny effect of haunting in a ghostly manner (Freud) first-world historiography and theory, so that its familiarity and familiarity come back to the fore, although in a yet repressed way. When the crisis of modernity seemed to be settled by the postmodern debate, Gilroy comes back to remind us that modernity has to be revisited. Yet, it is important to understand the reasons why this reappearance of the modern seems to be uncanny, since, historically speaking, the uncanny is always related to cultural hegemonic formations where no-longer-hegemonic or subaltern subjects have been repressed, as in the case of the ancient regime and the gothic novel or colonialism and the vampire novel (Arata).

Postmodernism's Political Unconscious and the Haunting of Modernity

Paradoxically, what I have called the uncanny irruption of the Black Atlantic confirms Jameson's claim that time is col-

lapsed into space in postmodernity: “space is for us an existential and cultural dominant” (365). Indeed, the Black Atlantic, in its new geopolitical “appearance,” haunts the postmodern succession of the modern, so that the modern returns from the Atlantic in an uncanny and ghostly manner that no longer can be transcended or repressed in a historiographic or theoretical way. The postmodern claim to the end of metadiscourses and the predominance of late capitalism is put into question by this Atlantic appearance. This haunting is ultimately spatial (here, Atlantic) and thus corroborates the spatial dominant of postmodernity in a way that hegemonic theories on postmodernity nevertheless cannot account for. This is precisely why the discourse of the Black Atlantic seems so postmodern (organized according to space) and yet familiarly modern (the end of modernity is not a *fait accompli*). It is, thus, worth exploring the uncanny nature of the Black Atlantic, since it appears to be familiarly postmodern but nevertheless not quite representable within hegemonic postmodern discourses such as Jameson’s—and thus ultimately strange in its familiarity, that is, ultimately uncanny.

Jameson concludes that the spatialization of time in postmodernity forecloses the historicity of modernity:

We need a detour through the modern, then, in order to grasp what is historically original in the postmodern and its spatialisms. Indeed, such a history lesson is the best cure for nostalgic pathos, minimally teaching us, by way of Necessity, that the way back to the modern is sealed for good. (156)

Jameson rightly points out that even history does not escape the logic of simulacrum in the postmodern West:

What follows paradoxically as a consequence is that [...] the postmodern must be characterized as a situation in which the survival, the residue, the holdover, the archaic, has finally been swept away without a trace. In the postmodern, then, the past itself has disappeared. [...] Where its buildings still remain, renovation and restoration allow them to be transferred to the present in their entirety as those other, very different and postmodern things called *simulacra*. (309)

Yet, if tangentially Jameson clearly states that this “simulational sealing off” of modernity is a Western phenomenon, this leaves the non-West open to alternative re-elaborations of modernity:

Ours is a more homogeneously modernized condition; we no longer are encumbered with the embarrassment of non-simultaneities and non-synchronicities. Everything has reached the same hour on the great clock of development or rationalization (*at least from the perspective of the ‘West’*). (310, my emphasis)

Against Jameson’s claims about the simulational impossibility of history, Gilroy’s theoretical intervention clearly establishes that only from a Western position is modernity and its historicity inaccessible. It is important to underscore that Gilroy’s archaeology of the Black Atlantic is particular in its elaboration and scope and yet it has the universal effect of vindicating a new location for modernity out-

side the modern/postmodern divide theorized by Western theorists, from Lyotard to Jameson. Gilroy's work highlights the fact that modernity always had a particular location, be it Western, Atlantic, or Other. As a result, the Black Atlantic opens up a new historicity for modernity, one that is foreclosed from Western postulates and positions.

Thus, it is paramount to underline that although Gilroy's analysis confirms Jameson's claim that time and history are being spatialized in such a way that space produces time and history as its unconscious (as the new Real, in the Lacanian sense) the Black Atlantic does not respond to the logic of simulacra, and neither is it a residue, holdover, or archaic element left over from the past, as Jameson would have it. Indeed, the Black Atlantic opens a new form of historicity that cannot be thought of from within postmodernism—hence its uncanny appearance. Although time and history cannot be symbolized at the same time from within the logic of Western postmodernity, they hold together the spatial structure of our historical and cognitive mode of postmodern and modern (the Black Atlantic) condition. Although Gilroy does not elaborate the implications of this new spatial historicity (Atlantic historicity) for postmodern theory, the Hispanic Atlantic, because of its particular historical location within modernity, allows us to further question the nature of historicity and postmodernism as well as their spatial organization.

But first, it is important to locate the contribution of Gilroy in the actual neo-Hegelian discussion of particularity and universalism (Butler, Laclau and Zizek), so that the relocation of the Hispanic Atlantic across the modern/

postmodern divide and the problem of spatial historicity are evaluated in full. In other words, we must avoid the risk of appropriating Gilroy's work precisely as a marginal or archaic form of modernity that now has been understood in its postmodern dimension and can be assimilated and forgotten as ultimately confirming the logic of hegemonic postmodernism. What must be underscored is the opposite movement: Gilroy's work allows us to read postmodernism from a modern point of view and this is so because the theoretical and historical tension between particularity and universality, understood in the Hegelian sense, are not cancelled in his work. His work is not reducible to any hegemonic postmodern discourse.

Particularity, Universality

A comparison of Gilroy's work with that of Homi Bhabha helps to understand the way in which the former's theorization of modernity is both particular and universal. That is, such a comparison makes clear how Gilroy's work does not slip into universalizing discourses that ultimately foreclose the particular and thus end up legitimizing hegemonic postmodern discourses. In short, such a comparison permits us to ascertain why *The Black Atlantic* does not enforce Western theorizations that ultimately confirm the postmodern logic of the end of modernity. Although in many ways Gilroy's work does not fall far from Bhabha's theorization of in-betweenness and the postcolonial condition (*The Location of Culture*), it does represent several important differences that we ought to take into consideration when dealing, as we will later on, with the Hispanic Atlantic.

Bhabha departs with a discussion of very specific elements, mostly derived from Indian culture and history, but ultimately elaborates what in its effect is a universal theory of postcolonialism. His theory does not acknowledge one particular geopolitical location. In other words, Bhabha does not elaborate the geopolitical and thus historical particularism of his theory: the Indian postcolonial experience. When he universalizes the postcolonial condition as a general condition of any non-Western society through general rhetorical tropes as “the other question” or “third space,” he ends up, by default, universalizing Western modernity. In his non-geopolitically situated discourse, Western modernity is no longer particularly Western, but rather hegemonically universal. Ironically, Bhabha displaces modernity out of any specific geopolitical location and makes it universal. His discourse only affords two temporalities: modernity and non-modernity; the first one is universal and the second is negatively universal, and thus neither one has a specific location. Although the West is still a location in Bhabha’s discourse, it becomes the only possible location of modernity, and thus ultimately is rendered into a universal location, the location of modernity. It is telling, for example, the way in which Toni Morrison, Guillermo Gómez Peña, Nadine Gordimer, and Salman Rushdie, among others, are collapsed in the introduction to his *The Location of Culture* so that particularism itself becomes erased and turned into a negative, yet universal, condition that complements and reifies Western modernity as similarly universal—hence the possibility of applying his theories in a rather indiscriminate way to any non-Western condition or discourse. When Bhabha in-

roduces postcoloniality, he turns it not into a particular position, but a negative and thus universal position defined by modernity:

Postcoloniality, for its part, is a salutary reminder of the persistent ‘neo-colonial’ relations within the ‘new’ world order and the multi-national division of labour. Such a perspective enables the authentication of histories of exploitation and the evolution of strategies of resistance. *Beyond this, however, postcolonial critique bears witness to those countries and communities—in the North and the South, urban and rural—constituted, if I may coin a phrase, ‘otherwise than modernity.’* (6, my emphasis)

In Bhabha’s work, postcoloniality becomes the condition of not being modern, ultimately a modern condition in its negativity—no matter how sophisticated the articulation of postcolonial negativity and differentiality is.

Echoing the debate between Butler, Laclau, and Žižek, I would like to highlight that Gilroy’s postmodern move to revisit the modern is carried out not from a hegemonic (Lyotard, Jameson, Habermas) or non-hegemonic yet universalizing (Bhabha) position—ultimately a hegemonic position in its negativity. The particular position defined by Gilroy’s work allows for a new reading of modernity that is not simply particular but both simultaneously particular and universal. As Žižek states, echoing Butler:

I am in total agreement with Butler who, it seems to me, also aims at this [Hegelian] legacy of ‘concrete universality’ in her central notion of ‘com-

peting universalities': in her insistence on how each particular position, in order to articulate itself, involves the (implicit or explicit) assertion of its *own mode of universality*. ("Holding" 315)

In short, Gilroy's work relocates hegemonic theories of modernity and postmodernity in ways that have irreversible and universal effects. Any theorization of the Hispanic Atlantic needs to follow Gilroy's lead in this location so that it remains particular and yet has universal effects, without falling in the trap of becoming hegemonic by claiming a negatively universal position such as the one delineated by Bhabha. Arjun Appadurai's claim about the resurgence of area studies—the disdained provincial periphery of the last decades—echoes and sums up this phenomenon in its historicity when he claims that:

There is a special anxiety that now surrounds the structures and ideologies of area studies in the U.S. Recognizing that area studies is somehow deeply tied up with a strategizing world picture driven by U.S. foreign-policy needs between 1945 and 1989, leading figures in the world of universities, foundations, think tanks, and even the government have made it clear that the old way of doing area studies does not make sense in the world after 1989 [...] [yet] area studies is a salutary reminder that globalization is itself a deeply historical, uneven, and even *localizing* process. Globalization does not necessarily or even frequently imply homogenization or Americanization, and to the extent that different societies appropriate the materials of modernity differently, there

is still ample room for the deep study of specific geographies, histories, and languages. (16-17)

The Modern Future of Postmodernity

We are not accustomed to rethinking the postmodern as a space, as a spatial condition whose Real is history, that is, the history of modernity and its diverse geopolitical conditions (the Black Atlantic, the homosexual closet, etc.). Jameson claims that, from a Western, postmodern position we have to think of time as space's unconscious—at this point the difference between time and history collapses. Žižek further emphasizes this point when he claims that the *unsymbolizable* (The Real/The Thing), including history itself, is what confirms the psychoanalytic logic of postmodernity:

What characterizes postmodernism is therefore an obsession with Thing, with a foreign body within the social texture, in all its dimensions that range from woman *qua* the unfathomable element that undermines the rule of the 'reality principle' (*Blue Velvet*) [...] up to the paranoid vision of social totality itself as the ultimate fascinating Thing, a vampire-like specter which marks even the most idyllic everyday surface with signs of latent corruption. (*Enjoy* 122)

He acknowledges the important function of the Real in postmodernity when he affirms that

The ambiguity of the postmodern relationship to the Thing pertains to the fact that the Thing is not simply a for-

eign body [...]. The Thing is what 'holds together' the social edifice by means of guaranteeing its fantasmatic consistency. (*Enjoy* 123)

For Žižek, modernity and history would also fall within this category.

However, from the new insight we have gained from the Black Atlantic and its new reading of modern history, we can conclude that time/history is the Western postmodern's Real. Yet, unlike what Jameson and Žižek conclude, we do have access to modernity and history; it is a new access that is not post-modern (as coming after modernity and from within the West) but modern: that is, from positions that are exterior to the hegemonic discourse of modernity and its aftermath. Thus, rather than claiming that metanarratives are no longer valid (Lyotard *The Postmodern Condition*), one could rewrite postmodernism by saying that modern history—the Real, *The Thing*—is the irreducible kernel around which we can, unsuccessfully but positively, create new narratives that are particular but that in their particularity help us to reconsider and rewrite a new universal discourse of modernity and postmodernity. The Black Atlantic constitutes one case, and so does the Hispanic Atlantic. Thus, one can actually create new universal metanarratives of modernity and its aftermath, but only from particular positions—hence their irreducible and uncanny appearance to Western hegemonic discourses.

The ultimate irony is that the meta-discourse of postmodernity can be written from the past, from non-hegemonic modernity—that is, from locations that are historicizing their own position in modernity. Since each position is particularly different, the present is only accessible as

an effect of rewriting the past. Thus, we could claim with Lyotard (*The Postmodern Explained* 15), although with a very different intention, that postmodernism's tense is the perfected future (future anterior), since the past allows us to reread what the future (our contemporary condition) will have been. Thus, Jameson's claim that the past (history) cannot be accessed is a very historical claim: from a postmodernist hegemonic position, hegemonic Western history cannot be accessed, since postmodernism actually means the end of such a position. Yet, particular archaeologies of non-hegemonic modernity allow us to rewrite postmodernity—a postmodernity that remains particular each time. These new particular archaeologies of non-hegemonic modernities are postmodern and thus, retroactively, in a perfected future tense, give us access to contemporary postmodernity. Actually, the only time that cannot be fully accessed and represented is not the past, but rather the present; but this is not a result of the impossibility of a metadiscourse of postmodernity. Postmodernity can only be accessed from partial modern positions as a universal position and time that will have been a partial future of such past modernity. Thus, history once again is accessible, but in a spatial and postmodern way that is, by assuming a specific position. And then, history is a future condition, not a past condition. Only from a specific archaeology of the past can history be rewritten as the future of the present.

In the above context, an elaboration of the Hispanic Atlantic does not simply represent a new geopolitical addition to the Black Atlantic. It is a new archaeology of history and modernity that reshapes the main premise of Gilroy's theorization of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, it alters radi-

cally the understanding of the Atlantic in ways that are not complementary with that of the Black Atlantic, but discontinuous or, in Butler's terms, "competing." The particularity of the Hispanic Atlantic cannot be universalized by analogy to the Black Atlantic. Thus, a new dialogue must be established between the Black and Hispanic histories of the Atlantic. The ultimate outcome is not some new liberal agreement, but rather the universalization of the Hispanic Atlantic so that the Black Atlantic also becomes Hispanic. Ultimately, the dialogue that can then be initiated between the Black and Hispanic Atlantic spaces can create a new metadiscourse of modernity and postmodernity which does not renounce its double and irreducible bind to particularism and universalism.

This new Hispanic relocation of the Atlantic presents at least three series of problems that must be addressed separately from that of the Black Atlantic.

Hispanic Modernity and Postmodernity

First and foremost, a Hispanic Atlantic underscores a new reading of modernity that goes back to the Spanish colonization of the Americas (including the United States). It is important to understand that any contemporary theorization of the Atlantic is also historically a continuation of a colonial and modern experience (British, Spanish, Portuguese, etc.). That is, this historical continuation can no longer be directly accessed by explaining its historicity through some metanarrative but by confronting it with other theorizations of the Atlantic that respond to other (their own) colonial his-

stories. Even in this respect, any theorization is determined by the particular imperialist history from which it hails. Simon Gikandi, from an Africanist position, has already denounced Gilroy's lack of attention to Africa in his construct of the Black Atlantic (147). Indeed this is the case; a quick glimpse at Gilroy's book shows that Africa remains the negative space against which Black American nationalist utopias are projected. From a Hispanic position one cannot but conclude that Hispanic modernity is also vacated from Gilroy's work so that modernity becomes a British (as well as German and French) development. This criticism is not new and has been already formulated on a more general fashion by Enrique Dussel, Walter Dignolo and others. As Dussel argues:

Modernity is, for many (for Jürgen Habermas or Charles Taylor, for example), an essentially or exclusively European phenomenon [...]. Modernity is, in fact, a European phenomenon, but one constituted in a dialectical relation with a non-European alterity that is its ultimate content. Modernity appears when Europe affirms itself as the 'center' of a *World History* that it inaugurates; the 'periphery' that surrounds this center is consequently part of its self-definition. The occlusion of this periphery (and of the role of Spain and Portugal in the formation of the modern world system from the late fifteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries) leads the major contemporary thinkers of the 'center' into a Eurocentric fallacy in their understanding of modernity. (65)

The Hispanic condition of modernity is particular and irreducible to a British understanding of the (Black) Atlantic. This

points to the fact that Gilroy's work is particularly framed by the British colonial experience and he does not transcend it—hence the little importance given, for example, to languages other than English, as if the Black Atlantic were intrinsically Anglophone. However, it is important to emphasize that Gilroy's work is not an unconscious victim of his location within the history of British imperialism.

Here, Chris Schmidt-Nowara's article on Richard Wright is crucial since he demonstrates the way in which an Anglo-American intellectual who has been excluded from the Anglo-American discourse of modernity, when faced directly with Spain (he visited Spain and wrote *Pagan Spain*) cannot avoid the double determination of finding himself excluded from modernity and at the same time, as American, of excluding Spain from a newly regained sense of modernity. The genealogy that Schmidt-Nowara's article establishes from the eighteenth century to our days around the "black legend of Spain" is crucial in this respect when understanding Gilroy's position.

Any other scholar or intellectual working from within the Hispanic Atlantic is also bound by Spanish imperialism's history. The only alternative would amount to a meta-Atlanticism that could not account for its position. Thus only by becoming aware of this "incapability" to transcend our own historical and imperialist pasts, by being particular, can we regain the theoretical and historical tension between the particular and the universal, which makes our contributions valuable both as local interventions and global theorizations. Mignolo acknowledges that, unlike Wallerstein's world-system theory, most contemporary Anglo-Ameri-

can postcolonial theory does not escape this British or North-European determination:

the modern world system model or metaphor has the sixteenth century as a crucial date of its constitution, while all the other possibilities [...] (Said, Guha, critical theory, poststructuralism) have the eighteenth century and the Enlightenment as the chronological frontier of modernity. (*Local* 19)

Yet, when approaching the issue of the location of postcolonialism in the Hispanic world, instead of following a Hispanic understanding of modernity, most critics revert to a postcolonial history that is ultimately dependent upon a Northern European understanding of modernity. If we consider Mignolo's work, the most ambitious, overarching, and crucial discourse in this area, we can see this effect in statements such as:

postmodernity is the discourse of countermodernity emerging from the metropolitan centers and *settler colonies*, while postcoloniality is the discourse of countermodernity emerging from *deep-settler* colonies (e.g., Algeria, India, Kenya, Jamaica, Indonesia, Bolivia, Guatemala). (*Local* 99)

The concept of postmodernity is not derived from a Hispanic modernity but a Northern European-American modernity (Lyotard, Jameson). Similarly, the above paragraph uses the term "counter-modernity" as referring to a Northern European modernity. Hispanic modernity is foreclosed.

Furthermore, when Mignolo defines the "post" of "postcoloniality," the colon-

ality that he has in mind is not the Hispanic, which ends at the beginning of the 19th century but rather that of Northern European imperialism. His differentiation of deep-settler and (non-deep) settler colonies derived from McClintock's work still responds to a Northern European conception and history of colonialism. For example, it is not clear whether Argentina is a deep-settler colony or a settler colony or whether it shares the same temporality and discursive position as Bolivia, which, according to Mignolo, is postcolonial. Also, in the above quote, he states that Jamaica, India, and Bolivia derive from the same type of colonial condition. There is a hundred year gap between the independence movements of India and Bolivia, which no coherent historization can avoid. Even if "internal colonization" is claimed as the situation of the Bolivian history of the last hundred or so years, this internal colonization is historically different from that of India or Jamaica. Mignolo himself is aware of these problems when he claims that

postcoloniality or the postcolonial becomes problematic when applied to either nineteenth- or twentieth-century cultural practices in Latin America. (*Local* 94)

Thus, fully aware of the above theoretical and historical contradictions, Mignolo resorts to a different theorization. According to this new theorization, and following Roberto Fernández Retamar, Mignolo underscores the fact that "Indias occidentales/Western Indies" were always considered part of the West, and thus he proceeds to denominate "post-Occidental" the condition and discourses arising from the emancipation of the Spanish colo-

nies. Thus, he groups postmodernity, postcoloniality, and post-Occidentalism as conditions and discourses related to different colonial histories. He concludes that they are countermodern moves responding to:

different kinds of colonial legacies and neocolonial states that have in common the process of Western expansion identified as modernity/coloniality/Occidentalism. (*Local* 107)

Yet, this theorization is still caught up in the Anglo-American and North-European understanding of modernity. After defining post-Occidentalism, Mignolo reverts to postcoloniality and defines it as:

embedded in each local history and more than an empty signifier is a link between them all. It is the connector, in other words, that can bring the diversity of local histories into a universal project, displacing the abstract universalism of ONE local history, where the modern/colonial world system was created and imagined. (*Local* 92)

Although this reflection shows Mignolo's awareness of the importance of remaining particular in any theorizing (unlike Bhabha) nevertheless, his proposal reverts to an Anglo-American understanding of coloniality and modernity. That is, post-Occidentalism becomes a geohistorical area or chapter of a larger postcolonial history that is theorized and organized according to an Anglo-American understanding of modernity and coloniality. In short, Anglo-American postcoloniality remains, unconsciously, the universal condition of postcoloniality, whereas Hispanic post-Occidentalism becomes a specific case or instance that ultimately confirms

the geopolitical hegemony of Anglo-American postcoloniality. Although post-Occidentalism is a geopolitical way of thinking, it still reverts to Mignolo’s earlier elaboration of modernity in his *The Darker Side of the Renaissance*. There, a strictly historical theorization based on the division “early modern/modern/late modern,” also makes Hispanic modernity and coloniality a subset (“early modernity”) of a general Anglo-American and Northern European modernity (“modernity” without qualifications).

A geopolitically committed location of modernity in the Hispanic world of the 16th century—rather than in Northern Europe and the Enlightenment in the 18th century—also requires a relocation of both postmodernity and post-colonialism, thus dislodging them from their ac-

ticular rehistoricization of modernity: the Hispanic Atlantic. In short, the Hispanic Atlantic is no longer a geopolitical instance or case of a universal Anglo-American modernity: the former’s particularity alters the latter’s universality so that a new Hispanic universality actually overdetermines it.

Thus, Latin America enters both a condition of postmodernity and post-coloniality in the nineteenth century—the case of the United States is discussed below. This condition is experienced by most colonies (India, Algeria, etc.) ruled by Northern European empires in the second half of the twentieth century when their own geopolitical temporality (their modernity) comes to an end. Graphically, this double geopolitical temporality could be expressed as in Fig. 1.

	15 th /16 th	17 th /18 th	18 th /19 th	20 th /21 st
Hispanic	modernity-colonialism		post-modernity-colonialism	
North-Eur.		modernity-colonialism	post-modernity-colonialism	

Fig. 1

tual theorization within Anglo-American and Northern European sites, so that the loci, subjects, and discourses of postmodernity and post-coloniality are relocated in the Americas, that is at the end of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. In this way, the relocation of postmodernity and postcoloniality in the Americas at the end of Hispanic modernity becomes consequent and coherent—it is particular—with a Hispanic and historical understanding of modernity.

Yet this relocation also has universalizing effects so that postmodernity and postcoloniality are rewritten from a par-

Although at first glance a post-modern Latin America in the nineteenth century might seem unthinkable, Mignolo himself acknowledges its postmodern condition when he claims that

The second phase of modernity, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution, was *derivative* in the history of Latin America and entered in the nineteenth century as the *exteriority* that needed to be incorporated in order to build the ‘republic’ after independence from Spain and Portugal had been gained. (*Local* 19, my emphasis)

Even the most seemingly modern texts, such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s *Facundo* (1885), are defined by their exteriority vis-à-vis Northern European modernity, that is, from a full consciousness that the locus of enunciation of their discourses is not modern. Furthermore, these discourses define their “modernity” by distancing themselves from Hispanic modernity: these intellectuals begin to look towards France and England. Thus, when this double, non-modern nature of culture and discourses (they are not Hispanic modern any more, and they are not Northern European modern yet either) is analyzed, then the idea of postmodernity can be redefined from a Hispanic and Latin American position not so much as the condition of the end of modernity (from within the West) but rather as the end of modernity from outside of the West. Therefore the first subjects and cul-

tal no longer is held by the national bourgeoisie but by a new global elite. Thus, socially, the working class and the middle class disappear and the gap between upper classes and lower classes increases to such a degree that a new elite and a subaltern migrant population come to define the new social landscape. Yet, one could argue from a Hispanic position that postmodernism is not a hegemonic discourse and condition in the nineteenth century; it begins as a peripheral and postcolonial condition and discourse. Postmodernism only becomes hegemonic once hegemonic modernity, that is, Northern European modernity (rather than the Hispanic one) ends, and thus gives rise to the confluence of postcoloniality and postmodernity in a hegemonic country such as the United States. The geopolitical history of the United States could thus be visualized as in Fig. 2.

	15 th /16 th	17 th /18 th	18 th /19 th	20 th /21 st
USA		modernity-colonialism	postcolonialism	postmodernity

Fig. 2

tures acknowledging the end of modernity and the impossibility of modernity are situated in the West but outside the West, that is, in Latin America and Spain. Rubén Darío’s modernism would be the height of this double consciousness.

Jameson has established that postmodernity is the social and cultural condition of the West in late capitalism. That is, capital moves to the third sector (tourism and information technology), production is replaced by reproduction, and capi-

The diphas between postcoloniality and postmodernity in the Northern American case would explain its raise to global hegemony in the twentieth century, when there is no longer a modernity capable of defying the North American postcolonial dominance.

Thus, the historical preeminence of Hispanic post/modernity can be established in a social and economic sense: contemporary United States looks more like declining imperialist Spain in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries when Baroque culture and social inequality prevailed in the hands of a Creole elite. One of the most stereotypical claims about Latin American history and culture is summarized by Néstor García Canclini in the following dictum: “we have had an exuberant modernism with a deficient modernization” (41). Yet this claim takes a very different and postmodern turn when analyzed from the new “chronology” I delineated above: it is non-hegemonic postmodernism, Baroque but no late-capitalist—unlike the United States. Critics such as José Joaquín Brunner already have hinted at this connection when claiming that

[T]he notion of cultural heterogeneity refers us [Latin America] instead to a kind of regional postmodernism *avant-la-lettre* that, nevertheless, is fully constitutive of our modernity. (40)

Other critics such as Anthony D. King have even generalized this contradictory postmodern preeminence for the whole “Third World.”

In Marxist terms, one can claim that the full commodification of culture and society experienced in postmodernism by the West triggers a global commodification of the “Third World,” which in turn pushes Western national projects, based on the idea of homogenous culture, into a new global arena of hybridation and heterogeneity. Hybridation and heterogeneity, which are new to the hegemonic West, were already present in Latin America in an uncommodified form precisely because Hispanic modernity never managed to fully incorporate them into its own project of modernity. Thus His-

panic postmodernity appears as a non-hegemonic, early stage of a later global/Anglo-American postmodernity which becomes hegemonic as a result of its success in commodifying non-Western cultures and societies.

In this respect Horacio Legrás’s essay skillfully analyzes the complex relation between production and reproduction in both Caribbean and European cultures and histories. His article gives a standpoint from which to rethink the above “origins” of post-modernity-coloniality in the context of an Atlantic cultural and historical economy.

Postcoloniality, Nationalism and Internal Colonialism

If postmodernity and postcoloniality begin in Latin America in the nineteenth century, then the issue of nationalism remains to be accounted for, since classical historiography characterizes nineteenth-century Latin America as the century of national construction—from social institutions to culture. The Hispanic Atlantic proposed here requires a clear articulation of nationalism and postcoloniality.

Benedict Anderson’s suggestive theory that nationalism begins in Latin America (in the fourth chapter, “Old Empires, New Nations” of *Imagined Communities*) has not been sufficiently examined by the majority of Latin American scholars and, yet, remains an essential point of departure to rethink the connection between postcoloniality and nationalism. Anderson calls the Latin American formation of nationalism a riddle when he ponders:

why was it precisely *creole* communities that developed so early conceptions of their nationness—well before most of Europe? (52)

Anderson notes that Creole communities defy later developments of nationalism in Europe—as theorized among others by Tom Nairn—where middle-classes are the subject of nationalism, which in turn rally lower classes into the national project. Anderson concludes that, in Latin America:

European-style ‘middle classes’ were still insignificant at the end of the eighteenth century. Nor was there much in the way of an intelligentsia [...]. Leadership was held by substantial landowners, allied with a much smaller number of merchants, and various types of professional [sic] (lawyers, military men, local and provincial functionaries). (50-1)

Anderson further emphasizes the absence of the middle classes and the centrality of Creole communities when he notes that:

Far from seeking to ‘induct the lower classes into political life,’ one key factor initially spurring the drive for independence from Madrid, in such important cases as Venezuela, Mexico and Peru, was the *fear* of ‘lower-class’ political mobilizations. (51)

From a Hispanic Atlantic perspective, nationalism can be elaborated as also constituting a modern and non-Western subject—Latin American Creole society. Unlike in Europe, Creole society did not have an *ancien régime* to dethrone and delegitimize in order to seize power since pre-Colombian cultures had already been

colonized. They were already in power and thus they only had to sever links with the Spanish metropolis. Thus, this class does not need to rally lower classes around the idea of the nation, neither do the lower classes embrace nationalism. As a result, and unlike in the European case, the Creole class bases a nationalist concept of identity on the idea of gain: nineteenth-century Latin American literature is populated by narratives in which romance and history are ciphered as marriage and reproduction between a male Creole hero and a native woman (Sommer). In this way, by gendering the lower classes as female and native, they are incorporated into the national discourse as reproducers of Creole gain, not as national subjects. Later on in Europe, nationalism is reelaborated as a romantic discourse of loss (the deployment of language and culture as embodying a rural folk/people that in their ideality stand for the disappearance of the *ancien régime* in the face of industrial capitalism).

Furthermore, Anderson’s theorization of Latin American nationalism as a Creole formation contributes to explaining the other apparent contradiction in my historization of nineteenth-century Latin America as postnational. That is, nationalism, unlike in the West, need not imply the end of colonialism. Rather it is the opposite, since colonization continues at an internal level. Mignolo, following the work of Pablo González Casanova, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, and Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, theorizes “internal colonialism” in the following terms:

‘internal colonialism’ [...] is clearly applied to the double bind of the national state after independence: on the one hand, to enforce the colonial

politics toward indigenous communities and, on the other, to establish alliances with metropolitan colonial powers. (*Local* 104)

In this way, nationalism becomes defined in Latin America as internal colonialism, whereas in Europe it could be defined as external colonialism (beginning with the French and British imperialist expansions in the nineteenth century).

Finally, the theorization of postcolonialism and postmodernity in Latin America as a phase in which colonization is reverted to the inside of the state and thus takes the shape of nationalism, permits us to establish a historical continuity between the colonial and postcolonial experience whereby the colonial experience marks Latin American history (as colonial or postcolonial/internal colonialism). In this sense, the posthumous work of Angel Rama, *The Lettered City*, gains new historical importance since the lettered city and its “letrados” remain at the core of post/colonial history. Rama is very emphatic about this when he concludes that

The same ideological purism that excluded some letrados from power provided privileged access to others, in a pattern that recurred thereafter in the Brazil of Getúlio Vargas, the Argentina of Juan Perón, and even the Cuba of Fidel Castro. (108)

Although Rama is doubtful about the applicability of the terms “democratic caesarism” and “democratic authoritarianism” (105) for the first half of the twentieth century in Latin America, he nevertheless concludes that the incorporation of a nationalist agenda does not interrupt the colonial experience:

An accent on ideological program, on democratic organization, and on national solidarity thus defined the new partisanism of the early twentieth century, but much remained the same. (111)

Finally, it is also important to reflect on the formation of postcolonial discourse in Latin America. The decline of nationalism in Latin America as hegemonic discourse and the irruption of globalization at the end of the twentieth century explains the contradictory position occupied by postcolonial theory in Latin America. Latin American intellectuals, still debating their histories in nationalist terms, do not have a problem with discussing the issue of postmodernity since it does not affect the internal and colonial structure of their respective states. However, when the concept of the nation is questioned and the issue of (internal or post) colonialism is raised, most react with ideological surprise, for the admission of the category of (post)colonialism entails a revision of what nationalism has meant in the last two hundred years. When examining Santiago Castro-Gómez’s ideas about postcolonial reason as third-degree thinking, Mignolo wonders:

Why is it that Castro-Gómez’s suggestion to identify postcolonial thinking and postcolonial reason as a third-degree observation can be found in English and French but not in Latin American philosophy? (*Local* 124)

Only a reconsideration of nationalism as postcolonial discourse will be able to remedy this lack of postcolonial theorizing.

Finally, the incorporation of a theorization of nationalism as internal colonialism/postcolonialism permits us to

think the end of nationalism and the resurgence of a new form of global colonialism of which the new Spanish presence in Latin America is the most clear and apparently most puzzling component. This is not an anachronism or some kind of uncanny resurgence. It is only another historical development that points to the fact that colonialist history in Latin America does not end with the processes of independence and nationalism; rather it continues to our day and it is ultimately *Atlantic*. Once again, our contemporary rethinking of past modernity and colonialism in Latin America permits us to rewrite the present as a perfected future, thus universalizing the concrete condition of the Hispanic Atlantic.

In short, even nationalism can be elaborated as a non-Western, modern and Hispanic Atlantic experience that only with some hindsight can be redefined in the West as an essentialist discourse on culture and identity at a loss, after romanticism. Only in this way can nationalism be retheorized as an Atlantic reality.

Subalternity and its Sexuality/ Gender/Race/Ethnicity

The Hispanic Atlantic, unlike the case of the Black Atlantic, brings forth the double nature of the Atlantic not only as passage and space of domination (as in the case of the African slave), but also as space of invasion that is not directly accessible to subjects such as the native. From this position, Mignolo has defined border gnosis and gnoseology as the subaltern knowledge of the subject defined by the borders of modernity and colonialism:

Border gnosis as knowledge from a subaltern perspective is knowledge conceived from the exterior borders of the modern/colonial world system, and border gnoseology as a discourse about colonial knowledge is conceived at the conflictive intersection of the knowledge produced from the perspective of modern colonialisms [...] and knowledge produced from the perspective of colonial modernities in Asia, Africa, and the Americas/Caribbean. (*Local* 11)

In this sense, Mignolo links both post-colonial and post-Occidental discourses to border gnosis and subaltern reason, which, following Gyan Prakash, he qualifies as the most important contemporary discursive change of the last decades:

the most fundamental transformation of the intellectual space at the end of the twentieth century is taking place because of the configuration of critical subaltern thinking as both an oppositional practice in the public sphere and a theoretical and epistemological transformation of the academy. (*Local* 95)

Mignolo derives the concept of border gnosis from Chicano border theory and, most centrally, from Gloria Anzaldúa's work: *Borderlands/La frontera*. Yet, the Hispanic Atlantic brings about a new dimension of subalternity that border gnosis does not address directly. Recent migrational movements, such as the new Bolivian migrations of natives to Argentina (O'Donnell) and the emigration/return of middle-class Argentinians back to Europe (especially Spain and Italy), point to the fact that the Hispanic Atlantic remains a space from which the movement

of subaltern and non-subaltern subjects has to continue being theorized. However, this space is not a border space where exteriority and interiority can be conceptualized following the subaltern discourse of the subject who can cross the border back and forth, as in the case of the Chicano experience, and most native subjects in Latin America and Spain. Border gnosis must be complemented with a new discourse of passage, which sometimes is a one-way voyage, other times is a postnational return, and sometimes is simply an imperialist invasion reminiscent of modern colonialism.

Yet, the Hispanic Atlantic is becoming the site of many new subaltern reorganizations in which race and ethnicity are being redeployed in ways that do not point to a new utopian, postnational mobility, but rather to the reorganization of a postcolonial order: from internal colonialism (nationalism) to globalization. In other words, the new “visibility” that natives and non-white Americans are acquiring in urban and metropolitan sites in which their presence was unthinkable in modernity (Colombian maids in Madrid, unskilled Bolivian workers in Buenos Aires) are not pointing to a more progressive reorganization of racial and ethnic differences on the Hispanic Atlantic. Rather, these subaltern subjects become, in their subalternity and lack of political discourse, the new boundary subjects against which postnational citizens on both sides of the Atlantic are thinking and positioning themselves.

The articulation of both forms of subaltern discourse or reason (border gnosis and passage discourse) is important in order to address new Atlantic political realities such as the reorganization of Spanish

imperialism, which is able to repress internal ethnic differences (Basque, Catalan, etc.) by equating them with external ethnic/racial differences (Colombian workers, Sub-Saharan immigrants) and othering them all in a new Atlantic logic that repositions Spanish hegemonic discourse as postnational and neoimperialist. Similar situations arise in Argentina where Bolivian Indian immigrants and Argentinian working-class groups are pitted against each other and, at the same time, equated as the new postnational subalternity of a new Argentinian/Atlantic elite class that plays to new global capitalist scenarios.

From a historical perspective that helps us to understand the continuity of colonialism, Eyda M. Merediz’s essay is pertinent here. Her study of the subaltern appropriations of the Virgin of Candelaria/Copacabana by natives and priests on both sides of the Atlantic is crucial to an understanding of the double nature (border/passage) of subaltern discourse. Furthermore, her analysis, in which the discourse of *De las Casas* reverts back to the Spanish side of the Atlantic and helps articulate similar discourses on the native Guanche population alters our traditional perception of the knowledge flow in the colonial period (Spain to Latin America).

The absence of gender and sexuality from many discussions about both the Black and Hispanic Atlantic points to the fact that they might be becoming another new form of global subalternity (Spivak). Therefore gender and sexuality have to be highlighted as some of the most pressing problems to be thought out in any Atlantic context, especially if we consider that this space defies any nationalist understanding of gender and sexuality articu-

lated along formations such as domesticity and heteronormativity, which have prevailed in the Hispanic world. Jane Kaplan, Norma Alarcón, and Mino Moallem reflect on the new conjunction between nation and woman in a global context and, after rejecting the logic that separates both issues, they conclude that

[I]n both aspects, international and national, that logic must be displaced by the more complex rhetoric of the double concept of borders insofar as the former keeps woman/women sequestered 'inside' the nation in the face of transnational movements or turns them into 'boundary subjects.' (9)

They are also the first noticing new kinds of postnational movements that defy the above equation:

Today, in the face of the construction of an 'outer' zone or space whose artificiality is left unquestioned, those movements are even more acutely uneven than at the variable 'inception' of modernity. (9)

Thus, these authors conclude that globalization and postmodernity do not require abandoning the nation as the formation from which gender and sexuality is constructed; rather they require its inclusion in a more complex geopolitical map in which neither woman nor nation can be cancelled, for women are caught between nation and woman:

This betweenness not only refuses two temporally ordered entities of woman and the nation, but also refuses a moment of reversal of women for nation, as in the discourse of global feminism, or nation for woman, as in the na-

tionalist discourse. 'Between' refers to a peculiar form of temporality, a 'suspended moment,' a moment of simultaneity and mutual inclusiveness or the spatiotemporal interval of *différance* essayed by Derrida (1982). Nation and woman include a political economy that is related to the production, distribution, consumption, and circulation of discourses and practices dividing time and space between bodies who are the occupants of metaphoric and national homelands. (14)

In the areas of gender and sexuality as well, the Atlantic emerges as a new geopolitical site, neither nation nor international arena, which does not either cancel the nation nor does it transcend it in some new global or internal scenario. Rather, Hispanicity, in its Atlantic dimension as new geopolitical and geohistorical formation, appears as a new reality and passage from which gender and sexuality must be rethought. New figures such as *jineteras*, native domestic maids, migrating students to the United States, and jet-set superstars are becoming new Atlantic subjects marked by gender. At the same time new feminist groups and traditions are being constituted in their common Hispanic and Atlantic history. This complex reality points to the new reorganization of gender and sexuality in which Hispanic sexuality and gender must be theorized with/against/around first world feminisms.

First and foremost, a new geopolitical organization of modernity and coloniality also demands that Anglo-American theorizations such as domesticity and heterosexuality, as arising from Northern European modernity, must be reconsidered. If the biological divide between genders, as studied by Thomas Laqueur, takes

place in Northern European modernity, then issues such as heterosexuality and its biologization must be considered from within the geopolitical history of Hispanic postmodernity and postcoloniality.

Yet, the fact that the Atlantic is a geopolitical category rather than a subject position points to the fact that ultimately, the Hispanic Atlantic is an imperialistic reorganization of power and bodies, which further emphasizes the subalternity of these subject positions. Thus the difficulty and the necessity to think of different subject positions within this new Atlantic geopolitical situation is paramount. In this context, the contributions of Silvia Bermúdez and Jaume Martí-Olivella are groundbreaking because they prove the complex imperialist reorganization of the Hispanic Atlantic along racial lines. Bermúdez accentuates the vitality with which Spanish music has mobilized the term “Black” in order to represent and contain new forms of subaltern immigration by othering them under the most radical form of racial difference for the Spanish social imagination. Martí-Olivella’s work, in turn, shows how the Spanish fascination with Cuba also rehashes race in very new innovative and postmodern ways in order to legitimize a bygone Spanish imperialism.

The fact that most of the contributions of this special section address gender and sexuality as secondary components of the Atlantic formation and organization of the cultural reality they analyze allows us to emphasize that the Hispanic Atlantic is not a formation that allows to think of gender and sexuality but rather the opposite—the Hispanic Atlantic turns them into subaltern positions from which we have to rearticulate new

political discourses. This is perhaps the most surprising, difficult, and ultimately worrisome realization of an analysis of the Hispanic Atlantic.

In the end, global capitalism in its manifold organizations (sexuality, gender, class, race) lingers over the Atlantic as the ultimate horizon as the organizer of a new postnationalist and neoimperialist condition. Far from being able to envision a new Atlantic utopia, the Hispanic Atlantic resituates the history of imperialism and modernity while highlighting the fact that modernity was simply a phase in a larger and longer history of imperialisms (Arrighi) that we must continue to theorize and challenge.

Notes

¹ I would like to acknowledge Susan Larson for her outstanding editing. I would also like to acknowledge, Robert Reid-Pharr and Andrés Avellaneda for their discussions about the Black Atlantic and Latin America respectively. Here the issue of Portugal and Brazil will not be addressed for reasons of space. However, I am fully aware that the problem is complex and requires its own theorization. At the same time the Latino condition has not been directly addressed by any of the contributions or this introduction. A longer and more thorough elaboration would have to include the Latino condition as well as that of other indigenous populations in Latin America as well as ethnic minorities in Spain.

Although this first elaboration does not allow me to sufficiently position myself as a writing subject, I nevertheless write as a Basque and believe that this standpoint may explain my interest in the Hispanic Atlantic and its repercussions for others in subaltern positions. Therefore, this introduction is ultimately a Basque reading of the Hispanic Atlantic.

The term Hispanic is used here to refer to the entire geopolitical area defined by Spanish imperialism and Castilian language: Latin

America, Spain, and the Latino world. Yet, Hispanism is used strictly to refer to the discipline and discourse that deals with Spain. The imperialist genealogy of the connection of both terms must be elaborated elsewhere.

Finally, throughout the article, I oppose the Atlantic to the West. Although I am aware that traditionally the Atlantic is considered part of the West, here both realities are used as opposed. The lack of space does not allow me to elaborate this difference further; nevertheless I wanted to make clear that I am aware of the problem.

² Even the historization of subalternity—Mignolo's project—does not escape this imperialist determination, since he defines subalternity as the exterior of (Hispanic) modernity (337-38).

³ Spain would be postmodern and postimperial, rather than postcolonial.

⁴ Anthony D. King claims that "if this classification [First/Third World] were reinterpreted to refer historically to those societies which, racially, ethnically, socially and culturally first approximated to what today are the culturally diverse, economically, socially and spatially polarised cities in the West but also, increasingly, major cities around the world, what is now the Third World would historically more accurately be labeled the First World, and the First World would become the Third. In other words, the culture, society and space of early twentieth century Calcutta or Singapore pre-figured the future in a much more accurate way than did that of London or New York. 'Modernity' was not born in Paris but rather in Rio" (8).

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